

A DUEL OF REASON BETWEEN KOREA AND US

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Introduction

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereinafter Korea or the north) is a "country under suspicion". The Rangoon incident in October 1983, the missing of a south Korean airliner in October 1987, and no end of similar incidents have been suspected with prejudice as the work of Korea without any clear evidence. Suspicion, however, is often aroused artificially. The United States, south Korea and Japan, which are in sharp confrontation with Korea, are especially enthusiastic about raising various suspicions against her.

These countries are, in most cases, gaining the greatest profit from growing suspicion. The countries which control the "information order" of the world exchange "information", which is unfavourable to Korea, exaggerate it and attach credence to it before spreading it throughout the world. The United Nations and international organizations are mobilized from time to time. The Korean voice is scarcely reported to the West. For the sake of fairness, it is necessary, first of all, to know the difference between the overwhelming power of such information manipulation and its influence.

For all that, the real nature of Korea is invisible, and the impression that Korea is a mysterious, ghastly country might persist.

This book is intended to provide a point of view of the essence of the situation in the Korean peninsula.

Part I, centring upon the missile clamour, verifies its true nature and proves that the launching of an artificial satellite in Korea has effected a fundamental change in the political and military balance in the Korean peninsula.

Part II analyses the present state of the Korea-US negotiations which started with the "nuclear suspicion" of Korea and deals with the articles published in the newspapers and magazines in those days. I can say confidently that when renowned experts on the problem of the Korean peninsula and its observers were publishing their speculations one after another, under the title "X Day (outbreak of the second Korean War) Is at Hand" and "Collapse of North Korea", I could make an almost correct assessment of the developments up to now. In

order to understand the present situation on the Korean peninsula and foresee its future, it is necessary to review the nuclear issue of Korea and the Korea-US nuclear agreement. The ranks of persons and names of organizations in Part II are those at that time.

Part III deals with the possibility and method of reunification of the north and south of Korea.

This book leads to the following conclusion:

1. Korea will never collapse or soft-land.
2. There is a great possibility that Korea will enter into diplomatic relationship with the United States within a few years, maintaining her socialist system.
3. Military tension will be eased, and the Korean economy will change for the better.
4. The north and south of Korea will move towards reunification by federation.

Improving Korea-Japan relations will be the last problem.

After the end of the Cold War, the situation on the Korean peninsula has changed radically. Though there were many twists and turns, the trend to liquidate the only remaining Cold-War structure in the world is an inevitable process of history. It is clear that the future trend will accord with this inevitability. But Korea-US relations will only be improved by overcoming many difficulties. There is a possibility that an extremely acute tension will be created in the first half of 1999 due to the missile issue, the "suspicion of underground nuclear facility" and the neglect of implementation of the Korea-US agreement on the part of the United States. It is estimated, however, that such a crisis will, on the contrary, accelerate the building up of peace.

In short, the situation on the Korean peninsula after the Cold War can be summarized as the sum total of an intense diplomatic game, a war without gunshot and without resorting to arms, in which both sides rack their brains for winning a victory. Who will, after all, emerge victorious in this war, a war without gunshot?

January 25, 1999

Jon Chol Nam

I. Missile Clamour and Prospect of the "Brain War" between Korea and the United States

1. A Ballistic Missile or an Artificial Satellite?

The Flying Object Was an Artificial Satellite

Korea launched a flying object on August 31, 1998. What on earth was it? At first, the US army in Japan informed the Japanese side that it was a ballistic missile. When it was confirmed that an object flew over the Japanese Islands and fell on the Pacific Ocean, Japan was thrown into utter confusion--"Was it a missile attack by north Korea? If it is a military threat, we can never tolerate it." However, on September 4, the Korean Central News Agency reported that Korea had successfully launched an artificial satellite. From then on, the clamour, "Was it a missile or an artificial satellite?" broke out. It came to light later that it was none other than the launching of an artificial satellite. The following is the circumstance of the event.

On September 4, an authority of the Russian space monitoring agency declared, "It was confirmed that the first artificial satellite of north Korea had entered the earth's orbit. At present, it is turning round in an elliptical orbit--218.82 km perigee and 6,978.2 km apogee at a cycle of 165 minutes and 6 seconds." Vice-President Mirov of the Russian Space Association said, "The technology of the rocket itself is very high and amazing." (*ITAR-Tass.*)

On September 4, Xinhua News Agency reported, "The satellite was successfully launched and entered orbit." (*Radio Beijing.*)

On September 4, some high-ranking officials of the United States said that there was a possibility that Korea had test-launched and placed a certain object in the earth's orbit.

On September 10, Hong Sun Yong, south Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade stated at a press interview during his visit to the United States that the launching of an artificial satellite was

actually attempted by using a new-type ballistic missile rocket, but it seemed to have failed.

On September 11, Craig Thomas, Chairman of the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, explained at a public hearing that according to the judgement of the NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration), north Korea had launched a satellite into the earth's orbit, but it was not working. A high-ranking official of the US government said that there were data of its flight that, right from its lift-off, differed from those of the test of a ballistic missile and they coincided with the explanation of the Korean side. The CIA also passed the same judgement on the analysis of the trajectory. (*Washington Times*.)

On September 14, the US government officially announced that an artificial satellite was loaded in place of the warhead, but it failed to enter orbit.

On September 15, an informal conference of the UN Security Council issued a statement demanding that Korea exercise "self-restraint", but it confirmed that "any country has a legitimate right to promote a plan for using the space for a peaceful purpose."

On September 17, the south Korean authorities called a security meeting and made a final conclusion that "an attempt was made to place a small artificial satellite in orbit by launching a three-stage rocket, but it ended in failure."

These statements show that it was internationally recognized that the flying object launched by Korea was not a ballistic missile but an artificial satellite.

Was the Launching of the Artificial Satellite a Success or a Failure?

Did Korea, then, succeed or fail in launching the artificial satellite? Now that it was internationally recognized to be an artificial satellite, whether it was a success or a failure is not so important here. But still, it is not meaningless to verify it.

The state-run Korean Central News Agency reported on September 4, 1998, the "success of launching" as follows:

1) A launch vehicle was lifted in the direction of 86 degrees at the launching site of Musudan-ri, Hwadae County, North Hamgyong Province, at 12:07 on August 31. Four minutes and 53 seconds later, it was put in the expected orbit.

2) The launch vehicle was three-staged: the first stage dropped off 95 seconds after its take-off and fell beyond territorial waters of the Korean East Sea at latitude 40°51' north and longitude 132°40' east; the second stage opened the streamlined part of the head 144 seconds later, was cast off 266 seconds later and dropped on the open sea of the Pacific Ocean at latitude 40°13' north and longitude 149° 07' east; the third stage placed the satellite in orbit 27 seconds after the second stage was cast off.

3) The satellite is turning round in an elliptical orbit, 218.82 km perigee and 6,978.2 km apogee from the earth, and its cycle is 165 minutes and 6 seconds.

4) The satellite is transmitting to the earth the melodies of the *Song of General Kim Il Sung*, the *Song of General Kim Jong Il* and the words *Juche Korea* in Morse code by 27 MHz.

Korea announced that the satellite named *Kwangmyongsong No. 1* had made the 100th orbit of the earth on September 13 and had been observed with naked eyes in the Korean sky at dawn on October 3 and 4. If this was true, Korea was the 9th in the world to succeed in satellite launching by her own effort after the former Soviet Union, the United States, France, Japan, China, Britain, India and Israel. But quite a few countries and specialists doubt the truth for three reasons: first, the transmission by the cycles announced by Korea was not confirmed; second, the satellite failed to acquire the first space velocity that is needed to enter orbit; and third, the artificial satellite itself could not be tracked.

The first point at issue. It is not strange at all that the radio waves sent by *Kwangmyongsong No.1* were not confirmed. In the past, Morse signals sent by satellites could be received even by amateur radio operators. At present, however, Morse signals are not used in advanced countries, and there are few receivers of this kind. Besides, "This wave length is, in fact, used by illegally converted civilian band in Japan, and it is difficult to catch weak signals from the orbit by ordinary means because of much noise." (Military commentator Nogi

Keiichi.) It is also because "27 MHz is too weak to catch." (Fukumoto Yasuyuki, chief manager of the information office of the National Space Development Agency.)

The second point. The US Department of Defence pointed out as a ground of failure that the satellite had only reached a speed of about 7 km per second, which is near the first space velocity (7.9 km per second), the necessary speed to put a satellite into orbit. But the US army missed the third-stage object at that time (so misjudged it as a missile) and could only track the dotted line, because it was so fast. Therefore, this figure is not accurate. On the contrary, it proves that it reached the first space velocity.

The third point. Since no country, except the United States and Russia, has an effective satellite search network, it is much more difficult to prove a satellite's failure to enter orbit than to confirm its insertion into orbit. It is because there are now 2,528 satellites as of the end of 1998 and 6,204 debris of rockets. It needs a tremendous amount of work to ascertain all of them one by one. Russia, having received an advance notice from Korea, has no need to do the job, nor does she think of doing it. The United States must have tackled the job as hard as she could, but all in vain. Having misinformed Japan of it as a ballistic missile, she might have tried to save her face at least by announcing that "it ended in failure," even if she could track *Kwangmyongsong No.1*. There is also a rumour that the United States had received an advance notice from Korea about the launching of an artificial satellite. But the United States might have thought that Korea had no power or capacity to do it, because she was suffering food shortage in an economic crisis. With such a prejudice she must have made a hasty conclusion after tracking the flying object.

The United States was thrown into confusion. Reaction of the US Defence Department (to the announcement of a satellite launching) was cold. "It sounds silly," "There is no need to take it seriously," were what they said at first, brushing it aside. The person in charge, who said in the morning he would "soon issue a statement", said in the evening in a gloomy mood that he could neither confirm nor deny it. Some scientists began to comment that it was strange for a missile test. (Verification, the Shock of *Taepodong*, an article carried in *Asahi Shimbun*, September 22, 1998.)

At the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 6, 1998, Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defence and Chairman of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, said that at first they considered it difficult for Korea to develop a three-stage missile for its intricacy, and that they did not know that solid propellant which needs high technology was used for the third stage and that a satellite was mounted on it. He admitted frankly that they had made little of the ability and technology of Korea and underestimated her. Whether the launching was a success or a failure may not be clarified further in the West because of political consideration. Regardless of whether it was a success or a failure, the important thing is the unmistakable fact that it was an artificial satellite that Korea had launched.

Agony and Dilemma of the Final Report of the Defence Agency

Meanwhile, the Japanese government, the only one in the world that had insisted that what was fired was a ballistic missile, also made a conclusion as a "missile firing" in its final report on *Taepodong* on October 30. However, the perusal of this report testifies that the flying object was not a missile but an artificial satellite.

"Just before an object C lost thrust, a small object D dropped off from it and made a flight for a while. But it failed to gather the velocity to enter orbit. The flying object is estimated as having been based on *Taepodong 1*." This expression in the final report can only be understood as meaning that an attempt to place a satellite in orbit failed.

Descriptions like "in theory, it is not totally impossible to put an object in orbit by the same flying method as this one" and "to judge the case in an all-round way, one will not preclude the theoretical possibility of placing a very small object in orbit" do not completely deny the possibility of the flying object being an artificial satellite.

Of course, the final report enumerates the grounds of judging the flying object as a ballistic missile: the insufficient speed of the flying object; unconfirmed signal transmission; the third stage is too small to mount a satellite; there is no trace of an object having entered the

earth's orbit; Korea's level of science and technology is not high enough to make it possible.

"An official of the Defence Agency, who had confidently expressed his view from the outset, declared that information collected by the US army by means of military satellites and missile tracking apparatus, which had been trusted until now, was 'on a par' with that collected by the Defence Agency and the Self-Defence Forces themselves." (*Sankei Shimbun*, October 30, 1998.) But in Japan there is no tracking system itself for independently observing and tracking the launching of a missile or a satellite. So the "confidence" of the Defence Agency is no more than a quibble. The grounds given in the final report are no more than materials to deny success in satellite launching, and do not give proofs that it was a ballistic missile.

The final report admits that the altitude of the flying object was lower than that of ordinary ballistic missiles and that it made a level flight like the launch vehicle of an artificial satellite. A long-range missile is launched vertically for gaining a flight distance and maintains a trajectory of 45 degrees outside the atmospheric sphere. A satellite launch vehicle enters orbit in parallel with the surface of the earth. But a ballistic missile maintains an angle of 40 to 45 degrees to the level surface of the earth when passing the atmospheric sphere and falls at the same angle. In other words, it traces a high, sharp mountain-shaped trajectory. A low and level flight cannot "verify the technical tasks for the long-range flight of a ballistic missile." (The final report.) According to the confident view of the Defence Agency, Korea had performed a test firing the technical verification of which is impossible, or a meaningless launching. It seems that at first the Defence Agency intended to publish its final report in support of the "opinion of the artificial satellite". "On 21st, the Defence Agency came to the conclusion that admitted the possibility of Korea's failure to launch an artificial satellite. This is included in the final report to be published within the month." (*Tokyo Shimbun*, October 22, 1998.) Other newspapers reported the same in advance. However, the conclusion was changed in the ten days prior to the publication of the final report. They might have concluded it as a "missile test firing", swayed by political judgement that it would be ridiculous to admit the

launching of an artificial satellite when they had already made a hasty conclusion as to missile firing and had taken sanctions against Korea.

Mainichi Shimbun, dated October 31, carried an article under the title "Smell of Political Motive": "A cadre of the Defence Agency, while stressing that there was agreement in understanding facts and analysis by the Defence Agency and the United States, expressed his view that there was a difference in 'definition'. ... Affirming the 'satellite' or not depends on whether north Korea's intention for launching is peaceful or not; it concerns the diplomatic attitude towards north Korea." In other words, the Defence Agency defined a satellite as "having the function of communication or observation of the earth, or some other significant functions enabling one to ascertain and track the object itself", and made a political judgement that the object was not identified and Korea's intention for launching was not peaceful, and so negated the launching of a satellite.

That is, the final report, the final conclusion of Japan, can be said to "have admitted for the first time that a certain object with thrust made a flight even for a short time." (*Asahi Shimbun*, October 30, 1998.) It was an ambiguous conclusion to save the face of Japan that had insisted that it was the firing of a ballistic missile, while paying regard to the stands of the United States and south Korea that had commented it as a failure in satellite launching. It cannot be denied that the conclusion was full of contradiction and dilemma.

The Reason for Launching an Artificial Satellite

Why did Korea launch an artificial satellite at this time? What is the reason for doing it, which requires a vast amount of money and a high technical skill, when she was in a serious food crisis and economic difficulties?

"One doesn't do a thing for no purpose. Any action which seems insignificant outwardly has some purpose. This is a characteristic of communists. If we do not keep it in mind, we cannot foresee their behaviours." (Military commentator Fuji Hisashi.) The West seems to lack this view seriously in its understanding of Korea.

Rodong Sinmun, organ of the Workers' Party of Korea, carries, on September 17, 1998, an interview with scientists who have developed

the artificial satellite. Let us look into the article to see the purpose of launching the satellite.

"*Kwangmyongsong No. 1* and multi-stage launch vehicle which have been launched recently were developed six years ago. It could have been launched at that time; however, it was postponed in full consideration of the influence on the complex world situation. Moreover, it had to be postponed for three mourning years after the death of President Kim Il Sung."

Six years ago President Kim Il Sung was in good health, and Korea could afford the project, for she had not undergone a food crisis caused by natural disaster. A multi-stage rocket is said to have been developed already in the '80s. There is nothing strange if we assume that Korea began satellite development in the '90s.

Also in 1992 the question of "suspicion of the development of nuclear weapons" was raised, and Korea was in a sharp military confrontation with the United States in a hair-trigger situation on the Korean peninsula.

There was a possibility that the launching of a satellite might be misjudged by the United States as the firing of a ballistic missile as she did this time, which might aggravate the military tension. "Full consideration of the influence on the complex world situation" means having evaded it beforehand.

Furthermore, success in launching an artificial satellite is a national event which enhances the dignity of the country. Doing this during the mourning period was inconceivable in view of Korea's national customs.

"This time, on the occasion of the First Session of the Tenth Supreme People's Assembly and the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the first significant artificial satellite was launched."

The mourning period having been over, Secretary Kim Jong Il, successor to President Kim Il Sung, was acclaimed as General Secretary of the WPK in 1997 and re-elected Chairman of the National Defence Commission at the First Session of the Tenth Supreme People's Assembly on September 5, 1998. Moreover, the year 1998 which marked the 50th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK was a golden opportunity for celebrating a new start after

having overcome hardships.

Another important matter was that Korea was building up confidence and reconciliation with the United States, according to the Korea-US Agreed Framework of 1994. At present, various measures have been taken for security in the Korean peninsula, so at least there is no hair-trigger situation.

Based on the above-mentioned judgement on the situation and calculation, the artificial satellite must have been launched. It is not difficult to imagine that the political effect was greater for Korea than the West supposed it to be. It is neither a waste of money nor power demonstration. Practical use of satellites is of great economic value for Korea, too. Artificial satellites are classified into scientific satellites, applications satellites, military satellites, and so on. Among them, Korea which is mountainous pins great hopes on a communications satellite, meteorological satellite for use in agriculture, and prospecting satellite for an effective discovery and development of natural resources. If she is able to launch a commercial satellite, it may be used for earning foreign currency.

Korea seems to give serious consideration to the practical use of satellites by repeating test launching in the future. In view of the fact that even advanced countries in the development of satellites could achieve success only after repeated failures, the technological capability of Korea that succeeded in launching the satellite in the first test cannot be slighted. The launching of the artificial satellite must be the symbol of change in Korea after overcoming the crisis and converting the adverse situation into a favourable one.

2. The Effect of Japan's "Card of Sentiment"

Inverted Understanding and the Theory of Sentiment

Korea's "launching at Taepodong" was an immeasurably great shock to Japan. Some people ridicule it as "Perry's black ships". However, for Japan, which has enjoyed "peace" for more than half a century, the fact that a flying object launched by a country hostile to her flew over the Japanese Islands may be as great a threat as the one

the people in the Edo period had felt at the "black ships". Mysterious threat produces dread which becomes repellent. I hope that such an anti-barbarian way of thinking as expressed in "Revere the Emperor! Drive Out the Barbarians!" slogans in the closing years of the shogunate, will not be revived after the lapse of more than 100 years. But was *Taephodong* the "black ships"?

As I shall refer to it later again, Japan has regarded south Korea as a sole legal government in the Korean peninsula and pursued a hostile policy towards Korea for a long time, based on the allied relationship with the United States and south Korea. By "friendly policy" they seem to mean food aid or something like that. It is, after all, a humanitarian support; it does not mean that Japan has fundamentally changed her hostile policy towards Korea.

Japan has not ignored the strained relations in the Korean peninsula. On the contrary, Japan involved herself in it of her own accord as a result of developments and chose and has followed the policy of sharp confrontation regarding the Soviet Union, China and now Korea as a hostile country, a potential threat. The "peace" which Japan is defending is security which is seen from the point of view of the world strategy and Asian strategy of the United States. To the Korean eye Japan is no more than a "great menace", not a "peaceful country" at all. However, Japan thinks that she is defending peace, without doing any harm. The fact is contrary to the Koreans' understanding.

The conservative, right-wingers who are deplored and angry at the absence of the consciousness of national defence, crisis consciousness and at the absence of crisis management among our contemporary Japanese, are expressing "thanks" to *Taephodong* for rekindling nationalism among the Japanese who have been degenerate and sleeping. But it is a very dangerous omen that the majority of the Japanese who never want war are easily involved in such a narrow-minded nationalism and impassioned debate, having lost their calm reason and sense of judgement.

Japan's Common Sense Is the World's Absurdity

The day after being informed by the US Forces headquarters in

Japan that "Korea fired a ballistic missile," the Japanese government reacted more quickly than usual. It held a Cabinet meeting and applied sanctions by stopping the Japan-Korea negotiation for the normalization of diplomatic relations and humanitarian assistance like food aid and suspending cooperation with the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

In addition, it suspended the operation of direct airline service between Nagoya and Pyongyang. On September 3, 1998, both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors unanimously adopted a resolution in "protest against the firing of a missile". What for this quick reaction of the Japanese government? Is it because of the criticism it has received for the absence of the will to deal with crisis and insufficient counteraction system and its defects? Or is it because it was very confident as a result of spreading a surveillance network, after receiving an advance notice on the "launching of a missile" from the US, by dispatching to the sea west of Japan the aegis battleship *Myoko*, which is equipped with a radar system, and the electronic information collector *EP-3*, which can fly for a long time?

The day after the resolution was carried at the National Diet, Korea announced that she had succeeded in launching an artificial satellite. The launching of an artificial satellite is utterly different from that of a ballistic missile in the political and military sense. If a little more time had been spent in analyzing and judging the situation, for instance, by asking for information from Korea, the reaction of the Japanese government would have been much different.

Frankly speaking, the United States and south Korea reacted calmly, and "it made a contrast in that Japan screamed at it, whereas the United States yawned." (Samuel Jameson.) Japan got angry at the United States and south Korea and expressed her earnest feeling of crisis, but she only got sympathy from them, unable to make them act in concert.

That is why Japan brought a complaint to the Security Council of the United Nations. However, she only got a statement of "apprehension" published in the form of oral report of the Chairman, which is not recorded as a formal document. He expressed apprehension about the fact that an object Korea had launched with a rocket dropped on the sea west of Japan. He said it was regrettable

that it had been launched without an advance notice to neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, he added that he reaffirmed that as long as space development for a peaceful purpose accords with the security rules of the international law and as long as its transparency is guaranteed, any country has a legal right to do it. Now that international society, except Japan, admits it as an artificial satellite, the UN Security Council could not do otherwise. In this connection, Foreign Minister Takamura boasted, "To pitch it strong, it means the victory of Japan's UN diplomacy. It is natural, but it is a good thing that her contention has been understood by all the members of the council." This is no more than self-contentment.

The suspension of cooperation with the KEDO is another mistake of Japan. A sanction is taken to inflict damages on the nation against which it is applied. It is a strong diplomatic means. This is a common sense of the world.

However, the KEDO, as is known, is an international consortium, organized with the United States as the prime mover, which is to offer light-water reactors (LWRs) to Korea, according to the Korea-US Agreed Framework. The longer the construction of the LWRs is delayed, the more the United States and south Korea, member nations of the council of the organization, will suffer. The delay will be almost no trouble to Korea. On the contrary, it will give Korea an excuse to denounce the United States, using it as a playing card. It is natural that the United States and south Korea have criticized Japan and demanded that she cancel suspension. Japan resisted it a great deal, but had no choice but to cancel it, without assigning apparent reason. It is not accidental that Charles Kartman, special envoy for the Korean peace talks, aired his dissatisfaction that Japan has little tactics, adding that she only says "I dislike you." (*Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, September 16, 1998.)

Other sanctions, too, had no effect on Korea. It was said that Korea's export of pine mushroom would suffer a blow because of the suspension of direct airline service. But in 1998 the mushroom was exported in a large quantity to the south Korean market via China, because south Korean mushrooms did not grow well due to heavy rain, and Japanese tourists to south Korea bought up almost all of them. After all, Korea did not suffer from it, either.

Because Japan has applied political and economic sanctions against Korea for a long time, the card of sanction, which is as threatening as an ultimatum to an ordinary country, lost its effect on Korea a long time ago. Koreans were not bombastic when they said that Korea had lived and would live in the future, too, without normalized relations with Japan; it is an expression reflecting the realities of the two countries.

Foreign Minister Takamura said, "It is an international common sense that Korea is to blame." But since it has become a common sense in international society that it was the launching of a satellite, the view of the Japanese government is senseless. The expression "Japanese common sense is the world's absurdity" is often used in a self-critical way in the economic policy. The same can be said to be true of her countermeasures against the Korean peninsula.

Is the Absence of Advance Notice Intolerable?

There are only two grounds for the Japanese government to apply sanctions against Korea. First, not giving an advance notice is a violation of the international law; second, invasion of territorial sky or infringement of sovereignty. These are too insufficient for applying sanctions, which, in fact, may provoke a war.

Korea refuted these two points. First, even though Japan has launched dozens of satellites since 1975, she has never informed Korea of them. Second, it is an international practice to launch a satellite without giving an advance notice. Third, the satellite was launched to fly through the air above the Straits of Tsugaru and fall on international waters. Japan was put to shame by this refutation.

As for advance notice, in the space agreement and international marine law there are no regulations about advance notice for the launching of an artificial satellite.

The former Soviet Union, the United States and China made public the launching of their first artificial satellites only after confirming their success. Naturally they did not give an advance notice to other countries. As for Japan, according to the Space Science Institute, she "only informs the air management bureau and harbours in various countries in English just a month before launching and warns planes

and vessels not to enter the area where the booster is expected to fall, and does not notify other countries." Needless to say, Japan launches satellites eastward from the launching pads in Tanega Island and Osumi peninsula, so their launching would raise no problem because the satellites would not fly over other countries.

By the way, a satellite has to be launched eastward in consideration of the rotation of the earth on its axis. In the case of Korea, eastward means passing through the sky over Japan.

In addition, as to the range of the territorial sky, there is no definite regulation in the international law. The range of 100 km from the ground is generally recognized as territorial sky. The higher altitude is recognized as outer space, which is beyond the reach of a state power. In the case of Korea's satellite launching, it flew much higher than the Japanese territorial sky--the altitude of the second-stage cast-off point was 204 km and that of the satellite's entering orbit was 239. 2 km. So it did not infringe upon Japan's sovereignty. That is why even Foreign Minister Takamura, who had been high-handed all the time, toned down his statement at a press interview on October 30, saying, "It is difficult to judge whether it has passed through the territorial sky or not."

"Originally, the most ideal launching direction to take the maximum velocity is due east--an angle of 90 degrees--which means flying over the Japanese territory. We changed the course out of respect for the sovereignty of our neighbouring country even if we could not obtain the most ideal launching direction. Although it was not favourable for us, we fixed the launching direction at an angle of 86 degrees (over the Tsugaru Straits between Hokkaido and Honshu, Japan). Besides, we could have put it into a higher altitude. But, we considered that the second cast-off would fall on the sea near Japan. We paid serious consideration to it. Thus, on the principle of respecting the sovereignty of other country, we lowered the height in spite of risk. It is regrettable that there are still such people in Japan who do not understand our just and thoughtful attitude to launching."

Japan should have been patient enough to listen to this explanation of the Korean scientists who were in charge of satellite development, because the flying object, which Japan judged as a "ballistic missile", left the traces of trajectory and altitude just as explained by them.

There were no instances in which an artificial satellite's flight over the territorial sky of any country had been at issue in the world, nor were there instances in which the countries which had launched satellites without giving an advance notice incurred a censure.

It was reported that the flying object had flown over the Japanese Islands and fallen on the sea off Sanriku. The booster dropped on a spot, 330 nautical miles away from Japan, which is on the open sea farther than the territorial sea (12 nautical miles) and the exclusive economic waters (200 nautical miles). It can be said that the "sea off Sanriku" was a political expression which needlessly roused the feeling of dread in the hearts of the Japanese.

The Reason for the Delayed Announcement of Satellite Launching

The fixed column *Elementary Particles* of *Asahi Shimbun*, September 5, 1998, reads, "If what was launched was not a weapon but an artificial satellite, it would be a very good thing (if so, say so promptly)."

The column of the newspaper, dated September 1, reads, "I am reminded of Lenin's 'Left-Wing' Communism--An Infantile Disorder. A missile launched at Taephodong(?). If it was launched without giving consideration to the surroundings, it is really infantile. If it was launched in consideration of the surroundings, it is really an 'infantile disorder'. There is no knowing whether it is 'left-wing' or not. Didn't they misjudge 'now is the time,' after hearing overseas broadcasts on the 'crisis of south Korea', 'confusion of Japan' and 'chaos of Russia'? It is really an expensive salute."

The writer of this article, who mocked Korea by assuming it as the launching of a missile, had only to give way to anger for honour's sake. The majority of the Japanese must have had the same feeling, too.

Why did Korea announce her satellite launching a few days after the event?

I think there are two reasons.

One is that, as mentioned above, it was necessary not only to

succeed in launching a satellite but also to confirm its regular orbiting. Since it concerns the dignity of a nation, there should be no room for announcing failure as success. The person in charge of the development said, "We intended to open it to the public from the outset. However, we maintained the principle of making it public prudently after confirming the success and collecting and analyzing the data." According to information I obtained, Korea had prepared two artificial satellites, and in case the first one would fail, she would try once more. This coincides with the report that "Korea is preparing another lift-off." Korea seems to have been determined to achieve success in launching a satellite at any cost, in order to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Republic.

The other is completely a technical reason. As Korea had no tracking system by which to ascertain the satellite entering orbit, it took her a few days to confirm it.

The statement issued by Korea two days after launching accused Japan of her clamour and sanctions, saying, "Japan is making a fuss without knowing any 'backgrounds' and 'facts'." Couldn't Korea make it public at that time? Probably, she did not confirm it fully yet. However, some observers interpret that "Korea has deceived Japan." *Asahi Weekly*, No. 18, September 1998, carried an interesting article, under the title "The Grounds for the View of the Secret Understanding between Korea and the United States on Missile". The following is the gist of the article:

The United States has hitherto suppressed the missile test firing of Korea by sending a strong warning. This time, however, the United States did not try to stop it, but connived at it even if she had received a certain hint. Then she informed Japan that "a missile had been launched." This means that the United States has deceived Japan in collaboration with Korea in order to draw Japan into the Theatre Missile Defence plan. The article also carries comments: "Wasn't the current missile clamour a 'stratagem' of the United States?" (A cadre of the intra-ministerial bureau of the Defence Agency.) "The United States intended to make her military industry prosperous by drawing out money from Japan." (Military commentator Kamiura Motoaki.)

International politics is relentless. Diplomacy is, in a sense, a game for survival--a matter of eating or being eaten. Japanese have a hunch

that the United States is very likely to deceive Japan, her ally, for her own interests. Japan may harbour such a doubt because she is watching the recent approach between Korea and the United States.

The conclusion, however, is that Korea and the United States are not in relations of trust enough to conclude a "secret agreement". When I visited Korea half a month after the launching of the satellite, I asked several cadres to ascertain whether it was true. They all said meaningfully, "There could be no such things. But there will be a possibility to be so in the long run."

It is a riddle why the United States did not hold back the launching this time in spite of the advance notice she had received from Korea. Anyway, that has nothing to do with Korea. The doubt that in order to feed her Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) programme and put the new Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines in operation, the United States might have deceived Japan cannot be ruled out. The truth, however, must be brought to light between Japan and the United States. If "good-natured" Japan has been deceived by the "cunning and diplomatic" United States, it means no more than the diplomatic defeat of Japan. Isn't it the United States, not Korea, that Japan should protest against?

Abandonment or Loss of the Diplomatic Card against Korea

If Korea had notified Russia and the United States, Japan may be entitled to her insistence that Korea should have said a word to her, since Korea was going to launch a flying object over the Japanese Islands, though not into her territorial air.

From the point of view of Korea, however, Japan is an impudent nation that refuses to repair her past of colonial rule, a dangerous nation hostile to her, an arrogant nation that does not keep international faith, and a subject nation of the United States that cannot shape an independent diplomatic policy. No country in the world is polite to her enemy. Besides, since it was not a missile for military purposes, but a satellite for peaceful purposes, Korea might have judged that there would be no need to notify anybody.

What is more, at present, there is no route for Japan to conduct

political dialogue with Korea. The responsibility for this situation lies with the Japanese side. Korea proposed improving relations with Japan a long time ago, but the latter has continuously ignored it, according to her policy of attaching great importance to south Korea. Later, over several times agreements have been reached between the parties in power in the two countries. In March 1995, a promise was made between the Workers' Party of Korea and the coalition ruling parties of the Liberal Democratic Party, the Socialist Party and the New Party Sakigake, in which they agreed to open talks in an independent stand and with no preconditions attached for improving relations. However, the Japanese government has not yet come to reopen the talks for the reason of the "suspicion of kidnapping a Japanese". It seems that Korea, unable to endure the insincere attitude of Japan any more, changed her policy a few years ago and decided not to have any dealings with Japan. In this way the route for dialogue between the two countries is gone.

Japan is often criticized that she has no policy towards Korea, no diplomatic strategy. The absence of diplomatic policy is due, above all, to the fact that she has no knowledge about Korea and does not try to know her, I think. It is an iron rule of diplomacy that without knowing the enemy it is impossible either to fight against or make peace with it. However, Japan has made a political judgement that all she has to do in the policy towards Korea is to follow the United States and south Korea. This must be a big pitfall.

The problem is that Japan has no political and diplomatic card against Korea when dealing with such a "state of emergency" as the recent one. It is a misfortune of the Japanese diplomacy towards Korea that Japan has no card but the "card of sentiment" that "Korea is insolent and intolerable." The "card of sentiment" can never take the place of Joker.

"The suspension of cooperation with the KEDO has some meaning in giving a strong signal to north Korea that the launching of *Taepodong* is wrong and that our country is offended. The United States and south Korea understood us." (Foreign Minister Takamura.) "The intention of Japan must have been fully delivered to north Korea by the 'diplomatic card' of suspension. ... It may well be appraised that as a countermeasure and step for the 'missile' issue the diplomacy of

playing the 'diplomatic card' has been employed." (Editorial in *Mainichi Shimbun*, October 20, 1998.) It cannot be denied that these remarks are nothing but an unfounded self-appraisal.

"The eruptive angry rebuff will lead to helping the north. By angering Japan, north Korea hopes Japan, the United States and south Korea to fail to act in concert. We must put reason into effect." (*Asahi Shimbun*, September 24, 1998.)

"The aim of north Korea is to split Japan, the United States and south Korea. She has secured considerable effect by the firing of a missile. ... Judging from the developments up to now, however, it is worried that Japan is belittled not only by north Korea but also by the United States and south Korea." (Editorial in *Sankei Shimbun*, September 16, 1998.)

The press, which took the lead in circulating the "rumour of missile threat", also began half a month after to demand a composed strategic diplomacy of the Japanese government. The tragedy of Japanese diplomacy, however, is that it has no effective political and diplomatic card against the enemy country. The abandonment or loss of the card means placing herself in a very dangerous state. If things go on like this, Japan will be abandoned by her allies and cannot avoid being isolated from international diplomacy surrounding the Korean peninsula.

3. The Might of the Card of the Artificial Satellite

Is an Artificial Satellite a Military Threat?

As the international recognition that it was an artificial satellite has become fixed, the Japanese government began to insist that "whether it is a ballistic missile or an artificial satellite, the threat it gives to the security of the Asian and Pacific region is the same."

Kurt M. Campbell, Deputy Assistant Defence Secretary for Asian and Pacific Affairs said: What was launched is a technically-developed multi-stage missile; whether it was an artificial satellite or

not is a secondary question; it is a matter of great concern.

Donald Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, said: The US intelligence agency is estimating the range at 4,000 km to 6,000 km, which corresponds to that of an ICBM.

This is the basic US understanding of Korea's launching of an artificial satellite. In the final analysis, the United States assumes it as an artificial satellite, and sees that it is much more shocking and exerts a graver international influence than a missile. This understanding differs subtly and yet fundamentally from that of Japan, which assumes it as a ballistic missile and insists that it gives a military threat.

As is known, the technology of satellite launch vehicle is the same as that of ballistic missile. At present, the technology of ballistic missile is applied to most of satellite launch vehicles in the world. The *Atlas*, *Titan* and *Delta* of the United States, the *Soyuz* and *Cosmos* of Russia and the *Long March* of China have all adopted the technology of ICBM or IRBM. The Japanese rockets--N-I, N-II and H-I--originate from the *Delta* or *Thor* IRBM. Korea herself admits that rockets have been developed as a by-product of the development of a ballistic missile. *Kwangmyongsong No. 1* was launched by a three-stage rocket, and a very reliable solid propellant (of her own development) was used for the third stage. The booster was successfully cast off. The multi-stage missile can acquire the flight distance of the ICBM. If the technology of casting off the booster is available, it is not very difficult to acquire this distance. The fact that Korea has equipped herself with its technology means that she is fully capable of developing the ICBM, which puts whole America within its range. (It may have already been developed.) The United States has been making it a precondition for missile defence that no other countries, except Russia and China, for the time being, can develop the ICBM, which can reach as far as America. But the success achieved by Korea in launching a satellite has compelled the United States to re-examine her missile defence strategy.

At the negotiation between Korea and the United States held in early October 1998, Korea declared, "It is for a peaceful use of the outer space and we will continue, in the future, too, the launch of

artificial satellites." Korea also resisted the demand of the United States for stopping the development and launching of missile by saying, "The development and deployment of missiles is a right of a sovereign state, and, in the light of Korea's special situation, it is necessary." The US side, however, could not make a reasonable refutation.

For the first time in June 1998, Korea made public the development and export of missiles, and declared that the development and deployment of missiles is a question relating to sovereignty and right to survival. She also demanded that, since the export of missiles is a valuable source of foreign currency, the United States, if she wants to stop it, should make an appropriate compensation. Only 16 countries joined in the Missile Technology Control Regulations (MTCR), but not Korea. The United States, which is most advanced in missile technology and the largest exporter of weapons, has no right to blame Korea for her missile export in a one-sided way. There is no international law prohibiting the export of missiles, so Korea's missile export does not violate the international law.

As it has become clear that Korea possesses the technology of developing the ICBM, the United States' fear of missile proliferation has increased. Military commentator Ehata Gensuke said, "If missiles are exported to the Middle East, it means that the countries possessing missiles with the range of over 2,000 km increase in number at once. Therefore, the nonproliferation of ballistic missiles becomes more acute than ever. It gives a feeling that the door to the hell is flung open all of a sudden." This is not an exaggeration.

Another serious question Korea's launching of the satellite raised for the United States and its threat to her is that Korea can possess a military satellite.

Korea has been under the constant nuclear threat of the United States in a one-sided way. Korea has the means of protecting herself from a preemptive nuclear attack, but she had no ability to retaliate. Furthermore, she has been under constant surveillance by the US military satellites and high-altitude air reconnaissance. Camouflaging and building underground military factories and military bases and keeping weapons underground were all that could be done as countermeasures. Of course, these measures could prevent the United

States from making a preemptive attack at will, although the United States could threaten Korea in a military way. But the success of launching a satellite suggests possibility that Korea has come to possess retaliation means against the attack of the United States, and put the enemy states of the United States, south Korea and Japan under her reconnaissance surveillance. It can be said that, as a result, the balance of power between Korea and the United States, a military balance, has changed radically.

The Real Shock of the Missile Test Firing in 1993

In 1993, when Korea made a test firing of a missile to the East Sea of Korea, there occurred a turmoil in Japan. However, the recent hard-line countermeasures of the Japanese government and the anger and reaction of the public opinion were great far beyond comparison with those at that time.

“1) The 'danger' was felt with the skin for the first time since the war (since August 15, 1945).

“2) For the first time there was a rush of the feelings of crisis and relevant actions in the United States and south Korea.

“3) The inner crisis, which can be said to be the functional disorder of the pivot of government, has come to the surface. This is the nucleus of 'Taephodong Shock.' (Ashahi Shimbun, September 22.)

What on earth was the current disturbance? Here is a more shocking fact which makes the disturbance insignificant.

“On May 29, 1993, (Korea) succeeded in the test firing of multi-stage missiles. According to a man of north Korean military authority, this test firing was informed beforehand to the United States. Three missiles were fired then; one of them was for the test of the 500-km range, and it fell on the international waters off the Noto peninsula; the other two flew away more than 3,000 km, and fell on the sea off Hawaii and on the open sea off Guam Island, it is said. With the success of this test launching, north Korea has become more confident, and it is guessed that she succeeded in the development of ICBMs in 1996 and deployed them on line.” This is an extract from *Kim Jong Il -Having Korea*

Reunified--North Korea: the Scenario of War and Peace written by Kim Myong Chol and published by Kojinsha. Several years ago the United States informed now and then that "it is north Korea, besides the United States, Russia and China, that has the capacity of developing the ICBM at the earliest date." However, in Japan there were few who paid attention to it. But in tune with the missile clamour the *Joson Ilbo* in south Korea, dated October 23, 1998, reported that "as a result of the analysis of the US intelligence authorities, it has become clear that this missile flew over the Japanese Islands and dropped on the Pacific Sea, 1,300 km away from the launching site." The Director General of the Defence Agency Nukaga also stated on the same day, "We received such information from the United States around spring this year." To be candid, it was probably the end of the previous year. However, it is said that the information was not made public on the instruction of Prime Minister Hashimoto.

Here arose two questions: First, why did the United States give Japan, at the time of 1993, only partial information that "it dropped on the East Sea of Korea"? second, why did Japan make a fuss about the same information from the United States this time, although she had not done so previously, in spite of the fact that the former was the launching of a ballistic missile, whereas the recent one was that of an artificial satellite?

In 1993 acute military tension was created by nuclear suspicion. Is this the reason why the United States judged that it would give a great shock to Japan, or was the United States herself greatly shocked by it? It was shameful for Japan to make a fuss about the information of five years ago, so this time she might have launched a counterattack with regret at her previous inaction.

It is difficult to understand the behaviour of the United States and Japan. It is possible, however, to confirm the fact that the United States did not furnish Japan with all the military information, that Korea had succeeded in launching a missile in 1993, which was akin to the ICBM and could easily fly over the Japanese Islands, and that it was a factor that compelled the United States to have a nuclear agreement with Korea. It is reported that the negotiation on the missile

issue between Korea and the United States was dealing with the matter of stopping Korea from developing and exporting missiles. However, the main issue might be Korea's development and deployment of the ICBM, and there might have been a serious diplomatic deal.

Is Korea a Military Threat?

It is true that Korea is strengthening armed forces now under the leadership of Kim Jong Il, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and Chairman of the National Defence Commission. Then, is Korea, which has demonstrated her capability to develop the ICBM and military satellites, really such a military threat as to launch a preemptive attack any time against the United States, south Korea and Japan, her enemies--that is, to provoke a war--and menace the security of the Asian and Pacific region?

The Korean people were robbed of their country by Japan and had the sorrow and sufferings of a ruined nation to the marrow of their bones. Their parents were killed, and 6 million people were forced to hard labour like animals; one million men had to serve the Japanese army as bullet shields; nearly 200,000 women were forced to suffer as sex slaves for the Japanese army. Their natural resources, culture, names and even language were all deprived. As a ruined nation they were not treated as human beings. Here is Korea's "grievance", and it is the starting point of the nation-building for Korea. Hence, it has become the main principle of Korea to defend the country, without allowing the aggression of foreign forces any more.

Nevertheless, the Korean peninsula was divided into north and south by outside forces, and the Korean War was forced. Through the war, the Korean people keenly felt that they must not allow a war to break out again, a war which would repeat national tragedy. The Korean Armistice Agreement, signed in 1953, stipulates that all foreign armies shall withdraw from Korea within three months and that the countries concerned (Korea, China and the United States) shall hold a political negotiation, in order to solve the Korean question in a peaceful way. But after the war the United States further strengthened the "mutual defence treaty" signed by the United States

and south Korea in August 1953, and the security treaty signed by the United States and Japan in 1951, and formed the US-south Korea military alliance, the US-Japan military alliance and the US-south Korea-Japan tripartite military alliance. Completely ignoring the armistice agreement, the United States subjugated south Korea and Japan politically, militarily and economically and formed an encirclement for stifling Korea, thus choosing the way of sharp military confrontation with Korea.

To cope with this, Korea had to invest a vast amount of funds and manpower in national defence, which gave hindrance to economic construction. What is worse, Korea was shocked by the fact that at the time of Cuba crisis in 1962, the Soviet Union withdrew missiles from Cuba, yielding to the nuclear threat of the United States. The fact that the Soviet Union, the socialist superpower during the Cold War years, was no longer able to contend with the United States on an equal footing, the apprehension that the United States may defeat the socialist countries one by one, without coming into direct conflict (war) with the Soviet Union--all this made Korea keenly feel the rigour of international politics.

Later, as anticipated, the United States intervened in the Vietnam War on a full scale, while intensifying pressure and appeasement with regard to the European socialist countries. Korea reached the conclusion that in order to cope with the challenge she must strengthen national defence and build a system capable of resisting the military pressure of the United States. Thus the four-point military line was advanced in the mid-1960s--arming the whole nation, fortifying the whole country, training the entire army into a cadre army, and modernizing the whole army.

The United States, while further strengthening the US-Japan-south Korea military alliance, accelerated the deployment of nuclear weapons in south Korea since the mid-1970s and staged in a big way the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises between the United States and south Korea. The nuclear weapons deployed in south Korea are said to be tactical nuclear weapons amounting to 1,000---ground-to-ground Tomahawk cruise missiles, infantry atomic shells, and Air-Force bombs. This military menace must be dreadful to Korea. South Korea or Japan would not be able to imagine the fear of nuclear attack

Korea has felt for decades.

Entering the 1990s, the Cold War came to an end, but in the Korean peninsula the Cold-War structure remained. This broke the political and military balance in the Korean peninsula that had been maintained delicately, without reaching the state of war. In order to cope with this, Korea made a counterattack, using the "nuclear card", by which she has attained the Korea-US Agreed Framework.

On the assumption of Korea's "collapse", however, the United States has neglected to implement the agreement, whereas the Korean side has been fulfilling the agreement, by sealing the nuclear facility, accepting inspection by the IAEA and mitigating economic restrictions against the United States. The basis of the package deal is the principle of simultaneous action. If this principle is not met, the Korea-US agreement itself will be functionally disordered. The United States, however, has not implemented the agreement sincerely, but proceeded to the "soft-landing policy" by which to force the market economy and capitalism on Korea. While giving a soft impression of an appeasement policy, the United States did not stop giving a military threat, her old trick. This is why Korea could not but advance towards further strengthening her military forces, national defence power. This is the summary of the political and military situation in the Korean peninsula up to now.

As mentioned above, the main feature is that the military threat was given first by the United States, south Korea and Japan, and Korea has stood against it. By the military threat here I mean a practical display and exercise of military power, not a potential threat that one side may attack the other first. In short, the fact is that though they describe Korea as a military threat, the United States, south Korea and Japan have made a threat out of Korea, and threatened her, thus compelling her to strengthen her military force.

Power Policy vs Verbal Power Diplomacy

In international politics and diplomacy an opponent is always defined as a "threat to the security of one's country or region". Accordingly, however hard Korea may appeal to international society that she is also under the military threat of the United States, there is

little effect. She only gets response, "Worried! We support you" at best. The expression of sympathy does not lead to specific actions. No country will try to fight against the United States, in support of Korea, a small country. Every country is busy with her own domestic affairs and diplomacy. In the past socialist countries had at least a just cause that they were defending socialism. At present, however, the socialism in East Europe itself has ceased to exist. Korea, which is determined to defend the socialist system of her own style to the end, is isolated in an encirclement of powerful Western countries.

In order for Korea, a small country, to contend with the powerful military alliance of the United States, south Korea and Japan, she must be well versed in the diplomatic strategy and method of the United States, the suzerain of south Korea and Japan. The US diplomacy is often called a "gunboat diplomacy", but this is only one aspect of it. The US diplomacy against hostile countries consists of three elements, which is called the "power policy". The following is my own theorem for it:

A. Verbal power diplomacy--diplomacy of expressing first her analysis, observation, standpoint and assertion and demanding others to follow them, while in the international diplomatic scene giving threats by intimating economic sanctions and military attacks. The verbal power diplomacy is, in short, diplomacy by oral power.

B. Diplomacy of economic sanctions--diplomacy by which to enforce economic blockade against hostile countries by making general mobilization of her economic power and the "economic order" of the world which she is controlling.

C. Gunboat diplomacy--diplomacy of sending an ultimatum, demanding compromise and submission on the part of her enemy by demonstrating armed forces and intimating military attack.

The United States is an expert at driving hostile countries into a corner, by making an effective combination of these three elements. She enforces them in five stages.

The first stage--employment of A. The United States, a masterhand of verbal power diplomacy, has displayed the power of the greatest country to the full. Almost all countries yielded helplessly at this stage.

The second stage--a combination of A and B. Economic sanctions

as well as verbal power diplomacy are employed. It is said that the United States has applied economic sanctions more than 60 rounds to over 70 countries and regions during the recent five years.

The third stage--a combination of A, B and C. The US armed forces are actually ordered out and even the possibility of nuclear attack is intimated. The US 7th Fleet and Marine Corps forces are sent to exert military pressure.

The fourth stage--variant combination of A, B and C. In case the enemy does not give in even at the third stage, she carries out a preemptive attack or provokes war, and even after the war, she continues with verbal intimidation, economic sanctions or military sanctions. Her policy and air raid against Iraq at present corresponds to this. In case the enemy does not yield to all that, she overrides and isolates him. In the policy against Korea all kinds of methods have been used over a long time--disregard, blackmail, economic blockade, encirclement and so on.

The fifth stage--reconciliation and establishment of diplomatic relations. If the use of the A, B, C and the means of war fails to subdue the enemy, the diplomatic policy of dialogue is adopted. The case of Vietnam is taken as a typical example. At present, her relationship with Korea is at this stage. On January 5, 1999, the US Department of State issued the policy of relaxing the economic sanctions against Cuba and extending non-governmental exchanges. The policy toward Cuba may have entered this stage.

Meanwhile, Korea has long since wanted to conclude a peace treaty with the United States, a signatory to the Korean Armistice Agreement, and called for a dialogue to put it into practice. Korea has once proposed a tripartite talk including even south Korea. The United States, however, has ignored it. That is the major factor that is responsible for the nearly 50 years of the "state of war" and the division into north and south.

The Bush Administration, however, changed the Korea policy in 1988, and initiated a counsellor-level contact in Beijing. With the end of the Cold War, an improvement was made in the Korea-US relations. However, due to the nuclear suspicion which started in 1992, the tension between them escalated. But this was a golden opportunity for Korea in improving her relations with the United

States.

Korea started a diplomatic game, a diplomatic war, with the United States. In order to win the game on an equal footing in confrontation with the only superpower which remains in the world, Korea exerted all her wisdom and efforts, and used all the methods and means conceivable. She says, "We will return all-out war for all-out war, and dialogue for dialogue" (hard-line diplomacy), and "We will retaliate without fail" (blackmail diplomacy). Sometimes she shakes hands with a smile (smile diplomacy), sometimes harasses the enemy by every possible means, makes use of the opponent's suspicion conversely or attacks his military weak point (guerrilla diplomacy), and sometimes she makes a move which is beyond all imagination and startles the world, namely, the declaration of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the declaration of withdrawal from the IAEA, the launching of an artificial satellite, and so on (diplomacy of brinkmanship). All these diplomatic names were given by the Western media. Without applying adept diplomacy by making the fullest use and having a command of intelligence warfare, psychological warfare and a war of nerve, it is impossible to win a victory in the relentless international diplomacy. It is a common sense in the diplomacy against the enemy country, so to speak.

Korean diplomacy is characterized by the fullest use of verbal power. The tone of her statements to the enemy country sounds high and intense, but if you read them carefully you will find that preconditions are given without fail. In other words, if the preconditions are met, there will be a way out. The strategy of Korea, at present, is to make use of the US diplomatic strategy to her own advantage and drive the enemy into a corner by putting into practice the saying that if one is to defeat the enemy one must know him well.

Appearance of a Powerful Diplomatic Card

The "diplomacy of verbal power" alone is not enough. It must be backed up by military force or defence power. The international diplomacy surrounding the Korean peninsula is particularly a "military diplomacy".

Korea has long since constructed underground factories and bases

and has built up unbreakable defences all over the country like a hedgehog with sharp needles or a tortoise with a hard shell. Even the powerful United States cannot dare to touch her. This opponent is a thorn in her sides, a country which never yields to any threat, declaring, "We will return war for war."

The United States, which could not win in the Korean War (was defeated in this sense), dispatched in haste her aircraft carrier task force and assembled in south Korea *B-52* strategic bombers, which can carry H-bombs, and fighter-bomber squadrons, in preparation for attack, at the *Pueblo* incident in 1968 and the incident of shooting-down of *EC-121* the following year. In each case, however, the US side had no choice but to save the situation by making apologies. This experience has taught the United States that Korea is a formidable opponent who is really resolved to fight against her. For the United States there is no alternative but to adopt the fourth-stage diplomacy of disregarding Korea or the fifth-stage diplomacy of dialogue. Korea's declaration of withdrawal from the NPT induced the United States to switch over to the fifth stage. If Korea withdraws from the NPT there will be no way for her to prevent Korea from developing and deploying nuclear weapons. Thanks to the Korea-US Agreed Framework, the United States could scarcely hold back Korea from withdrawing from the NPT.

Some people say that the United States gave Korea "sugar" and "remuneration", but this does not mean that she acquiesced meekly in Korea's demand. The United States had no alternative but to reconcile and negotiate with Korea.

Korea's launching of the satellite shocked the United States more than her declaration of withdrawal from the NPT had done. Why? The reason is that an impossible war became more impossible. If a war breaks out again in the Korean peninsula, it will surely turn into a nuclear war, as I will refer to it again later. In the light of this, although military commentators frequently make comparison of the armed forces between Korea and the United States, south Korea and Japan, such a comparison of armed forces or a simulation will be of little significance. Some people underestimate Korea's military power on the grounds that the Korean People's Army is short of fuel and provisions and that its weapons are old-fashioned and their amount is

insufficient. This analysis is also meaningless, because the war in the Korean peninsula will be a nuclear war, not an ordinary war. Either overestimation or underestimation will result in making a wrong analysis of the military situation on the Korean peninsula.

The criticism that "'nuclear deterrent' and 'a deterrent to war' are illusions" may be right in pointing out the danger and absurdity of competition in nuclear development and deployment and arms build-up. But in case military balance is completely broken, a weak country will be attacked by a powerful country and compelled to surrender. Such criticism is not convincing to a country which is under the pressure of acute military tension and poised between death and survival. This is the reality of international politics.

This essential question must be the basis on which to interpret the warning given by the Foreign Ministry of Korea on September 4 to the United States and Japan.

"It is the exercise of legitimate sovereign right for our country to have satellites. Whether this capability is used for military purposes or not depends entirely on the attitude of hostile forces. The United States must be prudent about her military pressure and preemptive attack upon us, and Japan must bear in mind that the enacting of the law for involving herself in the belligerent relations between Korea and the United States is a very dangerous act, which means a declaration of war against us."

Only by repeating the launching of a satellite for a peaceful purpose, which is recognized by all countries, can Korea give the United States a "shocking threat" and the "terror that if the enemy attacks, he will be retaliated," without going the length of testing and deploying the ICBM or without developing a military satellite. In this sense, it is much more shocking than a ballistic missile. Thus, Korea has acquired a new powerful political, military and diplomatic card, the card of artificial satellite.

On December 2, the spokesman of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army stated, "The 'surgical-operation-type attack' or a 'preemptive attack' is not the option of the United States alone, and the method of strike is not her monopoly. The enemy must know clearly that the attack of our People's Army is unlimited, and there is no place on this planet to evade the attack." He also warned that south Korea

and Japan would be also the "targets of strike". That was the first time Korea used such a strong expression of threat. It is clear that this warning was given on the basis of the card of the artificial satellite or the card of ICBM.

4. What the Over-Reaction of Japan Has Brought About

Negative Influence of "Missile Clamour"

The "missile clamour" in Japan has been escalating far from ceasing even after Korea made it public as an artificial satellite. The participation in the TMD plan, the launching of an intelligence satellite, the promotion of enacting a bill related with the new Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines, which had not been supported by public opinion, were successively under discussion, and have begun to move briskly to their realization. The public opinion of Japan appears to be in support of them.

"It should be blamed that the 'launching of a missile' without an advance notice, even though it is an artificial satellite, has stirred up the hard-liners of the US Republican Party which is against the north Korea policy of the Clinton Administration and has given the Japanese government an excuse for participation in the TMD." (Editor's comment in *Sekai*, December 1998.) This must be the representative viewpoint. However, whether they should permit the participation in the TMD or not depends entirely on the Japanese people. The truth is not that Korea gave the excuse, but that the United States and Japanese authorities have made military use of Korea's launching of a satellite to find the excuse. If the launching of a satellite increases military tension, the launching of a satellite for building a space station will also be a military threat.

Probably for this reason, the frequent and atrocious cases of persecution of Chongryon and Korean nationals in Japan, who support Korea, have not yet stirred up such a broad public opinion as that which was against the "*chima* and *jogori* (Korean folk dress--Tr.)

incident" at the time of the "pachinko suspicion" in 1989 and "nuclear suspicion" in 1994.

Judging from the news report about the "suspicion of kidnapping of a Japanese", "food crisis" and the "cancellation of visit by Japanese wives living in Korea to their native places" alone, it is no exaggeration to say that the feelings of the Japanese about Korea including their anti-Korean sentiment which has been accumulated for a long time, have gone from bad to worse because of the recent "missile clamour".

The Japanese people, however, must give careful consideration to the brutal fact that intensifying the confrontation with Korea by accelerating the legislation relating to "emergency" or by giving a free rein to the persecution of Korean nationals in Japan, out of anti-Korean sentiment, is not beneficial to Japan, and jeopardizes the future of Japan. As I mentioned above, Korea is now having a diplomatic war only against the United States. From the diplomatic point of view, it can be said that the satellite has been launched aiming at the United States. At present, Korea refuses to deal with Japan, nor did she launch the satellite aiming at Japan. The same can be said of the test firing of missiles in 1993.

"North Korea does not care much about Japan; she may be rather ignoring her. I also think that it was an artificial satellite, but I think that the current missile was not aimed at Japan.... It must be an expression that Japan is out of her mind. At least stress is not put on the message to Japan." (Komaki Teruo of the Asian Economic Research Institute, *Sekai*, November 1998.) However, as there is an assertion that it gave Japan the "greatest shock after the war" and it "constitutes a direct menace to Japan rather than anxiety" (Foreign Minister Takamura), Japan felt for the first time the "threat" of Korea with her whole body and came to have the consciousness of crisis. Even now when it has become clear that it was an artificial satellite, it is not dying down, but, on the contrary, getting worse.

For this reason the Foreign Ministry of Korea stated on September 15:

"First, as long as Japan continues hostile acts against Korea, Korea will never normalize her relations with Japan,

"Second, in case Japan refuses to apologize and compensate for her

past crimes any longer, the Japanese side will have to shoulder the whole responsibility for all aftereffects arising from it,

"Third, Korea will resolutely counter the anti-DPRK acts of Japan by comprehensive and strong self-defensive measures."

In September, Pyongyang raised no voice against the United States, whereas it spoke strongly against Japan. Hostile feelings against each other have grown intense gradually. This conflict of feelings is very unfavourable to Japan, because the world has recognized the strange object as an artificial satellite, and because Japan has no reason to blame Korea since it is clear that Korea has not launched it to threaten or provoke Japan. The counteraction of Japan will only result in giving a pledge to the Korean side, inviting criticism in return. The seriousness of the shock in the true sense is not in the "missile shock" but in the diplomatic loss caused by Japan's policy for becoming a military power in the future and the aggravation of continuing anti-Korean sentiment.

TMD Runs Counter to Japan's Interests

The TMD programme started by the United States in 1993 is still at the stage of planning, and involves many problems. There are four reasons for it.

First, the prospect of the plan is vague, and its effect is uncertain.

The TMD is a plan of intercepting theatre ballistic missiles (under the range of 3,000 km) flying at high altitude with ground-to-air missiles or missiles launched from aegis warships by detecting, identifying and tracking them by means of reconnaissance satellites, air-borne early warning and control system or ground radar network. This is almost impossible with the present technology.

"Suppose shooting down a ballistic missile, one metre in diameter, flying from the distance of 150 km at the speed of about 4 km a second, with an anti-missile missile, which is faster than the target. The effective range of the rifle used in the army is 500 metres, and its muzzle velocity is 1.8 km a second. So, it is technically more difficult to shoot down a ballistic missile with an anti-missile missile than to shoot down a bullet with a bullet." (*Sankei Shimbun*, October 24,

1998.)

Even the United States has little confidence in the technical possibility of the TMD. In fact, she has failed five times successively in the development test of the Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), spending about 3,600 million dollars a year. The prospect of the sixth challenge is still far from certain. The *Defence News* reported, on December 14, 1998, that the US Department of Defence was moving toward giving up the development plan of the THAAD on account of technical difficulty. If the THAAD, the backbone of the TMD, is stopped, there is much possibility of the TMD programme hanging in the air.

Second, it takes too much time to develop it.

Even if the development goes on smoothly, it will take at least 20 years to deploy it for action. At the moment, Japan considers that Korea is the greatest danger for her. Will she remain hostile to Japan even after 20 years? Of course, there may be an opinion that the TMD will not be useless because it may be possibly true that in 20 years the number of countries having ballistic missiles--36 countries as of the end of 1998--will increase, and because another hostile country may appear then. But the world is moving towards détente, arms reduction and the abolition of nuclear weapons and missiles. Therefore, no one can now affirm that it will be undoubtedly needed after 20 years. Rather, it is probable that it will become useless in the meantime and the development will be suspended.

Third, it needs a huge amount of money.

Even an elementary calculation at present shows that it needs 1,000,000 million to 2,000,000 million *yen*. Ten or twenty years later, the budget will surely increase beyond imagination because of the rise in prices and personnel expenses. The armament expenditure of the Self-Defence Forces for 1998 is 940,000 million *yen*. Unless at least 10 per cent of this figure is invested in the project annually, it will be impossible to realize its deployment in 20 years. There is an opinion that the present equipment expenditure of the Self-Defence Forces is not sufficient. Some people among those concerned with the Self-Defence Forces lament, saying, "The equipment of the Self-Defence Forces is just like a papier maché stage property. This insufficient and imperfect equipment is not useful. If equipment expenditure is

diverted to the TMD in spite of that, other units will become weaker. So it is impossible to put it into practice." There is a limit to increasing defence expenditure. The participation in the TMD will end up in weakening the Japan's military forces as a whole.

Fourth, it is impossible to intercept all the flying ballistic missiles.

Some military commentators say that it is cheap for the price of defending the peace of Japan, but the current sensible analysis is that it is impossible to shoot down all the scores or hundreds of ballistic missiles that come flying at the same time. If one nuclear missile is dropped or an ordinary missile hits an atomic power station, it will bring about a frightful calamity. If so, unless an infallible accuracy is ensured, it will be meaningless to develop it at the cost of a vast amount of military expenses. In addition, it is no longer a secret that the anti-missile missile *Patriot*, which "played a remarkable role" in the Gulf War, did in fact scarcely hit targets.

In its article under the titles "The Present of the TMD from General Secretary Kim Jong Il", (Kurt. Campbell, Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for Asian and Pacific Affairs) and "The Present of the TMD and Reconnaissance Satellite from General Secretary Kim Jong Il" (a high-level cadre of the Foreign Ministry of Japan), the *Asahi Shimbun*, dated September 28, concludes, "The incident of launching an improved *Taepodong*-type rocket is wily." It must be a present for the United States, because Japan will supply the expense which the United States alone cannot afford, and also because her munitions industry will be able to make money over a long time.

For Japan, however, can it be a present in the true sense? Some people claim that the TMD will greatly benefit Japan, because its introduction will strengthen her security, give her deterrent power and bring about technical innovations. To their regret, however, things will not be like that. Even if Japan deploys the TMD, the country, which is going to attack Japan with missiles, will not abandon the scheme. On the contrary, the enemy will try to improve the efficiency of parrying off anti-missile missiles. In a lecture he gave in Washington on January 12, 1999, Sha Zukang, director of armament reduction bureau of China, criticized sharply, saying, "The TMD programme exerts a bad influence not only on the Asian region but also on the whole world. It will stimulate other countries to work on

developing higher-level missiles. It is not beneficial to anybody." As he said, Japan will sink into the quagmire of the missile development competition.

According to an opinion poll that Fuji TV conducted on September 10, it is said that 64.4 per cent answered in the "affirmative" on the question "Should Japan promote the defence of her own by introducing the TMD programme or a reconnaissance satellite?" Is this answer based on the knowledge of this state of affairs? If the Japanese people unanimously insist on introducing it in spite of a great waste, it is needless for a stranger to interfere in it. However, it can be asserted even now that it is absolutely a bad bargain for Japan. It is immensely too great waste as an "expense for maintaining Japan-US relations, social expenses, so to speak." (a cadre of the Defence Agency.)

Information Satellite Is Good-for-Nothing

As for the information (military reconnaissance) satellite which the Japanese government decided to introduce at its Cabinet meeting on November 6, 1998, the launching of the home-made information collecting satellite system including two optical satellites with a resolution of about one metre and two radar-mounted satellites is estimated to cost 190,000 million to 300,000 million *yen*. Worse still, a satellite which costs 20,000 million *yen* lasts five years at the longest because it orbits at a low altitude. It means that a new satellite must be launched every five years. It is also estimated that full-scale development and deployment will cost some trillion *yen*.

An early-warning satellite which is used for the TMD requires much higher technology and expense. So Russia and China seldom launch reconnaissance satellites.

The information satellite *Helios* developed by the United States and the then West Germany has a resolution of about one metre.

Moreover, it will take Japan a pretty long time to acquire a resolution as high as that of the military satellite of the United States.

The interpretation capability is also low. The resolution of the area land observation satellite (ALOS) to be launched by the National Space Development Agency in 2003 is 2.5 metres, and it is the same

as that of the US reconnaissance satellite launched thirty years ago. In addition, it is said that the resolution of US military satellites is at least fifteen centimetres. So Japan's former system which relies on US information will remain essentially the same for the time being.

The military satellite as a means of collecting information about armaments, weapons development, calamities, farming and environment completely differs from the early-warning satellite which quickly detects the launching of ballistic missiles.

The TMD needs the early-warning satellite.

Even if Japan possesses a reconnaissance satellite, she will be unable to cope with the "threat of north Korean ballistic missile" which she speaks of.

When Japan was planning domestic production of fighter supports (FS-X) for the next period, the United States put strong pressure upon Japan for joint development.

Some people are afraid of the recurrence of similar situation this time because the United States will not sit with folded arms, knowing clearly that it will be profitable to her.

"If Japan adopts the US satellite or jointly develops it, the United States can control the information service as she pleases. If Japan produces it at home, she will meet with the strong opposition of the United States.

"How to persuade the United States is the most difficult problem with reference to satellites." (Editorial of *Sankei Shimbun*, November 7, 1998.) She may find herself in a dilemma.

It is said that the government policy for introducing the information-collecting satellite is the same as the plan made by Mitsubishi Electric Company, the largest satellite producing company in Japan. If Japan produces it at home, her war industry will earn money; and if she adopts the US satellite, the American war industry will make money. These industries are most pleased with Japan's military build-up on the pretext of missile shock.

On January 2, 1999, President Clinton proposed to the Congress a 12,000 million dollar increase in defence expenditure and put forward the policy of increasing defence spendings by 100,000 million dollars in all during six years.

It is the largest increase since the mid-1980s, the Cold War years.

Of course, in this period the US economy has improved, but the main reason is to be prepared to counter the military threat from countries like Iraq and Korea.

The refusal of inspection by Iraq and the "missile" of Korea were a godsend to the military-industry complexes of the United States and Japan which were in depression due to armaments reduction and the policy of decreased war expenditure.

However, launching of a satellite for military purposes is contrary to the resolution of the Diet (the law of National Space Development Agency) adopted in 1969, the resolution that the space should be developed and used only for peaceful purposes.

The resolution confirms that "peaceful purposes" means "non-aggression" and "non-militarism".

Taking advantage of the recent "missile clamour", they covered the scheme with a silk wrapper of "multi-purpose information collection" so as to break through the obstacle, but it is quite natural that they were severely criticized as too childish.

As the TMD is a plan based on the US early-warning satellite, its operating technology will depend entirely on the United States. A certain person points out that the reconnaissance satellite will be insignificant or a useless treasure. Korea will not care if Japan has the reconnaissance satellite or not because she has been under the surveillance of the US military satellite with the highest precision. Japan's intention to counter ballistic missiles with the satellite means no more than her self-comfort and self-satisfaction.

Self-Defence Forces Cannot Attack Missile Base

"We must not wait for death with folded arms, but be prepared to attack first." This is an opinion advanced by many hardliners at a meeting of the Security Council of the Liberal Democratic Party held on September 8, 1998. "It is much faster to destroy missile-launching sites than to introduce the TMD. Counterattack is a matter relating to the individual right to self-defence." (Diplomacy critic Okazaki Hisahiko.) "Other countries look down upon Japan. At the time when they have finished preparations for launching missiles at herself, Japan, a sovereign state, must naturally have an option of preemptive

attack within the framework of the international law." (Matsushima Yusa, former GSDF Inspector General for the Central Region.)

These allegations are based on the unified view of the government expressed in the Diet in 1956, the view that "we cannot think that it is the intention of the Constitution for us to wait for self-destruction with folded arms. As long as there is no other means, attacking the base of guided missiles is self-defence from the legal point of view." Apart from the question as to whether this opinion is contrary to the Constitution or not, is it really possible for the Japanese Self-Defence Forces to launch a preemptive attack on the Korean base of missiles? In other words, is the hardliners' view that "we retaliate if attacked" tenable?

November 1998 issue of *Military Study* concluded that it is impossible to launch preemptive, surprise attack on the Korean missile base; firstly because the Self-Defence Forces have no means of reconnaissance, secondly because they have no air-to-surface missile to destroy enemy radars, thirdly because they have no precision laser-guided missile for pinpoint strike, fourthly because they have no capabilities for blanket bombing and high-altitude accurate bombing, and fifthly because an attack by means of Tomahawk cruise missile from naval vessels will meet with strong counterattack of Korea.

Before looking into Japan's offensive capabilities it is necessary to point out that Japan has no justification for preemptive attack because Korea has never launched a missile attack against Japan, and her Constitution stipulates that Japan should only defend herself.

International society will neither approve nor support such an act. If Japan attacks Korea, it will mean an all-out war. Has Japan a strong will or is she prepared for it?

Ushio, a former staff officer of the general command of the Air Self-Defence Force and now journalist, did a more shocking simulation. In his article carried in *SAPIO*, dated November 11, 1998, he analyzed that in case of counterattacking Korea after being attacked by her ballistic missiles, the Self-Defence Forces could not use their main fighters because they have no capacity to attack missile base, and it is impossible to attack with missiles which they have now, and the only thing that remains to be done is a "special attack". He

concluded that there is the need to maintain and strengthen Japan-US alliance, enact a bill concerning the new Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines as soon as possible, and amend the interpretation of the Constitution about the right of collective self-defence. Other military commentators analyzed in a similar way.

However, it will take a long time and great efforts to revise the Constitution, extend the explanation of the right of collective self-defence and finish the procedure of discarding the major premise that permits only defence. Repulsion and vigilance of neighbouring countries against her will be greater than Japan thinks and it is possible for her to be isolated internationally.

It will also take a long time and cost much to change the equipment of the Self-Defence Forces for attacking.

It is not simple to put into practice what some politicians and political and military commentators say, namely, "Retaliate if attacked." That is the reality of Japan.

The problem is that however fully they are prepared by overcoming these obstacles, the new Self-Defence Forces (they may be called the Japanese armed forces by then) will be unable to destroy the missile base of Korea, because they can neither discover nor destroy missiles which are underground.

In the twinkling of an eye innumerable ballistic missiles will come flying over the whole land of Japan. Is it the best option for Japan to choose the way of an all-out war against Korea?

Some people may assert that the right of collective defence and the capacity for preemptive attack will be a deterrent.

However, now that Korea has declared that she will retaliate if she is attacked first, it will be an all-out war.

The United States is far away from Iraq, but Korea and Japan are neighbouring countries.

In addition, Japan is well within the range of the ballistic missile of Korea.

Anyone can easily imagine that if a war breaks out, Japan will not be safe.

In conclusion, a real deterrent will have no effect upon the hostile country unless the leader of the state has a strong will to return "an all-out war for an all-out war", and unless the people unanimously

support it.

Danger of the Bill Concerning the New Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines

Why is it necessary for Japan, a "peaceful country", to follow the line of militarization?

The reason is simple.

Korea is in hostile relations with the United States and south Korea. Japan is in military alliance with the United States. Japan has no intention of establishing friendly relations with Korea. Through the recent "missile clamour" Japan has recognized Korea as an apparent threat, not as a latent threat, and opposed it.

The real source of the "threat" Japan feels is Japan-US Security Treaty.

That's why Korea's "military threat" to Japan will naturally disappear, if peace is achieved between Korea and the United States or between Japan and Korea.

However, Japan has further strengthened her alliance with the United States. For example, she agreed to the new Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines in September 1997, which stipulates that Japan will automatically participate in the war (dispatch armed forces abroad) in case of emergency on the Korean peninsula, and has enacted the bill on the crisis in the vicinity of Japan to implement the guidelines.

At every opportunity the United States pressed Japan for its earlier enforcement and Obuchi government which has realized coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and Liberal Party is going to adopt it immediately at the regular session of the Diet to be held on January 19, 1999, taking advantage of the "missile clamour".

Japan has so far taken a practical part in intensifying military tension on the Korean peninsula and made it clear in the new Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines. For its effective execution, she has no alternative but to nullify Article 9 of her Constitution sooner or later, the article that prohibits her participation in war.

Then, Japan, a great military power, a practical and military threat to Korea, will stand on the foremost frontline of the cold war on the

Korean peninsula (there is a possibility of its becoming a hot war at any time).

After all, Japan will automatically become a belligerent to be attacked by Korea, irrespective of which side first attacked in case of emergency on the Korean peninsula.

Knowing this, the Japanese authorities have adopted the path and are following it, applying fresh spurs to it on the pretext of the recent "missile clamour". It is doubtful how much the Japanese people are aware of the fact. The discussion of the case of "emergency" is so complex and difficult that it even arouses a suspicion that smokescreen is being spread intentionally to keep its real meaning from being widely known.

The point Japan must take note of here is that she would benefit nothing from her war against Korea or from her participation in a Korea-US war.

The best way to national security is to create the state of no war against any country. Between Japan and Korea there is neither territorial dispute such as those with Russia about the northern territory or with south Korea about Tok Island, nor ideological confrontation, nor sharp conflicts of national interests. If any, it is only the question of repairing the past. It is not a question to be settled by war, which would be unfavourable to Japan from the start in the sense that the injurer fights a war again against the victim of the past.

Such a war would only result in aggravating the question of repairing the past and confrontation.

Worse still, Japan has no hope of winning the war. As mentioned above, fighting a war without any justifiable reason, contrary to national interests, would produce innumerable war victims in Japan and contaminate her land by radioactivity. Why, then, should Japan fight against Korea?

The "flying object" launched by Korea is an artificial satellite, so it did not violate Article 4 of Chapter 2 of the UN Charter which prohibits the threat by armed forces.

It is contrary to reason to accelerate military build-up under the pretext of the satellite.

Some forces gloat over the "missile clamour", saying that it has accelerated Japan's militarization, but on the contrary, it has

occasioned to disclose its meaninglessness and their true intention. The "missile clamour" may accelerate Japan's militarization temporarily but they will surely reflect upon the foolish hysterical reaction which plunged Japan into a crisis when the shock settles down and the public opinion recovers calmness.

5. Will the X Day Come?

Military Reasons for Avoiding a War

X day or the day of possible outbreak of a second Korean war has been discussed openly for a long time.

Experts on the Korean question have often predicted when it would break out, but they have made a mistake every time.

Has the launching of the Korean artificial satellite increased the danger of war? The answer is negative. In other words, the possibility of war has decreased, and now it can be said that the war will never break out.

Let me examine the military aspect of the question.

Firstly, Korea's defence capability is stronger than it is estimated to be. Her military power is geared to all-out defence. Its basic principles are defined by the four-point military line.

1) Arming the entire nation: All the people are armed and given military training so as to encircle and destroy the allied forces of the United States, south Korea and Japan. A ten-million-strong army will appear as soon as a war breaks out.

In ground battle this army will surge forward and wipe out the aggressors, relying on the favourable terrain conditions. The United States already gained shameful experience of how strong and dreadful this army was in the Korean War.

2) Fortifying the whole country: Air force bases, artillery and missile units, naval bases and munitions factories are built underground and anti-aircraft guns are deployed on countless mountains. During the war, all these will take shelter from nuclear

attack in underground fortifications. Food and fuel are stored to provide for a prolonged war. It is said that fortification has already been finished.

3) Turning the entire army into an army of cadres: Crack military cadres are trained constantly with the regular army as the core, and in case of war each of the soldiers takes command of the large army to be organized.

4) Modernizing the entire army: The regular army is equipped with modern weapons which are produced basically at home. Thus the war will be fought without foreign aid.

It is widely known that when Saigon fell in the Vietnam War the United States and South Vietnamese people were amazed at the powerful and modernized weapons and equipment of the North Vietnamese regular army. Of course, Korea's weapons and equipment are not so up-to-date as those of the United States, south Korea and Japan, but she believes that these are enough for defending herself because they are not for attacking other countries.

Thirteen thousand long-range guns and multi-shot rocket launchers (estimated by the United States) are positioned underground. "Sixty-five per cent of the troops and eighty per cent of field guns and missiles are concentrated within 96 kilometres from the 38th parallel." (*Military Balance*, 1998-99, British International Strategic Research Institute.) "South Korea already came within the range of north Korean missiles in the 1980s. South Korea has developed missiles with a range of 80 km, whereas the range of north Korean missiles is 600 km, which means the whole land of south Korea is within the range of these missiles." (Minister of National Unification Board of south Korea Kang In Dok.) And these guns will open fire if Korea is first attacked by the United States, south Korea or Japan. In addition, ballistic missiles including ICBM will strike the continental United States, south Korea and Japan in retaliation. *Rodong Sinmun*, dated December 19, 1998, carried a poster which shows three missiles inscribed with "Juche Korea" aimed at a plane with the words, "Washington, Tokyo and Seoul", under which a slogan "The targets are clear!" was given. This was a strong warning to the United States, south Korea and Japan.

Secondly, the United States cannot make a decision to fight against

Korea. Operation 5027, a simulated war scenario for emergency on the Korean peninsula which was prepared by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff already in the 1960s has been revised once every ten years. Clinton got it re-examined immediately after his presidential inauguration. They say that he gave up the idea of fighting a war against Korea after reading the report submitted to him in 1993.

According to the result of the war simulation, 540,000 troops or half of the US armed forces had to be mobilized for the war which lasted at least 120 days. Millions of civilians were killed. The number of deaths of US troops was equal to that in the three years of Korean War and ten years of Vietnam War, 52,000 respectively. Korean peninsula and its neighbouring countries were heavily contaminated by radioactivity because atomic power stations were bombed and destroyed.

In the Gulf War 1,000 US troops were killed and the American people were disappointed at the loss of so many lives in spite of the employment of up-to-date weapons, although they celebrated the great victory. Since then war-weariness has spread among them.

I believe that at present the United States has no intention to provoke a war against Korea, which will take as heavy toll as that the Korean and the Vietnam wars took.

In the past wars only the United States had nuclear weapons and her allies did not have even atomic power stations. The future war will inevitably be a nuclear war as atomic power stations will be the targets.

The United States dropped two atomic bombs against Japan but she did not use them in many wars that followed. She did not, or rather could not, use them. That was natural in view of the cruel effect of nuclear blast and its terrible aftereffects.

The Gulf War was not a nuclear war, but most of the US soldiers who participated in the war appeal strange symptoms such as chronic fatigue, loss of appetite, and fading memory. They are called Gulf War syndrome. The National Gulf War Compensation Centre, an organization of ex-servicemen, pointed out in the report published in March 1998 that it was most probable that the soldiers had been exposed to the radioactivity of depleted-uranium shells which were used in quantities by the US army during the Gulf War. These shells

were made from the depleted uranium after extracting uranium 235 from natural uranium. The US army first used them in the Gulf War to destroy tanks and positions of the Iraqi army.

According to the report, about 400,000 soldiers or 75 per cent of the participants in the war suffered from radioactivity of uranium during or after battles.

Various explanations have been given to the cause of the Gulf War syndrome. One of them says that Iraq's deliberate destruction of poisonous gas warheads was the cause, but people emphasize that it is most likely that depleted uranium caused the syndrome judging from the fact that so many war participants appeal the same.

As mentioned above, modern warfare, even if it is not an actual nuclear war, has a great possibility that the war participants and local inhabitants will be seriously affected by radioactivity.

So there is no need to talk more about the aftereffects of nuclear war.

Korea, if first attacked, will instantly counterattack with missiles the US army bases and atomic power stations in south Korea and Japan. A characteristic of guerrilla tactics is to arm oneself with captured enemy weapons and to attack enemy's weak points.

They say that destruction of one atomic power station causes a holocaust as large as the explosion of 10,000 atomic bombs. The horrible effect of the destruction of an atomic reactor is beyond imagination as is described in the book *An Atomic Power Station in Tokyo!* written by Hirose Takashi. If one of the launched missiles hits an atomic power station, both Japan and south Korea will surely be ruined, to say nothing of the "lake of flames". The continental United States will also be struck by intercontinental ballistic missiles in retaliation.

If a US aircraft carrier is attacked by a missile, the result will be the same.

It is not necessary for Korea to take the trouble of equipping nuclear weapons in the warheads of ballistic missiles. However, the result will be inevitably a nuclear war.

The United States will be unable to start a war against Korea without running the risk of herself being struck hard, the risk of destroying her soldiers in the Korean peninsula and Japan, in addition

to exposing the Korean peninsula and Japan to the holocaust. The United States cannot make a decision to provoke a war nor is she given authority to do it.

Thirdly, the United States cannot fight a war against Korea to the end.

The United States suffered a miserable defeat not only in Korea but also in Vietnam. She boasts of a great victory in the Gulf War, but did not win in that she failed to overthrow or oust the Hussein government which was her first target.

She stepped up military threat to Iraq in connection with the inspection of the weapons of mass destruction of Iraq and in December launched missile attacks in cooperation with Great Britain. It was reported that 415 cruise missiles were launched in four days. How many missiles were launched can be known from the fact that about 290 Tomahawk missiles were launched during the Gulf War which lasted one month and half.

However, the US Defense Department appraised that during the war they destroyed or severely damaged only 30 per cent of more than one hundred targets, and Secretary of Defence William. Cohen said that they only delayed the development of missiles of Iraq for a year.

Needless to say, Hussein government is here to stay.

What is more, other permanent member nations of the UN Security Council criticized the US attack of Iraq, and Russia, in particular, recalled her ambassadors to the United States and Great Britain as an expression of strong opposition. The attack failed to receive international recognition and support.

"The punishment of Iraq ended in a hazy effect.... International society first resisted and became indignant at the United States, the only superpower, and Great Britain (her only ally) for their use of the strongest armed forces in the world according to their logic. This is reality." (*Asahi Shimbun*, December 21, 1998.)

It became difficult for them to continue their inspection. President Clinton complained that if they bombed Iraq they would not be able to conduct the UN inspection. After their attack Iraqi Vice-President Ramadan expressed the decision to refuse the future inspection, saying that the UN Special Commission for eliminating weapons of mass destruction (UNSCOM), a spy group, was a thing of the past.

There is also a possibility of increasing sympathy for Iraq and anti-US sentiments among the Arab nations.

Actually in Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Jordan, Sudan and Libya several thousands or tens of thousands of people continued demonstrations against the United States and Great Britain. Western observers predict that the United States which applies sanctions and attacks Iraq will be in a more difficult condition than Iraq which is attacked. British newspaper *Guardian* commented that continual acts of this kind would increase the danger of terrorist attack on British airliners, fan public resentment among the Arab nations, weaken the UN's orthodoxy and further disturb the British position in Europe. The same can be said of the United States. The Japanese government immediately supported the US air raid on Iraq. There is an opinion that it gave support because it expected that military sanctions against Iraq would be effective in controlling, in other words, containing Korea. However, Korea is not Iraq.

Political and military conditions of the Korean peninsula are different from those of the Middle East. Iraq tried to receive international sympathy as she was attacked by the United States and Great Britain in almost defenseless state and achieved some success. That is, so to speak, a method of tripping the opponent up in the end even if one suffers some damage.

By contrast, Korea has clearly declared that she will retaliate if attacked and is demonstrating this capability. Korea is not a country which will do nothing if the United States attacks her with cruise missiles. South Korea and Japan do not want a punitive attack that would provoke a war which will ravage them. The United States cannot launch a missile attack against Korea even if she wants to do it.

On December 18, 1998, the Korean Foreign Ministry declared that nothing could justify the military attack against Iraq and that an infringement upon the sovereignty of a country by force under any pretext could not be tolerated. This statement is a strong restraint on the United States.

Korea intends to restrain the United States from using her armed forces. Demonstration of the military capability of powerful retaliation and strong will to resist is the only way to win without incurring damage. After all, the US and British air raid on Iraq ended up in

stimulating Korea to a firmer attitude; it failed to become the restraint the Japanese government had wanted.

The United States is in difficulty also in terms of economic conditions. In the Gulf War it would have been impossible for the United States to fight without receiving 9,000 million dollars from Japan and other war expenses from Middle East nations.

A US defence expert calculated that air raid on Iraq (in December 1998) cost her 500 million dollars. Bacon, spokesman of the US Defense Department, admitted that none of the six up-to-date air-to-air missiles launched by US planes had hit the target during an air battle against Iraqi planes around the no-fly zone on January 5, 1999. The missiles cost over 300,000 dollars each. The price of that sort of weapon is fantastic and the continuation of war requires tremendous expenses. The US economic boom has already shown signs of decline just as the Japanese bubble economy does.

The United States is also a greatest debtor country in the world. It is now impossible for her to start a war in order to fatten her military industrial monopolies. Worse still, modern warfare is not profitable to a victor either.

The Gulf War was called an "oil war", and how profitable was it to the United States, the "victor" in this war? The United States is the largest importer of Iraqi oil whose export is allowed for a humanitarian reason after the Gulf War. That is because Iraqi oil is cheap. It occupies eight per cent of US oil import; it is not a small portion for the US oil industry.

The US economic and military sanctions against Iraq have driven herself into a dilemma.

President Clinton regards Korea and Iraq as the greatest threat and tries to counter them simultaneously. But even without succeeding to eliminate Hussein the United States finds herself in a tight corner because of her creation of Iraqi crisis. It would be correct to say that the United States as such would be unable to simultaneously deal with the "problem of north Korea, the greatest threat to US security." (Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations.) The United States is resorting to her traditional gunboat diplomacy, as, according to President Clinton, her strength is displayed with the backing of strong military

power combined with diplomatic efforts. But she meets with counterattack and mockery everywhere in the world and cannot use the force of arms, even her threat has no effect.

Fourthly, the United States has no justification to fight a war against Korea.

Americans are strongly aware that there is no need for American young people to die in the interests of other countries. The GIs have no longer a strong desire to play the role of the "security officer" or "military police" of the world. In former days they had justification that they had to fight against the Soviet Union, a "big devil", and socialism and communism. But now that the socialist camp has ceased to exist, the American people do not care whether a small country in the Far East holds on to socialism or not.

Chairman Blechman of Henry Stimson Center said that if the United States strengthened military sanctions, the danger of American soldiers being sacrificed would increase and the resistance of public opinion would grow stronger. He asked why they should involve themselves in the disputes after the Cold War. Apprehension about the loss of lives and public opinion, he added, would end up in giving up their threat half way and in inviting an enemy thrust.

The public opinion of the United States persists in pointing out that her unipolar domination has passed the stage of dilemma and, in fact, failed.

For these reasons neither Korea nor the United States can start a second Korean war.

If a war breaks out, the United States, south Korea and Japan will never win, though not defeated, because a nuclear war is too destructive to benefit any of the belligerent.

Nothing but countless war victims and devastated fields contaminated by radioactivity would remain.

Political Reasons for Refraining from Provoking a War

Judging from the political and diplomatic situation on the Korean peninsula and its surrounding regions, one can definitely say that a war will not and cannot break out.

The reasons are as follows:

Firstly, relations between Korea and the United States have become a relationship of confidence building, not hostile relations, in accordance with the historic Agreed Framework of 1994, and the two countries are moving towards establishing diplomatic relations through dialogue, not war.

In the framework agreement the United States provided for the first time its formal assurances to Korea "against the threat or use of nuclear weapons" and the two sides confirmed that they would "work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula."

As long as the Agreed Framework exists, neither side can ignite a war even if it wants to do so.

Secondly, there are various channels for dialogue between Korea and the United States and many mechanisms for guaranteeing security on the Korean peninsula.

In many cases a war breaks out due to the lack of mutual understanding.

The continuation of dialogue can make it possible to avoid war in almost all cases even in the context of hostile relations.

Since the signing of the Korea-US Agreed Framework mechanisms have been created for security on the Korean peninsula, namely, the KEDO, the LWR project, missile negotiations, general-level talks, joint unearthing of the remains of the US soldiers and the four-party talks, and each of them is functioning. And these became the diplomatic cards of Korea, so to speak.

Korea will not use those cards for unleashing a war as long as she wants peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, Korea has another powerful diplomatic card of artificial satellite, so the United States has to cope with this.

Thirdly, there is a brisk movement towards coexistence and coprosperity centring on non-governmental economic exchange between north and south of Korea.

There may be twists and turns in the future, but there is no doubt that they both will go the way to coexistence. If a war breaks out, both of them will become a "sea of fire" and the Korean nation will perish. The people of the two sides fully understand this.

South Korea must wish to avoid a war in which she will most

suffer the ravages. The United States cannot start a war in the Korean peninsula as she pleases against her ally's wish.

Fourthly, Korea and the United States have assumed the historic mission to put an end to the cold war on the Korean peninsula as they are responsible for the settlement of the issue of the Korean peninsula, and this is the historical inevitability.

The Korean Armistice Agreement stipulates that the agreement shall be replaced by a peace treaty. The United States which has avoided the replacement cannot but assume the duty and responsibility to change her policy toward the Korean peninsula at a time when the Cold War has come to an end. This led to the Korea-US Agreed Framework and quadripartite talks proposed by the United States and south Korea. At the third full-dress talks they agreed to set up subcommittees and they reached accord as the United States and south Korea made concession that they could discuss the redeployment of troops on the Korean peninsula in answer to the DPRK's proposal for adopting the withdrawal of the US army from south Korea as an item on the agenda.

The military issue between Korea and the United States is basic to the question of the Korean peninsula. Therefore, enervating and neutralizing the US troops in south Korea is the focal point. The United States will have to follow that road, though gradually. It is said that Korea proposed in October 1998 to level up the general-level talks between the Korean People's Army and the UN Forces which began in June that year to a "joint military commission" consisting of generals of the Korean People's Army, US army and south Korean army. Korea has set the target of enervating and neutralizing the US army in south Korea by replacing the armistice agreement with a peace treaty and establishing a new peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula. The question of security on the Korean peninsula will inevitably be settled in this direction.

Korea Aims at Changing US Asia Strategy

According to the 1990 and 1992 Report on National Defence, after the end of the Cold War, the United States set forth the policy of reducing her armed forces in Asia. However, she changed it into her

world strategy based on "Nye proposal", being confronted with strong discontent and opposition of her allies. Joseph S. Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, proposed that she should fulfil her responsibility as the superpower by strengthening the relations with her allies and controlling the "nuclear umbrella" as well as the "information umbrella". The strategy was evolved into the "US security strategy in East Asia and the Pacific" (East Asia Strategy Report) published by the US Department of Defense in 1995.

The gist of this report is to get her allies to pay military expenses in return for her continued provision of the "nuclear umbrella" and "leadership" for them and to maintain 100,000 US troops in south Korea and Japan.

US Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe also stated in his testimony at the Congress that the US Asia strategy after the Cold War was to further strengthen her relationship with her allies, maintain her military presence and promote stable and permanent relations with China.

In accordance with this policy the cost of maintaining the US troops in south Korea and Japan, the so-called "goodwill budget", continues to increase. South Korea bears the expense of 399 million dollars in order to maintain the presence of about 36,000 US troops. This burden heavily weighs down upon south Korea which is tottering in the IMF crisis.

Japan is the "honour student" who was highly appreciated and thanked by the United States for her annual payment of 5,000 million dollars of aid money to the countries which are in need of aid, the most generous contribution in the shares of the allied nations in the world (1998 East Asia Strategy Report).

Isn't it, however, south Korea and Japan, which, though paying the cost of maintaining US troops, feel more keenly than any other countries that this strategy that is running counter to the trend of détente in view of the end of the Cold War and the signing of the Korea-US Agreed Framework, is drifting without destination, together with the two-front strategy (the strategy which simultaneously copes with the military crises in the Korean peninsula and the Middle East), which can already be viewed as a failure?

This time Japan has keenly felt that the United States does not give

her all the information, even if it is concerned with her "destiny."

Though the United States has promised the "nuclear umbrella" for Japan, she will not use her nuclear deterrent even at the critical moment when Japan's destiny is at stake. The same can be said of south Korea. The United States could not use her nuclear weapons even in the war that affected her own interests. So it is natural that she will not use them for her allies. It is difficult to expect that the nuclear weapons which cannot be used can serve as a deterrent. Only now south Korea has begun to see this obvious fact.

The United States published the new East Asia Strategy Report in November in order to smooth down the bumpy path of her alliance with Japan and south Korea and to coax these allies. The United States set forth the policy of further strengthening the relations with them and promised to keep the system of 100,000 US troops in Asia. Saying that her alliance with Japan is the key to her Asia strategy, the United States urged the formation of the new US-Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines. At the same time she expressed her understanding of Japan's "indignation", stating that the "missile" launched by Korea in August 1998 was the threat to the regional security. Saying that she would guarantee security by using another diplomatic means and the means of security, if north Korea did not comply with her, the United States tried to ease south Korea's anxiety with her firm attitude that she would not hesitate her military confrontation with north Korea.

The United States does not hesitate to aggravate tension in connection with the clamour of artificial satellite and the suspicion about underground nuclear facilities, south Korea does not want it (sometimes the attitudes of the United States and south Korea are reversed) and Japan is excluded from them. There is no way to deal with the different dreams they dream in the same bed about their Korea policy.

Summit meetings have been frequently held between the United States and south Korea, between the United States and Japan and between south Korea and Japan, reaffirming their alliance, but disagreement and conflicts between them cannot be removed fundamentally. An editorial carried in *Mainichi Shimbun* on November 24, 1998, reads, "South Korea would never respond to the military action decided by the United States. ... The main reason for

the discord between the United States and south Korea is the stubborn attitude of south Korea that only she knows how the north thinks as well as the US arrogance that only she knows the information on north Korea and the countermeasures through difficult negotiations." Their oversensitiveness is an expression of anxiety over the unbridgeable gap in their relations and their shaking alliance.

Korea's US strategy is to win the war without gunfire. A hot war will result in the ruin of the Korean peninsula. Therefore, her strategy is, to all intents and purposes, to compel the United States to follow the way to peace by using her weapons and military forces as the cards to settle political and diplomatic issues. The strategy has already been so skilfully applied that the United States is now like an elephant caught in the ant's nest and the spider's web. Of course, ants and spiders cannot devour the elephant, but it is not impossible to lead it to the direction as they want.

"Up to now the world has regarded the missile as a military weapon, but they defined it as a political weapon. If it is a 'weapon for threatening', possession of it is significant." (Ebata Gensuke.)

There is no need for Korea to have this weapon for practical purposes; it will be enough for her to show the capability to have such a weapon. Since the United States has come to negotiations, clamouring about a nuclear suspicion in spite of the declaration by President Kim Il Sung that Korea has no intention or ability to develop nuclear weapons, and that she was ready to accept nuclear inspection on an impartial basis, Korea believes that if she launches an artificial satellite, the United States will make a fuss, saying that Korea has intercontinental ballistic missiles or military satellite, so Korea is trying to make the most of it.

The United States clearly sees the method used by Korea, but is obliged to follow the way to peace as desired by Korea. This is the real fact of the war without gunshot.

If a small country is to confront a superpower on an equal footing, she has no alternative but to use the power of speech or brain, not weapons or military forces. Korea and the United States have been engaged in a fierce "war of speech". In this engagement there is no room for such lukewarm phraseology as "Bullying is bad." International diplomacy is a deceptive warfare to deceive each other

or to be deceived. The United States only recognizes the powerful and does not even deal with the weak. In order to win this war, one needs the brain and gut that overwhelm the opponent. Korea's launching of the artificial satellite gave the United States a shock several times stronger than the nuclear suspicion had done because the flying object which is as menacing as an ICBM was actually launched.

Immediately after Korea announced the success in launching the artificial satellite, the United States published that she would increase her food aid to Korea to 300,000 tons from 200,000 tons after concluding the Korea-US high-level negotiations which she had delayed from August, on the basis of the resumption of quadripartite talks, missile negotiations, the supply of heavy oil and the negotiations to write off Korea from the list of "terrorist nations" and of the start of full-scale construction of light-water reactors. The negotiations about the "terrorist nations" were the preparation for easing economic sanctions and the agreement on this matter satisfied Korea.

The US Department of State emphasized that nuclear freezing was all the more important because Korea had developed missiles, and this means that the liftoff of the artificial satellite stimulated the US sense of crisis further and compelled her to concede greatly.

Feeling that she was "betrayed", Japan got angry, without knowing what to do, and the US Congress controlled by the Republican Party bitterly denounced that the Clinton Administration had given "candy" to Korea. However, that was not "candy". The Clinton Administration could not do otherwise. Analysis of the timing of the launching of the artificial satellite indicates that the real purpose of Korea might have been to give an ICBM shock to the US side which delays the fulfillment of the Korea-US Agreed Framework and urge her to implement the agreement.

Hardline Measures vs Spider's Web

US Congressmen from the Republican Party raged at the artificial satellite launched by Korea.

A Congressman from the Republican Party said that they had given north Korea a new reward for her challenge.

Randy Duke Cunningham, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, said that the Clinton Administration had given her a candy stick instead of a club. Craig Thomas, Chairman of the Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that the framework agreement is no more than a sheet of paper.

The US Congress compelled the Clinton Administration to get the recognition of the cost of heavy oil supplies by stages on condition that President appoints a new special envoy to re-examine his Korea policy, clarifies the underground nuclear facilities and controls ICBMs by March 1, 1999; and after March, to get the recognition of the outlay of 15 million dollars on condition that the President guarantees the advance of inter-Korean talks and cooperation in sealing nuclear fuel rods; and after June 1, to get recognition of the expenditure of the remaining 20 million dollars on condition that the President ensures the opening of negotiations on the implementation of the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, agreement on a satisfactory settlement of the issue of the "underground nuclear facilities" and remarkable progress in ballistic missile negotiations.

In this way the US Congress put on the hardest brakes to the implementation of the Korea-US Agreed Framework and made a desperate resistance to amend their Korea policy.

However, Korea had anticipated the opposition by the US Congress, and it would be correct to say that the United States has already been involved in the war without gunshot as conceived by Korea. This can be explained by two reasons:

First, the launching of the artificial satellite by Korea and her development of ballistic missiles do not conflict with the Korea-US Agreed Framework. State Department spokesman James Rubin also pointed out that the development of missiles did not directly violate the framework agreement. If she delays the implementation of the agreement on the excuse that Korea violated the agreement, she will only provide Korea with a good excuse for counterattack. If the United States delays its implementation or cannot put it into effect, Korea will naturally notify its abrogation to the US side. Then, the United States will lose the means to freeze the "development of nuclear weapons" by Korea and be driven to the wall.

Second, the negotiator with Korea was levelled up. Former Defense

Secretary William J. Perry was appointed a new Korea policy coordinator and this has widened and raised the channel of dialogue, which means no loss to Korea. That is because no military crisis will arise so long as dialogue is under way. There have been various analyses that "the north Korea policy handled mainly by the State Department is now going to be re-established by the White House," (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 14, 1998) or that the Congress exercises greater influence, but Korea does not care whom the United States has appointed or who takes the initiative. That is because the United States cannot break the framework agreement.

The United States has to negotiate within this framework. It is said that the task of the coordinator is to thoroughly re-examine the policy towards Korea and its aim, but Perry cannot do it towards abrogating the agreement.

The harder the tug-of-war between the US Administration and Congress, the more profit Korea will get. The more the US side budges, the farther it will be dragged into a tight spider's web. In case the agreement is abrogated before its implementation, the Korean side will formally quit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, free from the special position of suspending the effectuation of her withdrawal from the treaty. Then Korea will declare that though she has not developed nuclear weapons so far, she will develop them from now. This is her last card against the United States.

As Charles Kartman, special envoy for the Korean peace talks, said, the United States also realizes that if the agreement is thrown away, Korea will develop nuclear weapons, and that the agreement is the most effective means of stopping her development of nuclear weapons. However, they do not believe that Korea will really act so and do not like to believe so.

Then, will this lead to a war? It can be definitely said that the war will never break out. Both the US Administration and Congress will coax Korea into reopening the talks and returning to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and stopping the "development of nuclear weapons". Because that is the only way out.

I am not sure whether the matter will go as far as that, but however desperately the US Congress resists, it will be unable to go against the agreement for improving the relations with Korea. This is an

undeniable reality.

It must be added that the only reason for the US Congress dominated by the Republican Party to oppose the Korea policy established by the Administration is that it has not taken the initiative. There is no other reason.

It was Bush's Republican Administration that formulated the policy of compromising with Korea at first. Clinton's Democratic Administration has raised the "nuclear suspicion".

Some experts on the Korean question comment that if the Republican Administration had existed as it was, the relations with Korea would have been improved earlier and that the Clinton Administration has been implementing the policy in a roundabout way.

Everybody knows that the United States is governed by the two conservative parties. There is little difference between the basic policies of the two parties. The difference, if any, is which of them is in power.

In the off-year election held in November 1998 the Democratic Party increased the number of its seats in the Congress in spite of the sex scandal caused by President Clinton. This might influence the repugnance of the US Congress at the policy of compromise.

6. Failure of Delaying Tactics and the Second "Nuclear Suspicion"

The "Soft-Landing Policy" Will Fail

Around 1994 the year when the Korea-US Agreed Framework was issued, the United States changed its hard-line policy of ignorance and hostility toward Korea into a reconciliation policy, the so-called "soft-landing policy".

This was aimed at avoiding a head-on clash with Korea that might entail a destructive damage on her and, especially, preventing maelstrom that would be created by a sudden collapse of the Korean government, ie, a rebellion or ignition of a war by her desperate army, dislocation of masses of her people, and the heavy cost of "unification

through absorption" south Korea would have to bear.

Having realized that she could not bring Korea to her knees by means of a war, the last means, the United States has now employed an appeasement policy, on condition that Korea introduces the system of market economy and institutes the capitalist system. This means leading Korea to reform and openness. "Soft-landing", a term frequently used by the "peace-loving" United States, enjoys a good reputation in the international society. Today's international society, where top priority is given to the logic and interests of the West, defines as an absolute truth the economy and social system of capitalism that emerged victorious in the Cold War between the East and the West. Economic analyses like that of John Kenneth Galbraith, an American economist, who said neither socialism nor capitalism can be said to have won one-sidedly, do not make sense here. There is, if anything, an impudent view that capitalism has won one-sidedly.

Nevertheless, there are still countries that cannot be viewed by the yardstick of this logic. Of these, Korea should be counted first. Korea will not "soft-land" nor will she abandon the socialist economic system. It is Korea's principled stand to hold fast to the Juche idea and defend her style of socialism. Attempting to force her to change it is only an expression of tyranny of a great power. We can understand it if we reverse the positions of the two sides. Let us suppose: The Cold War ends in a victory for socialism; Korea "forces" the United States and Japan, her enemy states, to introduce socialist economy and system as conditions for their survival; if they do not accept this "soft-landing policy", Korea encircles, isolates and applies economic sanctions against them by drawing on the international society dominated by socialist countries and, if they say "no" to the last, she "threatens" them that she will overpower them by means of huge armed forces. In this case, the United States and Japan have three options--first, to concede the demand and become socialist countries, second, to turn it down and fight a war, and third, to pursue coexistence and coprosperity through diplomacy. Without doubt, they will not choose the first option and will try to avoid the second one. Only the third one is desirable.

In the case of Korea, she is confronted with the United States, the superpower in the military, economic, political and information fields.

For all this, Korea has not collapsed. On the contrary, she is making the United States accept her demands one after another, consolidating Kim Jong Il's system step by step. The fierce diplomatic war Korea is waging against the United States, south Korea and Japan for her existence is a picture of the war without gunshot.

The "Sunshine" and "Northward Wind" Policies Are Senseless

Soon after taking office, the present south Korean authority put forward the "policy of reconciliation with the north". This is called, in short, "sunshine policy". He views that "sunshine", rather than the "northward wind", will lead the north to take off her thick and bigoted coat of socialism and help it to realize coexistence with the south. The north refused it, too, on the simple reason that the policy is but a version of the US "soft-landing policy".

At the talks between the US President and the south Korean authority held in November 1998, the south Korean "government" changed the name of the "sunshine policy" into "engagement policy". Here, the word "engagement" means "accepting the north as a colleague", ie, "soft-landing" the north. This is a result of the coordination of the "policies" of the United States and south Korea; it proves that the "sunshine policy" is none other than the "soft-landing policy".

Pak Tong Won, chief secretary of foreign relations and national security of the Blue House (the south Korean "Presidential" residence-Tr.) defined the nature of the "sunshine policy", saying, "It is aimed at stripping the north of its coat of strong 'closed society', planned economy of 'commanding system' and 'military confrontation', and overwhelming the north without fighting a war by maintaining a firm stand of national security and inducing the north to change herself." Even the south Korean chief executive said on a visit to the United States that the policy "aims at urging the north to introduce reform and openness and giving encouragement to the moderates inside the north ." Though under the cloak of reconciliation, the "sunshine policy" is, after all, confrontational in its nature as it aims at changing the system in the north. However, the north cannot accept it. For this reason, the

north has refused the policy, saying it is, in the final analysis, a "policy of national division".

For all that, Seoul cannot adopt the "northward-wind policy". Kim Young Sam's "government" that had appeared with the stand that "the nation is prior to anything" converted its policy towards the north into a hard-line policy, the "northward-wind policy," on the occasion of the death of President Kim Il Sung and subsequently led the inter-Korean relationship to an icy one. Seoul now regrets much about this. The "theory of unifying the country by absorbing the north", a theory which had enjoyed the backing of successful economy, vanished on its own as south Korea's economy got into trouble. The theory runs against the US "soft-landing policy". It is not accidental that the United States regarded Kim Young Sam's "government" as an obstacle to her "soft-landing policy", expressed her feeling of distrust of it and made her confrontation with the "government" sharp. The present chief executive of the south could not follow in his predecessor's footsteps, for there would be nothing to gain if the intensified inter-Korean confrontation leads to a war.

The south Korean authority is calling on the north to comply with the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange between the North and the South adopted in 1991, which the north would also be willing to comply with. The agreement, however, will not come into effect and be carried out on condition of the "sunshine policy" and the long-term presence of the US troops in south Korea.

Under the present circumstances in which both the north and the south are faced with economic difficulties, it is quite essential that the two sides overcome difficulties and pursue coexistence and coprosperity by cooperating with each other on the basis of the identity of the nation. Now is not the time to contend for victory of different political ideals and economic systems. The north would not accept the "sunshine policy" as it is, but there is a great possibility that the north would come again for north-south talks.

The Delaying Tactics in Dilemma

Korea is claimed to be employing delaying tactics, but the truth is

quite opposite. It is the United States that is doing so.

Why did the United States sign the framework agreement with Korea in 1994? It is because she thought Korea would collapse soon. She set the year 2003 as the year of completion of the light-water reactor project, proceeding from the judgement that Korea could not maintain her existence until that time and all she could do was to stop Korea's "development of nuclear weapons" during those years.

Robert Gallucci, US delegate at the time when the Korea-US Agreed Framework was signed, said that though the United States had not taken the "theory of collapse of north Korea" as a premise, she had calculated that the power of north Korea would grow weak and she would lose her military capacity, a threat to the surrounding countries. Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary of State of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said frankly that the agreement had been determined on the premise that north Korea would collapse even tomorrow and the essence had been to wait for north Korea to become weak, ie, delaying tactics. This is a common opinion prevailing among the overwhelming majority within the United States.

Still lingering is the thought if the Kim Jong Il government would not collapse. It is true that Korea was, then, in a dire situation owing to the food crisis and economic difficulties, but she was stable politically.

Mr. Izumi, former professor of Shizuoka Prefectural University of Japan, explains the changed US Korea policy in this way: "It has become a common opinion that the Kim Jong Il's system would not collapse soon and the international society should have to deal with it for some time in the future.... After the death of President Kim Il Sung in July 1994, many American people thought north Korea would implode in one or two years. But now specialists observe that the Kim Jong Il's system will be kept up for at least five or ten years."

Korea does not look to implode, and she will not "soft-land", either. The Kim Jong Il government is steady to the surprise of all. It was a fatal mistake of the United States to have made a wrong estimate of it.

Lack of faithfulness on the part of the United States to comply with the Agreed Framework is ascribable to her waiting for Korea to

collapse. She has not yet lifted economic sanctions, a measure Korea wants most eagerly, because it is her view that if she does so, it will only "prolong" the life of the Kim Jong Il government. In spite of the delaying tactics, Korea, far from "collapsing", is giving a hint that she could scrap the Agreed Framework, even bringing pressure to bear upon the United States for the absence of her faithfulness to the agreement. Alarmed by this, the United States kicked off a clamour about Korea's missile export and the suspicious underground nuclear facilities, a new card for applying pressure to Korea, expressing her hardline position that she would not hesitate to resort to the force of arms.

In this context, some advocated shelving or abrogating the Agreed Framework. Robert A. Manning, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations of the United States, explains the reason in this way: Isn't it that the United States has given north Korea a chance to win time to develop nuclear weapons and missiles which would enhance her position in negotiations?

Obviously the United States would be blamed and called to account if the agreement is annulled. As the days go by, the United States will find herself in a difficult situation. The US dilemma of gaining time has now plunged her in trouble. In contrast with this, all Korea would have to do is only to wait until the United States could no longer bear it. At that time Korea would have been prepared to deal with either of two measures the United States would choose--a war or the compliance with the agreement.

The United States gave Korea an excuse of the Agreed Framework and set the time limit, ie, 2003. The longer she employs the delaying tactics, the shorter the time for her to fulfil the agreement. To speak in defiance of misunderstanding, Korea might not be interested in the light-water reactors as there is no knowing when the building would be completed and as she has to depend on the West for uranium concentrate. It is Korea's strategic target to solve the hostile relations with the United States, a military threat, and in this sense, she acknowledges the importance of the Agreed Framework.

Apparently, Korea has no idea or time to wait. Indignation and impatience produced from the one-sided delay by the United States of the fulfilment of the agreement have reached their limits. The time is

approaching nearer.

The Second "Nuclear Suspicion"

From August 1998 the United States has clamoured about Korea's "suspicious underground nuclear facilities". The facilities at issue are in Kumchang-ri, Taegwan County, North Phyongan Province, about 40 km northwest of Nyongbyon, which had been the object of "nuclear suspicion" of the past. It is reported that the building of the site started around 1989 and, with the interior space of 380,000 m², it is capable of accommodating an atomic power station with a production capacity of 200,000 kw and re-processing facilities. A dam, apparently for supplying cooling water, has nearly been finished not far away from the site and 3,000-volt transmission line has been constructed. Seoul claimed that according to the US analysis of the earth and water obtained secretly in the vicinity of Kumchang-ri, the site was for extracting or storing plutonium. Washington said that experiments of a triggering device for the chain reaction of nuclear fission like plutonium were conducted near the site on several occasions. The US intelligence sources said that its existence was discovered in 1996 and the facilities under "suspicion" number seven.

Amid these plausible pieces of information, Charles Kartman, special envoy for the Korean peace talks, visited Pyongyang in November 1998 and revised his former remark that there were sufficient evidence that the facilities were being used for nuclear-related activities; now he said there were no substantial evidence. On meeting Perry, US Korea policy coordinator on a visit to south Korea, on December 7, 1998, the south Korean chief executive said, "There is no proper evidence that they are nuclear-related facilities and that the north is violating her agreement with the United States. Now is not the stage to give up the 'engagement policy' and apply sanctions." He suggested that the United States and north Korea solve the problem as a package deal.

In the final analysis, what are available are pieces of "information", not evidence. The structure of the information manipulation is identical with those of several "suspicions" against Korea up to now. What is different is that there is a great possibility that Korea might

have deliberately given the United States a bait to entertain suspicion.

It is well known that Korea has built many underground facilities for both civilian and military purposes. The point is whether the facilities in Kumchang-ri are for nuclear activities or not. It is reported that a US military satellite found thousands of workers digging a tunnel underground, but it is quite strange, in view of the methods Korea has taken up to now, that she is building "nuclear facilities" against the Korea-US Agreed Framework on such a scale as to be discovered by a spy satellite. If she builds them in actual fact, she will do it in secret, and above all, she would benefit nothing from developing nuclear weapons. She will not do such a foolish and unprofitable thing as deliberately putting herself at a disadvantage and plunging again into a danger of war at the expense of giving the United States an excuse to break the Agreed Framework. Rumour has it that Korea stated that she could allow visit to the facilities but in case they are not nuclear facilities, the United States must make due compensation. The spokesman of the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "The suspicion of underground nuclear facilities is groundless. Except the facilities in the Nyongbyon area that are frozen, there is no underground nuclear facility."

To rally from the failure in the delaying tactics and the mistake of concluding the Agreed Framework, the United States has kept up the "suspicion" to give a hint as to the abrogation of the Agreed Framework. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright claimed that the relations between the United States and north Korea were at the crossroads; and the US State Department spokesman James Rubin said that if north Korea fails to remove US apprehension, the United States has the right not to fulfil her obligations of the Geneva agreement. Even President Clinton reiterated the need to re-examine the Korea policy, hinting willingness to resort to military strength.

According to the November 1998 issue of the south Korean monthly *Mal*, Kenneth Quinones, representative of the Asia Foundation and a member of the US delegation to the Korea-US talks from 1993 to 1994, pointed out that suspicion of the "underground nuclear facilities" was part of effort by pessimists (in America) to bring about a feeling of fear among the south Korean and American people so as to create difficulties for the negotiations.

Didn't Korea cheat the United States deliberately so as to make the latter raise such a great fuss? Didn't she choose the issue as a powerful diplomatic means for aggravating the situation and driving the unfaithful United States to observe the agreement? In view of Korea's attitude that she can show the United States the facilities if her demands are met, it can be seen as a trick. But the United States is not composed to think in this way.

The second "nuclear suspicion" aggravated the tension between Korea and the United States once again. However, what can be confirmed now is the fact that first, the United States might inspect these facilities, second, she cannot collect nuclear-related evidence there, third, as a result, she would be put in a disadvantageous situation, and fourth, the "suspicion" would be removed by a package deal and the Korea-US relations will be improved radically.

According to the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, dated October 16, 1998, former US Secretary of Defence Perry, who is now Korea policy coordinator, said that the issue does not run against the Agreed Framework of 1994 that promised the freezing of building nuclear-related facilities in Nyongbyon but, as a violation of the spirit of the agreement, it can be said to be a new issue outside the agreement. Even if Korea promotes nuclear development in a region other than Nyongbyon, this does not mean a violation of the Agreed Framework. This is because the objects to be inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency defined in the framework agreement were the facilities in Nyongbyon only. The spokesman of the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs retorted that in spite of the "suspicion" of the underground facilities in Korea, she was not obliged to accept inspection and the framework agreement did not define such obligations. According to the January 7, 1999, issue of *Korea Herald*, English newspaper of south Korea, Fu Dawei, Chinese ambassador to south Korea, said that no country was entitled to inspect the underground facilities of Korea and it was justifiable if Korea demanded compensation for inspection. He called the two sides to settle the issue through negotiations true to the framework agreement.

Korea maintains the stand of respecting the spirit of agreement with the United States that "wants to check the nuclear arms development of north Korea". Since there is no need for her to

develop nuclear weapons, she does not seem to be actually building underground nuclear facilities. If the United States, despite this, raises eventually second "nuclear fuss", she cannot help but conclude a second nuclear agreement with Korea through the same course as that of 1994. This is just a powerful card of the "underground nuclear facilities". An agreement could not be reached on this issue even in the Korea-US negotiations held in New York and Washington in December 1998. Reports have it that Korea claimed that she would allow only one round of inspection of the facilities and the United States should give compensation for it in case they are not for nuclear activities. It is also reported that, pressing Korea with the demand to accept continuous inspections, the United States informed Korea that improvement of Korea-US relations, lifting of sanctions and large-scale food aid would be possible if this issue is settled to the satisfaction of both sides, thus expressing her intention to demand more concessions from Korea. These developments show that the two sides are advancing towards the second package settlement.

Some people say the US and British air raids on Iraq are a warning and "lesson" to the recalcitrant Korea. But the air raids proved to have brought about an adverse result.

On the suspicious nuclear weapons development in Iraq, the IAEA submitted in April 1998 a report to Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the effect that devices, raw materials and behaviour (for the development of nuclear weapons) were not discovered and there was no suspicion. According to Iraq, as many as 2,300 sites have been inspected over the past seven years since the investigation of the UN Special Commission in charge of dismantlement of the biological and chemical weapons started. The mission of the UNSCOM has not yet been accomplished. Nuclear development requires large facilities, so their inspection is comparatively easy. But the biological and chemical weapons can be produced at any place where simple equipment are available, so they can be hidden easily. Paradoxically speaking, pharmaceutical or semiconductor factories for civilian purposes and even university laboratories can become objects of suspicion. Endless will be the objects under suspicion for a resolved inspection team. Iraq, claiming that the UNSCOM was "a group of spies", denounced that Richard

Butler, executive chairman of the UNSCOM, under instructions of the United States, had delayed the inspection deliberately and harassed Iraq, aggravating the confrontation. Russia also demanded that Butler be dismissed from his post. France insisted on forming a new UNSCOM, demanding re-examination of the United Nations policy toward Iraq. *New York Times*, dated January 7, 1999, reported that the UNESCOM included US spies, quoting the remarks of a few insiders of the US government. Afterwards, Butler admitted that US-made devices had been used to wiretap the Iraqi authorities.

The precedent of the US and British air raids on Iraq shows that if confrontation grows intensified and the country concerned becomes a target of armed attack in spite of her acceptance of inspection by the US-led international organizations, the country will only hesitate to accept nuclear inspection, or to dismantle biological and chemical weapons.

Korea has so far refused such an inspection, and she will not permit it in future, either. She is watchful against the pressure and harassing that would be entailed by the endless inspections, regarding them as an attempt to disarm her. Her permission of one round of inspection of the facilities at issue is a measure aimed at containing the United States. The United States will only fall into a crisis incomparably more serious than the crisis in Iraq if she continues to force unjustifiable inspection on Korea or aggravates the tension on the excuse of Korea's refusal. Defence Secretary Cohen warned that the Agreed Framework might be broken if field inspection of the facilities was not permitted, but in 1999 he said that there was a very good sign of changing stand on the part of Korea and the United States has no intention to attack the country. As for the "rumour of crisis" widespread in Japan, he criticized it, saying that there would be no March crisis or April crisis; he denied the rumour that the United States had spread it. In other words, the United States attempts to shake Korea and make the feeling of crisis acuter so as to take the initiative. The same is the case with Korea. This "cockfighting", at first glance, seems to be dangerous, but actually each seeks for a chance to drive the other into a corner, avoiding a war. The situation will not be pushed to the extreme. This can be proved by the January 12, 1999, issue of *Mainichi Shimbun*, which quoted Assistant

Secretary of State Stanley Roth as saying it was foolish to presume that the year 1999 would be a decisive year for agreement or split. This time, too, Korea and the United States will try to find a solution through dialogue.

7. The Victor and the Defeated in the Korea-US War Without Gunshot

The Road to Coexistence and Coprosperity

Which side would win victory in the fight between the "soft-landing policy" and the defence of socialism?

Korea regards it as her basic strategy to emerge victorious in this fight without the use of arms and gunshot. As said above, it is clearer that Korea, making free use of political, diplomatic and military cards, is gaining the upper hand.

Making a fool of herself by Korea's powerful cards of "nuke", missile, artificial satellite and "underground nuclear facilities", the United States would not help but take the road of establishing diplomatic relations with Korea, the road defined by Korea. In this course, the US army in south Korea may continue to stay for some time, but it will only contribute to maintaining and managing security on the Korean peninsula by Korea and the United States.

In this way the war between Korea and the United States without gunshot will finally end in the victory for Korea. Korea will gain much from this. With the lifting of economic sanctions, the capital and high technology of the West including the United States will flow into Korea, resulting in the rehabilitation of her economy. Before anything else, peace will be brought about on the Korean peninsula and an atmosphere conducive to the reunification of the country through federation will be created.

The United States will also be the winner. She would lose nothing even if she makes peace with Korea; instead, the elimination of the danger of war on the Korean peninsula will facilitate her designing of global strategy. It can dispense with the need to enforce the "strategy

of simultaneously reacting to limited wars."

Both countries will together emerge victorious in the war of brains, and take the road to coexistence and coprosperity, recognizing each other's existence and establishing diplomatic relations. Neither of them will go to war if peace, security and political and economic interests on the Korean peninsula can be gained by means of verbal power diplomacy, which would destroy nothing, not by means of war, which would entail heavy manpower and material damage on them and their allies.

Diplomatic war has become the main current of war after the Cold War. This is true in view of the developments after the Gulf War that broke out firmly soon after the end of the Cold War.

The United States conducted missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan in retaliation for the bomb attack on her embassy in Nairobi in August 1998, but the grounds of the attacks were not clear and their results were questioned. Contrary to her intention, she made the Islamic nations her enemy, thus becoming a target of more powerful worldwide terrorist acts. She knows full well that the missile attacks did not prove effective in checking terrorism. Symbolic is the *Washington Post* nicknaming President Clinton the "cruise-missile President" to ridicule the United States that depends only on cruise missiles to threaten Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan and Bosnia. A terrorist attack cannot be countered with a regular warfare. It is the US dilemma to have to fight against the invisible terrorists.

When they saw on TV the corpses of GIs being dragged among the local people in Somalia, the Americans were greatly shocked and felt war-weariness. They showed delicate reactions to the small American casualties in the Gulf War. As Schlesinger, former Defence Secretary, said, the US army had already become an army that allows no casualties.

The effect of the US "power politics" has rapidly worn off, and the country is standing at the crossroads. Wars have exhausted the United States and put her into a danger. She cannot but pursue diplomacy without recourse to arms.

Japan Bogged Down

If Korea and the United States establish diplomatic relations, south Korea will have to recognize it. In this situation, there is no way for south Korea other than to reconcile with the north, and both the north and the south of Korea will take the road of reunifying the country through federation for coexistence and coprosperity.

This will drive Japan into a tight corner.

Prime Minister Obuchi of Japan proposed to President Clinton to hold six-party talks involving the north and the south of Korea, the United States, China, Russia and Japan, instead of four-party talks involving the former four countries.

The south Korean authority entertains the same plan and Russia, too, is interested in it. But participation by Japan and Russia, the parties irrelevant to the issue of the Korean peninsula, will be hardly feasible. Korea will not permit it.

Japan, in particular, is an obstacle to the building of peace which Korea and the United States are undertaking; she is not playing the role of promoting it. Korea declared that she will not talk to Japan, a country that was endeavouring to become a military power, insisting that Korea's artificial satellite was a ballistic missile.

Japan's possessing of the capacity for quick reaction in case of a "crisis" on the Korean peninsula means her attempt to become a military power. None of its neighbouring countries is happy with this; this only heightens their sense of watchfulness. The United States, too, allows Japan to build up her military strength as far as the US military-industrial complexes benefit from it, but not further than that. This is the essence of the so-called "theory of bottle cap".

Japan is an artificial satellite power that has launched many satellites by her own efforts. This means she has the capacity of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile any time. She can also manufacture a missile that can re-enter the atmosphere.

The September 17, 1998, issue of the south Korean magazine *Hangyore 21* points out, "In the case of a ballistic missile, the technique of making it re-enter the atmosphere from the outer space is required. Japan's H-II rocket raised suspicion in the United States and other countries of the world, because it was loaded with the experimental equipment for the re-entry."

Japan has plutonium in a large store and nuclear development

technology, so she can produce nuclear weapons any time. Japan's military expenditure exceeded one trillion *yen* in the 1970s and reached 4.95 trillion *yen* in 1998; thus Japan belongs to the first class of the world in this field. In other words, she can rush towards the goal of a nuclear-possessing state, a military power, any time.

For all this, Japan would not do so, for the Asian countries as well as the United States do not wish it, and apparently will not leave her to do so.

Korea is not what she was yesterday, and so is Asia. Asian countries and the United States will not leave Japan to herself to become a military threat to the Far East.

The United States wished for the early adoption of the new Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines, because she needed a tool, a strategic base, for carrying out her Asia strategy, not because she wished Japan to become a military power, free from the boundaries of her strategy.

When diplomatic relations are established between Korea and the United States and Korea is no longer a "potential threat" to the Asian and Pacific region, Japan's system for reacting to emergency, which has been built on the premise that Korea is a "threat", will lose her "enemy". As Japan did not know what to do with her fist raised during the "missile clamour" after it was proved to be a man-made satellite, her fist will again lose the object to strike.

After all, Japan cannot help but be the last to improve relations with Korea, after the United States and south Korea. By that time, Japan will find herself in a situation worse than now.

The talks for normalizing relations between Korea and Japan came to a rupture because Japan did not accept Korea's demand for basic and sufficient apology and compensation going beyond the boundaries of the "South Korea-Japan Treaty". If Japan accepts it, she will have to re-examine the treaty and again face the issue of redressing the past in relation with other countries.

The post-WWII treatment of Japan cannot be resolved completely as long as her past history in relation with Korea is not redressed. Korea is the last country that can rectify the deceitfulness and drawbacks of Japan's liquidation of her past in relation with other Asian countries, which was settled through political conspiracy. Such

being the case, normalization of relations between Japan and Korea cannot be realized at the moment.

The November 1998 issue of Japanese magazine *Sekai* quoted military analyst Ogawa Kazuhisa as saying, "It is natural that the country, which has failed to practice diplomacy on the level conventional in the world, cannot understand the intentions and way of activity of north Korea. It is quite doubtful whether Japan can open a channel towards a diplomatically competent north Korea. In this sense, complete post-war settlement serves as a condition for her promotion of relations with north Korea."

Apparently this judgement should not be expected from the Japanese authorities for the time being. After the reunification of the north and the south of Korea through federation is realized, Japan must redress her past with either the unified government or the regional government in the north, and it is obvious that the demand will again go beyond the boundaries of the "South Korea-Japan Treaty". The then Japanese government will also fail to find ways to turn the demand down.

In the final analysis, Japan will suffer the greatest loss. She will not be able to engage in solving the problem of the Korean peninsula, and in the end, she will find herself bogged down. This is an unavoidable end of the absence of independent diplomacy, abandonment of the diplomatic card in relation with Korea and a dash for a military power--the choices that run counter to the trend of detente in the post-Cold War era.

Korea will continue to launch artificial satellites. It is reported that Kim Kye Gwan, Korean delegate to the Korea-US talks, told the US Congressmen on December 9, 1998, "The exact time cannot be ascertained but second man-made satellite will be launched. We will give a prior notice to our allies, but not to the countries we are legally at war with."

With regard to this, the Japanese mass media made speculations that hardly hold water.

The January 6, 1999, issue of *Tokyo Shimbun* said, "According to the analyses of the information the Japanese government obtained from the United States and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defence Agency obtained independently, it has been confirmed that

north Korea is deploying, or planning to deploy, *Rodong* missiles at more than ten bases including those under construction." An unconfirmed rumour has it that Korea would "test-fire a missile in the future." *Sankei Shimbun*, dated December 25, 1998, reported, "The United States does a thing when she is determined, as she conducted air raids against Iraq. The Japan-US security circles see that the United States 'will attack north Korea without consultation with Japan or south Korea.' The day is not far when the Korean peninsula would vomit flames." *Asahi Shimbun*, dated December 31, 1998, said, "If north Korea launches a missile again, the Agreed Framework would be broken." I shall not dwell any further on whether the result of the analysis made in this book or these speculations would be correct.

But what cannot be set aside is whether the Japanese government is making correct analysis of the situation on the Korean peninsula and whether it can grasp effective diplomatic cards in relation with Korea. It can be said there is little hope in view of the stand of Norota, Director General of the Defence Agency, who on a visit to south Korea in January 1999 said, "Japan will discontinue supplying funds to KEDO in case north Korea launches another missile." Reality clearly shows that even if Japan freezes her supply of funds to KEDO, it will not bring pressure to bear upon Korea. Nevertheless, Japan miscalculates that it can serve as a serious message for preventing Korea's "nuclear and missile development" and "blast". This is quite fatal.

It deserves welcome that the Japanese government had an informal contact with Korea in New York in December 1998 on the request of the south Korean authority for the promotion of the Japan-Korea negotiations, trying to change her stand of confrontation. But as long as she makes a dash for a military power like adopting a bill related with the new Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines, alleging that Korea's artificial satellite was a "missile", the negotiations would not be conducted full steam.

South Korean daily *Dong-A Ilbo*, dated January 5, 1999, pointed out, "The United States and Japan should make diplomatic efforts so as not to be manipulated by the hard-liners in them in the settlement of the north Korean issue." Japanese government had better bear in mind that this was the then basic stand of the south Korean authorities.

The aftermath of the failure to conduct far-sighted diplomacy with clear-cut strategies will be excessively great. It is not too late even now. Japan should promote diplomacy in relation with Korea, ie, normalization of her relations with the country, to her national interests from the standpoint of independence so as to conduct with resolution "unshakable strategic diplomacy" conducive to the building of peace on the Korean peninsula.

What Will the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Korea and the United States Bring to Korea?

When Korea and the United States establish diplomatic relations, the political and military situation on the Korean peninsula will change at once. It will be alright to say it will be a fundamental change. Part of it was mentioned above. The influence it will exert on Korea's economy is as follows:

First, with the elimination of military confrontation and tension, Korea will be able to radically reduce the enormous military expenditure and divert national funds to revitalizing the economy.

If the reduced amount of defence budget is diverted to revitalizing the economy, it will not take a long time for her to improve the cycle of the economy. Agriculture has been experiencing poor yield because of successive natural calamities, unhealthy growth of crops caused by lack of fertilizers, and difficulties in crop growing and transport caused by lack of fuel. Investment in this field will prove effective as its foundation is steady.

Secondly, with the lifting of economic sanctions by the United States and the West, the Western capital and technology will flow into Korea.

The US firms have already begun to make inroads into Korea's economy. In 1995, 11 enterprises including General Motors, MCI Communications Corp. and US Washington Bank, with the formal permission of the Department of the Treasury, inspected Korea and expressed their desire to make investment. Of them, Standard Oil, general development company that has relations with Rockefeller, signed a contract with the then Sungri Chemical Complex in the Rajin-Sonbong Zone in 1996 for a joint venture. The US National

Minerals Association agreed in 1997 to explore zinc, lead and magnesite in the districts of Tanchon and Komdok of South Hamgyong Province, signing a contract amounting to 500 million dollars. At the time, they could not do business by means of the dollar because of the economic sanctions, but even in this situation, the Mineral Technologies Co. imported a large quantity of magnesite.

Magnesite is a fireproof material indispensable in iron works. Korea has its deposits of 3.2 billion tons, 56 % of the world's deposits.

Korea is a treasurehouse of strategically important mineral resources and rare metals like nickel, cobalt, chrome, manganese and titanium that are indispensable for the high-tech industry and high-tech weapons development. This arouses a great deal of interest among the US firms. If sanctions are lifted and accounts are settled by the dollar, the US enterprises' investment in Korea and money circulation in the trade between the two countries will be realized. Then, Western firms will undoubtedly propose joint development projects and the likes. It should not be forgotten that the West failed to strongly demand the respect of human rights on the apartheid regime in South Africa in the past, because it is a power of rare metals.

Economy defines politics and vice versa. If the political problems are solved between Korea and the United States, their economic relations will also be improved at once. The US enterprises, quick at investing in advance in promising projects, are making inroads into Korea, because they regard it as a golden business chance and economically profitable.

It is no accidental that in August 1998, Korea built a high-quality magnesia clinker factory and made public the basic data of her oil field. It is a message of her willingness to introduce Western capital.

Korea could not introduce Western technology officially as she has long been subject to COCOM. But, when diplomatic relations are established between Korea and the United States, the high technology will flood into the country. Also possible will be oil exploration that requires latest technology.

Rajin-Sonbong trade and economic zone in Korea, a special economic zone that allows full introduction of foreign capital, and set up in 1991, is still in the stage of infrastructural building; aspiring to serve for the transportation of goods in transit, processing for export,

tourism and financial transactions, it has begun to play its role slowly and yet smoothly. It is highly possible that a large-scale development would be undertaken at once in this zone by the US, Western and south Korean enterprises. The south Korean firms that have set themselves up in Hunchun, Jilin Province, China, are exporting their products via Rajin. The merit of it is "cheap transport cost and high speed".

The advantages of the zone are that it is situated in the center of the golden triangle bordering Russia, China and Korea and it can serve as a good transit base. Availing itself of the wide land and ports that can receive large vessels, it aims to become a Hong Kong in Northeast Asia. Korea, China, Russia, south Korea and Mongolia, with the UNDP as the centre, are participating in the Tuman River Development Programme that envisages introducing an investment of 30,000 million dollars for 30 years, and Japan is participating in it as an observer. If the US and Western businesses advance into the zone, the theory of "second Hong Kong" is not a dream. Here, the Rajin-Sonbong trade and economic zone will play a pivotal role.

Thirdly, inter-Korean economic cooperation will be further promoted. Hyundai, the biggest conglomerate in south Korea, already agreed with Korea on joint projects in many fields including the development of Mt. Kumgang and in December 1998 on establishing an industrial zone covering 66 square kilometres in the northwest coastal area. Daewoo has also set up factories in Nampho and other areas. Samsung, the second biggest conglomerate, is no less positive; it is holding negotiations with the north in Beijing. It formulated the policy of expanding cooperation with the north in the future and made public a plan of building in the north an electronics complex covering 1.65 square kilometre of land area with the investment of 1,000 million dollars, annually producing equipment and machinery worth 3,000 million dollars, products related with information communication, semi-conductors and video.

When the economic exchanges that are conducted unreported these days are included, it is no exaggeration to say that the north and the south have already been reunified. South Korea is the third largest Korea's trader next to Japan and China, and the scope is expanding rapidly. There is no doubt that the economic exchanges will be

accelerated at once with the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and the United States. With the lifting of various restrictions, economic ventures into Korea by the Korean businessmen living in Japan, the United States and other countries will be facilitated. In view of the fact that a business, which has established personal relations and laid down its foundation in a country in which it set itself up before others, enjoys preferential treatment, the situation may develop to be "first come, first served".

II. Korea-US Reconciliation Started As a Result of "Nuclear Suspicion" (Real-Time Analysis)

The Process of the Settlement of the "Nuclear Issue" on the Korean Peninsula

1992

January 22: The first Korea-US high-level talks are held in New York

January 30: Korea signs the Safeguards Accord with the IAEA

May 25: The first ad hoc inspection (six times until January 1993)
1993

February 25: The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a decision on demanding that Korea permit special inspection.

March 12: Korea issues a statement on withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

May 11: The UN Security Council adopts a resolution on demanding that Korea reconsider her withdrawal from the NPT.

May 29: Korea test-fires missiles

June 2: The first round of talks between Korea and the United States is opened.

June 11: Korea-US Joint Statement is published.

July 14: The second round of talks between Korea and the United States is held.

July 19: Korea-US Press Statement is issued by each side.

October 1: The General Assembly of the IAEA adopts by an

overwhelming majority a resolution on demanding that Korea permit inspection, denouncing that Korea violated the Nuclear Safeguards Accord.

November 11: First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju proposes a package deal to the United States.

1994

February 15: Korea and the IAEA agree on inspection for the continuity of the Safeguards Accord.

February 25: An agreement on suspending the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises and others is reached at the Korea-US contacts held in New York.

March 31: The UN Security Council publishes its Chairman's statement demanding that Korea permit reinspection.

April 4: The Foreign Ministry of Korea denounces the UN Security Council Chairman's statement.

April 28: Korea proposes to the United States to establish a new peace mechanism.

May 30: The UN Security Council publishes its Chairman's statement on the issue of changing fuel rods.

June 1: The Foreign Ministry of Korea rejects the UN Security Council Chairman's statement.

June 10: The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution on demanding that Korea permit "special inspection".

June 13: The Foreign Ministry of Korea declares Korea's withdrawal from the IAEA.

June 16-17: Talks between Kim Il Sung and Jimmy Carter are held.

July 8: President Kim Il Sung dies.

August 5: The first session of the third round of the Korea-US talks is held.

August 12: An Agreed Statement between Korea and the United States is published.

September 23: The second session of the third round of the Korea-US talks is held.

October 21: The Agreed Framework between Korea and the United States is signed in Geneva.

1995

January 9: The Foreign Ministry of Korea announces the removal

of restriction on importing US goods and the lifting of the ban on US trading ships putting in her ports.

January 20: The US Department of State announces the relaxation of part of the economic sanctions against Korea, including the removal of the freezing of assets and the approval of importing magnesite.

March 9: A general assembly for establishing the KEDO is held.

April 20: The talks between Korean and US experts on the light-water reactor project are ruptured.

June 13: At the Korea-US talks on the LWR project a joint statement that the United States is entirely in charge of the construction of the light-water reactors and that the type is called the "advanced version of US-origin design and technology" is published.

December 15: Korea and the KEDO sign the agreement on the LWR project.

1996

January 24: The IAEA resumes the routine and ad hoc inspections of the nuclear facilities of Korea.

February 22: Korea proposes to the United States to conclude a tentative agreement pending the signing of a peace treaty.

April 7: The US Department of Commerce removes restrictions on the humanitarian aid goods to Korea.

April 16: A quadripartite conference is proposed at the talks between the US President and the south Korean authority.

April 20: Korea-US talks on missiles are held in Berlin.

May 9: At the talks on unearthing the remains of the US soldiers a written agreement on returning them is adopted.

June 12: The US government gives aid to the Korean flood victims for the first time.

1997

August 19: The ground-breaking ceremony for the construction of the light-water reactors is held in the Kumho area in Korea.

December 9: The first quadripartite conference is held in Geneva.

1998

August 31: Korea launches her first artificial satellite.

September 5: An agreement on resuming the LWR project on a full scale is reached at the Korea-US high-level talks.

(This part analyzes the events that happened between 1993 and 1995. The official titles and the names of the organizations are those of the period.)

1. The Intention of the Withdrawal from the NPT and Its Background (March-April 1993)

Do-or-die Tactics in Defence of State Power

The day after Korea declared her withdrawal from the NPT on March 12, 1993, an international political scientist deplorably commented that Korea's withdrawal from the NPT meant her "defeat".

In commenting on the statement on her withdrawal from the NPT the mass media seemed to declare her defeat under the titles, "A Serious Challenge to the NPT regime", "Her Isolation Will Be Accelerated", "Serious Threat to Northeast Asia", "North-South Relations Grow Tense Again", "The United States, Japan and South Korea Look into Sanctions" and so on.

Are they correct? Toleration of the superpower's unfair and violent acts has resulted in today's unequal international organizations and order. The international order after the collapse of the bipolar Cold War system as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union means, after all, the US-led "order". The United States will be more violent if somebody does not apply the brake somewhere. Was Korea's decision the useless resistance of an ant that risked "defeat" in the fight against an elephant or the resistance of a bee that was resolved to die after stinging its enemy?

But that doesn't seem correct. This is clear from how much the giant "elephant" was embarrassed when Korea announced her withdrawal from the NPT. The IAEA spokesman's words that it was simply astonishing were symbolical. Most of those who are related to the IAEA regarded as only a "gesture" Korea's "self-defensive measure" repeatedly expressed in answer to the forced special inspection. At the special session of the Board of Governors on March

18, 1993, they failed to decide whether they should bring this question to the UN Security Council or not. Therefore, the IAEA was at a loss what to do. The United States had thought that if she put pressure on Korea by means of special inspection, Korea would make a concession. But the Americans proposed negotiations to Korea, saying that they would "wait and see" and "she is still in duty bound to observe the Treaty." They had counsellor-level talks with Korea in haste in Beijing on March 17 and 19, 1993. It is very exceptional that the United States proposed negotiations to Korea twice in such a short period. They even expressed their opinion that they would refrain from such "excessive reaction" as to apply economic sanctions in the name of the UN. They had threatened that they would apply various sanctions such as bringing a "complaint" to the UN Security Council and using the armed forces if Korea did not accept the special inspection. What does the sudden change in their attitude mean?

Korea's announcement of the withdrawal from the NPT was lawful because it accorded with Article 10 of the Regulations on the Withdrawal from the NPT. Korea had neither invaded other countries nor threatened them as Iraq did. The UN Security Council would not find sufficient reasons for adopting a resolution on applying sanctions against her. Moreover, China might veto. After all, bringing a "complaint" to the UN Security Council was no more than a threat and the United States found herself in a dilemma.

As for Korea, she aimed at evading the risk of the case being brought to the Security Council by her declaration of withdrawal from the NPT and at compelling the United States, the direct party to the matter, to come to negotiation, while defending her state power. Therefore, it can be said that the declaration of her withdrawal from the NPT was do-or-die tactics. In this way, Korea's announcement of her withdrawal put the United States and the IAEA in a difficult situation.

The Unfair and Unequal NPT

In order to have a correct understanding of the question of the nuclear inspection on Korea, it is necessary, first of all, to know what the IAEA and the NPT are.

The IAEA was formed in 1957. The United States and the Soviet Union which were the superpowers in the West and the East after the Second World War were crazy about competition in the development and deployment of nuclear weapons. In the course of this, the technology of the atomic power generation developed.

Plutonium, the material for nuclear bombs, is produced when operating atomic power stations. This became a problem and people raised voice for peaceful use of atomic power. The US President Eisenhower officially raised this problem in 1953.

The IAEA was formed in this context, and its Charter stipulates that the member nations shall be provided with nuclear technology and assistance and that it be their duty to ensure nuclear security, that is, to accept inspection to prevent the use of nuclear power for a military purpose. In addition to the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, France succeeded in nuclear testing in 1960 and China in 1964 since the formation of the IAEA, so that the number of nuclear states increased to five. Being afraid of the destruction of the nuclear balance and the weakening of the system of nuclear domination which centred on herself and the Soviet Union, the United States made a treaty to prevent other countries except those five countries from having nuclear weapons. This was the NPT which was published on March 5, 1970. (As of March 1994, 164 countries signed the NPT.)

The NPT divided its signatories into nuclear states and non-nuclear states and fixed the number of the nuclear states and made the non-nuclear states sign the agreement on undergoing the inspection by the IAEA in order to prohibit the military use of atomic power stations.

The NPT is an extremely unequal treaty. The nuclear states are not obliged to undergo the inspection. In the treaty there is an article that they should make efforts for nuclear disarmament, but it has no power to compel them to do so. Therefore, only the five countries can monopolize the political card of the powerful nuclear weapon. There is no way to prevent the countries which did not sign the NPT from developing nuclear weapons independently. There may appear some countries which regard it harmful to sign the NPT. This gives rise to criticism that the NPT is a treaty which justifies the weapons of the nuclear states, while discriminating against the non-nuclear states.

The most serious point at issue is that the United States actually bosses the NPT, and that, as Yoshida Yasuhiko, former head of the public information office of the IAEA puts it, the IAEA is her subordinate organization.

All the signatories to the NPT signed it in the hope that the nuclear states would put nuclear disarmament into effect and further abolish the nuclear weapons, but the nuclear disarmament has not been realized at all and the threat from the nuclear states continues. Many countries, critical of this fact, refuse to sign the NPT. In April 1995 the meeting to discuss and decide the renewal of the term of the treaty was held, and the countries which are against the US-led NPT did not want the approval of an unconditional, indefinite extension of the term.

Korea joined the IAEA in 1976 and signed the NPT in 1985. Why did she sign the NPT? There is a conjecture that Korea signed the NPT in expectation of introducing nuclear technology from the Soviet Union. But this is not correct. Korea already began to develop atomic energy in the 1950's and concluded an agreement on cooperation in the atomic research with the Soviet Union in 1956, but she has been independently developing the atomic energy on the principle of an independent national economy.

It appears that Korea signed the NPT for the purpose of removing the constant nuclear threat from the United States. This is explained by the following phrase in the Preamble of the NPT:

"Recalling that in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, states must refrain in the international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

Even after Korea's signing of the NPT, however, the nuclear threat against her has continued. Korea signed the Safeguards Accord with the IAEA after US President Bush made public the intention to withdraw the tactical nuclear weapons from the ground and the sea of south Korea in September 1991 and the south Korean "President" Roh Tae Woo declared the nonexistence of nuclear weapons in November 8 that year, and the suspension of the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises was announced in January the following year. This means

that Korea permitted the inspection of the IAEA because she believed that the nuclear threat had been reduced. In this respect Korea's logic and attitude is consistent.

Korea smoothly underwent six rounds of ad hoc inspection. Ad hoc inspection is an inspection which ascertains on the spot the correctness of the content of the report of the country that undergoes inspection. If the ad hoc inspection had been followed up with the routine inspection, without alteration, no question would have arisen. (The routine inspection ascertains periodically that the facilities and nuclear material confirmed by the ad hoc inspection are not used for military purposes.) But the IAEA demanded unilaterally and in haste the special inspection of the two facilities which were not included in the report, breaking the "relations of trust" with Korea.

The special inspection is to coercively inspect the other facilities other than the ones which are reported for the ad hoc or routine inspection. Until then not a country had undergone the special inspection which is highly questionable because it involves the danger of infringing upon the sovereignty of the countries which undergo inspection. The Korean side refused to accept the inspection of the two facilities because they were military installations. Then, the United States threatened Korea, saying that she would apply sanctions against her, and Korea announced her withdrawal from the NPT.

Counterattack against the US Nuclear Card

"It would be a mistake if north Korea attempted to use her withdrawal from the NPT as a 'diplomatic card'. Fundamentally speaking, the nuclear issue is not something to be used as a 'card'." (*Tokyo Shimbun*, March 13, 1993.)

The argument that "the nuclear issue must not be used as a card" is correct. It is none other than the United States that has used the "nuclear deterrent" for her "policy of strength" in the international politics. The United States has always used the nuclear issue as a card for diplomatic pressure by bossing the NPT-IAEA regime as she pleases.

The United States attempted to apply the same method to Korea. However, the "development of nuclear weapons" in Korea is not an

established fact but a fabricated "suspicion". Here Blix, Director General of the IAEA, an agent of the United States, played the leading role.

The photo "information" obtained by the US military spy satellite became the main cause of the "nuclear suspicion". It is preposterous to say that Korea is developing nuclear weapons on the grounds that buildings and transmission lines are not visible. But the people who are infected with the idea of worshipping the United States believe that "it will be true because the United States says so." Since the United States is in command of the "order of information" of the world, the ambiguous rumour has been rapidly exaggerated in the Western countries, as if it were "authentic". Taking advantage of this, the United States has wielded the card of "nuclear suspicion".

"There is a major premise in north Korea that she can be a great power if only she has nuclear weapons. She seems to view that if only she possesses nuclear weapons, south Korea, Japan and the United States will be afraid of her, and she will get rid of her international isolation and recover from her economic bankruptcy." (*Sankei Shimbun*, March 15, 1993.)

This is what Sato Katsumi, Director of the Modern Korea Research Institute, said. This is also the Western people's general understanding. They made a fuss as if the unidentified flying object (UFO) were attacking the earth, saying that "the intention to develop nuclear weapons is clear," and that it is a "hardline attitude", a "hidden operation", a "dangerous gambling to defend the system" and an "act to preserve the nuclear card". They seem to make a fuss intentionally though they know that the UFO does not exist in reality.

With this Western understanding, however, it would be impossible to explain properly the following actions which have been taken by Korea until now. Why did Korea sign the NPT of her own accord if she really intended to possess nuclear weapons? Why did she permit the inspection of the IAEA? Why did she adopt the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization with south Korea? Why has she insisted on making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone? If these are the nuclear cards, it will be correct to say that Korea has opposed the "development of nuclear weapons" by means of these cards.

If Korea possesses nuclear weapons, she will probably gain

increasing tension and her international isolation while losing international trust and her face. President Kim Il Sung declared that his country had neither intention to develop nuclear weapons nor the ability to do it.

On March 17, 1993, the Korean ambassador to the UN said Korea would reconsider her withdrawal from the NPT, on condition that the US nuclear threat against Korea be removed, that the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises be suspended, that the US military bases in south Korea be subject to inspection, and that the impartiality and strict neutrality of the IAEA be restored. This accords with the reasons why Korea signed the NPT and why she refused to sign the Safeguards Accord with the IAEA for a long time. In other words, Korea wants to get the threat of the US nuclear weapons in south Korea removed and all the nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula pulled out.

This is the pressing question for Korea. Korea will neither wish to develop nuclear weapons in secret nor tolerate her sovereignty being infringed upon by accepting the continual unjust inspection of the IAEA.

Even if Korea's statement on her withdrawal from the NPT resulted in becoming the "nuclear card" which drew the United States to the ground of the dialogue, it was the United States and the IAEA that made it the "nuclear card" by putting heavy pressure on Korea.

The United States uses the "nuclear card" as a means for maintaining the US-led international order and as a means for putting pressure upon other countries and interfering in their affairs. On the contrary, Korea is trying to realize denuclearization on the Korean peninsula. This is the fundamental difference between them. It can be said that Korea's declaration on her withdrawal is a challenge to and counterattack against the United States that has used the "nuclear card" as an instrument of putting pressure on other countries.

Threat and Blackmail by Nuclear War Exercises and Forced Inspection

Until now the United States has frequently used the nuclear card in her own interests as a convenient "pressure card".

Japan will also take countermeasures if her sovereignty is threatened. If her military secret can leak to a hostile country and if it is clear that an international organization is actually used by the hostile country, she will withdraw from it without hesitation.

Korea boldly decided to withdraw from the NPT as a step to defend her supreme interests. Paragraph I of Article 10 of the NPT stipulates:

"Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." The supreme interests in case of Korea mean the independence and sovereignty of the country and the socialist system which the Korean people gained at all costs.

In those days the extraordinary event which directly endangered the supreme interests of Korea was the "special inspection" decided by the IAEA. Another extraordinary event was that the United States and south Korea resumed the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises.

As the United States declared that she had withdrawn her nuclear weapons from south Korea and suspended the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises and expressed her intention to withdraw her troops from south Korea and "President" Roh Tae Woo declared the "nonexistence of nuclear weapons", Korea, judging that the threat of nuclear weapons had been removed, signed the Safeguards Accord in 1992 and permitted the IAEA's inspection.

However, the south Korean side and the United States asked Korea for only mutual inspection between the north and the south, excluding the US military facilities in south Korea.

The Korean side would never accept their "proposal" because it has asserted that the US nuclear weapons in south Korea were the root cause of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

Thus the inspection became impossible. On the pretext of it, the United States and the south Korean side stopped the work of the north-south nuclear joint committee and at the same time, resumed the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises. It is impossible to confirm denuclearization on the Korean peninsula unless the nonexistence of the US nuclear weapons in south Korea was proved. After all, they forced the "nuclear inspection" only on Korea.

The explanation of the south Korean side that the "Team Spirit"

joint military exercises were of defensive nature was not convincing, because they brought the aircraft carrier Independence, Stealth fighter-bombers and B-1B nuclear strategic bombers for the purpose of nuclear blackmail. It was not accidental that they demanded that Korea accept the forced inspection of her military bases at a time when the joint military exercises were in full swing. The "special inspection" was a threat and blackmail by means of inspection.

The editorial carried in *New York Times*, March 6, 1993, reads that the exercises stimulate north Korea needlessly and they were needless for the security of south Korea which the United States emphasizes ceaselessly. However, the United States staged the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises and demanded that Korea undergo the "special inspection", aggravating military tension on the Korean peninsula. Korea reacted to it by an adroit tactic of declaring her withdrawal from the NPT.

Prof. Frank N. von Hippel at Princeton University, an expert of the nuclear issue, suggested that it was desirable to stop the exercises, criticizing that the current exercises were the same as the incident of the Bay of Pigs in the early days of the Kennedy Administration which had attempted to overthrow the Cuban revolutionary government without making a full appraisal of the effect of the scheme. (*Asahi Shimbun*, March 19, 1993.)

Leonard Spector, Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Director of the Non-Proliferation Project, also pointed out that it was wrong to have driven Korea to declare her withdrawal from the NPT, and that the IAEA must make a special inspection of the former US military bases in south Korea and testify that there were no longer any nuclear weapons and equalize the pain of the north and the south, thus keeping up north Korea's face and giving her a chance of cancelling the declaration on her withdrawal. (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 18, 1993.)

A Heavy Blow at the Monopolistic and Tyrannical NPT

Many newspapers, dated March 25, 1993, carried an article, which reads, "De Klerk, President of South Africa, announced that South

Africa had produced six nuclear bombs by 1989 and dismantled them all in 1990."

This news gave the world a shock no less stronger than Korea's declaration on her withdrawal from the NPT. It was unprecedented that a country other than the five nuclear states--the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China--made public of her own accord that she had developed nuclear weapons.

Why, then, did South Africa dare to announce it in such a situation? If she has already dismantled them, is there any need to admit her production of the nuclear weapons and subject herself to international condemnation? She may probably have intended to use it as a deterrent to war by displaying her capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. But the explanation is not very convincing. So one may think of the "theory of US pressure".

Prof. M. Hough at the Institute of Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, pointed out that she must have done so in anticipation of the change of the political system because the United States worried over the transfer of the nuclear research work to the hostile forces. (*Sankei Shimbun*, March 26, 1993.) By the change of the political system, he means the seizure of political power by the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC is in close relationship with Korea. The professor thinks that if Korea withdrew from the NPT, her nuclear activity would be left to herself, and it would be impossible to prevent the South African technique of manufacturing nuclear weapons from flowing into the countries that could be troublesome to the establishment of a new world order, and for fear of them, the United States made the first move.

Wasn't it the real intention of the United States to arouse the world opinion against Korea's refusal to accept the inspection and against her withdrawal from the NPT by giving the world people the shock that the IAEA failed to discover South Africa's manufacture of nuclear weapons even in the course of 115 rounds of ad hoc inspection since she had concluded the Safeguards Accord with the IAEA in 1991, and that it is easy to develop nuclear weapons and their horizontal transfer is taking place beyond expectation? The United States would dare do so even though she may sacrifice South Africa. Whatever the real state of affairs may be, Korea's declaration on her withdrawal from the NPT

can be said to be a heavy blow which gave a big shock and trouble to the United States.

Many countries have protested against the nuclear states' monopoly of nuclear weapons and arbitrary actions by the United States based on their monopoly, but the United States has ignored them until today. For example, although the United States believes that Israel and South Africa have jointly developed nuclear weapons and that Israel has about 200 nuclear warheads already (Takaki Jinsaburo), she has not demanded that they accept inspection nor put political pressure upon them. But the United States puts strong pressure upon Iraq which is against Israel. The only reason for this attitude of the United States is whether they are friendly to her or not. Also, the United States completely ignores the criticism of such an unjust attitude.

"The country is divided into two which are confronted with each other, and one side clearly possesses nuclear weapons, constantly threatening the other side. It is unreasonable and contrary to the principle of fairness to demand the threatened side to accept the inspection." This assertion of Korea is the counterattack against those who clamour about the "nuclear suspicion" of Korea as well as a sharp criticism of the fundamental contradiction of the NPT regime. It roused a great sensation the world over.

The NPT expires in 1995, and many people, especially the third-world people, are raising their voices against the extension of the term of the NPT regime, because the NPT is the "nuclear states-centred regime" by which the "logic of the great power" holds sway.

The nuclear states have made no effort to abolish nuclear weapons, another aspect of nuclear non-proliferation which is stipulated by the NPT. Moreover, the United States is wielding nuclear weapons as a "political card", so that the number of the semi-nuclear states is increasing. Consequently, the people are raising their voices that there is no need to maintain the NPT, if it cannot prevent both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

There are opinions: "It is necessary to re-examine the treaty in order to stop up its loophole and abolish nuclear weapons" (India), which means that the nuclear states must move to abolish the nuclear weapons; "It is necessary to ensure the security of the countries which do not have nuclear weapons" (Nigeria), which means that the nuclear

states must not threaten the others.

There are also opinions for revising the content of the treaty and reforming the system on a long-term basis. The demand of Korea for the impartiality of the treaty and for the removal of the threat of the nuclear states means a sharp criticism of the unreliability of the NPT-IAEA regime and its contradiction. It is not Korea but the NPT and the "policy of strength" of the United States, which controlled it at will, that were driven into a tight corner this time.

The United States Which Got into a Dilemma

"First, ... north Korea will give up the development of nuclear weapons and maintain the system. Second, ... the nuclear issue will come to a deadlock and north Korea will be driven into a tight corner. And third, ... an armed conflict will break out and north Korea will crumble." This is a clause of an article carried in *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, dated April 19, 1993, under the headline "The Last Gamble for the Maintenance of the Present System". It predicted the future of Korea in these three aspects. It added that the possibility of the second prediction is 50 per cent, and her withdrawal from the NPT will get her stuck in a bog. Half the prediction was correct. The nuclear issue may come to a "deadlock" but it did not bring Korea to "bay".

The result of the UN disarmament conference held in Kyoto from April 13 to 16, 1993, was contrary to the expectation of the United States to such an extent that the US delegate deplored that he was disappointed.

Those who are related to disarmament and scholars of almost all the countries were confined to expressing no more than their "worry" about Korea's declaration on her withdrawal and on the contrary, they stressed that first, the United States must refrain from taking a hard line, punitive sanctions against Korea; second, the issue must be settled through the dialogue between Korea and the countries and the organizations concerned, without being restricted by the deadline of June 12; third, the declaration on refraining from making nuclear pre-emptive attacks against the non-nuclear states must be stipulated; and fourth, a comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty must be concluded for the total abolition of nuclear weapons.

What does this mean? It proves that the issue raised by Korea which always feels the nuclear threat from the United States, the nuclear superpower, is the common issue of the non-nuclear states, and that the non-nuclear states are badly disappointed at and displeased with the NPT regime under which the nuclear states, not implementing Article 6 of the NPT, that is, avoiding the efforts to effect nuclear disarmament and abolition, only demand the non-nuclear states to perform their duty.

It also shows that under the present circumstances, the countries which oppose the extension of the term of the NPT to be discussed in 1995 will appear in succession. As long as the settlement of the nuclear issue is delayed, the existence of the NPT itself will be difficult. Then, the United States will be more embarrassed than any other country.

Serig Harrison, Senior Associate of the US Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former head of the Tokyo bureau of *Washington Post*, said at a conference of experts recently held in Seoul: In order to change the attitude of north Korea, it is necessary for the United States, Japan and south Korea to change their policy; first of all, multilateral high-level talks should be held to discuss the problems, including the normalization of the political and economic relations between the north and the south, the reduction and withdrawal of the US troops in south Korea and the management of disarmament; it is unfair to blame north Korea alone; the United States, the nuclear state, seems to have many reasons to re-examine her policy. Similar opinions are being raised within the United States.

Mazarr, Senior Associate at the Centre for the Strategic and International Studies, and Crowe, Chairman of the US President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, insisted almost at the same time that it is necessary to stop the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises once and for all and permit the inspection of the IAEA to confirm the withdrawal of the US nuclear weapons from south Korea. The former is from the brain trust of the Republican Party and the latter is from the organization which works out and advises the long-term diplomatic policy for the Clinton Administration. Even the brain trusts of both the Democratic and Republican Parties opined that the nuclear issue should be settled by changing their Korea policy.

Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs of the United States, said in Seoul that he intended to raise the level of the US-Korea negotiation for the settlement of the "nuclear issue" of north Korea. This statement was prompted by his understanding that the Korea-US negotiation must be held in order to soothe protest from the inside and outside of the United States and settle the "nuclear issue" of Korea under the NPT regime.

The US government denied his statement by saying that it has never decided to hold the talks. Riscassi, commander of the US forces in south Korea said; the danger of attack on south Korea from the north is growing higher; north Korea is telling a lie though she is actually treating a greater amount of "nuclear fuel" than she reported to the IAEA. There are also similar statements.

However, the United States knows better than any others that it is really impossible to apply sanctions against Korea by inveigling the UN and other countries into the scheme. Therefore, Korea and the United States, the parties concerned, must discuss earnestly the four items proposed by the former. There will be no other solution.

2. The First-Round Korea-US Talks (June-July 1993)

Strength vs Counterattack--Point of Contact

The monthly magazine, *Choice*, dated June 1993, noted that a point of contact, which can bring the logic of strength of the United States and that of resistance-and-counterattack of Korea into compromise, should be searched now that it is certain that there can be no settlement of nuclear issue unless the United States and Korea remove the structure of confrontation and build confidence.

The June 11, 1993 Joint Statement (See Appendix.) published by Korea and the United States can be said to have found out the point of contact between strength and resistance-and-counterattack, the only way to the solution of nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula.

The East Asia International Conference held in Tokyo on May 17,

1993, three weeks before the publication of the Joint Statement, witnessed contrasting difference in opinion, which was very interesting.

A. Pessimism and hard line

"Any concession on the part of the DPRK is unthinkable."

"Now that the United States entered into negotiations, she needs long-term strategy. But the prospect is pessimistic because of the difference of each other's demand."

B. Optimism and compromise

"The US Administration must diplomatically recognize the north Korean government."

"For an effective solution to the relations between the two countries,

"1. Continued existence of the present system of Korea should be taken into consideration.

"2. The realization of peace and normalization of diplomatic relations should be systematized.

"3. Export ban should be lifted and economic cooperation be realized."

Present at the conference were scholars and foreign-ministry officials from the United States, south Korea, Japan, China and Russia who were well-versed in the Korean question.

Then who asserted A and who B?

The former was Japan's opinion whereas the latter was the unanimous opinion of those from the United States. It was only three weeks later that an answer was given. The scholars from the United States, the party directly concerned, foresaw the developments correctly while Japanese experts, the third party, who were in a position to have an objective view, predicted them in a wrong way.

For example, Kokonoki Masao, a professor of Keio University, said definitely at a meeting, "It is impossible to expect north Korea to repeal her declaration of withdrawal even if direct negotiations are to begin. The United States would not normalize her negotiations with north Korea. The future of negotiations is pessimistic."

His judgement was incorrect because, firstly, his view of Korea, that is, his appraisal or viewpoint, was wrong from the starting point. He came to a mistaken conclusion as the result of slighting or ignoring

the important signals given by Korea long ago.

The starting point of the Japanese argument was that "north Korea would need to develop nuclear weapons and might have such a desire in order to offset her economic handicap and military disadvantage in relation to south Korea, and maintain her system while opposing the United States, the superpower."

Underlying this thinking was a deep-rooted prejudice that Korea was a very "dangerous state" which opposes the maintenance of the "international order" of the US-led West. In spite of the fact that Korea has consistently maintained the principle of making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone, Japan thought that Korea regarded the "possession of nuclear weapons" as the only way to her survival. That is why Japan was mistaken from the starting point.

The second reason of their incorrect judgement was that Japan failed to see the change in the US policy towards Korea and the progress made in international relationship on the Korean peninsula.

Voices for the improvement of the US-Korea relations were raised in the United States, and the US government, particularly the Department of State, was almost definite about changing her Korea policy. In other words, the United States felt it necessary to ease her hostile relationship with Korea and tide over the present complicated situation.

Cartis, a professor at Columbia University, pointed out that if the United States applied sanctions to Korea, she would be isolated and repeat the same failure as in the Bosnian issue. If sanctions are applied, the United States would find herself in an embarrassing situation. Therefore the United States had to refrain from sanctions in any event. In this sense, it can be said that the Korea-US talks have brought about natural results.

Kang Sok Ju, Korean First Vice Foreign Minister described the talks as "historic". However, Izumi Gen, an associate professor at Shizuoka Prefectural University, negated Kang's opinion, saying that they had "only returned to the point before March 12 (declaration of the withdrawal from the NPT)". His denial supported the US opinion that she did not change the basis of US-Korea relations. But one can see the essential and radical changes in the bilateral relationship if he compares the developments before March 12 with those during the

three months after the Joint Statement was made public. These changes are: firstly, the hostile countries entered into negotiations; secondly, policy matters concerning the emergence of the "nuclear issue" were discussed on the basis of the US assurance that she would not give nuclear threat to Korea (It is presumed that the overall political matters on the Korean peninsula were discussed); thirdly, the two countries agreed in principle on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; fourthly, they assured mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's affairs; and lastly, they agreed to continue dialogue on an equal and unprejudiced basis.

The fact that the two belligerent countries reached an agreement like this cannot be described as unhistoric. If you consider this agreement as unhistoric, you will be unable to see the future of the Korea-US talks correctly.

Prevention of the Recurrence of Panamanian and Iraqi Incidents

By a sudden armed invasion on Panama in 1989, the US army "arrested" General Manuel Noriega of the National Guard. It was an evident case of aggression on another country, but it did not meet with such international denunciation and protest as Iraq's invasion on Kuwait did. That was probably because the US mass media gave the world a strong impression that she was punishing the "ringleader of drug trafficking".

However, the real fact of the case was disclosed recently by a documentary film released by a US television station. Due to the indiscriminate bombing by the US planes, Panama City was reduced to ashes. A large number of people were killed or put into prison. However, the aggression covered up the atrocities and gave the world an impression of punishment of "evils". In this sense, the fabrication of information on the part of the United States ended up in victory. By drawing on this experience, the United States made another success in the Gulf War.

The documentary film concluded that the real intention of the US invasion of Panama was not to arrest General Noriega, but to wipe out

the National Guard of Panama to keep her concessions, the Panama Canal.

Wasn't the fiction of "nuclear suspicion" in Korea a similar drama?

Actually the United States first spread the rumour that Korea was the "biggest factor" that was disturbing peace in East Asia. Still, they could not carry out an armed invasion immediately. Thus they planned to attack Korea "lawfully" by means of the IAEA, an international organization. That was none other than the "special inspection". Korea says that the real intention was to "disarm" her and "isolate, suffocate and destroy the socialist system."

Had Korea not announced her resolute decision to withdraw from the NPT, she would have encountered such an armed invasion as Panama or Iraq had.

It seems that the United States believed that Korea would "surrender" if she threatened to deal with the Korean issue by drawing in the UN as she did with Iraq.

At the announcement of Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, the Western mass media simultaneously clamoured that "the isolation would be accelerated," "she had taken the road to the collapse of her system" and "the United States, Japan and south Korea would examine the application of sanctions." Three months later, however, the outcome was quite contrary.

The "nuclear issue" was no more than a means to stifle Korea. For the United States it made little difference whether it was an issue of human rights, missile export or production of chemical weapons. She only calculated that the "suspicion of nuclear development" was the most effective means among them. If Korea had not announced the withdrawal from the NPT, she would have probably been attacked.

What was of paramount importance in the talks was that "policy matters which would serve as the basis of settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula were discussed as the central topic," according to Kang Sok Ju, First Vice Foreign Minister. In other words, they had not dwarfed the "nuclear issue" to such a low level as the permission of special inspection by the IAEA. They had discussed to find a comprehensive solution to the nuclear problem which was aggravated as a result of the US army's deployment of nuclear weapons in south Korea in 1957 and the subsequent constant nuclear

threat to Korea.

Not a few people asserted that keeping Korea bound by the NPT was necessary for the settlement of the problem but it could not be a sufficient condition, according to the editorial of *Yomiuri Shimbun*, dated June 13, 1993. Their assertion resulted from the misunderstanding of the essence of the nuclear problem. Their hidden intention was to distort or diminish the significance of the Korea-US Joint Statement.

Korea's return to the NPT is not a necessary condition for the solution of the problem. The necessary and sufficient condition for the solution is to ease the 40-odd-year-long hostile relationship between Korea and the United States. Its specific expressions will be; first, assurances against the threat and the use of nuclear weapons, second, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and third, denuclearization and peace on the Korean peninsula.

The Joint Statement adopted this time reflected these demands which Korea had repeated for a long time. The United States agreed to include the item of "support for the peaceful reunification of Korea".

This is an epoch-making event, which indicates radical change in the US Korea policy. The United States that had intended to threaten Korea with nuclear weapons and provoke a nuclear war at any time she liked, changed her policy and recognized the system of Korea that sharply confronted her. In this sense, the Korea-US relations have come to a turning-point.

President Bill Clinton said that the result of the talks was "successful" and Robert Gallucci, Assistant Secretary of State, assessed that it was a correct step forward to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. They recognized that there was no alternative but to have talks with Korea for the settlement of the "nuclear issue".

Seeking the Way to Verify Denuclearization

Asahi Shimbun, dated June 12, 1993, reported that a sigh of relief prevailed in the UN Security Council when investigation of sanctions, which had least possibility of agreement by the council member nations, was avoided.

Tokyo Shimbun, dated June 13, 1993, said that all the officials of the IAEA were breathing a sigh of relief as the channel of negotiations with Korea was not cut off.

These articles that report the response of the UN Security Council and the IAEA to the result of the Korea-US talks indicate that the two international organizations were fundamentally impotent in the settlement of the nuclear problem in the Korean peninsula.

The first reason for their inability was that the nuclear problem in the Korean peninsula was raised because the United States has given constant nuclear threat to Korea since 1957 when she began to deploy nuclear weapons in south Korea.

In 1975 Secretary of Defence James R. Schlesinger said that the United States was deploying tactical nuclear weapons in south Korea and that he thought everybody knew of it. The United States did not apply NCND (neither confirmation nor denial) policy of nuclear deployment only in the Korean peninsula in order to put pressure upon Korea by means of open nuclear blackmail.

The second reason was that the United States intended to stifle Korea "lawfully" as she had done in Iraq by employing the international organizations even though she knew that Korea-US negotiations were the key to the settlement of the problem.

At the time when the IAEA's routine inspection in Korea was being conducted smoothly and Director General Blix told that no suspicion of nuclear development was found, the United States pressed the director general to enforce "special inspection". Thus the attitude of the IAEA suddenly changed and the issue continued to be complicated until Korea announced the withdrawal from the NPT. In the course of this, the partiality of the IAEA and the conflict of applying double standards were exposed and the IAEA degraded itself into powerless one in the settlement of the nuclear problem.

The UN Security Council was obliged to take actions as the United States, south Korea, Japan and other Western countries "appealed" forcibly, but it did no more than announcing the "statement" of its chairman and its "resolution" in mild terms. The "resolution" requested Korea to abide by the NPT and Safeguards Accord. The "resolution" included the clause that "it would search for other measures if necessary," but the Security Council must have known

that it was not in a position to take effective "measures".

The Chinese government repeatedly declared that bringing the case to the Security Council would only complicate the issue, far from contributing to its solution. It supported dialogue and consultations between the states concerned, opposing pressure and sanctions all the time. The non-nuclear and the third-world nations strongly asserted the same. The Security Council was not in a situation to take actions.

Worse still, the "resolution" which the Security Council had adopted by force lacked justice from the outset. The "nuclear suspicion" of Korea was no more than suspicion. It constituted no actual threat to any nations. In the light of the UN Charter or the international law, it is unjust to apply sanctions simply on the grounds of suspicion. In other words, the Security Council's "resolution" was not based on legal grounds. This is one of the reasons why they sighed a "sigh of relief".

Then, what can be the specific solution to the nuclear problem in the Korean peninsula when Korea and the United States, the parties concerned, discussed policy matters to fundamentally settle the "nuclear issue" and published the Joint Statement?

The Korean ambassador to Austria pointed out that Korea was searching for the ways to prove her transparency to the international society although she would not return to the NPT, taking the example of Brazil and Argentina that had conducted mutual inspections even though they were not members of the NPT.

The most important thing in the settlement of the nuclear problem is to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula completely. Even if Korea returns to the NPT and accepts unilateral inspection by the IAEA, the problem of denuclearization will not be solved. Worse still, such a forcible method as "special inspection" will settle nothing. To begin with, Korea will never accept it. That is why the United States and IAEA are now avoiding the form of "special inspection". The United States and south Korea are thinking of including the IAEA in mutual inspection between the north and the south of Korea.

If impartiality is ensured, Korea would certainly return to the NPT. The United States and France decided to continue to freeze nuclear testing and are moving to adopt a comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. That is a matter of welcome, because Korea is calling for not

only the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula but also the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons.

Plus Thinking and Minus Thinking

At a press conference after the US-Japan summit talks held on July 6, President Clinton said that the United States wanted Korea to remain in the NPT, which would benefit Korea, whereas Prime Minister Miyazawa said that if Korea had nuclear weapons and their carriers, it would be a direct threat to Japan in view of the distance, and that Japan could not but be concerned about the direct threat, although she had no intention to possess nuclear weapons.

One can find a distinct difference in their statements--the former is based on plus thinking while the latter on minus thinking.

It should be said that Miyazawa had two purposes when he exaggerated the "nuclear weapons and missiles" of Korea, describing them as a "threat".

One is that he is going to use the "nuclear suspicion" about Korea as an excuse for Japan's nuclear armament. The passage "Japan could not but be concerned about" can be construed as "Japan could not help possessing nuclear weapons."

Japan was reluctant to include the phrase of unlimited renewal of the NPT in the political declaration to be adopted at the Tokyo summit of G7 industrial nations. It was because there was an heated argument in the country whether it was right for her to make a promise not to have nuclear weapons forever, even in case Korea is in possession of them. In other words, "Korea's threat" has become an excuse for Japan's nuclear armament. In the past Japan justified her arms build-up on the pretext of the "threat" from the Soviet Union. If she is intentionally framing up the "threat" from Korea, now that the "threat" from the Soviet Union cannot be made use of, it is very dangerous.

The other purpose is to maintain her hostile policy towards Korea. In other words, she expressed her refusal to recognize Korea or establish friendly relations. This does not mean that she would exercise her influence to change the situation of the Korean peninsula into a favourable one. It means that she would follow the road of aggravating tension as she had done in the Cold-War period,

expecting and expediting the "collapse of north Korea's system".

Such intention was revealed again when a Japanese official uttered violent words recently. According to *Tokyo Shimbun*, dated July 14, 1993, Japanese Foreign Minister Muto said, "If the missile that is said to have been developed recently were to come flying to Japan, the disastrous effect would be far beyond comparison with that of the earthquake in the sea southwest of Hokkaido a few days ago. Such a dreadful thing must not happen."

The Japanese anachronistic political and diplomatic awareness are disclosed while they dare to state such words. This is nothing more than utterance of "minus thinking" and "minus desire".

Here is an interesting result of investigation.

The heads of nine political parties in Japan were given questions and to the question about Korea's "nuclear suspicion", the Communist Party of Japan answered that it was impossible to find genuine solution in the framework of the NPT which tolerates the monopoly of nuclear weapons by the United States and other nations and that the abolition of nuclear weapons was the solution. The other parties all expressed their strong demand for the "special inspection" by the IAEA. This illustrates that the overwhelming majority of the political parties in Japan failed to grasp the nature of the nuclear problem in the Korean peninsula and lacked correct understanding of its basic solution.

If Japan wants to become a true "political power", there is one thing that she must do without fail. Before she is crazy about becoming a permanent member nation of the UN Security Council, she must first of all redress her wrong past by discarding the obstinate consciousness of the Cold War and removing the abnormal relations with Korea, the only legacy of the Cold War, and exercise her influence in finding solution to the nuclear problem and reunification in the Korean peninsula. If she goes on as she did in the past, she will be the only laggard in the changing world situation.

3. The Second-Round Korea-US Talks (July-August 1993)

A Turning Point in Ending Hostile Relationship

Korean First Vice Foreign Minister, Kang Sok Ju said that the talks were progressive and productive. The Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci said that the aim was achieved and that it was an important step forward, though small. The spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of south Korea commented that it was an important progress for the settlement of Korea's "nuclear issue".

The countries which are involved in the nuclear problem in the Korean peninsula and other nations and organizations which are concerned about it unanimously appreciated the results of the second-round Korea-US talks except Muto, Japanese Foreign Minister, who, unable to understand the progress of the event, disparaged the results, saying that nothing was clear and an overall assessment was impossible. This notwithstanding, it is very important that those concerned expressed their satisfaction with the results and prospects of the talks.

Some people commented: "The United States made too much concession," "North Korean diplomacy is formidable," "The tenacity of the north won," "The operation of the north should be guarded against." However, in the light of Gallucci's firm confidence expressed by his remark that there was no retrogression of the question, and of the optimistic view of the US State Department, it would not be correct to say that only the US side made concession; she also made a great success in the talks.

It is clearly pointed out in the last part of the July 19, 1993 Press Statement (See Appendix.) that the question of laying the basis for improving overall relations would be discussed next time. The fact that the United States, which had declared that she would not discuss other questions than the nuclear problem, agreed to discuss the question of improving relations shows that the US side, too, has gained something. Through this one can easily guess that the Press Statement does not contain everything that has been discussed and agreed upon in principle in the talks.

The Korean Foreign Ministry outlined that the New York talks showed the principles in the solution of the nuclear problem and

pending problems between Korea and the United States, whereas the recent Geneva talks took practical measures to implement them. This illustrates the character of the recent talks. The Korea-US talks were not for political bargain, but for the radical solution of the nuclear problem and their relations. Being well aware of it, both sides are climbing up the steps one by one towards the objective.

This is proved by the fact that in answer to the criticism that the United States is weak-kneed, criticism voiced in south Korea and Japan after the New York talks, an official of the US State Department stated that there was no need to be nervous about such criticism and the United States was not an agent of anybody.

President Clinton said something, threatening Korea, on the military demarcation line of the Korean peninsula. But he might have said it to cajole south Korea.

New York Times, dated July 14, 1993, highly appreciated the President's "skill in his diplomacy in Asia" and wrote that he gained time for the forthcoming diplomatic negotiations (with Korea), while quietening south Korea with the promise of continued presence of the US GIs in the south of Korea.

The Japanese mass media commented that Korea was gaining time. Still, both Korea and the United States needed time to find basic solutions to a number of questions without interference of the third party. This was explained by the Press Statement which announced that the next talks would be held "in the next two months". According to the Korean Foreign Ministry, "it is the continuation of the talks to find out ways for success."

On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the victory in the Korean war, soldiers' parade and one-million citizens' demonstration were held in Pyongyang on July 27, 1993. The Japanese observers of Korea predicted that there would be the largest military parade which would surpass the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army held in 1992 and that Kim Jong Il's real ability would be displayed. Actually no military parade was held; it was a function that symbolized the present Korea-US relationship.

At the national meeting held the previous day, Premier Kang Song San highly appreciated the result of the Korea-US talks, saying, "The foundation was laid to put an end to the 40-odd-year-long hostile

relationship and to find radical solution to the nuclear problem" and "it is a historic event which would contribute to peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world."

The Press Statement reaffirmed no use of nuclear weapons. It was also agreed not to deploy nuclear weapons in south Korea and terminate the "Team Spirit" exercises, which was not pointed out in the statement. Now the United States is the party to the dialogue with Korea as well as the party to normalizing their relations in the future. This is why Korea commented that the result of the Korea-US talks was a historic event and pointed out that both Korea and the United States stood at a turning point.

Light-Water Reactor for Nuclear Non-Proliferation

What is the "nuclear suspicion" of Korea the West raised about?

Firstly, Korea has refused to get nuclear inspection by the IAEA apparently to gain time to develop nuclear weapons;

Secondly, a large-sized atomic reactor and a facility for reprocessing spent fuel have been built in Nyongbyon and there might be a facility for processing the nuclear material and an explosive test site there;

Thirdly, there are inconsistencies between the quantities of plutonium reported by Korea and the results of the IAEA's measurement and between the composition of plutonium and that of the liquid waste examined. This can mean that Korea has kept plutonium in secret; and

Fourthly, there are buildings and facilities apparently for "reprocessing the waste" and "storing" it in two sites in Nyongbyon, which Korea failed to report.

The other "suspicions" are so far-fetched that they are not worth discussing. So, let us see the aforementioned four points.

As for the first point, it was dispelled by Korea's conclusion of the Safeguards Accord with the IAEA. The IAEA conducted six rounds of ad hoc inspection in Korea.

As for the second point, the facility considered to be for reprocessing spent fuel was still under construction. At the time of

inspection, the construction was suspended and it was confirmed to be none other than a radiochemical laboratory. Director General Blix, too, reaffirmed that this was for "peaceful development of atomic energy".

As for the third one, whose calculation is correct will be proved if the process of calculation of each side is examined. But, the IAEA failed to produce the related data. Investigation of fuel rods will solve without difficulty the problem of the ratio of composition. Though they did not mention in their Press Statement, it seems that Korea and the United States agreed that the IAEA inspectors would be present at the time of exchanging nuclear fuel.

The fourth point will be dealt with in the next section.

This time Korea and the United States agreed on the light-water reactor project to make the verification of these three points more transparent.

There are mainly two types of atomic reactors. One is the graphite-moderated reactor (GMR). It uses natural uranium as fuel and heavy water or pure carbon (graphite) as moderator; carbon dioxide gas heated in the reactor is taken out to generate steam for driving a turbogenerator. The other is the light-water reactor (LWR). It uses enriched uranium 235; ordinary water, ie, light water, is boiled to produce directly or indirectly steam that drives a generator.

GMR is relatively simple and easy to develop. The 5-megawatt-capacity test reactor in Nyongbyon, Korea, belongs to this type. But GMRs are divided into various types, including the type of Calder Hall reactor developed by Britain and the type developed by the USSR. The atomic reactor in Korea is said to be similar to the Calder Hall reactor. But since the reactor has been developed independently by the Korean scientists who acquired the technology of atomic energy development in the USSR and made further study of it, it can be said it is a reactor of the Korean type.

Korea has so far pushed forward with the study and development of the atomic energy for peaceful purpose in the direction of establishing a fuel-cycle system under the plan of building gas-cooled reactor that relies on natural uranium and graphite moderation. Korea says she has adopted this policy because, as Korea's Ministry of Atomic Energy states, "it was most suitable to Korea's actual situation, though it was

not considered to be superior to the LWR." In other words, Korea has adopted GMR because; firstly, she could maintain the principle of independence in the development of atomic energy, secondly, she could use natural uranium abundant in her, thirdly, the USSR that supplied technology to her had GMRs in the main, and fourthly, she could not introduce LWRs and enriched uranium as the West is holding a monopoly of their development.

Since Korea adopted the GMR, as Toyota Toshiyuki, Honorary Professor of Nagoya University puts it, "it is quite natural for Korea to study and test the process of extracting plutonium from spent fuel," and this became a material for suspicion.

Whatever the type of reactor, plutonium comes into being in fuel rods, and in GMR plutonium is easily made and easy to extract. The reactor the United States built for the first time in the world to develop an atomic bomb was this type. This type of reactor is still used for the production of plutonium necessary for making nuclear weapons. The claim that "the development of GMR in a friendly country does not pose a problem, but that it is quite another matter in the case of an evil country because it could be used for the production of nuclear weapons" has become the basis of the "nuclear suspicion" in relation with Korea.

LWR, whose large-scale development is possible, is superior to GMR in that the cost of electricity generation is cheap and it is safer. This type constitutes a large part of the atomic reactors in the world, numbering 331 of the 420 reactors as of December 1993. Mindful that LWR is superior to GMR in economic, technological and safety aspects, Korea has long expressed her intention to change GMR with LWR.

In 1992 Korea informed the United States and the IAEA that she would stop developing the technology of reprocessing spent fuel provided that the United States and Japan supplied her with the LWR technology. Vice-premier Kim Tal Hyon, during his visit to south Korea, officially signified the intention to south Korea. At that time the United States and south Korea paid no attention to it, but this time the United States promised to give assistance to Korea, and south Korea, too, confirmed her policy of rendering technical cooperation. It is difficult to produce plutonium with LWR and a few countries like

Britain, Germany, France, the United States and the former USSR have the technology of enriching uranium; the countries that have not this technology have to buy enriched uranium from these countries, and in this case they have to put themselves under international surveillance and allow the IAEA's inspection. They had this in mind.

Gallucci's statement that "GMR gives rise to the spread of nuclear weapons, whereas LWR prevents it" accords with Kang Sok Ju's remarks that the change was "aimed at proving that Korea has no intention to develop nuclear weapons."

The introduction of LWR necessarily makes Korea accept "things, money, personnel and information" from the West including the United States. In other words, it will hasten the improvement of relations between Korea and the Western countries. Unless this is fulfilled, it is impossible to introduce LWR. It symbolizes change of the Korea-US relations, so to speak.

Routine Inspection--The Way to Dispel "Suspicion"

As for Korea's statement that she had no intention to undergo special inspection without condition, Japanese newspaper *Akahata*, dated July 21, 1993, pointed out that it was nothing but "putting off the solution of the problem", that there was something questionable in "the negotiation that is under way on the basis of the NPT" and that "it has become more vivid that it was a mistake for Korea to have taken the realization of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as a bargaining chip for the improvement of her relations with the United States."

Let us see if *Akahata* is right.

Firstly, Korea is opposed to special inspection, a forced inspection on military establishments that have no relations with nuclear development and, if the demand for inspection is persistent, she can show them in a way that respects her sovereignty. This is her basic stand. She guards against forced inspection on other military establishments one after another that would follow the "special inspection" once she tolerates it.

Secondly, Korea is not opposed to the NPT regime itself, and so she has ratified the NPT. The point is unfairness and inequality the

NPT contains. Especially, Korea is indicting the nuclear states for making no effort to abolish nuclear weapons. She is trying to maintain the NPT regime on the Korean peninsula in the situation in which there is no more effective way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons than the NPT regime.

Thirdly, since the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula was raised by the deployment of nuclear weapons by the United States and is related with the hostile relations between Korea and the United States, the improvement of relations between the two countries is the only way to fundamentally solve the problem of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. One side produced a card, called "nuclear suspicion", while the other has snatched and used it as a bargaining chip for the improvement of the relations between the two. This type of offensive and defensive game is common in diplomatic work. Korea and the United States are not taking the issue of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as a bargaining chip for negotiations; they are waging a fierce diplomatic offensive and defensive warfare over the "nuclear suspicion".

Korea and the United States agreed this time on perfect and fair application of the Safeguards Accord and Korea promised that she will resume consultation with the IAEA. Subsequently, the inspection team of the IAEA visited Korea for a week from August 3 to check the equipment installed for inspection and exchange films of cameras. This was the first step toward the formal consultation between Korea and the IAEA.

Peter Hayes, Co-Director of the Nautilus Institute, says that what is important is routine inspection of the establishments Korea reported, especially the nuclear reactor for producing fuel. Admitting that the "special inspection" is no more than a means for examining what Korea did in the past and what she has at present, he continues that her refusal of the "special inspection" does not mean that she would have nuclear materials greater than what she has now.

To speak briefly, what is important for examining if Korea develops nuclear weapons or not is ad hoc inspection, not "special inspection". The frequently used phrases such as "to win time" and "delaying tactics to hide spent fuel" cannot be said to be reasonable.

Even if nuclear wastes are stored in the "suspicious two sites", it is

almost impossible to move the radioactive, difficult-to-handle materials to other places, and to extract from them plutonium enough for producing nuclear weapons.

The exact amount of plutonium extracted in Korea has never been made public; she only said the amount is "negligible", but the West one-sidedly estimates it to be "enough for producing several nuclear warheads".

If the West's estimation is true, it will be meaningless for Korea to make some nuclear weapons with it. What can Korea attack with them? If she uses them, it is inevitable that she will suffer a nuclear reprisal from the United States, which will result in her ruin. In this way, use of nuclear weapons will be of no significance in the military aspect and will produce only a transient effect in the political aspect.

For the IAEA, it is important to continue to operate the already-installed inspection devices and ad hoc inspection so as to dispell the "nuclear suspicion" in relation with Korea and on the other hand, to examine the fuel rods so as to compare the result with Korea's report. This will enable the organization to get acquainted with what it has wanted to know without resorting to "special inspection". It will have to bear in mind that to force "special inspection" on Korea in vain will only impede solving the nuclear problem.

4. The Improvement of Korea-US Relations-- The Inevitable Outcome of History and the Realities (February 1994)

"Power Politics" with Gloomy Future

One year has passed since the Clinton Administration came into power advocating "change". There have been various judgments on the administration so far; what cannot be denied is the conclusion that the the United States, too, cannot neglect the worldwide change after the end of the Cold War. Her engagement in the Korean peninsula is not an exception, the only region where the Cold War still drags on

and which is said to be courting the danger of war.

The strategic objective to which the administration pays primary attention is disarmament (the reduction of military expenditure and military strength) and prevention of nuclear proliferation. Drastic reduction of military budget is essential for reducing the country's budgetary and trade deficits and revitalizing her economy.

But, the "new strategic plan", the "strategy of simultaneously countering two limited wars", published by the Defence Department in September 1993 regards Korea and Iraq as new threatening countries after the fall of the Soviet Union and pursues simultaneous reaction to them. This strategy is quite impudent in that it aims at realizing expansion and reduction of armaments simultaneously by expanding armaments in certain places while clamouring about general disarmament. Sure enough, the Congress, the State Department and the soldiers of the Defence Department have raised their voices against it, and south Korea too reacted to it, complaining that "it is impossible to intervene at the same time in the disputes of the two main regions in the world."

The US armed intervention in an emergency of the Korean peninsula will drive her to a corner owing to the raising of war funds and the delay of her economic reconstruction. Besides this, it will inevitably worsen her relations with China, a market with the population of 1,200 million, the last place in which she can meet the trade deficit. It is stark reality that she cannot fight the war unless she induces the Western countries to participate in it under moral obligation just as they did during the Gulf War.

The vertical nuclear proliferation--competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union for the development of nuclear weapons and the expansion of nuclear armaments--has stopped, but the United States is worried by horizontal proliferation among the non-nuclear states.

The United States proposed without any conditions attached to guarantee security and give aid to Ukraine in compensation for the dismantling of nuclear warheads the erstwhile Soviet Union had left there. In this way, she tries to prevent at all costs the horizontal nuclear proliferation that threatens her monopoly of nuclear weapons.

The maintenance of the NPT regime is the mainstay of the "non-

proliferation policy" of the Clinton Administration. And the NPT expires in April 1995. The nuclear weapon states and the Western countries insist on the indefinite extension of its term, but things will not go smoothly because the non-nuclear states' criticism on its unfairness and partiality and the double standards in its application is deep rooted.

Why has the "nuclear issue" of Korea now become the greatest threat to, and a matter of concern for, the United States?

This is because the issue is a touchstone that decides the existence of the NPT regime and the security policy of the United States. If Korea is allowed to withdraw from the NPT, this means creating a precedent of this kind, thus enabling the countries, which are unhappy with the treaty that has contradictions, to withdraw from the treaty or resist it on the grounds of the precedent. Along with this, it will carry little conviction for the countries that have not signed the treaty, like India and Pakistan. Then, to say nothing of the indefinite extension of the treaty, its existence will be put into danger. The United States has now only one year's leeway, and this is the reason why she puts continual pressure on Korea, claiming that she is employing "delaying tactics" and "there is a limit to our patience."

Can economic or military sanctions solve the "nuclear issue"?

Korea clarified her stand that she would take self-defensive measures against any type of sanctions. Therefore, sanctions will only lead to war and Korea's complete withdrawal from the NPT, which will deprive the West of the way to check for the existence of nuclear weapons in Korea. Not only this, the United States will lose the power with which to convince Japan and south Korea not to develop their own nuclear weapons to counter Korea, scared as they are at Korea's ghost "nuclear weapons". There is no sure assurance on how long the alliance between the United States and Japan and between the United States and south Korea will continue. Japan's "nuke" may, in fact, be more dangerous for the United States than Korea's "nuke". It is estimated that the future US-Japan relations will grow worse on the basis of their economic contradictions, and not develop favourably. The United States sees that Japan has the technology, materials (plutonium) and will with which to develop nuclear weapons. If Japan possesses nuclear weapons, the United States will lose control of

nuclear weapons over Japan; this may give rise to a nightmarish structure of the days before the year 1945.

The United States has to radically change her outdated Korea policy that relies on "strength" in order also to carry out the task of disarmament and prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.

The "change" is also the inevitable demand of the present overall situation.

The US Responsibility for Redressing Her Past

On February 3, 1994, President Clinton made an announcement on the lifting of sanctions against Vietnam and opening of a liaison office in Hanoi. The US-Vietnam relations that had been frozen for about 20 years after the Vietnam War have now begun to be normalized. There would be their respective intentions, but what is certain is that it is a reaction to the "change" after the Cold War and a link in the whole chain of the establishment of a "new order".

Then, what is the state of Korea-US relations that span a history twice longer than the Vietnam-US relations?

Professor Bruce Cummings at Chicago University says; there live 22 million people in north Korea; they are by no means the "disabled with dead brain"; for 40 years the United States has besieged them, threatening that she will annihilate them; isn't it high time for her to abandon such an action?

Paying off the past is not a problem confronting only Japan; the nightmare of the two wars the United States waged during the Cold War are a thorn in her flesh and redressing the past is a task the history has left.

The "shadow of Vietnam" is still fresh in the memory of the American people as a great pain. It was quite possible to clear away the shadow if the United States was determined, for the force that objected it was negligible. The American people tried to remedy the past. The self-affirmation to escape from the nightmare was strong. On the other hand, the "shadow of Korea" has been weathered in the course of many years, becoming a thing of the past. To make the matter worse, south Korea, opposed to Korea, made the United States give up her effort to understand Korea. So, the American people gave

up the effort to free themselves from the "shadow of Korea". Paradoxically speaking, the "shadow of Vietnam" may be a thing of the past, but the "shadow of Korea" is a "past" of the present continuous tense, still spouting blood.

In disregard of the article of the Korean Armistice Agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue, the United States deployed her troops in south Korea, introduced nuclear weapons and has threatened Korea. This is a clear violation of the agreement. The United States is well aware of it. But to stand against the Soviet Union, the other superpower, in the structure of the Cold War, she arbitrarily violated her agreement with the small country. The destiny of the small nation was nothing in the superpower's high-handed way of thinking. She thought only about her own interests and the interests of the free world united under "anti-communism" and "defeat communism". Now the Soviet Union has collapsed and the Cold War has come to an end. It has become difficult for the United States to remain indifferent to the Korean problem with the old logic. Moreover, because of the nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula raised by her deployment of nuclear weapons in south Korea and the "nuclear suspicion" against Korea she kicked up, she could not help but sit at the negotiation table face to face with Korea, which repeatedly made proposals for talks. What can we say about it, an irony of history or a paradox? Thus, it took 40 years to realize the "consultation within three months" stipulated in the Armistice Agreement. It can be surmised that the years were a time necessary for doing away with the remnants of the Cold War, but what cannot be denied is that it was a result of the arrogance and negligence of the superpower.

Supporting the replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the UN, said on his visit to Pyongyang towards the end of 1993 that he was sure that the UN Forces Command in south Korea would be dissolved. This statement is certainly based on the result of the slow improvement of the Korea-US relations. Whatever the circumstances, it is of great significance that the UN is at last moving towards the settlement of the issue of the Korean peninsula. This will naturally exert an influence on the United States.

Not negligible in the United States are opinions filled with reason. Glenn Paige, Professor Emeritus at University of Hawaii, said that Korea should be understood first with sympathy and modesty. Harrison, Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, proposed that, in order for the nuclear inspection to be of significance, various payments, or "compensation", like concluding a peace treaty, should be made. (However, the change in the US policy is not a payment but her responsibility so as to put an end to the Cold-War structure on the Korean peninsula.) They are unanimous in their demand that the US government abandon the outdated mode of thinking of the Cold-War era and change her hostile policy towards Korea. Even if she does this, she will have nothing to lose. Instead, the United States and south Korea may gain more than they expect. They will be free from danger of another war on the Korean peninsula, get rid of unnecessary threats and secure a new market. Before anything else, the United States will be able to redress her past as the author of the division of the Korean peninsula.

The United States can gain nothing in keen opposition to Korea's socialist system. Now is the time for her to put an end to the Cold War and redress her nightmarish past.

The Way to Surmount Fear

High-ranking officials of the US government have again begun to raise their voices for applying sanctions against Korea. On February 4, 1994, the US ambassador to the United Nations told the representatives of the other Permanent States of the UN Security Council that his country was making a study of adopting economic sanctions against Korea. He asked the Chinese ambassador to "persuade" Korea to allow inspection before the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on the 21st of February, stating that it was the "ultimatum". The United States has so far clamoured about "sanctions" and "ultimatum" on several occasions, but she has never put them into effect. What is the reason? Would she really apply them this time?

The US mass media are reporting about the "nuclear issue" of Korea every day, carrying diverse opinions on it. This is a quite

unprecedented thing. But, compared to this racket, the force of hard-liners is small. Their theory is not based on a persuasive logic with which to resolve the "nuclear issue", but on the reckless theory of sentiment following the outdated "gunboat diplomacy", the base of which is the sense of superiority that "it is intolerable to be fooled by such a small country as Korea."

Be they hard-liners or dialogue-advocators, they seem to entertain an unidentifiable fear about Korea. The superpower that had bragged about its invincibility failed to win the Korean War for the first time. This is the reason why they do not look down the small country, Korea, but feel a fear.

Apparently, Korea's attitude after the announcement of her withdrawal from the NPT and the stubbornness she has displayed in the negotiations with the United States aroused the fear of the past among the Americans. They wonder if their "strong-arm policy" might again be defeated by Korea's "guerrilla tactics".

The computer simulation of the second Korean war conducted on several occasions in the United States points that the United States would suffer a great loss; this means the war would be incomparably more difficult than the Gulf War.

It is quite impossible for her to use nuclear weapons in consideration of the damages it would inflict on south Korea and Japan. It is even estimated that the use of nuclear weapons will make the ashes of death fly to the US proper with the jet stream. Even if the war is fought by means of conventional weapons, Korea's counterattack may damage the nuclear power stations in south Korea, producing ashes of death.

Meanwhile, what is the attitude of the Americans towards a Korean war? During the public opinion poll conducted through telephone among 1,000 eligible voters throughout the United States, 46 per cent of them insisted on the "continuous diplomatic effort" and 34 per cent suggested "asking the UN for economic sanctions"; those who demanded a "military action" constituted only 11 per cent. This was quite opposite to the high rate of support at the time of attack against Iraq.

The reason is analysed as follows:

Firstly, Korea has not committed an action identical with Iraq's

invasion of Kuwait;

Secondly, the great cause of "anti-communism" of the United States has become dim;

Thirdly, the Americans have grown weary of their responsibility of the "international police" and with the end of the Cold War the obligation and strength for it has dissipated; and

Fourthly, they entertain a great fear about Korea.

Drawing from the bitter lesson they learned in Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti, the Americans want even a "change" in their country's diplomacy.

What will Korea's "self-defensive measure" be? Korea and the United States are in a state of armistice, ie, "cease-fire". The United States has ignored and violated the Armistice Agreement, which is aimed at preventing another war. Sanctions against Korea will destroy the objective of the Armistice Agreement that stipulates that an armistice will be established to "insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea." Then, there is a possibility that Korea could break off the agreement on the basis of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, saying that she could no longer observe the agreement. This will immediately lead the relations between the two countries to the state of the days of the Korean War. It will not be a hair-trigger situation; the two countries will rather enter into a war directly. As *Washington Post* pointed out, the Americans think that "the fear about Korea has so far been a factor in formulating their policy toward Korea". Their attitude of confrontation rather increased the fear. There is only one way to surmount the fear. It is the establishment of favourable relations between the two countries.

5. MILESTONE IN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING— THE KOREA-US AGREED FRAMEWORK (October-November 1994)

The Difference between the “Nuclear Issue” and Nuclear Problem

After signing the Agreed Framework between Korea and the United States on October 21, 1994, Kang Sok Ju, head of the Korean delegation, said with a smile at a press conference,

“The Agreed Framework is a milestone in the settlement of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula and a document of historical significance. It indicates concrete ways to fundamentally solve the nuclear problem resulting from the abnormal relations between Korea and the United States.”

Korea has drawn a distinction between the “nuclear issue” and the nuclear problem. Whether the quotation mark is given or not seems to make little difference but in fact there is a big difference in their contents.

The “nuclear issue” means the issue of dispelling the “suspicion of Korea’s development of nuclear weapons” raised by the West. When the United States or the IAEA demands “special inspection”, Korea puts the words in quotation mark in the sense that it is a “nuclear suspicion” raised by the West. This implies Korea’s protest that it has no intention and capability to develop nuclear weapons and “nuclear suspicion” has not existed from the outset.

The nuclear problem is an issue that concerns the Korean peninsula as a whole, an issue raised by the introduction of nuclear weapons in the south by the United States, the continual nuclear test war she conducts and the constant nuclear threat she makes against Korea. In other words, it was raised by the long-standing hostile relations and mistrust between Korea and the United States.

The “nuclear issue” is an extremely unjustifiable side issue that originated from the nuclear problem. For this reason, unless the nuclear problem is solved, “nuclear issue” cannot be settled, either. This leads to the conclusion that elimination of the hostile relations between the two countries and confidence-building is a prerequisite for dispelling the “nuclear suspicion”. The US administration said that it came to understand Korea only now through the 16-month-long negotiations; this is a confession that it came to understand, though belatedly, the differences and relations between the “nuclear issue” and the nuclear problem. If the nuclear problem remains unsettled despite the dispelling of the “nuclear suspicion” against Korea, the

nuclear threat against Korea will remain unchanged. The root cause of the nuclear evil will remain unremoved, the tension on the Korean peninsula will not be eased fundamentally, and the peace and security of Asia cannot be achieved.

In other words, the United States cannot feel “relieved” even if the “special inspection” she demands is realized. South Korea and Japan, which do not, and are not willing to, understand this, have put every obstacle in the way of negotiations between Korea and the United States, alleging that the “special inspection” would lead to the improvement of the relations between the two countries. This is quite absurd. The problem can never be solved without due consideration of the order of priority.

Korea does not object to settling the “nuclear issue”, but she cannot accept the unconditional “special inspection”, an unjust forced inspection on her military sites. She cannot put off her underwear for her enemy.

It is only when the hostile relations between the two countries are changed into friendly relations that the nuclear problem, and further the “nuclear issue”, can be solved. This is the meaning of the “fundamental settlement” that Kang Sok Ju mentioned. For this, Korea proposed the way of solving the “nuclear issue” and nuclear problem simultaneously to the satisfaction of both sides. It is the way of package settlement and the principle of simultaneous action.

As a package deal that contains detailed measures for fundamentally settling the nuclear problem and improving the relations between the two countries, the Agreed Framework set the exact time of execution of the simultaneous action by both sides. Both sides agreed on this and so the heads of the two states approved of it, ordered its signing and gave assurance of it. There is no other way than the package settlement. This is why south Korea, Japan and the IAEA could not but welcome the agreement. Although they affirmed the “present and future”, they expressed their dissatisfaction with the verification of the “past” now overdue. This can be said to be a misunderstanding proceeding from the ignorance of the essence of the nuclear problem.

The United States concluded that verification of the “past” is not so urgent if Korea’s “present and future” possibility of “nuclear

development” is eliminated. Gallucci did not say without authority when he said confidently that the Agreed Framework contains what can deal with the “concern” for the “nuclear development plan” of Korea in every respect—past, present and future—and it also meets the interests of south Korea and Japan.

By not demanding the absoluteness of the verification of the “past”, the United States obtained a definite promise for the clarification of the “past”. As a party to solving the nuclear problem, she acknowledged that the fundamental solution of the nuclear problem is the one and only peaceful way to settling the “nuclear issue”.

The “Present and Future” Are More Important than the “Past”

At a high-level Cabinet meeting in April 1994, the United States adopted the policy of settling the issue on the “past” in the course of improving the overall relations between the United States and Korea while giving precedence to the work of “stopping” Korea’s future use of plutonium for the “development of nuclear weapons” over to the finding of how much plutonium it extracted and used for the “development of nuclear weapons”, ie, investigation on whether plutonium was used for military purposes.

It is proper to say that the “past, present and future” of nuclear activities must be clarified in full so as to completely remove the “nuclear suspicion”. The point is when the clarification could be made. Korea maintains that she cannot undergo ad hoc inspection beyond the limits of routine inspection now that she is in a special status of suspending temporarily her authority after her withdrawal from the NPT. She says she cannot undergo inspection aimed at verifying her “past” before her special status is terminated.

Conversely speaking, verification of the “past” can be made whenever it is wanted after the special status is terminated. The United States came to understand and agree with it only after drawn-out negotiations.

In the meantime, the verification of the “past” by the IAEA had already been conducted. During the inspection held in March Korea,

in consideration of the US withdrawal of her proposal for the exchange of special envoys between the north and the south of Korea as a precondition for the third round of Korea-US talks, took an exceptional measure of allowing additional inspection of the radiochemical laboratory which she had refused to be inspected until then since her withdrawal from routine inspection. The United States said after the inspection that it cannot be judged to be for military purposes.

Shortly after the inspection, an issue was raised on replacing fuel rods of the experimental atomic reactor with a production capacity of five megawatts.

Korea reported to the IAEA on several occasions that fuel rods should be exchanged as the continuous operation of the reactor would expose it to danger because of the failure to exchange the fuel rods and that a blower went out of order, requesting its presence at the time of exchange. The IAEA asked for her selection and storage method of fuel rods on the condition of its collection of samples. But Korea refused it because it fell in the category of ad hoc inspection. And yet, she promised to place the work of exchanging under IAEA's supervision and store the spent fuel rods so that the organization could examine a sample any time after her special status was terminated. Nevertheless, the watchdog organization insisted on its demand and its Director-General Blix made a rash conclusion on the exchange of fuel rods conducted in the meantime, saying that there was no opportunity to sort out and store the fuel rods and he could not stand security for the nonuse of nuclear materials for military purposes. Subsequently, the situation rapidly went from bad to worse—"statement" of the Chairman of the UN Security Council, "resolution on sanctions" of the IAEA and Korea's statement on her withdrawal from the IAEA.

All these seem quite complicated, but in the final analysis, it can be said to be a war on the time of inspection. Though seemingly negligible, this is an essential matter, because there is a fundamental difference between viewing the verification of the "past" from the point of improving the relations between Korea and the United States (Korea and the United States) and using it as a political pressure or a prerequisite for the improvement of the relations (the IAEA, south

Korea and Japan).

Inspection of fuel rods is aimed at, firstly, storing and keeping spent fuel in the cooling pool under the supervision of the IAEA to prevent their use for military purposes (the present and future), and secondly, examining samples to investigate the history of reactor operation and the extracted amount of plutonium (the past).

The fuel rods are still under the supervision of the IAEA by the presence of inspectors from the IAEA, so they can be said to be guaranteed. As the cooled rods should be disposed of, a definite answer must be delivered quickly.

Next, the whole process of fuel-rod exchange is recorded accurately and according to Korea's General Bureau of Atomic Energy, "the channel of fuel rods and the order of the rods in the channel can be represented any time it is wanted." Therefore, the "past" can be verified to anyone's satisfaction. In other words, verification of the "past, present and future" can be made even today when the fuel rods have been exchanged.

What is important is to give priority to discussion with regard to improving bilateral relations between Korea and the United States and restore Korea to the NPT, thus terminating her special status as soon as possible and creating conditions favorable for verifying the "past".

An Agreement Profitable to Both Sides

During a press conference held on October 18, 1994, after reaching an agreement on the draft Agreed Framework between Korea and the United States, a journalist asked US delegate Gallucci, "Haven't you made an unprecedented mistake of rendering aid scared by Korea's threat of 'nuclear card'?"

He answered that the presupposition of the question itself was wrong.

Amidst high appreciation of the Agreed Framework between the two countries by many people, voices were raised against the agreement and the authorities of the two countries. *Washington Post* described it as an awkward resolution by the US government and a Congressman from the Republican Party said that the crisis was only prolonged; some others said Korea made a fortune through

stubbornness and the United States made a heavy concession.

The basis of criticism varies, but they can be divided largely into three; firstly, verification of the “past” is five years overdue, secondly, there is no need to make a concession to Korea that “violated” international laws and thirdly, such a concession will rescue Korea from the doorstep of “collapse”.

First, as regards the “past”, Korea declared that she had not developed nuclear weapons. In other words, the problem of the “past” has never existed in Korea from the start and, if any, there is only a difference in views on the amount of extracted plutonium between Korea and the IAEA. If settlement of the “past” is insisted in spite of this, the underlying hostile and mistrustful relations between Korea and the United States must first be removed. Needed therefore is a time for confidence-building.

The time should not be spent to “hide nuclear weapons” or to develop them. As they agreed to give priority to building confidence, verification of the “past” is not a big problem. If Korea refuses to clarify her “past” or tries to develop nuclear weapons, the two countries will relapse into hostile relations in a moment. Then, all the efforts made so far will be wasted. Korea that has tried to improve her relations with the United States for a long time will not let the opportunity slip on its own.

As for the statement on the withdrawal from the NPT, it was an act justifiable by the provisions stipulated in the treaty. It is none other than the IAEA and the United States that made Korea unable to do otherwise. Komaki Teruo, head of the trend analysis department of the Asian Economic Institute, was quoted by *Yomiuri Shimbun*, dated October 29, 1994, as saying, “Originally, there was not an unmistakable evidence that Korea possesses nuclear weapons. As the United States clamoured that ‘Korea would probably have nuclear weapons,’ she must pay for it; it is a different matter with the one of applying sanctions against Iraq that invaded another country.”

Contrary to the expectation of the West, Korea has so far not experienced wavering and confusion in spite of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the East European countries, the end of the Cold War and the death of President Kim Il Sung.

To lay a foundation for settling the problem through

negotiations also meets the interests of the West.

Both Korea and the United States sought for the settlement of the “nuclear suspicion” and nuclear problem and approached and understood each other. Although it is said the United States made a big concession, in fact she has lost nothing.

New York Times pointed out that the agreement made a demand to halt building a large-sized GMR, a demand greater than the NPT could make. True, the United States obtained a great “relief”.

Kang Sok Ju said the two sides held serious discussions on important matters for the fundamental settlement of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula; as a result of the studying of the most practical and reasonable method or as logical necessity, a concrete way for improving the relations between the two countries has opened out. This is the greatest fruit Korea picked in her effort to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

The delicate political and diplomatic balance established on the Korean peninsula during the Cold-War days was destroyed with south Korea entering into diplomatic relations with Russia and China, and this created fresh insecurity in Northeast Asia. Worse still, the military tension ran high by the constant nuclear threat against Korea by the United States, intensification of the military and political encirclement of Korea by the United States, south Korea and Japan and fabrication of the “nuclear suspicion”.

Korea had to straighten out this abnormal situation as soon as possible, while the United States that had lost the cause for maintaining tension on the Korean peninsula any longer had to establish a new post-Cold-War “international order” and redress her disgraceful “past” in relation with Korea. The interests and objectives of both countries agreed in principle and the framework agreement came into being.

War or Talks?

The United States achieved a “great historical victory” in the Gulf War and the Bush Administration won a miraculous support, but Hussein still remains as the President of Iraq, his “threat” continuously existing as a troublesome and heavy “burden” on the

United States. The military tension was created again early in October when the Iraqi army concentrated on the border of Kuwait. Clinton dispatched without delay huge armed forces including air force, aircraft carriers, marine corps and mechanized units. Iraq withdrew her army in a hurry saying that it was a “usual military exercise”.

By means of this “stimulation strategy”, Iraq made the West European countries and the Gulf countries concentrate their attention on lifting the economic sanctions of the UN. She gained a success in this strategy. France is against the plan of the United States for creating a no-deployment area in the southern region of Iraq, and Russia and China, too, began to move to lift the sanctions.

Nevertheless, the United States cannot acquiesce in removal of sanctions, nor can she withdraw her troops at once considering the possibility of Iraqi army’s advance to the Kuwaiti border. Snyder, head of the political and military department at the US Centre for Strategic and International Studies, warned; the dispatch of the US troops to the Gulf area costs several hundred million dollars; Hussein will continue his play if the West European countries do not enter into negotiations with Iraq; if the United States continues her overseas advance as she does now, the *America* will surely be wrecked by the heavy load of munitions.

The United States is suffering a serious trouble in a dilemma, fooled by Iraq’s tactics.

The Democratic Party was utterly defeated by the Republican Party in the off-year election, so it doubled Clinton’s trouble as a helmsman.

Snyder also said that the United States should not launch another Iraqi event in any part of the world. When the military tension is aggravated extremely on the Korean peninsula or another Korean war breaks out, the *America* will be wrecked on a rock and sink because of the heavy burden of military expense and a great loss of lives.

Only half a year has passed since the US-led clamour for applying economic “sanctions” against Korea. Korea announced that she would regard any sanctions against her as a military provocation and she would return a war for war and talks for talks. Breakout of another war would have been quite possible if sanctions had been

strengthened.

Concerning the Agreed Framework, Jon Wolfsthal, Senior Research Analyst for Non-proliferation Issues at the Arms Control Association, said that it was far better than any armed conflict breaking out on the Korean peninsula before the agreement was reached.

The signing of the Agreed Framework created a condition to avoid the possible worst situation and opened a way to solve any complicated problems such as the “nuclear issue” by a peaceful way, ie, through talks. Herein lies the great significance of the agreement. People may say that this success is an inevitable result of the historical development, but more exactly, it is the most desirable fruit of concerted efforts of the two sides.

This event must be welcomed by south Korea and Japan, too. A voice, “Why must Japan donate money?” is ringing among the Japanese press, but it is a short-sighted view.

“Japan’s share amounts to approximately 1,000 million dollars and the Foreign Ministry says it is not a grant but a loan, so it would be right to say that she pays a small sum of money for her security,” said Prof. Yoshida Yasuhiko at Saitama University. As he pointed out, it is not a big burden to Japan if the money is spent to dispel the “nuclear suspicion” of Korea and to remove “insecurity factors” in Northeast Asia. During the Gulf War Japan contributed 9,000 million dollars, but she enjoyed no “praise” from the West and her “efforts” to solve the Iraqi question aroused no response. We should call this fact to mind.

An expert on the Korean question in the United States said correctly about the prospects of the agreement. He said that although the LWRs were said to be very expensive, the United States would gain greatly in return if Korea faithfully observed the agreement. Thus the Agreed Framework secures in its content an adequate profit and safety for the West.

War brings no profit and no settlement; it leaves the lasting hatred and antagonism between the two sides. As the Gulf War shows, even the winner cannot solve the problem fundamentally. But peaceful talks, though they require a long time and patient efforts, give many hopeful suggestions and make it possible to find solutions to the

complicated international problems.

The Korea-US talks, which had lasted over one year, suggested a way to peaceful settlement—building confidence by way of negotiation, not by confrontation and war—and its unlimited capabilities.

For a Nuclear-Free, Peace Zone

Robert Gallucci pointed out even the blind spot of the IAEA and the NPT regime to stress the validity of the principled agreement between Korea and the United States, saying that many people would not understand, but mass-production of plutonium (by Korea) was not a violation of the regulations of the IAEA and the NPT. This means he recognized that the IAEA or the NPT regime was powerless in the settlement of the complicated problems such as the nuclear question on the Korean peninsula.

This is quite clear when we consider the limitation of the countermeasure of the IAEA against Korea and the fact that the result of the withdrawal of Korea from the NPT was the negotiations between Korea and the United States.

The NPT regime namely aims at the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, but it is nothing but a system that only prevents non-nuclear states from possessing nuclear weapons while conniving at the expansion of nuclear weapons by five nuclear states.

The shortcomings of this system are as follows: firstly, the NPT is a one-sided unequal treaty; secondly, it is unfair and has double standards in its application; thirdly, it cannot exercise restrictions on the non-nuclear states and those which have withdrawn from the treaty; and fourthly, even if the treaty is observed, nuclear weapons cannot be abolished completely, nor can denuclearization be realized.

These shortcomings had already been discussed, but after Korea took a decisive measure for the settlement of the nuclear question, they were made public and revealed clearly. However, there is some tendency to calumniate the significance of the Korea-US agreement.

“There is an opinion that unlike the Ukraine method, the Korea-US Agreed Framework gave the ‘worst lesson’. It means that for the first time the international community witnessed a way of negotiation

by which one violates the NPT and stubbornly rejects the inspection of the IAEA, in order to easily take a ‘gift’ such as economic and technical aids or the improvement of the diplomatic relations.” (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 25, 1994.) This is a typical example of slandering. There are also many other complaints against the agreement: “It would be difficult to check if other countries follow the method of north Korea,” “There will appear many countries which would wield the nuclear card to get aids,” “It is an unwelcome compromise and regrettable instance,” “The NPT has become a mere scrap of paper,” and “It produced another inequality.”

However, all these are one-sided assertions and complaints based on the stand of nuclear states, and they are nothing but an attempt to keep their vested rights, leaving the present shortcomings of the NPT as they are. It means the arbitrariness of the nuclear states, aiming at maintaining the system which forces inequality upon the non-nuclear states. Such an attitude can never settle the nuclear issue of the world.

The Korea-US talks and their agreement is an epoch-making event which opened a new way for nuclear non-proliferation and the settlement of the nuclear problem. Furthermore, it rectified the defects of the NPT regime itself and provided a new possibility of nuclear non-proliferation. It also showed for the first time that the non-nuclear states, the small countries, too, are fully able to get rid of nuclear threat by the superpowers if they make a vigorous struggle against them.

The Korea-US Agreed Framework is the first diplomatic document on the “nuclear arms control” in Asia, the first step towards the establishment of the first nuclear-free, peace zone in Asia.

The observation of the inspection by the IAEA and the NPT regime will not lead to denuclearization. It means, on the contrary, that if one country observes the one-sided obligations, it will become powerless under the nuclear threat. In this sense, there were some difficulties in the negotiations between Korea and the United States, but the US side eventually promised a specified country for the first time not to threaten her with nuclear weapons. It would be right to understand that the United States agreed on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, although she intended to prevent the nuclear

armament of south Korea and Japan.

As reaffirmed at the talks between President Kim Il Sung and former US President Carter, the Korea-US talks proceeded on the basis of the Joint Agreement on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and achieved a good success.

“Each side faithfully kept the promise,” said Carter with satisfaction. But the purpose of Korea-US agreement is not in the solution of the “nuclear issue” but in the final settlement of the nuclear problem; it is not in the unilateral observation of the NPT, but in the seeking of a new nuclear non-proliferation system, in other words, the establishment of a nuclear-free, peace zone on the Korean peninsula.

Fulfillment of the Agreement and Building-up of Mutual Confidence

Korea abided by the agreement for one month since her signing of the Agreed Framework.

As a first step she made a decision to stop the building of the 50-megawatt and 200-megawatt GMRs and withdrew the fuel rods prepared for replacement. Besides, she gave a favorable and constructive response to the Korea-US experts consultation on the safe storage and final disposal of the spent fuel, allowed exceptionally a US delegation to inspect the atomic facilities in Nyongbyon, and reopened negotiations with the IAEA to receive its delegation.

Korea froze the GMRs completely and sealed the radiochemical laboratory which was alleged by the Western side to be a reprocessing facility, placing them under the supervision of the IAEA. Such measures prove that the Korean side fulfilled its obligations faithfully within one month, and that Korea is qualified to demand the US side for the sincere fulfillment of her responsibility.

Within the limits of the NPT regime it is quite legal to operate the GMRs and reprocess the spent fuel, so Korea’s measures exceeded the objectives set forth by the regulations of the NPT. Besides, these measures show that Korea fulfilled the first three of the four obligations stipulated in the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula between the North and the South of Korea,

which are as follows; (1) prohibition of the test, manufacture, production, introduction, possession, stockpile, deployment and use of nuclear weapons, (2) use of the nuclear energy exclusively for the peaceful purpose, (3) prohibition of the possession of nuclear reprocessing facilities and uranium-enriching facilities, and (4) enforcement of regular procedures and inspections by the North-South Joint Committee of Nuclear Management on the sites which were selected by the other party and agreed by both sides (agreed in 1991 and effectuated in 1992). (See Appendix.)

During the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Clinton said, after meeting heads of state respectively, that the agreement between Korea and the United States opened up the roads to a new era of security and prosperity in East Asia, continuing that heads of the United States, south Korea and Japan expressed resolute support to this agreement. Heads of the three states affirmed their willingness to cooperate for the LWR project.

Nevertheless, the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO--later renamed as Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization), the international consortium which would be responsible for the LWR project, has not yet been ready to be established because of disagreement on its member states, the rate of their share and operation funds.

Worse still, as a result of the off-year election in the United States, the Republican Party has held the majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives; this caused a great difficulty in the fulfillment of the agreement. Ultra-hawkish Senator Helms, who is expected to become chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, openly said that the committee would adopt a resolution, the content of which is first, the United States will not donate money for the assistance to Korea; second, the United States will not allow her allies to give aids to Korea, and so on.

If the conservative hard-liners unprecedently occupy the posts responsible for the diplomatic and defence policy of the Congress and exert pressure, the Clinton government may face difficulties in implementing the Korea-US Agreed Framework.

Anyhow, the Agreed Framework is an official document signed for the first time between Korea and the United States and Clinton

assured its implementation by the authority of the President. Moreover, it is an international commitment which the United Nations, the IAEA and the countries concerned welcomed and supported.

When the promise is revoked, the national prestige of the United States will be shattered, and this will lead the two countries to go back to the state before the Korea-US talks, ie, mistrust and confrontation.

6. OFFENSE AND DEFENSE SURROUNDING THE “SOUTH KOREAN-STYLE LIGHT-WATER REACTOR” AND AGREEMENT ON THE REACTOR (April-July 1995)

What Is “Trojan Horse”?

“North Korea called the south Korean-style light-water reactor (LWR) Trojan Horse. This means that she admitted herself to be an aggressor. I think north Korea revealed that she is contradicting herself.” This is what a Japanese journalist said.

Trojan War is a legendary war between ancient Greece and Troy described in a heroic epic *The Iliad* by the Greek poet Homer. According to the poem the Greek allied army attacked Troy for ten years to conquer her, but failed. At last, Greece got warriors into a hollow wooden horse and left it in the field, pretending to desert the war. Using such a trick, Greece conquered Troy. *The Iliad* described Greece as fighting for justice, but in an objective view, she was an aggressor who provoked war.

Similarly, in view of Koreans, the alliance between the United States, south Korea and Japan is naturally equivalent to the Greek allied army, the “international cooperation system” an encircling net against her and the “south Korean-style LWR” “Trojan Horse” to

destroy her socialist system from within.

Kong Ro Myong, the south Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that the “south Korean-style LWR” is not “Trojan Horse”, but the fact that the south Korean authorities came up with a nominal “south Korean style” and entreated Americans to call that reactor the “south Korean style” on the condition that they offer money, made Korea doubt that the south was trying to use the “Trojan Horse” scheme. The United States which was in shortage of funds had no words to decline south Korea’s offer. Since then, the words “south Korean style” which had never existed prevailed. It was ridiculous that the words which were not mentioned in the Agreed Framework between Korea and the United States were openly out. Gallucci made a distorted interpretation that the LWRs of 2 million kw capacity meant two reactors of south Korea based on *Uljin No. 3* and *No. 4*, that the country, which could offer reactors is only south Korea from the view of both funds and technology and that when the Agreed Framework was adopted, both sides understood such a situation in secret and did not mention it in the agreement as “diplomatic etiquette” for the Korean government.

The pressurized LWRs which have been internationally recognized up to date are the product of the Westinghouse of the United States, the *VVER* style of Russia, *CPI* of France, and *Biblis* of Germany, but the “south Korean style” does not belong to any of such kinds. Japan, which has many reactors, does not call their reactors Japanese style and the international community does not recognize them as a Japanese style.

The basic designs and reactor core of *Uljin No.3* and *No. 4* are the products of Combustion Engineering (USA) and their turbines are those of the General Electric (USA), so these reactors may be called the US style. As a result, at the working conference concerning the LWR project held on June 30 and July 1, 1994, between the United States, south Korea and Japan, Americans rejected the export of the south Korean-style reactors, saying that their establishment in other countries is greatly subject to legal and technical restrictions.

But they suddenly changed their attitude, recognizing the “south Korean style” as a fait accompli and forced Korea to accept it. The reason is that first, money can be raised only by south Korea; second,

south Korea obstinately calls it “south Korean style”; and third, the United States, too, wanted Korea to “collapse” from within and hoped that “south Korean style” would become “Trojan Horse”.

The Agreed Framework between Korea and the United States dealt comprehensively with the solution to the nuclear question in the Korean peninsula and the way to improve the relations between the two countries. In another view, however, the United States which recognized that she could not bring Korea to her knees by the “policy of force” changed her policy into the “appeasement policy” to make Korea “soft-land”. Imposing the “south Korean style” was the result of the concurrence between the United States which considers that the “south Korean style” is favourable and the Kim Young Sam “regime” which wants “unification through absorption”.

The second reason why the LWRs to be established in Korea should be the south Korean style is that they would make it possible to maintain and expand the south’s possible influence on the north.

The construction of LWRs takes 8-10 years. In this period, the capital, technology, materials and many technicians in particular would enter the north from the south.. Agents of “Security Planning Agency” may be included among them. From the view of south Koreans, it would make it possible to disturb the north with which she has long been confronted and take opportunity to establish her domination over the north.

When the relations between the north and the south are aggravated or the south is in a dilemma, the south may threaten the north to stop the construction of the LWRs or withdraw their constructors.

Kondo Shunsuke, Associate Professor of the Tokyo Institute of Technology, said: “From the technological viewpoint, the ‘south Korean-style LWR’ does not exist. Apparently the ‘south Korean style’ means that programming of computer and the like needed in the construction of reactor may be offered by south Korea. We can say that the nuclear power station is a great industry in which the different kinds of latest technology are compiled. When south Korea builds LWRs, many technicians and factories which have a contract to offer reactor parts would approach north Korea. This means that south Korea would control the atomic energy market in the Korean

peninsula." (*Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, April 17, 1995.)

In the agreement between Korea and the United States concerning the LWR, north Korea made the maximum concession to the United States. Detailed items are not published, but rumour says that first, Russia provides Korea with the LWR that she is to offer to south Korea as repayment of debt; second, on the condition that the United States has charge of the designing of the nuclear core, south Korea may take charge of other basic designs; third, if the United States becomes the prime contractor, Korea is ready to receive south Korean technicians; and fourth, the contracting party must be the KEDO (the international consortium centring on the United States, south Korea and Japan).

The United States, too, was interested in the proposal of Korea and had a plan in which the US firms work as the prime contractor. Some Americans said that it was not necessary to attach importance to the "south Korean style". Gallucci also said that if it is the "south Korean style", there is no need to bother about its name. The Democratic Party, an opposition party in south Korea, insisted that there was no need to care about the name.

However, the south Korean authorities pay all their attention to the name of the "south Korean style". Threatening Americans Kim Young Sam said, "If the reactor is not named the 'south Korean style', we cannot donate even a penny. If we do not donate money, the contract about LWRs will be a mere scrap of paper and the agreement in Geneva will become useless." Meanwhile, Kong Ro Myong, Minister of Foreign Affairs, blatantly said, "As long as the 'south Korean style' is denied and south Korea cannot play a leading role, we have no intention to take part in the LWR project."

Following this trend, delicate difference began to appear between the United States and south Korea in the understanding and standpoint concerning the reactor. *Wall Street Journal*, dated March 27, 1995, wrote that a discord sprouted between the authorities of the United States and south Korea. South Korea had a doubt whether the United States and Korea would try to give up the "south Korean style", keeping pace with each other, and whether the former would persuade south Korea to donate money and take all the profit to herself. Worse still, Korea and Japan showed a move to reopen

negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations, so south Korea felt more isolated.

Nevertheless, south Korea is resorting to the “south Korean style” because she wants a leading role. In other words, she attempts to use the offering of LWRs as a decoy so as to lead the north by the nose and at last realize domination over the north. She considers that a “leading role” is imperative for this purpose. That is why Kong Ro Myong took a firm attitude, saying that as long as the south Korean Electric Co. does not become the prime contractor from designing to manufacturing, execution and building, the contract cannot be signed.

As a south Korean expert on the south-north question revealed that south Korea exerted all her effort because she wanted the reactor to be the “south Korean style” (*Mainichi Shimbun*, March 28, 1995.), the “south Korean style” was a political term she devised to realize her political purpose to “destroy” the north from within.

Defective Facility Whose Safety Is Not Guaranteed

The offensive and defensive battle between Korea, the United States, south Korea and Japan centring on the “south Korean-style” LWR is not confined only to the style of LWR, but a symbol of the long-protracted north-south confrontation, as well as a question connected with the present and future relations between the north and the south of Korea. Therefore, the north denies the “south Korean style” stubbornly and the south sticks to her gun.

As the issue of the “south Korean style” started from the political purpose to destroy the north, it is natural that the north rejects it.

In addition to this political purpose, there is another reason why the north rejects it. South Korean nuclear reactors cause many accidents, so their safety is not guaranteed. Apparently because they are a mixed bread which is now under construction based on the design of a reactor imported 20 years ago, *Ujin* No. 3 and No. 4 have many fatal defects: first, the rate of meltdown of the reactor core is four times higher than the international standards; second, durability is as short as 30-40 years; and third, the body of reactor and its turbine are in the stage of trial product, and since it is expected to commission

partly from 1998, there is neither experience of operations nor actual export record.

But, the United States, south Korea and Japan hold that they, the offerers, that is, the KEDO, have the right to choose the LWR style. This is not reasonable. Misunderstanding comes from the word “offer”. Korea buys the LWRs in the name of a loan, not receiving it free of charge. It is not reasonable that the seller forces the buyer to buy what the latter dislikes. The seller must naturally respect the buyer’s opinion.

“The LWRs are not offered by any grant-type aid or favour. Our country receives it on the condition that we will repay. We, the buyer, have the right to choose the style. The irrational insistence on the ‘south Korean style’ is equivalent to giving rice cake to those who want to eat noodle.”

As Han Song Ryol in the Korean mission to the UN said, Korea has the right of choice.

Who Is to Be in Charge?

The marathon Korea-US talks held in Kuala Lumpur ended at last, issuing the Joint Press Statement on June 13, after a long dispute about whether the “south Korean style” and the “leading role” of south Korea should be written on the document or not. In the long run, the dispute was settled without placing the name “south Korea” on the document. But, a side-by-side comparison shows a subtle difference between the English and Korean versions of the statement.

The point in question is the phrase which defines the role of programme coordinator. In the Korean version the phrase is written, “A US firm will serve as programme coordinator which supervises overall implementation of the LWR project by assisting KEDO,” but in the English version, “A US firm will serve as programme coordinator to assist KEDO in supervising overall implementation of the LWR project.” (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 14, 1995.) In other words, in Korean the supervisor of the LWR project is a US firm, the programme coordinator, but in English the KEDO.

The KEDO is an international consortium centring on the United States, south Korea and Japan and among them south Korea

bears most of the money. If the KEDO supervises this project, it means that south Korea has a say.

However, if the programme coordinator supervises the project, south Korea has no say. The KEDO is trying to select the south Korea Electric Co. as the prime contractor. In this case, too, as long as the programme coordinator supervises, it would be nothing but a “contracted being” of the US firm.

As a point at issue had been whether the “leading role” of south Korea would be recognized or not, the expression of this phrase is of great importance. It was expected that this expression would bring about a conflict. But, unexpectedly south Korea is keeping silence at present. Be it a natural result or not, the “role of south Korea” faced double or treble obstacles. The attempt of south Korea to use the provision of LWRs as her anti-north card was totally destroyed.

First of all, the LWR style was clearly recorded in the document as the advanced version of US-origin design and technology. According to the Joint Press Statement, the style may be the same as *Uljin No. 3* and *No. 4*, but it does not mention that it refers to the *Uljin* style of south Korea. It means that a US firm may change the design of the advanced version of “Model 80” of the US firm CE (the present ABB-CE) to suit the reality of Korea. Therefore, the LWR style is nominally and virtually a US style.

First, the “south Korean style” has never been recognized internationally. Since *Uljin No. 3* and *No. 4* are the south Korean version of the US “Model 80”, the “south Korean style” has never existed.

Second, the press statement stipulates that the KEDO is under US leadership and that the United States will serve as the principal point of contact with Korea for the LWR project and US citizens will lead delegations and teams of the KEDO as required to fulfil this role.

According to the statement, south Korea cannot behave at her own discretion in the KEDO. In general, whether the programme coordinator or the KEDO supervises, the role of south Korea is not important.

The recent Korea-US talks reaffirmed that the one and only contracting party for the LWR project is the United States which should be responsible for the whole of the project, playing a loading

role. If south Korea disturbs the LWR project even a little, Korea can lodge a protest with the United States at once. If the United States does not execute the contract Korea can press her for carrying it out. On the condition that such rights are vested in Korea, both sides came to the recent agreement. It would be right to say that both sides reached accord because the United States accepted all the demands of Korea, rather than to say, as in the editorial of *Tokyo Shimbun*, June 15, 1995, reads, “The recent agreement was made as a result of clearly defining the dignity and profits of the north and south of Korea.”

The Meaning of Two Personal Letters

Concerning the LWR question, US President Clinton sent two personal letters; one is the letter of assurance to General Secretary Kim Jong Il, sent when the Agreed Framework was adopted between Korea and the United States in October 1994, and the other is the letter to Kim Young Sam, sent when the recent Joint Press Statement was published between these two countries. But the contents of the two letters are totally different and their roles and significance, too, are different.

The letter to General Secretary Kim Jong Il promised to deliver alternative energy (heavy fuel oil) by exercising the authority of the President. In other words, it reaffirmed that the United States is responsible for providing oil.

Why did Korea demand the letter of assurance?

According to the letter, in case the LWRs are not completed not because of Korea, but some other reasons, the United States herself bears the responsibility of offering and completing them. In this way the letter prevents the third party (south Korea) from interfering with the implementation of the contract. It means that the north checked beforehand the rash attempt of the south to realize the “south Korean style” and her “leading role”.

In the first item of the statement, the United States reaffirmed that the letter of assurance continues in effect. The letter of assurance and the press statement which clarified the US style and the leading role of the United States accord with each other and have no contradiction.

The letter of assurance is a victory of the diplomatic policy of Korea and at the same time, a defeat of south Korea. An editorial of *Yomiuri Shimbun*, dated June 15, wrote in wonder, “President Clinton praised General Secretary Kim Jong Il before the statement was published and sent a personal letter to him as a subject does to the King.” The editorial is certainly reasonable.

The other letter of Clinton is different from the former. In this regard there are two questions.

First, the letter reads, “The reactor to be referred to as pointed out in the commercial contract adopted between KEDO and the prime contractor is *Uljin No. 3* and *No. 4*.” This is quite different from the expression “the advanced version of US-origin design and technology”. The press statement did not mention “the reactor to be referred to”. The letter goes against this fact.

Second, the letter reads, “A US firm takes part in the LWR project as a contracting party of the south Korean company, the prime contractor.” This is also different from the content of the press statement which clarifies that the United States should be responsible for the whole of the project, whoever supervises the project.

After all, this letter is a desperate measure of the United States to appease south Korea’s anger at the fact that the “south Korean style” and her “leading role” were not mentioned in the press statement, while aiming to reach accord with Korea at any cost. So it can be said that the United States, which had been in a dilemma between the north and the south of Korea, made another error of exposing herself to complaints of both sides for “double-dealing”.

However, it is obvious that in the settlement of the nuclear and LWR questions, the document that the two parties concerned signed is more significant than the letter one party sent to the third party. Plainly speaking, the letter means that south Korea was forsaken by the United States.

Some people consider that the recent talks were not those between Korea and the United States, but those between the north and south of Korea. Precisely speaking, one party was Korea and the United States and the other party was south Korea. When the day of the conclusion of the LWR agreement was near at hand, the popular opinions in America were that “The name of the LWR is not

important,” “The stubborn attitude of south Korea is the direct reason for the United States to fall into a pit,” “The United States must make a fresh start, disregarding south Korea,” and “Allowing south Korea to supervise the provision of the LWR is a shame on the United States.” The US administration, too, exerted pressure of different forms on south Korea to give up the “south Korean style”.

The US attitude is that if nuclear freezing in Korea could be maintained, any compromise matters little. What is most important for both Korea and the United States is to observe and put into effect the Agreed Framework. In fact, between Korea and the United States, there was no fundamental difference in their opinions. The obstacle was south Korea. The problem was how to persuade south Korea. In this sense, the three weeks of marathon talks were indeed the time needed to persuade south Korea.

As expected, south Korea aired her dissatisfaction. Her distrust ran very deep. She struggled desperately to the last. But the talks ended up “excluding south Korea”. The ambiguous letter of Clinton could not help anything. It was a choice placed on the edge of precipice. Sure enough, a sharp criticism that it was “betrayal of the United States” burst out from the south Korean authorities. Through the recent agreement on the LWR, south Korea became more isolated and her distrust in America increased. The “international cooperation system” between the United States and south Korea began to break, its root shaking.

Korea and the United States Moving towards the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

Linton, research associate at the Centre for Korean Research, Columbia University, who visited Korea tens of times, said that the improvement of the Korea-US relations is a prerequisite for the improvement of relations between the north and south of Korea and that there is nothing to lose for south Korea, continuing that in order to create a dialogue between the north and south of Korea, the relations between Korea and the United States must be improved first.

This remark is contrary to the allegation of the United States, south Korea and Japan that the negotiation between the north and

south of Korea is a prerequisite for the improvement of Korea-US relations. Which is right?

Since October 1994, when the Agreed Framework was published between Korea and the United States, the relations between the two countries have newly developed from hostile relations to those of trust. This may bring a conclusion, "The essence of the Agreed Framework is to allow north Korea to maintain her system for a while." (*Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 16, 1995.)

South Korea which did not want it resisted, using every possible means. Her last resort was the "south Korean style" and her "leading role". We can consider it as "the scramble for leadership for establishing order in the Korean peninsula." (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 14, 1995.) Therefore, the negotiation went through a hot controversy, but it ended in south Korea's defeat.

"The true motive of north Korea is to improve her relations with the United States and Japan and make up for the shortage of food and heavy oil, the energy it can duely obtain afterwards, rather than to build the LWR which would take over ten years from the start of the project to completion. North Korea will leave a vague question for the LWR project and use it to maintain her system." This analysis of Ri Song U, a professor of Sogang University, south Korea, reflects the present distrust and hostile relations between the north and south of Korea. However, what is most important for the north is to better the north-south relations finally, by improving her relations with the United States and Japan, so as to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone and reunify the country.

On the part of the north, improving her relations with the United States and Japan is the foundation for reunifying the country on an equal footing with the south. At present, the south seems to be "neglected", but to reunify the country peacefully, not by a war, improving the relations with the United States and Japan even by making a detour is a prerequisite for the north for developing the relations between the north and south of Korea.

Kim Young Sam is afraid that he would fail to take initiative in achieving reunification, "unification through absorption". The recent agreement on the LWR project clearly showed that it would be impossible.

The United States established at last diplomatic relations with Vietnam. Twenty years have passed since the Vietnam War ended, but the period is not so long as that of division of the Korean peninsula. Since Korea is divided into the north and the south, it would not be easy for the United States to establish diplomatic relations with the north. But nobody can check the historical trend in which the Cold War ended. In the United States, a demand for developing the US-Korea relations is daily increasing, disregarding the opinion of south Korea. The successful settlement of the LWR question is stirring up this trend.

The provision of the LWR will take as long as 10 years. In this period Korea and the United States would develop their relations in different fields based on the bridge of the LWR. The agreement on the LWR became a springboard for establishing a new order in the Korean peninsula. The Korean peninsula is moving vigorously towards a new era.

III. MATURING POSSIBILITY OF THE REUNIFICATION OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH THROUGH FEDERATION

A MAGIC—THE NORTHERN IRELAND STYLE

The 20th century, a century of violent events and wars, is ending. It was an unprecedented century which witnessed so many regional disputes and great worldwide wars for territory, nation, religion, ideology, resources, national interest and so on, producing a lot of war victims. The high growth of civilization and technology brought about “affluent life” to the people; at the same time, the rapid increase of the power of weapons killed incomparably greater number of people than the wars in previous centuries. It caused mass destruction, claiming even civilians. The emergence of unimaginably powerful weapons which destroy a city in a moment, the appearance of atom, hydrogen and neutron bombs and biochemical weapons threaten even the

existence of mankind. This is why the 20th century is called a “century stained with blood” and a “century without a victor”.

However, amid the ceaseless wars and arms race, mankind drew a lesson and displayed their resourcefulness, albeit to a little degree, to survive. Furthermore, approaching the end of the present century, the world began to move from confrontation and hatred to reconciliation, cooperation, coexistence and coprosperity. The typical examples are the conclusion of the Cold War, the restoration and independence of nation-states, the dialogues and efforts for nuclear disarmament and the reduction of mass-destruction weapons, and the realization of the historical reconciliation between Palestine and Israel. The questions which had been considered impossible to be settled, are being unentangled one after another. Indeed, man plays a role of importance. Making the 21st century a peaceful century of coexistence and coprosperity depends largely on creating as many paradigms of reconciliation as possible.

The reconciliation negotiation for the settlement of the Northern Ireland question which came to a historical agreement on April 10, 1998, was one of such great movements. Whoever had imagined the agreement would be achieved? It was a miracle, indeed. A miracle does not mean an impossibility. It is achieved by the maturity of general situation, the arrival of an opportunity and the sincere efforts. The settlement of the Northern Ireland question proved this truth again.

The dispute in British Northern Ireland started from the 12th century. England tried to conquer Ireland, but failed. Amid such attempts, in the period of the absolute monarchy, the first plantagenet King Henry II launched a war to conquer Ireland and established domination by the Anglo-Saxon race. As a result, England forced Irish people to follow the Church of England, made Ulster province the royal fief and emigrated English people to this region.

It caused the repeated resistance mainly of the Celtic race that emigrated to this island before Christ. After many riots were put down, Ireland was converted into a colony of England and suffered oppression and poverty. In the 17th century, England emigrated her people on a large scale to Ireland and strengthened her rule. The people who came there by the forced settlement are the ancestors of

the present Protestant inhabitants. Entering the 20th century, riots continued in Dublin and other parts of the island, so England divided Ireland into the north and the south. The south gained independence in 1937 and became the Republic of Ireland of today.

However, the northern part, where the Anglo-Saxons (English Protestants), the ruling circle, comprised 60 per cent of the population, remained as an English territory without gaining independence in antagonistic relationship between Roman Catholics and Protestants.

As the structure of inequality and discrimination between rich Protestants and poor Roman Catholics became solid in 1960, the civic movement was activated among Roman Catholic inhabitants and their conflict with the ruling circle or Protestant population was aggravated. With the occupation by the British army in 1969, the Irish Republican Army launched an armed struggle. This caused the Northern Ireland dispute and brought about a bloody sectarian conflict of three decades claiming 3,200 lives.

The conflict, aggravated by Protestants insisting on remaining as a part of the United Kingdom with Roman Catholics demanding union with the Republic of Ireland, was not a religious conflict, but a 900-year-long national conflict, a conflict between the conqueror and the conquered. The United States where 38 million Irish-Americans are living sides with the Roman Catholics and the confrontation between the East and the West in the Cold-War era kept up the armed conflict between the two sides. The continued bloody dispute entangled and deepened the hatred and interests between the two parties, so people considered that their reconciliation would be absolutely impossible.

But, the two parties and the countries concerned reached an agreement on peaceful settlement and made a start towards historical reconciliation. Their agreement is as follows: first, a new Northern Ireland Assembly will be founded, which will establish autonomy and exercise administration and legislation of the area; second, the new assembly will organize the “South-North Council” with the Irish government in the form of transcending the frontier to deliberate on matters concerning the whole of Ireland; third, a “conference” of the representatives of the governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland and the assemblies of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales will be functioned; and fourth, the Republic of Ireland will

amend the item of her Constitution which claims her possession of Northern Ireland.

Indeed, it is like a magic. It can be called an intelligent attempt to weaken the significance of “territory” or “frontier” so as to remove the confrontation caused by “reunion spirit”. There is a criticism that it is nothing but a delay of the “reunion” question which is the root of grudge and conflict, but it is significant in that both sides recognized that this is the only way to overcome the pent-up hatred and conflict and reached an agreement.

The peace proposals based on the agreement were approved by the referendum held in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland on May 22, 1998. 71.12 per cent voted for the proposal and 28.88 per cent against. According to the opinion poll conducted by *Guardian*, 73 per cent of the residents of Northern Ireland said they would vote “Yes”, 61 per cent of the inhabitants of the Republic of Ireland favoured the amendment of the Constitution and 80 per cent of Britain supported the agreement. This survey was almost correct.

In the following months, incendiarism and retaliations were frequently perpetrated by the die-hards of the two sides. The confrontation was aggravated after a demonstration of Protestants, with the result that on August 1 a bomb exploded in a bus in Banbridge, Northern Ireland, injuring 35 people and on August 15 a terroristic bomb attack took place in the centre of Armagh causing 250 casualties. But, with the growing enrageament among residents, the radical terrorist group could not but declare a “complete cease-fire”, being afraid of their isolation from the people.

Anyhow, a great trial started for peace challenging the “reunion spirit” by weakening the meaning of “territory” which had been absolutely recognized as the range of the rule of a state and the meaning of “state”. The Northern Ireland style was an epoch-making event in that it showed the way to settle different disputes caused by history and national conflict. It will be highly appreciated that it has brought about a bright future and hope for the world in the end of the 20th century.

1. THE FIRST TRIAL TO OVERCOME THE

DIFFERENCE OF THE SYSTEMS BY MEANS OF “NATION”

The realization of peace by dialogue, the Northern Ireland style, suggests many things and encourages the efforts to end the territorial division of the Korean peninsula.

Needless to say, the division of Korea into the north and the south and the confrontation between them are different in essence and structure from the Irish question. The conflict between the north and south of Korea originated from the colonial rule by Japan and after liberation she was divided by the US occupation of south Korea. This division became solid by the Korean War, a proxy war of the Cold War between the East and the West. Outside forces are the fundamental factor of the national division. This is a national problem, but, in fact, it is a national conflict caused by the differences of ideas and social systems. The “reunion” question in this case where both sides are the same race lies not in the nation, but in ideology and faith.

All big countries surrounding Korea—Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union—have been concerned with the division. Herein lies the complication of the question and difficulties for its solution.

However, everybody knows that while the division has been continuing for over half a century, the Korean nation has not remained idle, being controlled by big countries. Whenever the reunification trend was rising, various “incidents” were caused, big powers interfered with them and distrust increased between the north and the south, making the situation go against reunification. Nevertheless, if both sides are pessimistic about reunification considering it impossible and have a feeling of frustration and futility, it may help the perpetuation of the division. It may take a long time, but north-south reunification will be achieved without fail. Reunification is by no means a pipe dream. There are two explanations about this question. Those are internal and external factors in and outside the Korean peninsula.

With regard to the internal factor, the north and the south of Korea already reached the level of the Northern Ireland style. There is a tendency to underestimate this fact in that the Korean question has

not been tried, but it must be correctly appreciated. We should not forget that it has been discussed at the same level as the Northern Ireland style.

This is explained by the historical agreements achieved by the north and the south, that is, the North-South Joint Statement published on July 4, 1972, and the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange between the North and the South adopted in 1991.

The July 4 joint statement proclaimed the agreement on the three principles of reunification—*independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity*. These principles are the fundamental principles even today, when one-fourth of a century has passed since its publication and will be the same in the future.

First, because it is the national conflict resulted from the division by outside forces, the reunification must be achieved by the Korean nation itself rejecting them; second, because the division was perpetuated and the hatred and conflict were aggravated by the Korean War, a fratricidal war, the reunification must be realized not by another war but by a peaceful dialogue; and third, a fundamental solution must be found by the united efforts of the nation. Such mutual understanding resulted in the three principles of national reunification.

Based on these principles the north-south agreement explained in detail the stand and view for reunification. What is important in this document is that both sides promised “to remove the political and military confrontation for the achievement of national reconciliation, for the prevention of invasion and conflicts by the armed forces, for the realization of *détente* and for the guarantee of peace, to realize many-sided cooperation and exchange for the promotion of the common interests and prosperity of the nation, and to make concerted efforts to achieve peaceful reunification, admitting that the relationship between the sides is not the one between the countries but a special one formed temporarily in the process of advancing towards reunification.”

It is of epochal significance that both sides recognized the “special relationship formed temporarily, not the one between the countries”. It is because both sides had competed for a long time to be approved by

the international community and if they resort to such competition, there would be nothing but one way by which one party brings the other to its knees and absorbs it. We can consider that these two documents elucidated a way to overcome hatred and conflict, a way as intelligent as that indicated in the Palestine-Israel peace agreement or the Northern Ireland agreement. This is the product of the resourcefulness of the nation and the power of national will for national reunification. The point at issue is how both sides will put the items of the agreement into practice. In particular, what must be mentioned here is the proposal to establish the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo (DFRK) made by the north in 1980 and the 10-Point Programme of the Great National Unity of the Whole Nation for the Reunification of the Country presented by President Kim Il Sung in 1993.

The former was advanced as the reunification programme based on “One nation, one state, two systems and two governments”. The main content of this proposal is that the north and south should have their governments for the regional autonomy and the unified government formed with the representatives of both sides and representatives of overseas nationals should work as the supreme decision-making body, and that the DFRK should be a neutral country. It clarified for the first time the way for both sides to coexist tolerating the ideas and systems of both sides, on the condition of recognizing the existence of south Korea. This proposal is more epochal than the Northern Ireland style in that it explains the image of the state in a more detailed and clear way. In the present circumstances the reunification by federation is the only way to achieve north-south reunification peacefully.

Some people may say that it deters the “reunion spirit” like the Northern Ireland style, but the special character of this proposal is that it aims at achieving great unity on the common denominator of the nation recognizing different kinds of “reunion spirit” and considers it reunification.

Going one more step forward, the latter emphasizes “Patriotism and the spirit of national independence, coexistence, coprosperity and common interests”.

President Kim Il Sung appealed that the fear of invasion from

both south and north, the ideas of prevailing over communism and communization should be dispelled, and the north and south should believe in each other and unite. It is an effort to make different political systems and ideas, that is, socialism and capitalism, coexist using patriotism and national unity as a binder, remove the division and conflict in the same race and build up mutual trust.

2. THE CHANGES AND FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Structure of Peace and Security

For studying the outside factor, we must consider the fact that the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula has fundamentally changed. It is connected with the fundamental change of the world situation. It means the end of the Cold War. Until the 1980s, there was little possibility for the realization of the aforementioned north-south agreement and the proposal of federation, but entering the 1990s, the possibility is daily increasing with the collapse of the Cold-War system. So it is progressing as an inevitability of history.

We can say that the adoption of the Northern Ireland peace agreement, too, was an inevitable product brought about by the world situation on which the end of the Cold War exerted positive influence. With the cessation of the Cold War, the East and the West stopped their support to and intervention in the Protestant group and the Roman Catholic group. The world started a continuous advance towards reconciliation and peace. International criticism on armed conflict and bloody terrorism has become severe and the people's doubt and weariness about insoluble conflicts exerted influence.

The fact that Irish-American Bill Clinton became the President in the United States where many descendants of Irish immigrants are living and the fact that the Democratic government which had been closely connected with the Irish immigrants considered the solution to the conflict to be a primary diplomatic task, worked greatly in this question. President Clinton invited the leader of the Sinn Fein Party,

the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, to Washington to pressure him into a peaceful solution, personally visited Northern Ireland and dispatched Mitchel, chairman of the Roundtable Conference and former Democratic senator, as peace coordinator.

What is more important is that Blair's Labour Party, directly concerned in this question, took power. It exerted great influence on the adoption of peace agreement. The successive conservative governments never tried to face the Sinn Fein Party. Former Prime Minister Thatcher stuck fast to the stand that "we will not talk with the terrorists." Former Prime Minister Major relied on Protestants to obtain majority in his support because he was weak in the parliament. He was too vacillating in carrying out his policy to find a correct solution. But, Prime Minister Blair from the Labour Party which is on friendly terms with the Democrats of the United States expressed his opinion on confidence-building by both sides of the conflict immediately after his inauguration using the majority backing. He asserted that the negotiation excluding the Irish Republican Army is meaningless and at last realized the Sinn Fein's participation in the Roundtable Conference.

Other factors that influenced the Irish question in combination were the increasing international prestige of Ireland as a result of her economic boom, an attempt by European countries to find a new way for existence, that is, the move towards the merger of countries and the development of local autonomy, and the increasing consciousness that the remains of colonialism which run counter to history must be eliminated.

However, it cannot be explained that only the situation surrounding Northern Ireland was favourable. In addition, the question was not settled by mere chance of history. It must be considered that it was an inevitable event resulted from the trend of a great change of history, the end of the Cold War. The pulling down of the Berlin Wall broadcast worldwide on TV screens might have given a great impact and courage to the Irish and British people.

But, what is the state of affairs in the Korean peninsula? The United States which had stubbornly ignored Korea's appeal for dialogue accepted her proposal for negotiation and improvement of relations after the end of the Cold War. The United States had

threatened Korea by fabricating the “nuclear suspicion”, but at last signed the historical Agreed Framework. The United States recognized in principle the existence of Korea to which she had been hostile and the existence of her socialist system and provided formal assurance against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. She also promised to normalize diplomatic relations. In the process of negotiation, she expressed her support for the peaceful reunification of Korea. Such a reconciliation policy means the fundamental change of the US policy towards Korea and it is attributable to the change of the meaning and significance of the Korean peninsula in view of the world strategy of the United States following the end of the Cold War.

Korea-US relationship has not been improved up to date as the United States has not relaxed economic sanctions against Korea, but confidence-building between them has advanced considerably. The Agreed Framework is significant in that it dissolved the only Cold-War structure and helped both sides start forming a new structure for peace.

The provision of the LWRs to Korea may be a guarantee for the maintaining of peace structure in the Korean peninsula, because the international consortium, the KEDO, will exist in the construction period and the two countries would not return to the hostile relations.

In case of the four-party talks, too, the fact that the continuation of the talks itself would assure the structure for peace is more important than what would be discussed and decided in the talks. Apparently, there is no need to get optimistic or disappointed temporarily regarding the result of the talks, because the existence of the talks itself would contribute to the security of the Korean peninsula. The United States, too, said that the discussion of peace by the representatives of four countries immediately means the best measure for confidence-building.

In other words, the security and peace in the Korean peninsula are guaranteed by double or treble system in addition to the Agreed Framework, so the condition for the north-south dialogue and reunification is maturing from outside, we can say.

However, the four-party talks are not a ground for north-south dialogue. South Korea hopes that the north-south dialogue would be held in a form that the United States and China complement and

guarantee it, but as far as the question of Korea-US relations are not settled, the north-south relationship cannot advance any further. Therefore, the north-south dialogue has only to go on independently based on the already reached accord. The principal parties of the four-party talks are not the north and south, but the north and the United States. The question of the change of the position and character of the American troops stationed in south Korea, the question of replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty and establishing a new peace mechanism and the like are primary issues.

Needless to say, if a progress is made in the settlement of these issues, it would complement and guarantee the north-south dialogue, but if the primary question is confused with the secondary question, it will destroy even what is possible. Korea's stand in the four-party talks is not that "the north and south shall not hold negotiation," but that "the north-south dialogue should be convened in other place."

Kenneth Quinones, a researcher of the US Institute of Peace, said; the four-party talks must suggest positive conditions to north Korea on which the withdrawal of the US troops from south Korea is possible and help its realization; on the condition that north Korea takes actions to reduce military threat, the United States should respond to the call for dissolving the nominal UN Command or the Military Armistice Commission, the remnants of the Korean War; if the policy of blockade and oppression continues as in the past, a durable peace cannot be achieved.

The Existence of Korea as the Keyman

The change of the allied relations between the Western countries brought about by the end of the Cold War made them all change their policy orientation or re-examine their policies. *Drifting Allies* (Hunabashi, *Iwanami Shoten*) narrates this dramatic real-time change. It seems that one who had long enjoyed peace, sitting cross-legged in the Cold-War days, lost his position with the change of the situation, and with his "enemy" disappearing, one goes far so as to cast a doubt on his ally.

In particular, a fierce power game is going on surrounding the Korean peninsula and one is probing another's intention. Interestingly

and unexpectedly, however, Korea is the keyman in it. For example, Korea and the United States are in honeymoon, south Korea, jealous of it, is putting a spoke in the US wheel, the US-south Korean relationship becomes worse particularly in the days of the Kim Young Sam “regime”, and Japan is only reading others’ faces. It is a comedy, indeed. How to approach Korea and what kind of relations one should have with her define the diplomatic attitude of the countries surrounding Korea and it is shaking the allied relations between the United States, Japan and south Korea.

America’s acknowledgement of Korea follows the way of recognizing her and this inevitably weakened her alliance with south Korea in inverse proportion.

This is proved by the fact that there is an opinion that the hard line of south Korea against the north is an obstacle to the settlement of the Korean question. (Larry Niksch, specialist in Asian affairs at the Congressional Research Service.)

The US acknowledgement of Korea experienced retrogression and vacillation, but the structure of the Korea-US relations will advance in a spiral way instead of retreating.

What is most important is that the United States, China, Japan and Russia do not want the sudden change of Korea and unanimously want peace and security of the Korean peninsula. Even if it aims at soft-landing Korea, the fact that the neighbouring countries are moving to create peace on the basis of the recognition of the system of Korea and her existence had been inconceivable in the Cold-War era. Furthermore, the neighbouring countries except Japan are establishing their diplomatic strategy in anticipation of the future when Korea is reunified.

A high-ranking official of the US government said that the day will surely come when the Korean peninsula is reunified and the important mission of the Marine Corps will be finished. (*Drifting Allies.*)

An official in the US Department of Defence said that the reunification of the Korean peninsula may be achieved considerably earlier than expected. He quoted Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, former head of the planning department of the US Pacific Command, who predicted that if the Korean question is settled peacefully or the

country is reunified, the existence of the US troops in East Asia would be changed from the magic number of 100,000. (*Ibid.*)

A US specialist on south Korea said that after reunification, the purpose of the US-south Korea alliance for deterring Korea will be cancelled and this situation would make it imperative to put a definition again of the Japan-US alliance whose purpose is to ensure regional security, adding that such a process has already started. (*Asahi Shimbun*, February 13, 1998.)

As mentioned above, the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula after the Cold War has changed dramatically and the condition to put the north-south agreement into effect is created. It is no exaggeration to say that the peaceful reunification of the north and south has been scheduled. This is an indication that all are moving towards reunification. It ceaselessly moves, spreads and increases. The maturing internal and external conditions for the peninsula provide an ample possibility for the reunification as an inevitable event after the Cold War, and earlier than expected. In order to prove that it is not an unreasonable illusion, it is necessary to study the present political and economic circumstances of the north and the south of Korea.

3. THE WAY CUT BY THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH

The Present Situation of the North's Economy

Everybody knows that both the north and south of Korea are in the worst economic situation. The north is suffering a severe shortage of food as the result of successive natural disasters. Owing to the shortage of fuel and foreign currency, she is not in a position to maintain the previous economic level. According to the statistical data she presented to the UN, the gross national output decreased to 50 per cent for three years after 1993.

But, it is almost impossible to calculate and assess her socialist

economy by the Western yardsticks. Of course, Korea's economy is in the stage of that of a developing country. In particular, following the disappearance of the socialist market, the economy grew worse. The situation is serious owing to the shortage of foreign currency and energy like oil and electricity, the reduction of the rate of operation of factories, and the decline in the overall economy but Korea's economy is unexpectedly unshakable as her basic policy has been self-reliance of the economy and self-sufficiency of food. The rate of food self-sufficiency in 1986 was 22 per cent in Japan and 55 per cent in south Korea, but 99 per cent in Korea. The rate in Korea might have been reduced afterwards owing to the natural disasters. In addition to this, she was not in a position to import grain. If Japan and south Korea had experienced such a situation, they might have been in a more miserable state.

In his treatise, Han Ho Sok, head of the Unification Research Institute, living in New York, emphasized the need to appreciate the socialist economy of Korea in a fundamentally different way on three conditions; first, the economic activity of Korea is not accessible from outside, second, the economy of Korea must be assessed not by the gross national product, but by the gross social product which means only material production excluding the value coming from the service and commercial sectors, the value that occupies a great proportion in capitalist society, and third, it is necessary to take into account the various social benefit, ie, the secondary distribution of the national income, like the provision of food, dwelling houses and fuel, free education and medical care and the supply of daily necessities.

The *Report on the Korean Peninsula Policy* published in May 1998 by the Council on Foreign Relations, which exercises influence on the establishment of the foreign policy of the US government, pointed out that there is virtually no precedent in history of a state which existed after suffering deficit for eight years, but Pyongyang stays alive. The *Report on the Reality of North Korea* published by the foreign-aid section of the US Department of State explains the answer as follows:

The north Korean people has a history of boosting advance based on the spirit of self-reliance. It would be wrong to underestimate their will and ability with which to overcome continuing crisis. We must take into account that in the protracted worsening hardships and

isolation, the north Korean people and government have developed complex countermeasures, assimilating themselves to any circumstances.

A correct analysis of the socialist economy of Korea is impossible by capitalist statistics and calculating methods.

Needless to say, the economic problem of Korea is serious. But, in view of the fact that the political system, the greatest factor that moves Korea's economy, is strong and functioning, we can hold that Korea has an ability and possibility of being rehabilitated once the Western countries eliminate their political, economic and military pressure on her.

The Present Situation of the South's Economy

In south Korea, too, the economic cycle reached the lowest level entering the latter half of 1997, owing to the successive bankruptcies and worsening management of the conglomerates and large enterprises. Foreign debts of south Korea amount to 150,000 million dollars. As a result of the unprecedented financial crisis, at the end of the same year the south Korean economy reached just before payment suspension which means the "nationwide dishonour". She could escape this crisis temporarily by obtaining loans of 57,000 million dollars from the IMF and other international financial organizations and Japan, but the economic stagnancy has continued afterwards and the unemployment has been increasing rapidly.

It is a fact that the financial crisis, the economic crisis of Southeast Asia, exerted influence on it, but the unanimous opinion points out that the economic crisis of south Korea resulted directly from the defective economic structure, the failure of the Kim Young Sam "regime" to find a solution and its wrong policy. The strain was caused by the economic system centring on conglomerates, which, on a poor basis, aimed at growing bigger enjoying special monopolistic benefit from the development banks and rushed towards diversification thoughtlessly.

Amidst the union of politics and the economy, the egoistic management on the part of conglomerates was overlooked and the banks under the control of the government financed them recklessly

without examining their solvency or standing guarantee for the transparency of the financing. They made up for deficiency by relying on foreign banks. As a result, financial bodies went so far as to bear large amounts of bad bonds and foreign liabilities which exceeded their solvency. The day has come when the south Korean economy should repay the cost of the rule-of-thumb estimation and aleatory management, by which financial groups were settling accounts, misappropriating funds. In a nutshell, it means the collapse of the bubble economy of south Korea.

But, recently it is looking up, though slowly. As its basic conditions are comparably steady, a solution can be found if the structural reform is carried out by taking bold and detailed measures including the reorganization of conglomerates.

Inevitability of the Economic Cooperation between the North and the South

Paradoxically speaking, the above-mentioned economic crisis and hardship which the north and the south are suffering simultaneously make both sides inevitably follow the one and only road to hasten the improvement of the relationship between them.

The reason is that first, the theory of reunifying the country by “absorbing” the north is practically impossible at present. Frequently talking about the “collapse” of the north, Kim Young Sam “regime” repeated provocative words and actions which meant the “unification through absorption” based on economic power. When President Kim Il Sung passed away, he did not offer condolence and, worse still, repressed those who wanted to express condolence, making the north-south relations worst. The “reunification cost” increased at every calculation and reached 1,000,000 million dollars, far exceeding the reunification cost of Germany. South Korea which is on the verge of bankruptcy cannot appropriate such a colossal sum of money. The theory which had been loudly propagated disappeared of itself so simply.

Second, after the demise of President Kim Il Sung, Western countries and south Korea were unanimous in considering that the “collapse” of the north was a matter of time, but Korea is still

maintaining political stability, far from “collapsing”. They thought that the frustration of socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would be extended to Asia, but the situation has not developed as they expected. The differences in the process of establishment between the Soviet-style socialism and the Asian-style socialism and in their social systems produced the result. In particular, the Korean-style socialism is more solid than expected. The south, too, could not but recognize that the easygoing hope for the “breakdown” of the north is not realistic. Considering her present condition, the south may try, by all means, to escape an incident of the system of the north collapsing suddenly. Apparently she wants to direct all her efforts to rehabilitating her economy. To this end, they will naturally try to relax confrontation at the least and move towards reconciliation and coexistence at the most.

Third, the south came to understand that mutual economic cooperation and assistance is the best way for both sides to survive in the international community. The necessity of north-south economic cooperation has long been recognized and brought some tangible results. For the north, the south is a big trade partner. Nevertheless, economic cooperation has not developed smoothly because it became a victim of the political situation of the north and south and the control of exchanges and investment has been intensified. However, the economic crisis of the north and south does not tolerate the theory of principle. As symbolized by the financial Big Bang, the international economy entered the era of a great competition of jungle, called liberalization and market economy. In order for both the north and south to overcome economic crisis and survive in this great competition, economic cooperation is essential. In this sense, the north and south have to share their lot in economic affairs, too. To say in addition, the south Korean people resisted the financial support from the IMF, which actually means putting south Korea under its control, saying that it is the “second national humiliation”, the “economic trusteeship” and “deprivation of economic sovereignty”. The emergence of “chauvinism” under the pressure of large-scale unemployment, heavy taxation and a sudden rise in price attracts attention as being coincident with the aspirations for attaching importance to the nation. The south Koreans’ feeling about the United

States is a mixture of “thanks to her” which has extended a helping hand, though not satisfactory, to south Korea for fulfilling the role of the “anti-communist wall”, and “antipathy against her”, concerning her reconciliatory attitude towards the north “in disregard of the alliance between the United States and south Korea” and the extremely strict demand of the IMF for opening the south Korean market. Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State of the United States, criticized that the policy of the IMF strangles the countries with a high unemployment rate, encouraging nationalism in Asian countries.

Favourable Political Conditions for the Resumption of North-South Dialogue

Favourable conditions for reopening the north-south dialogue are maturing even in the complex situation surrounding the Korean peninsula and the different political circumstances of the north and the south.

First, the three-year mourning period ended in Korea by 1997 and leader Kim Jong Il was acclaimed as the General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea. In 1998, he was re-elected Chairman of the National Defence Commission. General Secretary Kim Jong Il clarified that he would follow the lines set forth by President Kim Il Sung and it is the same in case of the reunification policy. The north defined as the three charters of national reunification the July 4 Joint Statement, the proposal to establish the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo and the 10-Point Programme of the Great Unity of the Whole Nation for the Reunification of the Country and is trying to settle the reunification question on the principle of national independence.

Second, a new “regime” was established in south Korea. In his inaugural address, the south Korean authority advanced three principles concerning the north; first, he would not tolerate armed provocation; second, he does not want “unification through absorption”; and third, he would start reconciliation and cooperation from the possible spheres. And he declared that he was ready to exchange special envoys for the execution of the north-south

agreement and simultaneously to respond to a summit if the north demands it. Giving up “unification through absorption” means that he recognized for the first time the possibility of living together with the north, by reversing the “unification policy” of the successive military “regimes” and Kim Young Sam’s “civilian government”. Considering the fact that he attaches importance to the north-south agreement and his attitude to its implementation, he is different from the Kim Young Sam “regime”.

Among the “one hundred tasks” set by the “government” transferring committee before assumption of office, seven tasks are “the preparation for the foundation of the improvement of relationship by the implementation of the north-south agreement, the promotion of economic cooperation on the principle of separation of the economy from politics, the reunion of separated families, the promotion of unification policy which enjoys the support of the people” and so on. In the item of “separation of the economy from politics”, he advanced the policy for realizing exchange and cooperation in the economic and humanitarian fields even before the reopening of the political dialogue. For tourism, he proposed to develop jointly Mt. Kumgang and other places as “free tourist resorts”. For the humanitarian aid, he expressed his intention not only to offer food aid as had been done by the Red Cross, but also to support the north with improved seeds, farming materials and agricultural technology. This is the expression of his unusually soft, detailed and colourful will for the improvement of the north-south relationship and thus it deserves attention.

Third, the north shows a positive attitude towards the resumption of north-south dialogue.

Kim Yong Sun, Secretary of Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, said on April 6, 1998, “The north-south dialogue must be held as soon as possible to hasten the implementation of the north-south agreement.” On December 12, Kim Yong Nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, told the European Parliament delegation on a visit to Korea; “We want to open a new political dialogue with the south. The withdrawal of the US troops from south Korea is an important matter, but it is not a prerequisite for dialogue.” This is very suggestive. In addition, when the north criticizes the south, she does not name the south Korean authority. It

is noticeable. As if responding to this, the south Korean “government” began to show its intention to approve the improvement of the Korea-US relationship before the settlement of the north-south relations. It is important in that it changed the policy of “simultaneous parallelism”, so this created a possibility for hastening the north-south dialogue.

Fourth, the neighbouring countries welcome and support the move to improve north-south relations and reached accord in their interests for the first time. The US Department of Defence said that the interests of the United States and China were the same in that they did not want conflict and confusion in the Korean peninsula. It seems that Japan has not yet established the basic strategy in her policy towards the Korean peninsula, but anyhow she is trying to follow the trend of peace. However, the liquidation of the past and normalization of diplomatic relations with Korea are pressing the Japanese government as a thorn in the side. Russia, too, is trying to find an opportunity to have a part in the establishment of the peace system in the Korean peninsula. In this way, in spite of differences in their views, they are unanimous in that they want the implementation of the north-south agreement and they approach the reunification issue leniently.

The plan of “the declaration of six countries for peace and stability of Northeast Asia” presented by the south Korean authority is not possible to be realized in the near future, but Northeast Asia will usher in the era that necessitates security between countries. For the settlement of this issue, too, reconciliation and coexistence of the north and south of Korea has become a prerequisite.

The Detailed Moves for Exchanges between the North and the South

Such changes of the north and south approach gradually to the same frequency and both sides are responding to each other. This has already been expressed in different speeches and moves. The year 1998 alone shows many instances of such moves.

On February 15, the north announced that she would accept from March 1 the requests to help find the addresses of separated families living at home and abroad.

On February 20, Pak Yong Su, Vice-Chairman of the Committee

for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland of the north, who participated in the reunification conference of scientists from the north, south and abroad held in Beijing, expressed an expectation for the present south Korean “government”, saying, “The change of the ‘government’ is a good event and would present an opportunity for our nation to part with the past and advance towards independence, reconciliation and détente. Such an opportunity does not always present itself for our nation.” This is clearly a signal of the desire for the resumption of dialogue. Paek Yong Chol, Chairman of Unification Forum of south Korea, responded to this, saying “The south and north should use the economic crisis faced by both sides as a chance for national coexistence and cooperation.”

On February 18, one week before the change of the south Korean “regime”, the joint conference of the political parties and organizations of the north held in Pyongyang declared that they were ready to hold negotiations with their counterparts in the south to open the way to reunification and adopted letters to the President of the National Congress for New Politics and other persons.

On March 27, the fifth red-cross talks held in Beijing reached accord that the south would offer 50,000 tons of wheat, cooking oil and salt calculated in maize equivalent by the end of May, on condition that the north allow the International Red Cross to supervise their distribution.

On the same day, the south Korean authorities made a decision to alleviate control positively when enterprises invest capital in the north and respect the independent judgement of businessmen on the principle of separating the economy from politics and to drastically simplify the procedures.

Entering April the “Unification Board” of south Korea approved the plan to establish a joint management farm of 1,500 hectares in a cooperative farm in Rajin-Sonbong economic and trade zone to cultivate crops and raise pigs. This is the first north-south cooperation in the agricultural sector. In this joint farm 8 million dollars will be invested in 20 years. The “Unification Board” also approved the request of the Korean Nation Welfare Funds to build a pharmaceutical factory and run a hospital in Rajin.

On April 6, Secretary Kim Yong Sun said, “It is said that south

Korea will promote cooperation and exchanges on the principle of separating the economy from politics. If it started truly from the purpose for national reunification, we will deal with it broad-mindedly without regard to their forms."

The vice-ministerial north-south talks reopened in Beijing on April 11 after the suspension of three years and nine months came to a "rupture" without overcoming a discord of opinions concerning the problem of fertilizer aid and separated families, but it does not mean the rupture of north-south relations as happened in the Kim Young Sam's era. The south Korean chief delegate said, "The south and the north have the same opinion in that they should continue the talks, and the result of the current talks does not mean a rupture. It is equivalent to the time out in a sports game." Instead of laughing or crying at the result of an event, it would be necessary to have a long-term view of the north-south dialogue gradually developing as if ascending the spiral stairs. The report that the representatives of the north and south who had a severe argument in the day drank wine together at night and sang Korean folk songs side by side shows that such a supposition is not the result of a simple, optimistic observation. In particular, entering 1999, the "Unification Board" of south Korea pointed out that the south was changing her policy toward the north on the principle of "non-simultaneity" and "non-equivaleency", instead of "reciprocity" that demand guarantee for immediate repayment, and trying to include fertilizers in the list of humanitarian aid presupposing no concession.

On April 13 according to the south Korean Yonhap News Agency, in the policy coordination meeting, the "government" and the ruling party of south Korea adopted such measures as the expansion of visits to the north by businessmen including the leaders of big enterprises and economic bodies, the allowance of the lease and deposition of the idle facilities of the south in the north, the abolition of the limit of every investment to 1 million dollars, and the change from the present way of allowing a few categories of business to the system of forbidding a few types of industry.

On April 25, an international air route which passes through the territorial sky of the north and south of Korea was opened and an airliner of the south Korean Air Lines passed the sky of the north for

the first time.

On May 2, the art troupe *Little Angels* of the south visited the north for art performance.

On June 8, different social organizations of the north formed the National Reconciliation Council.

On the same day, Jang Yong Sik, president of the Electric Co. of south Korea, said, "Preparations are being made to connect the power lines between the north and the south which have been cut since May 1948," and expressed an intention to supply surplus electricity to the north.

On June 13, the south announced such measures of relaxing restrictions as abolishing the permission system for exporting production facilities and approving the import of books from the north on condition.

On June 16, Jong Ju Yong, honorary president of the Hyundai Group, visited the north with 500 head of cattle, and an agreement was made on the tourist development of Mt. Kumgang and the building of a factory by the Hyundai Motors.

On June 18, the south approved as part of north-south cooperation the development project of the International Maize Foundation which planned to cultivate maize of superior strain on an experimental basis in the north.

On July 8, the north started broadcasting letters which the separated families in the north sent to their family members in the south.

On August 15, the south Korean authority proposed to run the north-south joint committee and organize the north-south permanent negotiation on the minister or vice-minister level.

On August 18, the "Unification Board" of south Korea announced to simplify from September 1 the procedures from the approval system to the application system, when members of separated families of 60 years and over want to visit the north.

On October 30, General Secretary Kim Jong Il had talks with Jong Ju Yong, honorary president of the Hyundai Group, on a visit to the north.

On November 3, the Hangyore Unification Culture Foundation, a non-governmental organization of the south, visited the north to hold a

joint concert.

On November 10, the Samsung Group of the south adopted a policy on expanding south-north economic cooperation and announced a decision to create a big electronics complex in the north.

On November 18, Mt. Kumgang was opened for the tourists from the south.

On December 15, Jong Ju Yong paid a visit to the north and agreed to build a large industrial area on the west coast.

On December 30, the Hyundai Group published that over 10,000 people made a tour of Mt. Kumgang.

Some of these facts show that the figures of personnel and material exchanges between the north and the south are very high. According to a report by the Institute for Unification Education under the "Unification Board", the south Koreans who visited the northern half of Korea in 1998 amounted to 3, 231 (except the tourists of Mt. Kumgang), whereas those who visited the north in 9 years from 1989 to 1997 numbered 2,408. Such a tendency may rise in future.

4. REUNIFICATION THROUGH FEDERATION FOR COEXISTENCE AND COPROSPERITY

As is expected, this radical development of north-south contacts and dialogue is substantially melting the frozen wall between the two sides. However, this is not believed to proceed smoothly. The mutual mistrust rooted in the confrontation and hatred that has lasted for over half a century would not be removed overnight. This is because the basic attitudes of the two sides towards dialogue and reunification are different from each other to a considerable extent.

First, even if they want to promote economic cooperation, the differences in their economic systems and methods would arouse troubles, dampening the enthusiasm of the south Korean businesses for investment. Their venture into the north may arouse anxiety that a great number of workers in the south, where unemployment is a serious problem, would be laid off and the south's economy would become empty, retaining only its name. There may be temporary

retrogression. But in the long run, the south Korean economy will be revitalized and the north and the south will follow the road to coprosperity. Highly possible is that the development of north-south economic cooperation will play the role of vitamin and bring about a turn in revitalizing the south Korean economy in crisis. As for the north, she can introduce technology and capital of the south, the same nation, free from apprehension, for it will give a booster shot to her stagnant economy. If the rich natural resources of the north are supplied to the south at a low price and on a steady footing, the south will earn enormous profits. And if the south Korean goods are transported to China, Russia and Southeast Asia via the north including the Rajin-Sonbong area, their prices will be reduced. Both sides can also develop new projects in cooperation. All in all, if both sides coexist and further achieve reunification, they will become a country with a population of 70 million and its economic power will surely take an important place in Northeast Asia.

Next problem is that the two sides have different concepts of reunification. In 1993 Kim Young Sam proposed the “doctrine of unification through three stages”—the “stages of reconciliation and cooperation, north-south commonwealth and reunification into one nation and one state”. The present chief executive of south Korea has insisted from the 1970s on his own “doctrine of unification through three stages”, the stages of coexistence and exchange, confederation and reunification. Although both doctrines sound similar, they are fundamentally different in their contents. The former advocates north-south commonwealth and the latter confederation. But in 1999 he said he would “not deny confederation”, taking a step backward. Some people interpret that his stand was influenced by the widespread understanding among the Opposition that the north is not a “partner to cooperate with on an equal footing”, but an “object to be saved”. They say the opposition figures were disappointed in socialist system after the fall of the Soviet Union and East European countries. The opinion is, in other words, that a commonwealth, recognizing two Koreas, can be tolerated, but a confederation, aspiring to one Korea, will be impossible. Furthermore, whereas the north considers the formation of a federal state as reunification, the south advocates that as commonwealth or confederation is, to all intents and purposes, a

transitional stage, complete reunification is the ultimate objective. Herein lies the greatest difference. If the establishment of a federal state is not recognized as reunification, it follows that reunification will never be accomplished. To aspire after complete reunification that aims at integration of not only the territory and nation but also systems is to put reunification aside as something infeasible at the moment and avoid its implementation. How the reunified federal state would become integrated over a long period of time is a matter to be handed over to the coming generations. This is because the problems like the position of the autonomous governments of the north and the south and treatment of the diplomatic right and command of the military, the important problems that define the character of the reunified country, are decided by the ideals and concepts of reunification.

Some people would worry about the “reunification cost” the south would have to bear when reunification through federation is achieved. Unlike the case of complete reunification of east and west of Germany, in the case of federation, the original way of Korea, the “reunification cost” will hardly arise if the integration of currencies is not enforced impetuously. A matter calling for prior settlement is to revitalize and strengthen the economic constitution of the north and the south through economic cooperation. It is possible that north’s economy will be activated through the maintenance and further promotion of such cooperation even after the realization of reunification through federation. In other words, economic integration can be promoted in the course of studying it according to the circumstances after the territory, state and nation are reunified. The south Korean authority frequently says that he does not wish for early reunification and will gradually promote reunification after realizing exchanges and cooperation. If this is aimed at overcoming the economic crisis in south Korea, he must move in the opposite direction. His aide once said; “When the north falls, the south will follow suit. So we must coexist with her.” If this is true, they should scrupulously examine the north’s proposal for reunification through federation and hold substantial discussion with the north to direct their efforts as soon as possible to reunifying the country through federation of a form agreeable to both sides, a form that does not incur

any loss to either of them.

Ri Tong Bok, member of the power transferring committee in south Korea, said, "Reunification is difficult to achieve unless communism recedes and market economy appears in the north and she tolerates liberal democratic system of the south. Reunification is a waiting game. What is more important at the moment is the administration of division than reunification." If south Korea maintains this stand, the north-south relations will never be furthered. Now is the time to move, not to "wait", to make efforts for overcoming division for peace, not to "administer division." Needless to say, the efforts should be orientated to reunification through federation that ensures coexistence and coprosperity.

The south Korean authority's nomination of Kang In Dok, a notorious conservative hardliner, as minister of the National Unification Board was soon revealed to be a barrier in the vice-ministerial talks between the north and south, in which the north expressed a feeling of rejection and distrust. This was an expression of the north's rejection and distrust of Kang In Dok who took charge of south-north talks. The north's demand for dismantlement of the "Agency for National Security Planning" (the present National Intelligence Service—Tr.) and abolition of the "National Security Law", which defines the north as enemy, is none other than sharp questioning of the present south Korean authority's real attitude towards the dialogue. It is too clear that one cannot coexist nor attain prosperity together with one's enemy. The nature of the coalition government, treatment of Kim Jong Pil and replacement of the presidential system with the cabinet system will also exert a great influence on the resumption of the north-south talks.

The south Korean authority often says, "but for the US troops in south Korea and Japan, the present stability and balance of power will be destroyed at once. The American military presence in south Korea is an absolute prerequisite for the stability and peace in Northeast Asia."

If the Korea-US relations are improved and a peace treaty is concluded between them, the meaning of the US military presence in south Korea will surely be changed. The United States basically admits that if her troops are to remain in the Korean peninsula

temporarily after Korea's reunification, their nature and position have to change to those of a "peacekeeping force". Conversely speaking, this means that the insistence on the present position of the US troops in south Korea will prove an obstacle to the north-south talks and to the effort for reunification. The south Korean authority should sincerely discuss with the north the problem of the country's reunification from a standpoint of revolutionizing the status quo, a standpoint of national independence, not of maintaining the status quo.

As mentioned above, it can be said that though there are some obstacles, knotty problems and negative elements, the internal and external situation and conditions for Korea's reunification have matured. If the north and the south miss this chance, their reunification will be almost impossible. The world is focussing its attention on how the north and the south of Korea would make use of these conditions, the last chance for them, to achieve national reunification in the early 21st century.

The continuing division of the country is a shame for the entire Korean people. They will surely accomplish their national reunification; the force and boundless possibility for it are in the nation. If they advance for reunification with a great ardor, determination not to miss the capital chance, presumably the last of its kind, and faith and resourcefulness of the nation, the door to reunification will be opened without fail at long last.

Let me assert once again: the reunification of Korea is neither a dream nor a miracle but the inevitability of history.

In the wake of the "Pachinko scandal" of 1989, threats and outrages were committed against the students of the Korean schools in Japan throughout Japan. Korean girl students there go to school in the national costume of *chima* and *jogori*. As they could be recognized as Koreans at the first glance, the girl students were the main target of outrageous acts, their national costume being torn by knives. For this reason, it was called a "*chima-jogori* incident". Severe criticisms were raised within the Japanese society as well as the Korean residents in Japan, and these outrageous acts stopped as if suppressed by the condemnation.

Ten years have passed since then. But such acts, large and small,

have been committed against Koreans on several occasions. Large ones are those of “nuclear suspicion” in 1994 and the “ballistic missile” racket in 1998, which were characterized by brutality and extremity. Apparently as poisoning was “in fashion” in Japan, pernicious threatening phone calls and letters were sent to the Korean schools; “The water tower of the school is poisoned by potassium cyanide” and the like. Girl students had the backs of their hands cut by knives; and bottle grenades were thrown at the headquarters and Kanagawa Prefectural office building of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (an organization of Korean residents in Japan supporting the north). In the midst of outrages, the hall of the Chiba Prefectural headquarters of the organization was burnt and in the building a 42-year-old man named Ra Hun, who was on night duty, was found burned to death. He was hit by a blunt weapon on the back of the head, cut by a knife across the face and abdomen on a dozen spots and strangled. In view of this brutal way and the fact that he had not been hated by others, the case does not look to be a mere robbery or arson. Because the criminal is still at large, there is no knowing whether the case is related with the “ballistic missile clamour”, but the tragic incident gave a shock to Koreans in Japan.

However, the press circle remained silent to the incident and the Japanese society did not stir up public opinion about it as it did before. Even if Korea test-fired a ballistic missile over the airspace of Japan, there is no reason why Koreans in Japan should be bullied. After Korea made public that she had launched a man-made satellite, outrages against Koreans in Japan became more violent, far from stopping. It cannot but be concluded that underlying the outrages is the feeling against Korea and her nationals sweeping the Japanese people. On December 17, 1998, a rightist stabbed Hirayama, governor of Niigata Prefecture, on the cheek. It is reported that he shouted at that time, “Why do you allow *Mangyongbong* (Korea’s cargo-passenger ship sailing between Korea and Japan—Tr.) in?” This reminds one of the proverb, “He who hates Peter harms his dog.” Prevailing among the Japanese people is an abnormal attitude not to understand Korea.

The feeling against Korea that had made inroads into the psychology of the Japanese people and been accumulated persistently

by the help of various “suspicions” about the country exploded instantly with the clamour about the “suspected kidnapping of Japanese” and “ballistic missile launch”. Even if most of those, who committed violences, are related with rightist groups or have certain ideological backgrounds, it seems that hatred against Korea is widely spread and ingrained in Japan.

But dispute or war produces only hatred and tragedy. Almost all disputes have started from misunderstanding. Have the relations between Japan and Korea and between the Japanese and the Koreans residing in Japan not advanced even a single step, in half a century since the Second World War, from those between the injurer and the injured or those between the side that despised and discriminated and the side that suffered? Yes, they have. The relations have made a great advance thanks to the continuous efforts of both sides. Symbolic of this is the time when the great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake happened; things like massacre of Koreans that had been committed nearly 70 years ago at the time of the great Kanto earthquake did not take place this time and instead, touching scenes of Koreans and the Japanese helping each other were witnessed.

For all this, an unidentifiable, giant strength is apparently aggravating and distorting the relations between Korea and Japan. I wrote this book to identify this strength. It will be no exaggeration to say that underlying my intention is indignation against those (either authorities or state) that attempt to alienate Japanese from Koreans.

When I was writing this book, the United States and Britain made an air raid on Iraq. It is said that the greatest “threat” and unforgivable “enemy states” of the West are Korea and Iraq. Is this true?

Dennis Halliday, one of the last two UN humanitarian coordinators in Iraq, resigned in October 1998 in protest against the tenacious sanctions by the UN. He said: the international community is killing the Iraqi people ceaselessly; before the Gulf War, Mr. Hussein had a lot of money invested in social infrastructure; Iraq had a best public health system in the Middle East; its communications and transportation means were in good order; he even made it a system to send excellent students abroad to educate them.

It is not my intention to speak in favour of President Hussein, who invaded Kuwait. But it is necessary to judge the Iraqi problem on the

premise that the United States made remarks that resulted in exciting Iraq to invade Kuwait and that the photos of oil-soaked seabirds were shams.

The Japanese mass media did not remain silent on the air raids of the United States and Britain. They made cool analyses and criticized the sudden raids in many cases. However, it is felt as if the Japanese government, mass media and people have now lost even the last, small portion of objectivity towards Korea, their neighbouring country. They are so sensitive to the word “Korea” that they frown and do not hide the feeling of displeasure at the mention of it. A large number of them deride and despise the Korean people who are living through a serious shortage of food in economic difficulties under the socialist system, instead of giving any thought to how they are braving out the difficulties. From when did they begin to do so? Isn’t it from the time when they watched on TV the falling of the Berlin Wall, or when they witnessed the collapsing of socialism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe?

The post-Cold-War world is not dominated by capitalism alone but space time in which socialism and various concepts of value and ideologies exist and prosper together. For this, we should not be tempted by the emotions produced by the image implanted by others, but make efforts to understand, recognize and reconcile with each other.

It is apparent that the Japanese people feel it difficult to get an understanding of Korea for lack of information as she does not provide the West with information about her. Nevertheless, they should not be easily amenable to suspicions and manipulated information which lack evidence and foundation, nay, which can be analyzed to be full of contradictions if we give some thought to them. It seems many Japanese people are easily taken in by barbarous tricks and manipulated information.

We, men, act, collecting information and judging everything. False information may lead one to commit murder. If a piece of information is too well-wrought, or suspicious somewhere or unilateral, one must find time to ascertain whether it is true or not. This should be all the more so in the extremely information-oriented society of today, in which all things, be they human relations, goods, politics or

diplomatic relations, are easily decided by propaganda, ie, manipulated information based on image-making strategy.

The Korean peninsula is in a vortex of fabricated information, indeed. We must not forget that the Korean peninsula is still in a state of war. In this situation, “suspicions” of various kinds pop up, most of which are linked with Korea. We must first throw doubt on this fact, I think.

At the end of 1998 it was reported by the mass media that it seemed the south Korean authority would make public that the ANSP (Agency for National Security Planning and the present National Intelligence Service) had been responsible for the crash of the plane of KAL (the south Korean Air Lines). The November 1998 issue of *Mal*, south Korean monthly, raised many questions and contradictions under the title *Mysterious Crash of KAL Flight 858* and asked for reinvestigation of the accident. Then, why has the accident, whose investigation was concluded 10 years ago, become a point under discussion now? This is because the “theory of Korea’s performance” the West put unilaterally is full of inconsistencies and, first of all, no wreck of the plane or human corpse has been discovered.

It is uncertain whether the south Korean authority will announce the truth or not. If it is revealed that the ANSP (the former Korean Central Intelligence Agency) was responsible for it, the possibility will get greater that most of the suspicions against Korea are fabrications.

The Japanese press that has relayed much of the releases by the ANSP and the Japanese government that has boycotted the negotiations for the normalization of Korea-Japan relations mainly on the plea of the “kidnapping of Japanese” must be called to account. How will the matter develop?

Diplomacy is not decided by emotion alone. The basic objective of modern diplomacy is to accomplish cooperation, coexistence and coprosperity between countries, and its success is to reach a negotiated compromise. Sometimes it becomes a serious diplomatic game requiring political cards, but the side that grows emotional loses the game. If a country goes to dispute or war with another country, the worst confrontation, the country is a failure in diplomacy.

A joint meeting of the authorities on foreign relations and national

defence of the Japan Liberal Democratic Party was held on September 1, 1998, during the period of “missile clamour”. It is reported that at the meeting measures were discussed to freeze the assets of Koreans in Japan and prohibit their remittance of money to Korea, and some participants even claimed that Chongryon was a hostage. Subject to the existing laws, these measures were not carried out. It looks Japan did not know that the measures she applied against Korea could have invited a war. Apparently the Japanese people do not still reconsider their government’s rash applying of sanctions like suspending the raising of money for the KEDO which cannot be called sanctions.

Professor Maeda Yasuhiro of Kitakyushu University said, “Even if the Japanese people regret ‘the summer of 1998 when they strayed from the normal state of mind’, it will be like coming a day after the fair. Stupid people produce a stupid government. The foundation for reconciliation and coexistence with the Korean peninsula cannot be laid until the Japanese people realize that they cannot have a government higher than their level.”

The Japanese government and mass media, as well as people should restore reason and make once again a correct observation, analysis and judgement of the situation on the Korean peninsula so as to build up favourable relations with Korea and the Korean peninsula before it is too late. This is my heartfelt wish, as a Korean residing in Japan and a man who loves both Korea and Japan and is desirous of their reconciliation and good-neighbourliness. I will be happy if this book can help readers improve their analysis and understanding of the situation on the Korean peninsula.

I am much obliged to Shinko Hajime of Shakai Hyoronsha for his advice on compiling this book.

IV. KOREA’S ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC AND REUNIFICATION STRATEGY

1. A “REVOLUTION IN POTATO FARMING” AND KOREA-US REUNIFICATIONS

Significance Tantamount to the LWR Project

The US State Department made public on June 25, 1999, the final report on the field inspection of the underground facility in Kumchang-ri, Korea.

The report concluded that there was no evidence that Korea was violating the 1994 US-Korea agreement. The report clarified that the facility was an empty tunnel whose excavation had nearly been finished, its scope was too small for a nuclear reactor or a fuel-reprocessing facility to be installed and there was no trace of any machine or equipment being installed there. It judged that the possibility that Korea had intended to build it as a nuclear facility could not be ruled out but at the moment it cannot be used for the purpose.

James Rubin, US State Department spokesman, said that the inspection team inspected every corner of the area and could not gather evidence that Korea had attempted to cover part of it.

This means the “suspicious underground nuclear facility” turned out to be “false”. This is what had been envisaged before. Then there may arise a question as to what was the suspicion kicked up from August 1998 supported by “detailed evidence”. But I will mention here the adroitness of Korea’s US policy and its profundity.

The racket was a fuss the United States made in order to “reexamine” the Korea-US Agreed Framework including its abrogation. The United States had signed the agreement, presuming that Korea would “crumble” sooner or later, and resorted to delaying tactics, procrastinating about the performance of her obligations. Nevertheless, Korea did not crumble. Faced with this new situation, the United States came up with the “Kumchang-ri suspicion” so as to save herself from the dilemma of her own making and exert a new pressure to bear upon Korea. The “Taephodong fuss” seemed to have been helpful to the US pressure on Korea.

However, the joint statement issued on March 16, 1999, reads that the two sides reaffirm the Korea-US framework agreement, that Korea allows the United States to make an inspection of the underground facility in Kumchang-ri several times and that the United States will

take measures for improving her political and economic relations with Korea. In this way Korea won an overall victory in diplomacy.

It can be explained first by the fact that the United States could not drive Korea into a corner and instead reaffirmed her positive stand towards the implementation of the agreement, though she had expressed her intention to annul the agreement, and second by the fact that she could realize her inspection of the facility not by means of the diplomatic and military pressure but through the invitation by Korea, ie, through conciliation and friendship, not through pressure and confrontation, to remove the suspicion upon the other party. The result is quite contrary to the original intention of the United States.

This is identical with the course and result of the first “nuclear suspicion” during which Korea, by using the suspicion to her advantage, made the United States recognize her system and make promise that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against her and offer LWRs to her. Korea prevailed herself of the second “nuclear suspicion” and achieved certain successes in improving her relations with the United States.

Noteworthy among the large-scale food aid the United States agreed to offer Korea is her cooperation with the “revolution in potato farming” which Korea is pursuing.

This is entirely a success of Korea’s US strategy. Korea takes as her first and foremost diplomatic objective the improvement of her relations and reconciliation with the United States, a party responsible for the division of Korea and her greatest political and military adversary. This is because the economic development of Korea, security on the Korean peninsula and, furthermore, reunification of the nation cannot be realized unless reconciliation has been achieved between Korea and the United States.

Before and after the collapse of the Cold-War structure, Korea has made an effort to improve her relations with the United States. As mentioned before, she made use of cruel political and military pressure like the “nuclear suspicion” to her own advantage and resorted to every means to involve the United States, which is delaying the implementation of the Agreed Framework, in the Korean question. To be exact, it is not that the United States has been involved in the Korean question on her own initiative, but Korea has

induced her to be involved in the question.

The LWR project is a typical example. When negotiating for the settlement of the “Kumchang-ri issue”, Korea even suggested turning the facility under “suspicion” into a civilian facility like a Korea-US joint-venture plant or office.

What is her real intention? It seems the view that Korea’s tactics aimed at not only avoiding inspection but also making the United States lift her sanctions by instituting a joint venture is formidable, and that if the first joint venture is inaugurated, she would propose normalizing relations with the United States, her highest diplomatic objective (*Tokyo Shimbun*, February 5, 1999.) is correct. This proposal has not yet been realized, but as an issue beyond the expectation of the United States, it can be fully guessed that Korea indicated the United States a course she should follow for improving relations with her.

The US agreement on helping Korea’s “revolution in potato farming” will possibly have a significance tantamount to the LWR project.

Simultaneous Solution of Energy and Food

The United States announced on March 22, 1999, that she would supply 200,000 tons of food to Korea, which is suffering a continuous shortage of food, clarifying that 100,000 tons of it is for the cooperation of potato cultivation conducted jointly by the two countries and it is the first direct aid she offers Korea.

One month later, ie, on April 22, the US Agency for International Development announced that it reached a final conclusion in Pyongyang with Korea on the detailed pilot programme for supplying potatoes for relieving the food crisis in Korea. The agreement reads that the aid would be realized between the two countries, not going through the channel of the World Food Programme, and the United States will supply Korea 1,000 tons of potato seeds and, until the programme gets under way, 100,000 tons of potato as food.

This is identical with the way of supplying LWRs by 2003 and, as a substitute fuel until then, 500,000 tons of heavy oil every year. The supply of potato is of greater significance and advantage for Korea in the sense that she can obtain food supply than the LWRs, a project

that is not sure when it would get commissioned.

The south Korean newspaper *Hangyore Sinmun*, dated April 22, 1999, said that along with the US government, a joint team involving eight US civilian organizations will participate in the aid project and “two agricultural specialists and nine food-distribution monitors, 11 in all, will visit Korea and set about increasing potato production in ten farms in Kangwon Province. The civilian organizations will appropriate one million dollars for the potato seeds of 1,000 tons.” It continued; “This is the first time for the US civilian organizations to take part in the agricultural development of the north full steam. So far, the civilian relief organizations have confined themselves to supplying food and medicines. With the participation in this project by the north’s government officials and farmers, including the Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Institute and management authorities of farms, it will be promoted on a wide scale as a joint project.” The newspaper quoted a specialist participating in this project as saying, “If a comprehensive plan is formulated with the assistance from the Asian Development Bank and other international organizations, this model project will develop as a ‘small-scale Marshall Plan’, marking an important turning-point for the agricultural and economic development of the north.

It would be advantageous for the United States to help Korea become self-sufficient in food rather than to continue with the limitless food aid. As for Korea, the political advantage will be greater than the economic advantage that is directly related with the increase of food production.

Undeniable is the fact that the difficulties now facing Korea’s agriculture and economy are largely attributable to the US economic sanctions against the country. With the collapse of the socialist market, Korea began to feel strongly the economic blockade of the United States and the West. To make the matter worse, natural calamities befell the country for several successive years. For the problem of the present shortage of energy and food facing Korea to be solved, the West’s economic sanctions (including the hindrance and blockade of the flow of high technology and advanced equipment) must be lifted. The great obstacle is the US economic sanctions.

Korea is trying to meet the shortage of energy by obtaining LWRs

and substitute fuel. It is General Secretary Kim Jong Il's strategy to make the United States, the greatest and strongest adversary, deliver them as her due responsibility.

In *Over the Line* published by the US Enterprise Institute, Jack Downs analyzed Korea's method of diplomatic negotiation in this way; when describing north Korea's method of negotiation, "unreasonable", "random", "unpredictable" and other such words are often used, but in actual fact, seldom to be seen are countries that set "negotiation" as a main weapon of diplomacy and resort to conventional methods, winning admirable successes, as north Korea does.

The word "cunning" is improper in this regard. Diplomacy is a ruthless war of brains, and if a small country is to face a superpower on an equal footing, she cannot but resort to tactful methods of negotiation. Why does the United States, a superpower, sometimes give Korea "candy" in dealing with her? This is because Korea drives her into a situation in which she has to be engaged in it and implement her obligations. Further, it is because justness is on Korea's side.

Why does the United States still fail to publish the "report of re-examination" of her Korea policy even after her Korea policy coordinator Perry's visit to Pyongyang? Isn't it because Perry confirmed in Pyongyang that the "comprehensive approach" combining "candy" and "stick" would not make any sense with Korea? And isn't it that the United States, for this reason, has to re-examine the re-examination? At the moment, the obligations to be fulfilled by the two countries are expressly clarified by the framework agreement. Demanding a new obligation of Korea goes against the basic principle of the agreement. The "candy" Perry has offered is an obligation the United States promised to fulfil, and so Korea will not take it. In this sense, Perry Report will not prove effective unless it is conducive to implementing the agreement.

The United States is obliged by the agreement to lift her economic sanctions against Korea and improve her relations with the country at an earlier date. Her direct assistance to Korea's potato farming is of great significance in promoting her fulfilling of the obligation.

Famine Relief and Food Security

What is the “revolution in potato farming” advocated by General Secretary Kim Jong Il, its significance and its future?

When giving a field guidance to Taehongdan County in the northern Ryanggang Province in October 1998, he instructed that efforts should be directed to potato farming. True to his instruction, the joint editorial published by Korea’s leading newspapers on the New Year’s Day of 1999 called on “making a revolution in potato farming”. Now the country is trying to solve the food problem by her own efforts by cultivating potato on a wide scale and taking it as a staple food along with rice.

In order to increase potato production, she is taking measures to select fields suitable for potato farming and rezone them on the principle of the right crop on the right soil, cultivate high-yielding varieties, produce organic fertilizer in larger quantities, raise two crops a year and prevent virus generation in potato seeds.

Potato grows well even on dry and sterile land. It requires less fertilizer than maize does and the period of its growth is shorter than rice and wheat, so it is possible to cultivate it before or after another crop in a year. Its per-unit area yield is 3.04 times, 2.68 times and 1.12 times greater than wheat, barley and maize respectively. It grows fast and the rate of fixing solar energy is quite high.

Called an “apple growing under the soil” in France for its rich nutritional elements like vitamin, calcium and minerals, it is used as a staple food. And many countries and nations in Europe and Africa eat mainly potato.

Potato yield is stable even in the changeable climate. Not particular about the soil conditions, it yields a certain amount even in dry lands. Its rate of fixing solar energy is high. So during the period of famine or when food import is stopped, it plays the role of famine-relief crop, food-security crop. It is well known that during the Second World War Switzerland, with the channels of food import cut by the encirclement of Nazi Germany, tided over the food crisis by ensuring every household to plant potato in its kitchen yard. There are many examples of countries that escaped famine by increasing potato production.

Viewed from this light, it can be called a wise measure for Korea to

have set about increasing potato production, for it has been experiencing successive natural calamities, adverse climatic conditions, decrease of soil conditions, and a shortage of fertilizers.

General Secretary Kim Jong Il said that had Korea directed efforts to potato farming ten years ago, the people would not have suffered the shortage of food and potato is as good as rice.

If the increasing of potato production goes on smoothly, Korea will possibly relieve the food shortage.

Then hasn't Korea cultivated potato in the past?

So far, Korea has cultivated potato in its northern plateau regions like Ryanggang Province. In the plain areas, maize has been cultivated. If maize is cultivated on the same soil for years, the soil fertility and the crop yield decrease. The adverse weather that has lasted for several years seems to have been another reason of the fall of crop output.

Worse still, potato production has not increased.

On this matter, Dr. Jong Jong Gil of the south Korean rural economy institute, a specialist in the north's rural issue, says:

"Potato yields 20 tons per hectare. But if the same variety is sown, the yield decreases to 10 tons in the second year and to 3 tons in the third year because of virus contamination. The per-hectare yield in the United States is 39 tons, whereas it is 11 tons in the north. This can be ascribed to the failure to improve the seed."

His opinion seems to be right.

Over the recent years Korea has emphasized improvement of potato seed and directed efforts to the research and experiment of seed production and storage and to the building of related institutions. The test cultivation in Taehongdan, Ryanggang Province, of the seed imported from Switzerland and said to be yielding 80 tons per hectare recorded 71 tons per hectare. She is importing the seeds from the Netherlands and Germany, too. When the seeds and technology of the United States are introduced, it will prove effective in further increasing potato production.

The Conception of Turning and the Strategy of Self-Reliance

General Secretary Kim Jong Il is adhering to the Juche farming method, initiated by President Kim Il Sung as the basis of the agricultural policy of Korea.

The West ascribes the decreased crop production in Korea and her shortage of food to the structural defect of the Juche farming method and its failure. The Japanese newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun*, dated March 18, 1999, explains that Korea has “set about ‘restructuring’ her agricultural structure in the name of ‘converting the Juche farming method into a farming method of the peasant masses themselves’.” But they are misguided.

As a scientific farming method, the Juche farming method requires the principle of growing the right crop on the right soil in the opportune time taking into consideration the characteristics of the crop. General Secretary Kim Jong Il emphasizes that the opinions and choice of the peasants must be respected, calling adherence to the Juche farming method and its faithful application. He never has in mind repealing or diversion from the method.

He stresses improvement of seeds, land rezoning and two-crop farming a year so as to make maximum use of the limited crop land, cultivation of the right crop on the right soil and in the right time, promotion of diversified farming, and increased production of organic fertilizer. Particularly noteworthy is the promotion of diversified farming and increased production of organic fertilizer.

Cooperative farms breed pigs and other domestic animals mainly on potato, and increase the soil fertility by means of the organic fertilizer made of the animals’ excretions so as to increase potato production. The state encourages this method, saying, “If we raise 16 pigs for one hectare of potato field, we can produce about 70 tons of liquid manure every year, as well as meat.” (*Rodong Sinmun*, October 31, 1998.)

The country is also using compound microbial fertilizer, which proved to be effective in rice farming. The fertilizer is a liquid organic fertilizer, a mixture of 80 soil microbes including yeast, lactobacilli and the bacteria helpful to photosynthesis. It has been produced for some years with the assistance of the Koreans living in Japan. The organic farming method that excludes the usage of chemical fertilizers and agricultural chemicals has been introduced in many countries of

the world. In addition, microbial chemicals are being experimented. The chemicals are said to be effective in preventing virus contamination without destroying the ecological environment. This is the way Korea's agriculture is developing on the principle of establishing an organic agricultural system, which is stable and makes soil fertile at a low cost. Over the past years Korea has used less chemical fertilizers than other countries, and now she is applying them as less as possible, saying that relying on chemical fertilizers and agricultural chemicals is tantamount to strangling herself.

While realigning crop lands for a wide-scale potato farming, the state allows each farm to cultivate various crops as suited to its situation, consolidating the foundation of her self-reliant agriculture.

When the land becomes fertile and crop output increases through the organic farming method and diversified farming, President Kim Il Sung's objective of making people "eat rice and meat soup" will be attained.

Following is a dialogue excerpted from *Compound Pollution*, a bestseller written by Ariyoshi Sawako, Japanese writer, and published by Shinchosha:

"If some pigs are distributed to each peasant family, who cultivate one crop, for its switchover to organic farming, it can produce organic fertilizer with the excretions of pigs and rice straw, so its living with regard to expenditure will get stabilized. If the households that raise pigs only decrease their number and obtain crop land, they can manage without buying fodder. Furthermore, they can leave the pigs on the harvested paddy fields in autumn, enabling them to take exercise and gnaw at the rice stubble digging soil and eating the good earth instead of internal-organ regulators."

"To hear your words, it's quite simple and clear."

"The objective of organic agriculture is to make every farm household self-sufficient by producing on its own rice, barley, beans and vegetables by using a small number of domestic animals. It is diversified farming through stockbreeding, so to speak."

"It smells old-day agriculture."

Agriculture Korea is pursuing at present seems to be this self-sufficient organic agriculture, old and yet fresh. When we consider the state as a unit, it means self-reliant agriculture.

As is known, Japan's agriculture is not self-reliant. Through the US food (wheat) aid after the Second World War and the subsequent propagation of meal service at schools under demand from the United States and the "diet-improvement drive", her staple food was converted from cooked rice to bread. Falling captive to the world strategy of the US cereal dealers, the amount of meat consumption has radically increased.

What has become the result?

The book, *Japan's Six Conditions—The Age of Competing for Food*, compiled by a coverage team of the NHK and issued by the Japan Broadcasting and Publishing Association, reads in part:

"According to the statistics of 1980, the self-sufficiency rate of milk and dairy products was 87.8 per cent, that of chicken 93.7 per cent and that of pork 87.4 per cent. Japan produced 71.6 per cent of the beef consumed, which was the focus of economic conflict and trade liberalization. At a glance, the self-sufficiency rates are high. But in actual fact, the figures are all sham, because nearly 100 per cent of the fodder of cattle, pigs and chickens has been imported. Japan imports 96 per cent of the defatted bean-cake. Bean paste, soy sauce, bean curd, fermented beans and vegetable oil are all produced in Japan, but their raw material, defatted bean-cake, is from abroad. All in all, the rich table of the contemporary Japanese people, who are living in unprecedentedly glutinous times, is laid with the foods imported from the world. The rate of her food self-sufficiency being 33 per cent, Japan ranks last in this sphere among the developed countries. If rice is excluded, the rate decreases to 4 per cent. Now Japan is the No. 1 food importer in the world. Japan depends most on the United States, the food power."

The food export of the United States accounts for 60 per cent of the total amount of food export in the world. Being fully under the cover of the US "food umbrella", the rate of Japan's food self-sufficiency is on the decline, reaching 22 per cent in 1986. In the same year the rate in the south and north of Korea was 55 per cent and 99 per cent respectively. Of course, a country should import what is lacking, but if the self-sufficiency rate of staple food and other basic cereals is low, the danger that it would be threatened by the food exporter becomes greater. This is the very reason why cereal is called a strategic

material. In other words, the greater the proportion of imported cereals, the greater the political and diplomatic dependence on the exporter.

Korea's present rate of food self-sufficiency would be low as she is receiving assistance from other countries and international organizations. However, she will never depend on other countries for food as Japan does. She is adhering to the principle of food self-sufficiency. She values sovereignty and national dignity before anything else. In case she depends on others for food, Korea, under the West's constant pressure to yield (to "restructure" and "open door"), would have to give up her socialist system.

The clear-cut agricultural policy of self-reliance finds expression in the "revolution in potato farming". General Secretary Kim Jong Il's extraordinary quality can be found in this conception of turning misfortune into a blessing and his dauntless will.

Rodong Sinmun, dated January 3, 1999, said, "If we emerge victorious in the revolution of potato farming, we will solve the problem of food and lay the economic basis of a powerful nation. This is not a thing of distant future." This is never a pipe dream.

Bright is the future of the "revolution in potato farming" aimed at achieving both the solution of food problem and the improvement of the Korea-US relations and General Secretary Kim Jong Il's prudent and daring agricultural and diplomatic strategy.

2. WAVERING DOLLAR REGIME AND KOREA'S ECONOMIC STRATEGY

Korea's Approach to the EU

The highlight of the session of the UN General Assembly held in September 1999 was Korea's active diplomatic campaign with the member states of the EU (European Union).

Korea's Foreign Minister, Paek Nam Sun, made a speech at the assembly seven years after his predecessor and now President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, Kim Yong Nam, had made a speech there in 1992. In 1993 Vice Foreign

Minister Song Won Ho made a speech at the assembly and from 1994 to 1998 Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su Hon made speeches.

The attendants from the West listened with keen interest to the speech of Paek Nam Sun from a country, the focus of world attention for her “nuclear issue” and serious famine.

Paek said in his general speech that Korea would “suspend missile launch during the period of the Korea-US high-level talks.”

In a statement released at a press interview, he said, “The economy that had been suffering difficulties for five years has passed through the most serious phase and entered a period of recovering. Some people guessed we would fall soon, but we did not fall. Rather we have become stronger in the course of overcoming difficulties.”

What surprised foreign delegations more greatly was his “quite unprecedented”, active diplomacy behind the scenes. The Foreign Minister had talks with the Foreign Ministers of 18 countries, including Italy, Switzerland, Denmark, Austria, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, the Philippines, Cuba, China and Australia. He also met his counterparts from Middle East and Africa.

What was especially noteworthy was his active approach towards the EU countries. Korea had vice-ministerial talks with Finland, the country that held presidency of the EU that year, and Norway. Finland reached a basic agreement with her to make efforts to continue dialogue. In the name of 15 member states of the EU, Finland published on September 29 of the same year a Statement on the Issue of the Korean Peninsula, calling the north and south of Korea to resume dialogue without any preconditions attached. This can be viewed to be based on the agreement.

Before the opening of the session of the UN General Assembly, Korea also suggested to the United Kingdom, France and Germany to hold bilateral foreign-ministerial talks. The talks did not take place, but all the EU countries were the target of Korea’s approach diplomacy.

Surprised as they were, Japan’s mass media made analyses like “Aimed at creating an environment conducive to promoting the Korea-US dialogue, it is a sign of Korea’s commencement of multifarious diplomacy,” (*Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, August 26, 1999.) and “It is an effort to free herself from the post-Cold War isolation.”

(*Asahi Shimbun*, September 27, 1999.)

These analyses can be said to be right to a large measure, but the purpose of Korea's diplomacy is not confined there, I think.

Korea's approach to the EU started several years ago.

According to the south Korean newspaper *Hankuk Ilbo*, dated October 11, 1999, Korea and Britain had secret contacts on six occasions (on the level of section chiefs and department chiefs) from October 1996 up until recently and discussed on opening liaison offices in each other's capital cities. The first political, working-level talks between Korea and the EU were held in Brussels in December 1998 on the level of department chiefs. The EU is rendering food aid and other humanitarian aids to Korea and has joined the KEDO.

This groundwork did make possible the minister-level talks during the session of the UN General Assembly. All in all, it would be reasonable to view Korea's approach to the EU as being based on a far-reaching strategy, not on an improvisational strategy so as to escape from an "international isolation" and economic difficulties.

Following is the analysis of this intention on the point of Korea's economic strategy (of consolidating her independent economy and establishing a new international economic order).

Common Illusion about the Dollar

No one will deny the fact that the dollar, as a key currency, holds sway over today's world economy. Key currency is a currency that is used widely in international settlements and financial dealings. The dollar occupies 62 per cent of the foreign currency in reserve in the world, and 50 per cent of the world trade is settled by means of the dollar.

After the end of the Cold War the United States has become the only superpower. At the moment she has greeted an unprecedented boom. In spite of the worldwide financial crisis and economic depression, only the US economy is showing a sign of spiralling up. In addition, the dollar, supported by the US economic and military strength, is becoming a more powerful key currency, and it looks to be enjoying an unshakable trust.

Then will the dollar's dominance continue as ever? As the

European economy was devastated by two world wars, the pound sterling had to yield its position of a key currency to the dollar. Likewise, if the US strength becomes weak, the dollar's power (trustworthiness) will become weak automatically and this will end up jeopardizing the status of the United States as the centre of the world economy. In other words, the status of the United States as the superpower is directly linked to the strength of the dollar.

Over the past ten years after the end of the Cold War the US hegemony and the dollar's pre-eminence has looked to be unshakable. But in actual fact, it has been managed to be maintained by the impalpable common illusion as Japan's "bubble" economy has.

The United States maintained the "conversion system", the gold parity of the dollar. Holding the dollar was as good as holding gold. But the unbridled arms race between the East and the West during the Cold War affected the US economy greatly. With the increasing international payments deficit, the United States could not continue to maintain the "convertibility" of the dollar, and President Nixon declared the annulment of the system in 1971. Nevertheless, the dollar continued to operate as a key currency, because no currency strong enough to take the place of the dollar was available and the dollar was supported by the military strength of the United States. The expectation and trust that "whatever happens, the dollar will be stable" is merely a common illusion that relieved to a certain extent the fear that the dollar will become only a piece of paper when the strength of the United States becomes weak.

The total amount of the US foreign debt exceeds 3,000,000 million dollars. Her national debt recorded 5,400,000 million dollars in 1997. She has to pay 240,000 million dollars every year as interest, which is as large as her defence budget. The United States is the largest debtor country in the world.

Then how could this country continue to exist as a country of key currency?

The tricky device is simple and yet shrewd. Thanks to an excessive issue of the notes of the dollar and the government bonds, the American people, at the expense of getting into debt, have led a luxurious consumer life and the country has showered a colossal amount of money on military budget.

Yamada Atsushi, member of the editorial board of the Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, said, “At the expense of being called a ‘worker bee’ and a ‘rabbit hutch’, Japan did not stop buying the US bonds. The unsung service to America’s victory in the arms race was rendered by the Japanese people’s savings. The sweat of their brow supported the American people’s excessive consumption. The United States sold the dollar abroad, getting into debt, so as to remain as the ‘rich superpower’. The dollar flown into Eastern Europe and the erstwhile Soviet Union circulated in the black market. The market economy run by the dollar expanded into black dealings and excited consumerism, destroying the controlled economy. It was the deficit economy of the United States that crumbled the Communist camp.”

To say conversely, this is the very weak point of the dollar. One day in 1997 the then Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto muttered, “I once felt like selling the US bonds.” Soon the New York Stock Market responded to it too sensitively and in consequence the share prices nosedived. In view of this example alone, the outflow of a huge amount of dollar (an excessive issue, circulation and saving sustained by an excessive common illusion, to be exact) can be called the weakest link in the US economy. “Self-satisfaction of the strong over successive victories in spite of the worldwide crises” (*Asahi Shimbun*) will be shattered sooner or later and the time will come when the strong will have to taste the bitter.

Symptoms of the Crumbling of the Dollar’s Pre-eminence

In recent years the decades-old pre-eminence of the dollar began to wane.

The first attack was the Asian financial crisis. Most of the Southeast Asian countries linked their currencies to the dollar, building an economic sphere by relying on the dollar. In the early years they benefited from the low risk of the exchange rate of the dollar, achieving a high rate of growth. But excessive dependence on the dollar deteriorated their economic foundations and China’s devaluation of her *Renminbi* and the weakening of their competitive positions entailed by wage increase brought about the financial crisis.

In 1997 Thailand cut the link, followed by other Asian nations. Consequently, the price of the dollar slumped and the financial crisis swept over the whole world.

The countries experiencing the financial turmoil has to receive assistance from the IMF. But claiming that the assistance from the organization representing the US-style economic system was inducing fresh strengthening of the dollar's supremacy and their dependence on it, they showed a strong negative response to it.

Typical of the opposition to the dollar's dominance and the IMF system is the following remarks by Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia; freed from colonial domination, we learned about capitalism and introduced foreign capital, achieving prosperity; but there is a time when the wealth of the developing countries goes to nothing overnight by the capital that moves freely at a fast speed; it is preferable to become a dissident than to become a colony of those who worship only money.

This is not a case only related with the Thai baht. It is cynical that George Soros, an international speculator, who is said to have set Malaysia as one of his targets, has the same opinion with Prime Minister Mahathir. He says that the financial market, originally unstable, was maintained by the misguided view that the equilibrium was ensured by free competition. He is quite pessimistic about the market economy going beyond its limit. He admits that the financial market is destroying the economy of a country without mercy like an iron ball that is used in demolishing a building. He points out that the capitalist system has begun to disintegrate.

The volume of foreign exchange circulated across the world in 1995 was about 430,000,000 million dollars, the volume of trade transactions reaching only 5,000,000 million dollars. After all, impalpable speculative funds, 80 times as large as the trade volume, are making a fool of the world economy through the bubble game. Peter Drucker, No. 1 man in the management theory, calling it "virtual money", said that nation-states and market economy have begun to discontinue their functions.

As the fear and reactions show, the apprehension about the American-style capitalist system, ie, market economy, is looming large, and it is being negated around the world. A warning against,

and negation of, the excessive dependence on the dollar has become an irresistible trend.

The second attack against the dollar was the appearance of the euro on January 1, 1999, the common currency of the 11 of the 15 EU member states.

The population of the European region that would form a single-currency economic sphere as large as the dollar sphere is 290 million, and its GDP in 1997 was 6,900,000 million dollars, 1.5 times as great as that of Japan and nearly the same as that of America. In 1998 the United States had a deficit of 235,000 million dollars, while the euro area registered a black figure of 110,000 million dollars. The euro is fully capable of becoming a powerful currency, a key currency.

The notes and coins of the euro will be circulated from 2002, but the credit cards and bank checks have already begun to be settled in the euro. Stable in its exchange rate, the euro is expected to become an international currency. It is almost definite that the new currency will threaten the dollar in the future. It was presumed that a tripolar monetary system involving the dollar, euro and yen would be established. But the Japanese government, fearing the response of the United States and the Asian countries, is reluctant to "internationalize the yen" and the currency fails to become strong because of the long-drawn-out recession of the Japanese economy. In this situation, the possibility of the system has become small. As a result, growing worldwide is the expectation for the newly-emerged euro, a challenger to the dollar, the international monetary champion.

Either out of her forecast or as her measure to contain America's hegemonism, China, a country that boasts of being second in holding foreign currency in reserve (about 151,500 million dollars as of September 1999) made a statement that she will "hold a large amount of the foreign currency in reserve in the euro," shocking the United States. Some say that China is going to hold 40 per cent of her foreign currency in reserve in the euro. Taiwan and Cuba are sympathetic with it.

Chairing with the EU a conference of the banks of the central and south American countries held in November 1998, the President of the Cuban Central Bank said, "The cause of the worldwide financial crisis is in the monetary system centred on the United States, the dominance

of the US dollar. In the future we must hold the currency in reserve in the euro, instead of the dollar.”

It is an urgent task for Cuba, whose socialist principle of “equality” is being seriously threatened by the double economy of the dollar and peso, and for central and south American countries, a citadel of the dollar, to free themselves from the domination of the dollar. The euro’s appearance would probably have been a godsend to them.

The dollar occupies 62 per cent and the European currencies 20 per cent of the fund in reserve in the world. When the euro starts to be circulated, the figures will change greatly and a hot competition is expected to take place. A serious money war will erupt in the early 21st century.

The third attack was the symptom of disintegration of the US economy itself.

Of the “twin deficits” of the United States, the financial deficit shows a sign of improvement, but the trade deficit registered a record high of 168,500 million dollars in 1998. President Clinton expressed a deep apprehension that the trade deficit would reach 300,000 million dollars in the end of 1999. As mentioned above, the United States is the largest debtor country in the world and the power of the dollar is a fiction. So the US economy is destined to go downhill. As the market economy advocates free competition, it is inconceivable that the economy of only one country would continue to win one victory after another.

In October 1999 the stock prices in New York slumped for a time. Afterwards, they began to go up; but there was no ecstasy on the day when the stock prices hit the highest and an unidentifiable feeling of uneasiness is prevailing over the stock markets in the United States. In spite of the US government’s message that “the US economy is healthy,” the fear about inflation is deep-rooted inside the country. This is quite natural, because it is a common sense that the market economy always courts the danger of being crumbled even in the days of boom. It will be redundant to quote Paul Krugman, Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who said that the US stock prices had clearly become a bubble and were going astray from the normal track.

The plummeting of the share price of the Coca-Cola Inc. by the

continual failure of its world strategy including the incident of its product containing impurities in Belgium and France signifies the beginning of the shattering of the myth of the US growth.

Needless to say, the United States will not remain a mere onlooker. She will make desperate efforts to maintain the dollar's pre-eminence. But when many countries that feel disgusted with the dollar's dominance and the high-handed hegemonism of the United States confront it in alliance and the US economy continues to go downhill, the disintegration of the dollar's pre-eminence and the US domination of the unipolar world will be inevitable.

Disengagement from Dollar's Dominance and the Independent Economy

The dollar exerts a great influence on Korea, too. How come Korea, a socialist country that had advocated a self-reliant economy, faced this situation?

This is the result of the end of the Cold War. In the past, she maintained an independent economy supported by the socialist economic system. She mainly conducted barter trade with other socialist countries. This made it possible for her to dispense with the dollar in conducting trade. After the end of the Cold War the socialist market became extinct of its own accord, and Russia and China demanded that Korea settle account in hard currency. Being self-reliant and engaged in barter trade in the past, Korea had not saved the dollar or the yen in large quantities, so she soon began to feel a dearth of foreign currency and could not conduct foreign trade on a regular footing. Consequently, her economy experienced a vicious cycle and the rate of operation of factories decreased sharply owing to an acute shortage of energy and raw materials. Earning foreign currency became an urgent task for her to boost her economy.

Availing themselves of this situation, the United States, Japan and south Korea began to enforce the "soft-landing" policy on Korea, claiming that she could not revitalize her economy unless she introduced "restructuring" and "openness", in order to force her to abandon the socialist system. However, Korea asserted that she would maintain the socialist economy and would not introduce the market

economy. She is making use in part of the elements of the market economy, like setting up the Rajin-Sonbong economic and trade zone and developing an industrial zone of the type of a special economic zone in the west coast area with south Korea's Hyundai Group. There is no doubt that she will make use of such elements tentatively in the future. But it seems she would not introduce the market economy in full measure.

Then what will be the way for Korea to escape from the situation?

Korea is trying to find the way by consolidating the self-reliant character of her economy, contrary to the "international common sense". This can never be called a choice inconsistent with the common sense in view of the aforementioned remarks of the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad and the US speculator George Soros. It is because the market economy is not an immutable economic system and its future is bleak as it is exposed to constant danger of crumbling.

Korea has possibly defined a new economic strategy with the focus on freeing herself from the fetters of the dollar.

To give a further explanation for the sake of the readers' understanding, an independent economy is an economy that supports itself as far as possible, an economy that does not sway in any economy fluctuations of the world. It is never a closed economy; it does not deny trade and exchanges with other countries. A healthy, independent economy preconditions mutually beneficial economic exchanges on an equal footing with other countries.

Korea feels more keenly than others the dire situation in which the socialist market crumbled and she was thrown into the maelstrom of the market economy inevitably accompanied by unbridled competition. The choice of continued advance towards consolidating the independent economy is based on General Secretary Kim Jong Il's judgement that it is the best way.

Korea thinks that some countries may choose the socialist economy and others the market economy. In other words, she is searching for a way of coexistence of the two types of economy. Whatever one chooses, one must build an independent economy and consolidate it—this is the basic stand of Korea.

The Ideal for Establishing a New International Economic Order

Korea's consistent contention for rebuilding the world economy is that a new international economic order must be established.

A new international order aims at eliminating the economic difference between the developed countries centring on the imperialist powers and the backward, developing countries, former colonies, and eliminating the backwardness, poverty and hunger in the latter countries.

It can be said that most of the economic problems, territorial disputes and national conflicts are the aftermath of the colonial rule of the imperialist powers and war. Korea, Palestine, Kosovo and East Timor—there are innumerable examples. It is the same case with the problem between the rich North and the poor South. The North has enjoyed prosperity by exploiting the resources of the South and selling finished products to it. The principle of market economy, the principle of the law of jungle, further widens the economic gap between the North and the South.

According to the Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, dated September 6, 1999, "The ratio of income difference between the most developed country and the least developed country in the early this century was about 10:1. In 1960 it was 30:1, in 1990 60:1 and in 1997 74:1, increasing at an accelerated tempo."

This is an undeniable, stark reality of the problem between the North and the South. Worse still, its seriousness and complicatedness is growing every year, with the addition of the global inequality like the devastation of nature and environmental pollution. In order to solve the problem the non-aligned countries proposed on their own initiative the establishment of a new international economic order.

A method for this is the building of an independent national economy and the South-South cooperation of the relatively rich non-aligned countries helping poor ones.

President Kim Il Sung said:

"South-South cooperation is a noble work of the developing countries to achieve economic independence through economic and technical cooperation and an important link in their struggle to

establish a new international economic order. Achieving economic independence by building an independent national economy is a primary task facing the developing countries today.”

Nevertheless, this noble ideal has not yet been realized owing to the obstacles placed by developed countries, the differences in purposes and situations of individual countries and in particular to the excessive dependence on the old order that can hardly free itself from the dollar’s domination. Another reason is the situation in which the non-aligned countries had to place themselves under the domination of the dollar with the further strengthening of the market economy and the dollar’s dominance in the post-Cold War days. It is never easy to root out the cause of the cumulative debt of the developing countries, totalling 1,300,000 million dollars.

After the end of the Cold War, some non-aligned countries have expressed their doubt over the significance of the existence of the non-aligned movement itself. In other words, the establishment of a new international economic order is becoming more and more difficult.

Even in this world situation, Korea has not abandoned her hope and ideal. She is striving to build an independent economy and realize the noble ideal. For this, she has to break the shackles of the dollar. Isn’t it for this purpose that she has first paid attention to the euro that can confront the dollar? Underlying Korea’s attention for the EU and her policy of active approach towards it is that purpose, I think.

Kim Jong Il’s government is very realistic and profit-orientated. But General Secretary Kim Jong Il does not confine himself to realism. I think he has a strategy of first shaking the dollar-dominated old unipolar economic order by pitting the euro against the dollar and in future producing a unified currency of the non-aligned countries to make it a key currency on a par with the dollar and euro. Needless to say, this will be regarded as a daydream at the present stage. But this will not be a quite impossible happening as the domination by the dollar will one day collapse and the system of market economy, whose future cannot be foreseen, is not immutable.

Korea has long ago intensified approach to the ASEAN (the Association of South-East Asian Nations), apparently to participate in the East Asian Economic Sphere advocated by the ASEAN.

Searching for “a framework that would develop into a common

currency of the future free trade sphere" (the Philippin Foreign Minister Domingo Siaazon) is another challenge to the dollar's dominance and a sign of the incipient independent economies being established. If a powerful common currency appears in Asia that has a large proportion of the world population, the world economy will change radically.

In the 21st century the concept and existence of key currency might become dim. When the system of key currency is rearranged in the world and a new system is established, the establishment of a new international economic order will naturally be promoted.

Korea regards the improvement of her relations with the United States as her supreme task. The two countries will establish diplomatic relations in the near future. Some guess that "Korea will become a pro-American country in the future," but she approaches the United States with good will when the latter approaches her with good will; she will never be a pro-American state. Korea values political independence, so it is natural that she maintains economic independence that guarantees political independence. This means that she does not build an economy that depends on the dollar.

Viewed on this basis, Korea's economic strategy and diplomacy is thought to be conducted in the direction of accelerating the collapse of the dollar-based unipolar domination and establishing a new international economic order through the strengthening of the independent economies of her own and other countries.

3. KOREA ELIMINATES THE MAIN FACTORS OF THE CONTINUING NATIONAL DIVISION

Elimination of the US Hostile Policy and Her Control

The main factor of the 50-year-long division of Korea into north and south is not the difference and contradiction of their political and economic systems and ideological beliefs. This is only a secondary factor. An agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, and cooperation and exchange was adopted between the north and the

south of Korea, but today it remains as a sheet paper; and the promotion of non-governmental economic exchanges between the two parts of Korea has not been a decisive factor in realizing the reunification. This means that they are secondary conditions in the final analysis.

Needless to say, the efforts made by the people of the north and south of Korea and the overseas Koreans to put an end to national division have radically inspired the spirit of reunification and decisively prevented permanent national division. However, there seems to have been not a few misunderstandings and pits in that some people regarded that the lack of reunification force is the main factor of the continuing division. It goes without saying that the main factor and the right of decision for the reunification is in the Korean nation, the core of which is the expansion and maturing of the independent reunification force of the nation. But the main factor has existed in another way.

As is well-known, the division of Korea has been finalized after the Korean War. The United States, a party to the war, has neglected to comply with the Armistice Agreement she had signed. Ignoring the existence and system of Korea, she has been hostile towards her; she has continued to threaten her, maintained a blockade against her and continually committed war provocation. In the meantime, she has pursued a neo-colonial policy in south Korea to subordinate her politically, economically and militarily. It is the United States that has been the basic factor of national confrontation and aggravated it. In other words, the continuation of the US hostile policy towards Korea and maintenance of her control over south Korea is the main factor that has aggravated the confrontational structure of the Korean peninsula and the danger of re-eruption of a war and blocked the country's reunification.

In order to check the US interference and intervention, the main factor that blocks Korea's reunification, Korea, through various means, called the United States to observe the Armistice Agreement; in other words, she attempted to achieve the withdrawal of foreign troops and peaceful settlement of the Korean question by means of dialogue. As this was given a wide berth, Korea could no longer allow the continued division of the country. Though it was a secondary

requirement, Korea succeeded in issuing a joint statement with the south Korean authorities on July 4, 1972, making public the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity. The entire Korean nation supported the statement enthusiastically; the majority of the Korean people thought that the day of reunification was not far. But it could not be a decisive measure without the US engagement, so it gave the people a disappointment. It was the same case with the north-south agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, and cooperation and exchange.

The United States is responsible for neglecting and obstructing Korean people's desire for national self-determination and reunification. What made Korea succeed in inducing the United States to enter into dialogue were the negotiations on the nuclear problem originated by the so-called "north Korea's nuclear suspicion" and the subsequent talks between Korea and the United States.

In the course of this, Korea received from the United States assurances, first, against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons; second, for peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, respect for her sovereignty and non-interference in her internal affairs; and third, for support for the peaceful reunification of Korea. The joint statement containing these three principles was issued on June 11, 1993. With the main party responsible for the division of Korea recognizing the system of Korea and supporting the reunification of north and south of Korea at the talks, Korea's reunification has become a feasible task of the day.

That Korea's reunification cannot be realized unless an end is put to the hostile relations between Korea and the United States, the parties to the Korean War, is eloquently proved by the history of the Korean peninsula of half a century.

Korea Emerges Victorious in Her Diplomatic War with the United States

I will not dwell on the details of the ten-year negotiations between Korea and the United States. But the diplomatic war of the brains and strategies of the two sides can be called a war without gunshot, and Korea can be said to have won the "war".

Having made claptrap concessions repeatedly on the basis of the illusion about Korea's possible "collapse", the United States neglected to comply with the framework agreement she had signed in 1994; and employing delaying tactics, she waited for the collapse of Kim Jong Il's government.

This expectation was shattered to smithereens by the successful launching of the man-made satellite *Kwangmyongsong No. 1* by Korea in 1998. The satellite, though launched for a peaceful purpose, displayed the capability of intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach the US territory. The fact that a hostile state, though small, had possessed an ability of mass destruction in retaliation was enough to make the United States shudder with fear. The seriousness of the fear is proved by the United States' tenacious pursuance, albeit repeated failures, of the missile interception tests based on the NMD initiative for the "defence from the nuclear-missile attack of Korea and others".

For this reason, when Korea hinted that she would launch the second satellite, she could not but start implementing the agreement so as to check the launch.

The first stage is Perry Report on revising her Korea policy. Its full text has not been made public, and it has been described as a comprehensive approach involving dialogue and deterrence; in short, it will be something like a "statement of defeat".

Han Ho Sok, head of the New York-based Unification Research Institute, said, "The report is a document that formulated an alternative policy of the 21st century that the United States would normalize her relations with Korea and she would neither interfere in nor obstruct Korea's peaceful reunification in return for Korea's promise not to threaten her nuclear non-proliferation policy and her alliance with Japan."

The second stage is the US promise to improve her relations with Korea at the Korea-US high-level talks in Berlin in September 1999. In return for Korea's temporary suspension of missile launch, the United States announced comprehensive relaxation of economic sanctions against her. The West expressed a feeling of surprise at it, but it is not so surprising. The outcome had already been decided by the successful launching of the satellite *Kwangmyongsong No. 1*, and the United States could not but implement the agreement, her

responsibility.

Fifty years have passed since the outbreak of the Korean War, and the last ten years have proved that the positions of Korea and the United States have reversed completely. The United States entertained a deep-rooted fear for Korea, the adversary she could not defeat in the war, and so it continued to slight it; but as she could no longer neglect the country for the “nuclear suspicion”, this time she fought a diplomatic war, and she again suffered a defeat.

The third stage is the Korea-US negotiations held after the second round of talks in Berlin. According to the sources of the south Korean government, on the eve of the talks Charles Kartman, US special envoy for the Korean peace talks, told Kim Kye Gwan, Vice Foreign Minister of Korea, that the United States was ready to make an official statement to the effect that “the United States abandons animosity toward north Korea.” This will be a further development of her assurance of non-use of force. If the hostile policy is given up, what is left is the establishment of diplomatic relations of the two countries.

As a result, Korea and the United States shall implement the Agreed Framework of 1994 in conformity with the three principles made public in 1993 and the principle of simultaneous action and, in the course of this, a peace treaty will be reached between the two countries, and in the early 21st century they will enter into diplomatic relations.

At this point reunification of the two parts of Korea will become a realistic task from a long-term task.

Withdrawal of the US Troops in South Korea and the Status of South Korea

The focal point of the time when Korea and the United States conclude a peace treaty and establish diplomatic relations will be the treatment and status of the US troops stationed in south Korea.

On condition that the US troops remain in south Korea, neither peace treaty nor diplomatic relations would be conceivable. It is because putting an end to the Cold-War structure on the Korean peninsula and realizing peaceful coexistence is immediately détente between Korea and the United States and a precondition for the

reunification of north and south of Korea.

The south Korean government and people, who have the wrong idea that they have so far been protected by the GIs, will fall into a panic if they withdraw all at once. South Korea might drastically increase armaments (including developing nuclear weapons and ICBMs) allegedly for the capability to confront the north. This would never be conducive to reunification, and it might jeopardize the result of the improvement of the Korea-US relations. The United States does not want this, either.

The authorities of Korea and the United States are presumed first to make the US troops in south Korea not hostile towards Korea, second to make them keep security in the Korean peninsula along with the Korean People's Army like a peace-keeping force, and third to withdraw them by stages.

Probably the US troops, changing their nature and tasks in this direction, will have to remain in south Korea until north and south of Korea move towards reunification in concrete terms. It is apparent that Korea recognizes it, though passively.

Some people might doubt whether the United States would withdraw her troops from south Korea and waive her control of south Korea. This is natural in view of the division of Korea that has lasted for half a century. However, the answer is, "It is inevitable." A good example took place 30 years ago.

The United States realized a dramatic reconciliation in 1972 with China, one of her big adversaries in the Cold War. The two countries agreed on five principles of peace in the Shanghai Joint Communique, building a framework for new Sino-American relations.

The GIs in Taiwan withdrew and the US military bases there were closed. In this way, the Cold War between China and the United States came to an end.

President Kim Il Sung described Nixon's visit to China as "white-flag diplomacy". The US abandoning of her military control of Taiwan, her ally, can be called a defeat of her previous diplomacy. As a result, however, she gained more than she had lost, gathering a fruit at the cost of honour. In January 1979, seven years later, the two countries established diplomatic relations and, at the same time, the United States severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

The procedure and content of the improvement of the Sino-American relations are very similar to those of the improvement of the relations between Korea and the United States. What corresponds to the five principles of peace is the three principles clarified in the joint statement of 1993 and the principles took a concrete shape in the Agreed Framework of 1994. The content is more complicated than that of the relations between China and the United States, because China was a big power possessed with nuclear weapons and ICBMs, whereas Korea is a small country who has not yet made clear whether she has possessed them. In other words, what China had to do was to wait for the United States to call her, waving a white flag, as Tokugawa Ieyasu said, "Wait until you are called." Nevertheless, Korea had to force an unwilling United States to open her mouth and cry by resorting to every wisdom and means.

It is obvious that Korea and the United States will conclude a peace treaty and establish diplomatic relations and the US troops in south Korea will withdraw; at this stage the two countries will reconcile with each other. Then, will south Korea sever diplomatic relations with the United States as Taiwan did? No, she will not.

The difference in national power (like territory, population, military strength and total economic strength) between China and Taiwan was beyond compare. And China insisted on reunification through "one country and two systems", whereas Taiwan advocated reunification through "one country and two governments". Taiwan that had been trying to fix the division and take a path different from China's could not tolerate the US support and recognition of China's reunification policy. She had no choice but to break off her relations with the United States.

However, the difference in strength between the north and south of Korea is not as great as that between China and Taiwan. Though superficially, the south wishes for coexistence with the north. Kim Dae Jung is not opposed to the normalization of relations between the north and the United States. He even proclaimed that he would "put an end to the Cold-War structure in the Korean peninsula" during his tenure of office. When Korea and the United States establish diplomatic relations and the US troops get out of south Korea, it will entail a certain degree of shock and confusion in south Korea, but the

inevitable current of history cannot be checked now.

The theory of cross recognition of north and south of Korea insisted by the United States, south Korea and Japan was realized only for one side, with south Korea establishing diplomatic relations with Russia and China after the Cold War. This destroyed political and military balance in the Korean peninsula and aggravated military tension. It follows that redressing this imbalance poses itself as the first and foremost task in settling the Korean issue.

And unlike the case of China and Taiwan, the question of reunification becomes a primary task in the Korean peninsula almost simultaneously with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the north and the United States; so, the south needs not sever her diplomatic relations with the United States thereupon. But it is doubtful whether the south Korean government, which has been ingrained with subordination to the United States and dependence on foreign forces, could preserve the political strength with which to realize reunification coping appropriately with the new era of reunification in which the spirit of national independence is the main thing.

The Realistic Mode of “One Country and Two Systems”

As preconditions for Korea’s reunification have been provided, a question arises as to which mode would be most feasible. The modes under discussion at the moment are federation (one country and two systems) and union (one union and two independent governments).

At present different ideologies and systems exist in the north and south of Korea. Both of them are not willing to give them up unilaterally nor can they force them upon each other. At one point the theories of the “collapse of the north” and “unification through absorption” were in vogue, but they disappeared on their own accord as Kim Jong Il’s government remained firm. It is unrealistic to wait for one side to collapse. To achieve complete reunification through “one country, one system and one government”, the two sides must fight a war to decide who will conquer whom. In other words, peaceful reunification by this theory is not feasible.

There is no other way than to view the recognition of each other's ideology and system and their peaceful coexistence as reunification. How a reunified national state will be created afterwards cannot but be left with the coming generation.

According to the Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, dated January 1, 2000, Kim Dae Jung said, "What I have to do during my tenure of office is to put an end to the Cold War in the Korean peninsula and achieve peaceful coexistence and exchange between the south and the north. I leave reunification with the future successors."

At the first glance this looks similar to the theory of reunification advocated by the north. But it is fundamentally different from it as to which stage should be viewed as reunification. Kim Dae Jung, who has so far insisted on reunification through a moderate union of the south and the north, once advanced "three stages" initiative: the first stage is peaceful coexistence, with the present governments exercising the right of diplomacy and defence separately; the second stage is the establishment of a federal government that exercises the right of diplomacy and defence uniformly, while leaving the regional governments in the south and the north to deal with their respective internal affairs; and the third stage is achieving the complete reunification on the principle of "one nation, one state and one government".

The first stage is identical in nature with Taiwan's "theory of two states"; and the third stage could be viewed as reunification. But viewed from this theory, it is not clear when reunification can be achieved. To conclude, it cannot be recognized that this theory aims at reunification.

Contrary to this, the mode of reunification through federation advanced by the north views the establishment of a federal state based on "one nation, one state, two systems and two governments" as reunification, the state being a neutral one. In other words, the realization of "one state, two systems and two governments" means reunification. This can be accomplished right now provided that the main factors of division have been cleared. This is the very reason why reunification through federation is reasonable and rational. This mode provides a concrete plan and hope for reunification to the Korean nation that have experienced sufferings and tragedy of

division for more than half a century. Reunification is not an issue of the future, an issue to be left “with the future successors”; it is an issue that must be settled right now so that a reunified state could be handed over to the coming generations.

Here let us refer again to the example of China.

In December 1999 China restored Macao after the lapse of 442 years. With China’s restoration of Hong Kong and then Macao, the West’s colonial rule of Asia came to an end.

Like Hong Kong, Macao, on the principle of “one country and two systems”, will exercise a high degree of autonomy for 50 years except diplomacy and defence. The restoration of Hong Kong and Macao, ensurance of a high degree of autonomy and their sustained economic prosperity prove the validity of the Chinese style of “one country and two systems”. President Jiang Zemin of China said at the ceremony celebrating the restoration of Macao, “This proves a model for the final solution of the Taiwan problem.”

What is important here is the fact that the United States supports “one China”, the Chinese government’s policy of reunification through “one country and two systems”. Korea, too, welcomed the event, saying in her newspaper *Rodong Sinmun*, dated December 20, 1999, “The fact that Macao, following Hong Kong, has returned to China through the mode of ‘one country and two systems’ convincingly proves the validity and reasonableness of the proposal for reunification through federation.” This is a sort of signal to the United States, demanding her support also for “one country and two systems” in the settlement of the Korean issue.

When the relations between the United States, the main factor of the continuing division, and Korea, the hard core of the reunification force, improve drastically, the feasibility of reunification through federation will become decisive. Having supported fully China’s principle of “one country and two systems”, the United States will have no reason to object the same principle of Korea, a country it has established diplomatic relations. If the United States refuses to do so, the relations between the two will go back to the starting point. In other words, the United States will have nothing to do other than supporting Korea’s reunification through federation.

“One country and two independent governments” advocated by the

present south Korean authority cannot achieve the peaceful coexistence of the north and the south of Korea, only maintaining the present tension. Only “one country and two regional autonomous governments” that tolerate each other’s system can achieve peace and security on the Korean peninsula, as well as coexistence and coprosperity between the north and the south.

What needs attention here is that establishing national sovereignty in the south is a prerequisite for achieving reunification through federation. Unless the deeply-ingrained habit of depending on foreign forces is rooted out, federation cannot be achieved. If the favourable relations with the reunified Korea do not violate her national interests, the United States will not oppose a government of national independence being established in the south.

The possibility that the present regime would become such a government is not so high, but it depends on which attitude it takes. For example, a touchstone is whether it will take at an earlier date a political decision of repealing the “National Security Law”, which has been condemned at home and abroad, an obstacle to reunification.

Korea Clears Away One after Another the Obstacles Surrounding Reunification

Having set a milestone in her relations with the United States, the main factor of national division, Korea set about clearing away the surrounding obstacles to reunification.

First, to make her victory in the diplomacy towards the United States as a decisive one, Korea continuously wages a fierce diplomatic war to bring it to completion.

When will Korea and the United States establish diplomatic relations? The important figure for foretelling it is 2003. On the assumption that “Korea will collapse,” the United States signed the framework agreement, agreeing easily to supply LWRs to Korea until then. She apparently treated it lightly, thinking that it would not present a big trouble to promise for a thing of ten years later with a country that would “collapse” soon.

The LWR project of the KEDO has been delayed up until now, and it is totally impossible to hand over finished LWRs to Korea three

years later, ie, in 2003. This is why the United States drew up the Perry Report in a hurry to revise her Korea policy, but it was too late. If she fails to keep promise by the year 2003, she must make compensation for it. If the Clinton Administration fails to do so, its successor must do it. Whether it is Republican or Democratic, it has a weak point from its first day of being obliged to pay the debt incurred by the failure to fulfil the agreement.

The compensation is nothing but the establishment of diplomatic relations with Korea and support for Korea's reunification through north-south federation. Economic aid is only a secondary issue. If the year 2003, the absolute condition, is assumed to be a prerequisite, diplomatic relations between the United States and Korea will be established before the year. In other words, the US delaying tactics have only three years to go.

Until then, Korea will gain what she aims at by conducting the negotiations with the United States in her favour and coordinate and perfect to the maximum the conditions for achieving reunification through federation.

Second, Korea promotes improvement of her relations with the West.

In the end of 1999 Korea reached an agreement with Japan to resume the talks for normalizing relations between the two countries. The improvement of her relations with Japan is presumed to be most difficult and take time since it contains the issue of making reparation for the past.

The continuation of dialogue between Japan and Korea will be favourable for ensuring security in Northeast Asia and it will also be advantageous to Korea in clearing away the surrounding obstacles on the way for reunification. If Japan wishes for dialogue and friendship, Korea will not reject it, but welcome it.

On the other hand, Korea has intensified contact with the West, mainly with the EU member states, over the recent years. In the early 2000 she made public establishment of diplomatic relations with Italy. Italy is the first country among the G7 countries to establish diplomatic relations with Korea. The political influence this event exerts on the United States, south Korea and Japan is great. It shattered their propaganda that they "pursue security in Northeast

Asia by drawing into the international community Korea that has been isolated internationally.”

Isn’t Korea trying to make loose their encirclement and further replace it with her own encirclement by improving her relations with the G7 countries? It is beyond doubt that her establishment of diplomatic relations with Italy will at least become a factor that accelerates the improvement of Korea-US relations.

In this way, Korea has established diplomatic relations with 135 countries, reducing the difference in number with south Korea that has diplomatic relations with 183 countries. She will possibly establish diplomatic relations with Australia and the Philippines in the near future. It is also said a delegation of the Foreign Ministry of France will be visiting Korea in February 2000.

There is a considerable degree of economic merits. Recently, Fiat made public that it will build in Korea a plant for assembling 10,000 cars a year and conduct production under license of low-priced station wagons. A joint project of an auto company of the south and a joint-venture company of the north with the total investment of 300 million dollars will start production in June 2001 and export the assembled cars to Russia and Southeast Asia. This shows that economic exchange starts smoothly soon after the establishment of diplomatic relations. The political and economic relations between Korea and the United States will follow the precedent.

Establishment of diplomatic relations with Italy that broke down a corner of the Group of 7 can be called an event, which shows a full picture of profit-orientated Kim Jong Il’s diplomacy that tries to win economic and political gains and create conditions favourable for the country’s reunification by breaking a new ground for cultivating relations with the West while maintaining friendly relations with the non-aligned countries.

Third, Korea revitalizes her economy.

Owing to various reasons, the socialist economy of Korea began to slacken from the mid-1990s. To make the matter worse, she has suffered a serious shortage of food. It is largely attributable to this situation that the United States, south Korea and Japan made a fuss about the “theory of north Korea’s fall”. However, braving through difficulties with a strong political cohesion and a persistent spiritual

power, Korea began to rehabilitate her economy from around 1998.

Having advanced a plan for building a “powerful nation”, General Secretary Kim Jong Il is channelling a greatest effort into the economy as well as to the military affairs. This is a strategy, a prerequisite for national reunification. The “reunification cost” once discussed in south Korea is nonsense in reunifying the country through federation. Still, Korea must consolidate her independent economy based on socialist system and restore its power in order to realize the principle of “one country and two systems”. If the advantages of socialist economy are not demonstrated, it will be impossible to reunify the country through federation based on an equal footing with the south.

As seen above, Korea is trying to attain the main objective of national reunification at an earlier date by clearing away the surrounding obstacles one by one. Concrete successes are being achieved now and reunification has become quite feasible. Reunification of the country will soon be an order of the day. The Korean nation will put an end to national division without fail and live in the 21st century as a reunified nation.

APPENDIX

AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION, NONAGGRESSION, AND COOPERATION AND EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH

(Agreed and signed in Seoul on December 13, 1991, by Premier Yon Hyong Muk, head of the north's delegation, and Prime Minister Jong Won Sik, head of the south's delegation)

Pursuant to the will of all the fellow countrymen desirous of the peaceful reunification of the divided country,

Reaffirming the three principles (independence, peace and great national unity) of national reunification laid down in the July 4 North-South Joint Statement,

Pledging themselves to remove the political and military confrontation for the achievement of national reconciliation, for the

prevention of invasion and conflicts by the armed forces, for the realization of détente and for the guarantee of peace, to realize many-sided cooperation and exchange for the promotion of the common interests and prosperity of the nation, and to make concerted efforts to achieve peaceful reunification, admitting that the relationship between the sides is not the one between the countries but a special one formed temporarily in the process of advancing towards reunification, the north and the south have agreed as follows:

1. North-South Reconciliation

Article 1. The north and the south shall recognize and respect the system that exists on the other side.

Article 2. The north and the south shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the other side.

Article 3. The north and the south shall cease to abuse and slander the other side.

Article 4. The north and the south shall refrain from all acts aimed at destroying and overthrowing the other side.

Article 5. The north and the south shall make concerted efforts to convert the present armistice into a lasting peace between the north and the south and to observe the present Military Armistice Agreement until such peace has been achieved.

Article 6. The north and the south shall discontinue confrontation and competition, cooperate with each other and make concerted efforts for national dignity and interests in the international arena.

Article 7. The north and the south shall set up and operate a north-south liaison office at Panmunjom within 3 months after the effectuation of this agreement in order to ensure close contacts and promote consultation with each other.

Article 8. The north and the south shall form a north-south political subcommittee within the framework of the full-dress talks in one month after the effectuation of this agreement in order to discuss concrete measures for implementing and observing the agreement on north-south reconciliation.

2. North-South Nonaggression

Article 9. The north and the south shall not use arms against the other side, nor shall they invade the other by force of arms.

Article 10. The north and the south shall settle differences and disputes between them peacefully through dialogue and negotiation.

Article 11. The north and the south shall designate as the demarcation line and zone of nonaggression the Military Demarcation Line which was laid down in the Agreement on the Military Armistice dated July 27, 1953 and the area which has so far been within the jurisdiction of the sides.

Article 12. In order to implement and guarantee nonaggression the north and the south shall set up and operate a north-south joint military committee within three months after the effectuation of this agreement.

The north-south joint military committee shall discuss and promote the realization of military confidence-building and disarmament, such as notification of and control over the transfer of large units and military exercises, use of the Demilitarized Zone for peaceful purposes, exchange of military personnel and information, the realization of phased arms cutdown including the removal of mass destruction weapons and offensive capability and their verification.

Article 13. The north and the south shall install and operate direct telephone links between the military authorities of the sides in order to prevent the outbreak and escalation of accidental armed conflicts.

Article 14. The north and the south shall form a north-south military subcommittee within the framework of the full-dress talks in one month after the effectuation of this agreement and discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement on nonaggression and the removal of military confrontation.

2. North-South Cooperation and Exchange

Article 15. The north and the south shall effect economic cooperation and exchange, such as joint development of resources and the exchange of goods in the form of exchange within the nation and joint investment for the coordinated and balanced development of the

national economy and for the promotion of the well-being of the whole nation.

Article 16. The north and the south shall effect cooperation and exchange in various fields, such as science, technology, education, literature and art, public health, sports, environment and mass media including newspapers, radio, TV and publications.

Article 17. The north and the south shall effect free travels and contacts between the members of the nation.

Article 18. The north and the south shall effect free correspondence, travels, meetings and visits between the separated families and relatives and their reunion based on their free will and take measures regarding other problems awaiting humanitarian solution.

Article 19. The north and the south shall connect severed railways and roads and open sea and air routes.

Article 20. The north and the south shall install and connect the facilities necessary for the exchange of post and telecommunication and ensure secrecy in this sphere of exchange.

Article 21. The north and the south shall cooperate with each other in economic, cultural and many other fields in the international arena and jointly conduct external activities.

Article 22. For the implementation of the agreement on effecting cooperation and exchange in various fields, such as the economy and culture, the north and the south shall form a north-south joint economic cooperation and exchange committee and other departmental joint committees within three months after the effectuation of this agreement.

Article 23. In order to discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement on cooperation and exchange between the north and the south, the two parts shall establish a north-south cooperation and exchange subcommittee within the framework of the full-dress talks in one month after the effectuation of the agreement.

3. Amendments and Effectuation

Article 24. This agreement can be amended and supplemented by

mutual consent.

Article 25. This agreement shall become effective as from the date when the north and the south exchange its text after they go through necessary formalities.

December 13, 1991

**JOINT DECLARATION ON
DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN
PENINSULA**

(Adopted and signed in Panmunjom on January 20, 1992, by the
signers of the above agreement)

With a view to denuclearizing the Korean peninsula and thus removing the danger of nuclear war, creating conditions and environment favourable for peace and peaceful reunification of our country and contributing to peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world, the north and the south declare as follows:

1. The north and the south shall refrain from the testing, manufacture, production, acceptance, possession, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear weapons.
2. The north and the south shall use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes.
3. The north and the south shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.
4. The north and the south shall make an inspection of facilities chosen by the other side and agreed upon between the sides through procedures and methods defined by the north-south joint committee of nuclear control in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
5. The north and the south shall form and operate the north-south joint committee of nuclear control within one month after the publication of this joint declaration in order to implement it.
6. This joint declaration shall take effect from the day of

exchange of its texts between the north and the south through procedures necessary for their effectuation.

January 20, 1992

JOINT STATEMENT OF THE DPRK AND THE UNITED STATES

(Adopted at the first round of talks held in New York on June 11, 1993)

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America held government-level talks in New York from the 2nd through the 11th of June, 1993. Present at the talks were a delegation of the DPRK headed by First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju and a delegation of the United States led by Assistant Secretary of State Robert L. Gallucci, both representing their respective governments.

At the talks, the two sides discussed policy matters with a view to a fundamental solution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. Both sides expressed support for the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the interest of nuclear non-proliferation goals.

The DPRK and the United States have agreed to principles of:

- Assurances against the threat and the use of force, including nuclear weapons;
- Peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, including impartial application of full scope safeguards, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs; and
- Support for the peaceful reunification of Korea.

In this context, the two governments have agreed to continue dialogue on an equal and unprejudiced basis. In this respect, the government of the DPRK has decided unilaterally to suspend as long as it considers necessary the effectuation of its withdrawal from the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

June 11, 1993, New York

PRESS STATEMENT ON THE DPRK-US TALKS

(Agreed at the second round of talks in Geneva and agreed to publish respectively on July 19, 1993)

The delegation of the DPRK and the United States met from July 14 to 19, 1993 in Geneva for the second round of talks on resolving the nuclear issue.

Both sides reaffirmed the principles of the June 11, 1993 joint DPRK-US statement.

For its part, the United States specifically reaffirmed its commitment to the principles on assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons.

Both sides recognize the desirability of the DPRK's intention to replace the current graphite moderated reactors and associated nuclear facilities with light-water moderated nuclear reactors. As part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue and on the premise that a solution related to the provision of light-water moderated reactors (LWRs) is achievable, the United States is prepared to support the introduction of LWRs and explore with the DPRK ways in which LWRs could be obtained.

Both sides agreed that a full and impartial application of IAEA safeguards is essential to accomplish a strong international nuclear non-proliferation regime. On this basis, the DPRK is prepared to begin consultations with the IAEA on outstanding safeguards and other issues as soon as possible.

The DPRK and the United States also reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK reaffirmed that it remains prepared to begin the north-south talks as soon as possible on bilateral issues including the nuclear issue.

The DPRK and the United States have agreed to meet again in the next two months to discuss outstanding matters related to resolving the nuclear issue, including technical questions related to the introduction of LWRs, and to lay the basis for improving overall relations between the DPRK and the United States.

July 19, 1993, Geneva

AGREED STATEMENT BETWEEN THE DPRK AND THE UNITED STATES

(Published after the first-day session of the third round of talks in Geneva on August 12, 1994)

The delegations of the DPRK and the United States met in Geneva from August 5 to 12, 1994, to resume the third round of talks.

Both sides reaffirmed the principles of the June 11, 1993, DPRK-US joint statement and reached agreement that the following elements should be part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue:

1. The DPRK is prepared to replace its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants, and the United States is prepared to make arrangements for the provision of LWRs of approximately 2,000 MW(e) to the DPRK as early as possible and to make arrangements for interim energy alternatives to the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors. Upon receipt of US assurances for the provision of LWRs and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze construction of the 50 MW (e) and 200 MW (e) reactors, forgo reprocessing, and seal the Radiochemical Laboratory, to be monitored by the IAEA.

2. The DPRK and the United States are prepared to establish diplomatic representation in each other's capitals and to reduce barriers to trade and investment, as a move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

3. To help achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, the United States is prepared to provide the DPRK with assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United

States, and the DPRK remains prepared to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

4. The DPRK is prepared to remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.

Important issues raised during the talks remain to be resolved. Both sides agree that expert-level discussions are necessary to advance the replacement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated program with LWR technology, the safe storage and disposition of the spent fuel, provision of alternative energy, and the establishment of liaison offices. Accordingly, expert-level talks will be held in the DPRK and the United States or elsewhere as agreed. The DPRK and the United States agreed to recess their talks and resume in Geneva on September 23, 1994.

In the meantime, the United States will pursue arrangements necessary to provide assurances for the LWR project to the DPRK as part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue, and the DPRK will observe the freeze on nuclear activities and maintain the continuity of safeguards, as agreed in the June 20-22, 1994, exchange of messages between First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju and Assistant Secretary of State Robert L. Gallucci.

August 12, 1994, Geneva

AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(Published as the final agreement of the third round of talks in
Geneva on October 21, 1994)

Delegations of the governments of the DPRK and the United States of America held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the

Korean peninsula.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement between the DPRK and the United States and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the DPRK and the United States to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The DPRK and the United States decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:

I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the US President, the United States will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW (e) by a target date of 2003.

-The United States will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The United States, representing the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.

-The United States, representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this document.

-As necessary, the DPRK and the United States will conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the US President, the United States, representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy forgone due to the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.

-Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.

-Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date

of this document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries.

3) Upon receipt of US assurances for the provision of LWRs and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities.

-The freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this document. During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.

-Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.

-The DPRK and the United States will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW (e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.

4) As soon as possible after the date of this document, DPRK and US experts will hold two sets of experts talks.

-At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project.

-At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for the spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.

II. The two sides will move towards full normalization of political and economic relations.

1) Within three months of the date of this document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.

2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert-level discussions.

3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the DPRK and the United States will upgrade bilateral relations to the

ambassadorial level.

III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

1) The United States will provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States.

2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

3) The DPRK will engage in north-south dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.

IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.

2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze.

3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.

Kang Sok Ju,
Head of the DPRK delegation,
First Vice-Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the DPRK

Robert L. Gallucci,
Head of the US delegation,
Ambassador-at-Large of the
USA

October 21, 1994, Geneva

DPRK-US JOINT PRESS STATEMENT

(Issued in Kuala Lumpur on June 13, 1995, and served as the basis of the LWR supply agreement reached between the DPRK and the KEDO on December 15 of the same year)

The delegations of the DPRK and the United States held talks in Kuala Lumpur from May 19 to June 12, 1995, with respect to implementation of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994.

Both sides reaffirmed their political commitments to implement the DPRK-US Agreed Framework, and with particular regard to facilitating the light-water reactor (LWR) project as called for in the Agreed Framework, decided as follows:

I

The United States reaffirms that the letter of assurance from the US President dated October 20, 1994 concerning the provision of the LWR project and interim energy alternatives continues in effect.

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), under US leadership, will finance and supply the LWR project in the DPRK as called for in the Agreed Framework. As specified in the Agreed Framework, the United States will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project. In this regard, US citizens will lead delegations and teams of KEDO as required to fulfill this role.

II

The LWR project will consist of two pressurized light-water reactors with two coolant loops and a generating capacity of approximately 1,000 MW (e) each. The reactor model, selected by KEDO, will be the advanced version of US origin design and technology currently under production.

III

The Commission for External Economic Relations representing the DPRK Government and KEDO will conclude a supply agreement at the earliest possible date for the provision of the LWR project on a turnkey basis. On the basis of this statement the DPRK will meet with KEDO as soon as possible to negotiate the outstanding issues of the LWR supply agreement.

KEDO will conduct a site survey to identify the requirements for construction and operation of the LWR project. The costs of this site survey and site preparation will be included in the scope of supply for the project.

KEDO will select a prime contractor to carry out the project. A US firm will serve as program coordinator to assist KEDO in supervising overall implementation of the LWR project; KEDO will select the program coordinator. A DPRK firm will enter into implementing arrangements as necessary to facilitate the LWR project.

IV

In addition to the LWR project, the two sides decided to take the following steps towards implementation of the Agreed Framework.

Experts from the two sides will meet in the DPRK as soon as possible in June to agree on a schedule and cooperative measures for phased delivery of heavy fuel oil in accordance with the Agreed Framework. KEDO will begin immediately to make arrangements for an initial delivery of heavy fuel oil, subject to conclusion of the above agreement.

The DPRK-US Record of Meeting of January 20, 1995, on safe storage of spent fuel will be expeditiously implemented. In this regard, a US team of experts will visit the DPRK as soon as possible in June to begin implementation.

June 13, 1995, Kuala Lumpur

EDITOR'S COMMENT

The writer supplemented the preface for the translated version of the book and Part IV in February 2000, and it took several months to translate it in several languages.

The months was a witness to the fact that the development course of the situation he had drawn in the book was correct. Typical examples are the meeting and talks the heads of the north and the south held in Pyongyang, the first of its kind in over-half-a-century-long national division, and the signing of the North-South Joint Declaration by them.

Leaving the readers to analyze and judge these developments, the editorial board reproduces the full text of the North-South Joint Declaration for the readers' reference.

NORTH-SOUTH JOINT DECLARATION

True to the noble will of all the fellow countrymen for the peaceful reunification of the country, Chairman Kim Jong Il of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea had a historic meeting and summit talks in Pyongyang from June 13 to 15, 2000.

The heads of the north and the south, considering that the current meeting and summit talks, the first of its kind since the division of the country, are events of great importance in promoting mutual understanding, developing inter-Korean relations and achieving peaceful reunification, declare as follows:

1. The north and the south agreed to solve the question of the country's reunification independently by the concerted efforts of the Korean nation responsible for it.
2. The north and the south, recognizing that the low-level federation proposed by the north and the commonwealth system proposed by the south for the reunification of the country have similarity, agreed to work together for the reunification in this direction in the future.
3. The north and the south agreed to settle humanitarian issues as early as possible, including the exchange of visiting

groups of separated families and relatives and the issue of unconverted long-term prisoners, to mark August 15 this year.

4. The north and the south agreed to promote the balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and build mutual confidence by activating cooperation and exchange in all fields—social, cultural, sports, public health, environmental and so on.
5. The north and the south agreed to hold an authority-to-authority negotiation as soon as possible to put the above-mentioned agreed points into speedy operation.

President Kim Dae Jung invited Chairman Kim Jong Il of the DPRK National Defence Commission to visit Seoul and Chairman Kim Jong Il agreed to do so at an appropriate time.

June 15, 2000

Kim Jong Il,
Chairman of the DPRK
National Defence Commission

Kim Dae Jung
President of the Republic of
Korea

5. MILESTONE IN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING— THE KOREA-US AGREED FRAMEWORK *(October-November 1994)*

The Difference between the “Nuclear Issue” and Nuclear Problem

After signing the Agreed Framework between Korea and the United States on October 21, 1994, Kang Sok Ju, head of the Korean delegation, said with a smile at a press conference,

“The Agreed Framework is a milestone in the settlement of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula and a document of historical significance. It indicates concrete ways to fundamentally solve the nuclear problem resulting from the abnormal relations between Korea

and the United States.”

Korea has drawn a distinction between the “nuclear issue” and the nuclear problem. Whether the quotation mark is given or not seems to make little difference but in fact there is a big difference in their contents.

The “nuclear issue” means the issue of dispelling the “suspicion of Korea’s development of nuclear weapons” raised by the West. When the United States or the IAEA demands “special inspection”, Korea puts the words in quotation mark in the sense that it is a “nuclear suspicion” raised by the West. This implies Korea’s protest that it has no intention and capability to develop nuclear weapons and “nuclear suspicion” has not existed from the outset.

The nuclear problem is an issue that concerns the Korean peninsula as a whole, an issue raised by the introduction of nuclear weapons in the south by the United States, the continual nuclear test war she conducts and the constant nuclear threat she makes against Korea. In other words, it was raised by the long-standing hostile relations and mistrust between Korea and the United States.

The “nuclear issue” is an extremely unjustifiable side issue that originated from the nuclear problem. For this reason, unless the nuclear problem is solved, “nuclear issue” cannot be settled, either. This leads to the conclusion that elimination of the hostile relations between the two countries and confidence-building is a prerequisite for dispelling the “nuclear suspicion”. The US administration said that it came to understand Korea only now through the 16-month-long negotiations; this is a confession that it came to understand, though belatedly, the differences and relations between the “nuclear issue” and the nuclear problem. If the nuclear problem remains unsettled despite the dispelling of the “nuclear suspicion” against Korea, the nuclear threat against Korea will remain unchanged. The root cause of the nuclear evil will remain unremoved, the tension on the Korean peninsula will not be eased fundamentally, and the peace and security of Asia cannot be achieved.

In other words, the United States cannot feel “relieved” even if the “special inspection” she demands is realized. South Korea and Japan, which do not, and are not willing to, understand this, have put every obstacle in the way of negotiations between Korea and the

United States, alleging that the “special inspection” would lead to the improvement of the relations between the two countries. This is quite absurd. The problem can never be solved without due consideration of the order of priority.

Korea does not object to settling the “nuclear issue”, but she cannot accept the unconditional “special inspection”, an unjust forced inspection on her military sites. She cannot put off her underwear for her enemy.

It is only when the hostile relations between the two countries are changed into friendly relations that the nuclear problem, and further the “nuclear issue”, can be solved. This is the meaning of the “fundamental settlement” that Kang Sok Ju mentioned. For this, Korea proposed the way of solving the “nuclear issue” and nuclear problem simultaneously to the satisfaction of both sides. It is the way of package settlement and the principle of simultaneous action.

As a package deal that contains detailed measures for fundamentally settling the nuclear problem and improving the relations between the two countries, the Agreed Framework set the exact time of execution of the simultaneous action by both sides. Both sides agreed on this and so the heads of the two states approved of it, ordered its signing and gave assurance of it. There is no other way than the package settlement. This is why south Korea, Japan and the IAEA could not but welcome the agreement. Although they affirmed the “present and future”, they expressed their dissatisfaction with the verification of the “past” now overdue. This can be said to be a misunderstanding proceeding from the ignorance of the essence of the nuclear problem.

The United States concluded that verification of the “past” is not so urgent if Korea’s “present and future” possibility of “nuclear development” is eliminated. Gallucci did not say without authority when he said confidently that the Agreed Framework contains what can deal with the “concern” for the “nuclear development plan” of Korea in every respect—past, present and future—and it also meets the interests of south Korea and Japan.

By not demanding the absoluteness of the verification of the “past”, the United States obtained a definite promise for the clarification of the “past”. As a party to solving the nuclear problem,

she acknowledged that the fundamental solution of the nuclear problem is the one and only peaceful way to settling the “nuclear issue”.

The “Present and Future” Are More Important than the “Past”

At a high-level Cabinet meeting in April 1994, the United States adopted the policy of settling the issue on the “past” in the course of improving the overall relations between the United States and Korea while giving precedence to the work of “stopping” Korea’s future use of plutonium for the “development of nuclear weapons” over to the finding of how much plutonium it extracted and used for the “development of nuclear weapons”, ie, investigation on whether plutonium was used for military purposes.

It is proper to say that the “past, present and future” of nuclear activities must be clarified in full so as to completely remove the “nuclear suspicion”. The point is when the clarification could be made. Korea maintains that she cannot undergo ad hoc inspection beyond the limits of routine inspection now that she is in a special status of suspending temporarily her authority after her withdrawal from the NPT. She says she cannot undergo inspection aimed at verifying her “past” before her special status is terminated.

Conversely speaking, verification of the “past” can be made whenever it is wanted after the special status is terminated. The United States came to understand and agree with it only after drawn-out negotiations.

In the meantime, the verification of the “past” by the IAEA had already been conducted. During the inspection held in March Korea, in consideration of the US withdrawal of her proposal for the exchange of special envoys between the north and the south of Korea as a precondition for the third round of Korea-US talks, took an exceptional measure of allowing additional inspection of the radiochemical laboratory which she had refused to be inspected until then since her withdrawal from routine inspection. The United States said after the inspection that it cannot be judged to be for military purposes.

Shortly after the inspection, an issue was raised on replacing fuel rods of the experimental atomic reactor with a production capacity of five megawatts.

Korea reported to the IAEA on several occasions that fuel rods should be exchanged as the continuous operation of the reactor would expose it to danger because of the failure to exchange the fuel rods and that a blower went out of order, requesting its presence at the time of exchange. The IAEA asked for her selection and storage method of fuel rods on the condition of its collection of samples. But Korea refused it because it fell in the category of ad hoc inspection. And yet, she promised to place the work of exchanging under IAEA's supervision and store the spent fuel rods so that the organization could examine a sample any time after her special status was terminated. Nevertheless, the watchdog organization insisted on its demand and its Director-General Blix made a rash conclusion on the exchange of fuel rods conducted in the meantime, saying that there was no opportunity to sort out and store the fuel rods and he could not stand security for the nonuse of nuclear materials for military purposes. Subsequently, the situation rapidly went from bad to worse—"statement" of the Chairman of the UN Security Council, "resolution on sanctions" of the IAEA and Korea's statement on her withdrawal from the IAEA.

All these seem quite complicated, but in the final analysis, it can be said to be a war on the time of inspection. Though seemingly negligible, this is an essential matter, because there is a fundamental difference between viewing the verification of the "past" from the point of improving the relations between Korea and the United States (Korea and the United States) and using it as a political pressure or a prerequisite for the improvement of the relations (the IAEA, south Korea and Japan).

Inspection of fuel rods is aimed at, firstly, storing and keeping spent fuel in the cooling pool under the supervision of the IAEA to prevent their use for military purposes (the present and future), and secondly, examining samples to investigate the history of reactor operation and the extracted amount of plutonium (the past).

The fuel rods are still under the supervision of the IAEA by the presence of inspectors from the IAEA, so they can be said to be

guaranteed. As the cooled rods should be disposed of, a definite answer must be delivered quickly.

Next, the whole process of fuel-rod exchange is recorded accurately and according to Korea's General Bureau of Atomic Energy, "the channel of fuel rods and the order of the rods in the channel can be represented any time it is wanted." Therefore, the "past" can be verified to anyone's satisfaction. In other words, verification of the "past, present and future" can be made even today when the fuel rods have been exchanged.

What is important is to give priority to discussion with regard to improving bilateral relations between Korea and the United States and restore Korea to the NPT, thus terminating her special status as soon as possible and creating conditions favorable for verifying the "past".

An Agreement Profitable to Both Sides

During a press conference held on October 18, 1994, after reaching an agreement on the draft Agreed Framework between Korea and the United States, a journalist asked US delegate Gallucci, "Haven't you made an unprecedented mistake of rendering aid scared by Korea's threat of 'nuclear card'?"

He answered that the presupposition of the question itself was wrong.

Amidst high appreciation of the Agreed Framework between the two countries by many people, voices were raised against the agreement and the authorities of the two countries. *Washington Post* described it as an awkward resolution by the US government and a Congressman from the Republican Party said that the crisis was only prolonged; some others said Korea made a fortune through stubbornness and the United States made a heavy concession.

The basis of criticism varies, but they can be divided largely into three; firstly, verification of the "past" is five years overdue, secondly, there is no need to make a concession to Korea that "violated" international laws and thirdly, such a concession will rescue Korea from the doorstep of "collapse".

First, as regards the "past", Korea declared that she had not developed nuclear weapons. In other words, the problem of the "past"

has never existed in Korea from the start and, if any, there is only a difference in views on the amount of extracted plutonium between Korea and the IAEA. If settlement of the “past” is insisted in spite of this, the underlying hostile and mistrustful relations between Korea and the United States must first be removed. Needed therefore is a time for confidence-building.

The time should not be spent to “hide nuclear weapons” or to develop them. As they agreed to give priority to building confidence, verification of the “past” is not a big problem. If Korea refuses to clarify her “past” or tries to develop nuclear weapons, the two countries will relapse into hostile relations in a moment. Then, all the efforts made so far will be wasted. Korea that has tried to improve her relations with the United States for a long time will not let the opportunity slip on its own.

As for the statement on the withdrawal from the NPT, it was an act justifiable by the provisions stipulated in the treaty. It is none other than the IAEA and the United States that made Korea unable to do otherwise. Komaki Teruo, head of the trend analysis department of the Asian Economic Institute, was quoted by *Yomiuri Shimbun*, dated October 29, 1994, as saying, “Originally, there was not an unmistakable evidence that Korea possesses nuclear weapons. As the United States clamoured that ‘Korea would probably have nuclear weapons,’ she must pay for it; it is a different matter with the one of applying sanctions against Iraq that invaded another country.”

Contrary to the expectation of the West, Korea has so far not experienced wavering and confusion in spite of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the East European countries, the end of the Cold War and the death of President Kim Il Sung.

To lay a foundation for settling the problem through negotiations also meets the interests of the West.

Both Korea and the United States sought for the settlement of the “nuclear suspicion” and nuclear problem and approached and understood each other. Although it is said the United States made a big concession, in fact she has lost nothing.

New York Times pointed out that the agreement made a demand to halt building a large-sized GMR, a demand greater than the NPT could make. True, the United States obtained a great “relief”.

Kang Sok Ju said the two sides held serious discussions on important matters for the fundamental settlement of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula; as a result of the studying of the most practical and reasonable method or as logical necessity, a concrete way for improving the relations between the two countries has opened out. This is the greatest fruit Korea picked in her effort to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

The delicate political and diplomatic balance established on the Korean peninsula during the Cold-War days was destroyed with south Korea entering into diplomatic relations with Russia and China, and this created fresh insecurity in Northeast Asia. Worse still, the military tension ran high by the constant nuclear threat against Korea by the United States, intensification of the military and political encirclement of Korea by the United States, south Korea and Japan and fabrication of the “nuclear suspicion”.

Korea had to straighten out this abnormal situation as soon as possible, while the United States that had lost the cause for maintaining tension on the Korean peninsula any longer had to establish a new post-Cold-War “international order” and redress her disgraceful “past” in relation with Korea. The interests and objectives of both countries agreed in principle and the framework agreement came into being.

War or Talks?

The United States achieved a “great historical victory” in the Gulf War and the Bush Administration won a miraculous support, but Hussein still remains as the President of Iraq, his “threat” continuously existing as a troublesome and heavy “burden” on the United States. The military tension was created again early in October when the Iraqi army concentrated on the border of Kuwait. Clinton dispatched without delay huge armed forces including air force, aircraft carriers, marine corps and mechanized units. Iraq withdrew her army in a hurry saying that it was a “usual military exercise”.

By means of this “stimulation strategy”, Iraq made the West European countries and the Gulf countries concentrate their attention on lifting the economic sanctions of the UN. She gained a success in

this strategy. France is against the plan of the United States for creating a no-deployment area in the southern region of Iraq, and Russia and China, too, began to move to lift the sanctions.

Nevertheless, the United States cannot acquiesce in removal of sanctions, nor can she withdraw her troops at once considering the possibility of Iraqi army's advance to the Kuwaiti border. Snyder, head of the political and military department at the US Centre for Strategic and International Studies, warned; the dispatch of the US troops to the Gulf area costs several hundred million dollars; Hussein will continue his play if the West European countries do not enter into negotiations with Iraq; if the United States continues her overseas advance as she does now, the *America* will surely be wrecked by the heavy load of munitions.

The United States is suffering a serious trouble in a dilemma, fooled by Iraq's tactics.

The Democratic Party was utterly defeated by the Republican Party in the off-year election, so it doubled Clinton's trouble as a helmsman.

Snyder also said that the United States should not launch another Iraqi event in any part of the world. When the military tension is aggravated extremely on the Korean peninsula or another Korean war breaks out, the *America* will be wrecked on a rock and sink because of the heavy burden of military expense and a great loss of lives.

Only half a year has passed since the US-led clamour for applying economic "sanctions" against Korea. Korea announced that she would regard any sanctions against her as a military provocation and she would return a war for war and talks for talks. Breakout of another war would have been quite possible if sanctions had been strengthened.

Concerning the Agreed Framework, Jon Wolfsthal, Senior Research Analyst for Non-proliferation Issues at the Arms Control Association, said that it was far better than any armed conflict breaking out on the Korean peninsula before the agreement was reached.

The signing of the Agreed Framework created a condition to avoid the possible worst situation and opened a way to solve any

complicated problems such as the “nuclear issue” by a peaceful way, ie, through talks. Herein lies the great significance of the agreement. People may say that this success is an inevitable result of the historical development, but more exactly, it is the most desirable fruit of concerted efforts of the two sides.

This event must be welcomed by south Korea and Japan, too. A voice, “Why must Japan donate money?” is ringing among the Japanese press, but it is a short-sighted view.

“Japan’s share amounts to approximately 1,000 million dollars and the Foreign Ministry says it is not a grant but a loan, so it would be right to say that she pays a small sum of money for her security,” said Prof. Yoshida Yasuhiko at Saitama University. As he pointed out, it is not a big burden to Japan if the money is spent to dispel the “nuclear suspicion” of Korea and to remove “insecurity factors” in Northeast Asia. During the Gulf War Japan contributed 9,000 million dollars, but she enjoyed no “praise” from the West and her “efforts” to solve the Iraqi question aroused no response. We should call this fact to mind.

An expert on the Korean question in the United States said correctly about the prospects of the agreement. He said that although the LWRs were said to be very expensive, the United States would gain greatly in return if Korea faithfully observed the agreement. Thus the Agreed Framework secures in its content an adequate profit and safety for the West.

War brings no profit and no settlement; it leaves the lasting hatred and antagonism between the two sides. As the Gulf War shows, even the winner cannot solve the problem fundamentally. But peaceful talks, though they require a long time and patient efforts, give many hopeful suggestions and make it possible to find solutions to the complicated international problems.

The Korea-US talks, which had lasted over one year, suggested a way to peaceful settlement—building confidence by way of negotiation, not by confrontation and war—and its unlimited capabilities.

For a Nuclear-Free, Peace Zone

Robert Gallucci pointed out even the blind spot of the IAEA and the NPT regime to stress the validity of the principled agreement between Korea and the United States, saying that many people would not understand, but mass-production of plutonium (by Korea) was not a violation of the regulations of the IAEA and the NPT. This means he recognized that the IAEA or the NPT regime was powerless in the settlement of the complicated problems such as the nuclear question on the Korean peninsula.

This is quite clear when we consider the limitation of the countermeasure of the IAEA against Korea and the fact that the result of the withdrawal of Korea from the NPT was the negotiations between Korea and the United States.

The NPT regime namely aims at the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, but it is nothing but a system that only prevents non-nuclear states from possessing nuclear weapons while conniving at the expansion of nuclear weapons by five nuclear states.

The shortcomings of this system are as follows: firstly, the NPT is a one-sided unequal treaty; secondly, it is unfair and has double standards in its application; thirdly, it cannot exercise restrictions on the non-nuclear states and those which have withdrawn from the treaty; and fourthly, even if the treaty is observed, nuclear weapons cannot be abolished completely, nor can denuclearization be realized.

These shortcomings had already been discussed, but after Korea took a decisive measure for the settlement of the nuclear question, they were made public and revealed clearly. However, there is some tendency to calumniate the significance of the Korea-US agreement.

“There is an opinion that unlike the Ukraine method, the Korea-US Agreed Framework gave the ‘worst lesson’. It means that for the first time the international community witnessed a way of negotiation by which one violates the NPT and stubbornly rejects the inspection of the IAEA, in order to easily take a ‘gift’ such as economic and technical aids or the improvement of the diplomatic relations.” (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 25, 1994.) This is a typical example of slandering. There are also many other complaints against the agreement: “It would be difficult to check if other countries follow the method of north Korea,” “There will appear many countries which would wield the nuclear card to get aids,” “It is an unwelcome

compromise and regrettable instance,” “The NPT has become a mere scrap of paper,” and “It produced another inequality.”

However, all these are one-sided assertions and complaints based on the stand of nuclear states, and they are nothing but an attempt to keep their vested rights, leaving the present shortcomings of the NPT as they are. It means the arbitrariness of the nuclear states, aiming at maintaining the system which forces inequality upon the non-nuclear states. Such an attitude can never settle the nuclear issue of the world.

The Korea-US talks and their agreement is an epoch-making event which opened a new way for nuclear non-proliferation and the settlement of the nuclear problem. Furthermore, it rectified the defects of the NPT regime itself and provided a new possibility of nuclear non-proliferation. It also showed for the first time that the non-nuclear states, the small countries, too, are fully able to get rid of nuclear threat by the superpowers if they make a vigorous struggle against them.

The Korea-US Agreed Framework is the first diplomatic document on the “nuclear arms control” in Asia, the first step towards the establishment of the first nuclear-free, peace zone in Asia.

The observation of the inspection by the IAEA and the NPT regime will not lead to denuclearization. It means, on the contrary, that if one country observes the one-sided obligations, it will become powerless under the nuclear threat. In this sense, there were some difficulties in the negotiations between Korea and the United States, but the US side eventually promised a specified country for the first time not to threaten her with nuclear weapons. It would be right to understand that the United States agreed on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, although she intended to prevent the nuclear armament of south Korea and Japan.

As reaffirmed at the talks between President Kim Il Sung and former US President Carter, the Korea-US talks proceeded on the basis of the Joint Agreement on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and achieved a good success.

“Each side faithfully kept the promise,” said Carter with satisfaction. But the purpose of Korea-US agreement is not in the solution of the “nuclear issue” but in the final settlement of the

nuclear problem; it is not in the unilateral observation of the NPT, but in the seeking of a new nuclear non-proliferation system, in other words, the establishment of a nuclear-free, peace zone on the Korean peninsula.

Fulfillment of the Agreement and Building-up of Mutual Confidence

Korea abided by the agreement for one month since her signing of the Agreed Framework.

As a first step she made a decision to stop the building of the 50-megawatt and 200-megawatt GMRs and withdrew the fuel rods prepared for replacement. Besides, she gave a favorable and constructive response to the Korea-US experts consultation on the safe storage and final disposal of the spent fuel, allowed exceptionally a US delegation to inspect the atomic facilities in Nyongbyon, and reopened negotiations with the IAEA to receive its delegation.

Korea froze the GMRs completely and sealed the radiochemical laboratory which was alleged by the Western side to be a reprocessing facility, placing them under the supervision of the IAEA. Such measures prove that the Korean side fulfilled its obligations faithfully within one month, and that Korea is qualified to demand the US side for the sincere fulfillment of her responsibility.

Within the limits of the NPT regime it is quite legal to operate the GMRs and reprocess the spent fuel, so Korea's measures exceeded the objectives set forth by the regulations of the NPT. Besides, these measures show that Korea fulfilled the first three of the four obligations stipulated in the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula between the North and the South of Korea, which are as follows; (1) prohibition of the test, manufacture, production, introduction, possession, stockpile, deployment and use of nuclear weapons, (2) use of the nuclear energy exclusively for the peaceful purpose, (3) prohibition of the possession of nuclear reprocessing facilities and uranium-enriching facilities, and (4) enforcement of regular procedures and inspections by the North-South Joint Committee of Nuclear Management on the sites which were selected by the other party and agreed by both sides (agreed in 1991

and effectuated in 1992). (See Appendix.)

During the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Clinton said, after meeting heads of state respectively, that the agreement between Korea and the United States opened up the roads to a new era of security and prosperity in East Asia, continuing that heads of the United States, south Korea and Japan expressed resolute support to this agreement. Heads of the three states affirmed their willingness to cooperate for the LWR project.

Nevertheless, the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO--later renamed as Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization), the international consortium which would be responsible for the LWR project, has not yet been ready to be established because of disagreement on its member states, the rate of their share and operation funds.

Worse still, as a result of the off-year election in the United States, the Republican Party has held the majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives; this caused a great difficulty in the fulfillment of the agreement. Ultra-hawkish Senator Helms, who is expected to become chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, openly said that the committee would adopt a resolution, the content of which is first, the United States will not donate money for the assistance to Korea; second, the United States will not allow her allies to give aids to Korea, and so on.

If the conservative hard-liners unprecedently occupy the posts responsible for the diplomatic and defence policy of the Congress and exert pressure, the Clinton government may face difficulties in implementing the Korea-US Agreed Framework.

Anyhow, the Agreed Framework is an official document signed for the first time between Korea and the United States and Clinton assured its implementation by the authority of the President. Moreover, it is an international commitment which the United Nations, the IAEA and the countries concerned welcomed and supported.

When the promise is revoked, the national prestige of the United States will be shattered, and this will lead the two countries to go back to the state before the Korea-US talks, ie, mistrust and confrontation.

6. OFFENSE AND DEFENSE SURROUNDING THE “SOUTH KOREAN-STYLE LIGHT-WATER REACTOR” AND AGREEMENT ON THE REACTOR (April-July 1995)

What Is “Trojan Horse”?

“North Korea called the south Korean-style light-water reactor (LWR) Trojan Horse. This means that she admitted herself to be an aggressor. I think north Korea revealed that she is contradicting herself.” This is what a Japanese journalist said.

Trojan War is a legendary war between ancient Greece and Troy described in a heroic epic *The Iliad* by the Greek poet Homer. According to the poem the Greek allied army attacked Troy for ten years to conquer her, but failed. At last, Greece got warriors into a hollow wooden horse and left it in the field, pretending to desert the war. Using such a trick, Greece conquered Troy. *The Iliad* described Greece as fighting for justice, but in an objective view, she was an aggressor who provoked war.

Similarly, in view of Koreans, the alliance between the United States, south Korea and Japan is naturally equivalent to the Greek allied army, the “international cooperation system” an encircling net against her and the “south Korean-style LWR” “Trojan Horse” to destroy her socialist system from within.

Kong Ro Myong, the south Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that the “south Korean-style LWR” is not “Trojan Horse”, but the fact that the south Korean authorities came up with a nominal “south Korean style” and entreated Americans to call that reactor the “south Korean style” on the condition that they offer money, made Korea doubt that the south was trying to use the “Trojan Horse” scheme. The United States which was in shortage of funds had no words to decline south Korea’s offer. Since then, the words “south Korean style” which had never existed prevailed. It was ridiculous that the words which were not mentioned in the Agreed Framework between Korea and the United States were openly out. Gallucci made a distorted interpretation that the LWRs of 2 million kw capacity meant two

reactors of south Korea based on *Uljin No. 3* and *No. 4*, that the country, which could offer reactors is only south Korea from the view of both funds and technology and that when the Agreed Framework was adopted, both sides understood such a situation in secret and did not mention it in the agreement as “diplomatic etiquette” for the Korean government.

The pressurized LWRs which have been internationally recognized up to date are the product of the Westinghouse of the United States, the *VVER* style of Russia, *CPI* of France, and *Biblis* of Germany, but the “south Korean style” does not belong to any of such kinds. Japan, which has many reactors, does not call their reactors Japanese style and the international community does not recognize them as a Japanese style.

The basic designs and reactor core of *Uljin No.3* and *No. 4* are the products of Combustion Engineering (USA) and their turbines are those of the General Electric (USA), so these reactors may be called the US style. As a result, at the working conference concerning the LWR project held on June 30 and July 1, 1994, between the United States, south Korea and Japan, Americans rejected the export of the south Korean-style reactors, saying that their establishment in other countries is greatly subject to legal and technical restrictions.

But they suddenly changed their attitude, recognizing the “south Korean style” as a fait accompli and forced Korea to accept it. The reason is that first, money can be raised only by south Korea; second, south Korea obstinately calls it “south Korean style”; and third, the United States, too, wanted Korea to “collapse” from within and hoped that “south Korean style” would become “Trojan Horse”.

The Agreed Framework between Korea and the United States dealt comprehensively with the solution to the nuclear question in the Korean peninsula and the way to improve the relations between the two countries. In another view, however, the United States which recognized that she could not bring Korea to her knees by the “policy of force” changed her policy into the “appeasement policy” to make Korea “soft-land”. Imposing the “south Korean style” was the result of the concurrence between the United States which considers that the “south Korean style” is favourable and the Kim Young Sam “regime” which wants “unification through absorption”.

The second reason why the LWRs to be established in Korea should be the south Korean style is that they would make it possible to maintain and expand the south's possible influence on the north.

The construction of LWRs takes 8-10 years. In this period, the capital, technology, materials and many technicians in particular would enter the north from the south.. Agents of "Security Planning Agency" may be included among them. From the view of south Koreans, it would make it possible to disturb the north with which she has long been confronted and take opportunity to establish her domination over the north.

When the relations between the north and the south are aggravated or the south is in a dilemma, the south may threaten the north to stop the construction of the LWRs or withdraw their constructors.

Kondo Shunsuke, Associate Professor of the Tokyo Institute of Technology, said: "From the technological viewpoint, the 'south Korean-style LWR' does not exist. Apparently the 'south Korean style' means that programming of computer and the like needed in the construction of reactor may be offered by south Korea. We can say that the nuclear power station is a great industry in which the different kinds of latest technology are compiled. When south Korea builds LWRs, many technicians and factories which have a contract to offer reactor parts would approach north Korea. This means that south Korea would control the atomic energy market in the Korean peninsula." (*Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, April 17, 1995.)

In the agreement between Korea and the United States concerning the LWR, north Korea made the maximum concession to the United States. Detailed items are not published, but rumour says that first, Russia provides Korea with the LWR that she is to offer to south Korea as repayment of debt; second, on the condition that the United States has charge of the designing of the nuclear core, south Korea may take charge of other basic designs; third, if the United States becomes the prime contractor, Korea is ready to receive south Korean technicians; and fourth, the contracting party must be the KEDO (the international consortium centring on the United States, south Korea and Japan).

The United States, too, was interested in the proposal of Korea

and had a plan in which the US firms work as the prime contractor. Some Americans said that it was not necessary to attach importance to the “south Korean style”. Gallucci also said that if it is the “south Korean style”, there is no need to bother about its name. The Democratic Party, an opposition party in south Korea, insisted that there was no need to care about the name.

However, the south Korean authorities pay all their attention to the name of the “south Korean style”. Threatening Americans Kim Young Sam said, “If the reactor is not named the ‘south Korean style’, we cannot donate even a penny. If we do not donate money, the contract about LWRs will be a mere scrap of paper and the agreement in Geneva will become useless.” Meanwhile, Kong Ro Myong, Minister of Foreign Affairs, blatantly said, “As long as the ‘south Korean style’ is denied and south Korea cannot play a leading role, we have no intention to take part in the LWR project.”

Following this trend, delicate difference began to appear between the United States and south Korea in the understanding and standpoint concerning the reactor. *Wall Street Journal*, dated March 27, 1995, wrote that a discord sprouted between the authorities of the United States and south Korea. South Korea had a doubt whether the United States and Korea would try to give up the “south Korean style”, keeping pace with each other, and whether the former would persuade south Korea to donate money and take all the profit to herself. Worse still, Korea and Japan showed a move to reopen negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations, so south Korea felt more isolated.

Nevertheless, south Korea is resorting to the “south Korean style” because she wants a leading role. In other words, she attempts to use the offering of LWRs as a decoy so as to lead the north by the nose and at last realize domination over the north. She considers that a “leading role” is imperative for this purpose. That is why Kong Ro Myong took a firm attitude, saying that as long as the south Korean Electric Co. does not become the prime contractor from designing to manufacturing, execution and building, the contract cannot be signed.

As a south Korean expert on the south-north question revealed that south Korea exerted all her effort because she wanted the reactor to be the “south Korean style” (*Mainichi Shimbun*, March 28, 1995.).

the “south Korean style” was a political term she devised to realize her political purpose to “destroy” the north from within.

Defective Facility Whose Safety Is Not Guaranteed

The offensive and defensive battle between Korea, the United States, south Korea and Japan centring on the “south Korean-style” LWR is not confined only to the style of LWR, but a symbol of the long-protracted north-south confrontation, as well as a question connected with the present and future relations between the north and the south of Korea. Therefore, the north denies the “south Korean style” stubbornly and the south sticks to her gun.

As the issue of the “south Korean style” started from the political purpose to destroy the north, it is natural that the north rejects it.

In addition to this political purpose, there is another reason why the north rejects it. South Korean nuclear reactors cause many accidents, so their safety is not guaranteed. Apparently because they are a mixed bread which is now under construction based on the design of a reactor imported 20 years ago, *Uljin* No. 3 and No. 4 have many fatal defects: first, the rate of meltdown of the reactor core is four times higher than the international standards; second, durability is as short as 30-40 years; and third, the body of reactor and its turbine are in the stage of trial product, and since it is expected to commission partly from 1998, there is neither experience of operations nor actual export record.

But, the United States, south Korea and Japan hold that they, the offerers, that is, the KEDO, have the right to choose the LWR style. This is not reasonable. Misunderstanding comes from the word “offer”. Korea buys the LWRs in the name of a loan, not receiving it free of charge. It is not reasonable that the seller forces the buyer to buy what the latter dislikes. The seller must naturally respect the buyer’s opinion.

“The LWRs are not offered by any grant-type aid or favour. Our country receives it on the condition that we will repay. We, the buyer, have the right to choose the style. The irrational insistence on the ‘south Korean style’ is equivalent to giving rice cake to those who

want to eat noodle.”

As Han Song Ryol in the Korean mission to the UN said, Korea has the right of choice.

Who Is to Be in Charge?

The marathon Korea-US talks held in Kuala Lumpur ended at last, issuing the Joint Press Statement on June 13, after a long dispute about whether the “south Korean style” and the “leading role” of south Korea should be written on the document or not. In the long run, the dispute was settled without placing the name “south Korea” on the document. But, a side-by-side comparison shows a subtle difference between the English and Korean versions of the statement.

The point in question is the phrase which defines the role of programme coordinator. In the Korean version the phrase is written, “A US firm will serve as programme coordinator which supervises overall implementation of the LWR project by assisting KEDO,” but in the English version, “A US firm will serve as programme coordinator to assist KEDO in supervising overall implementation of the LWR project.” (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 14, 1995.) In other words, in Korean the supervisor of the LWR project is a US firm, the programme coordinator, but in English the KEDO.

The KEDO is an international consortium centring on the United States, south Korea and Japan and among them south Korea bears most of the money. If the KEDO supervises this project, it means that south Korea has a say.

However, if the programme coordinator supervises the project, south Korea has no say. The KEDO is trying to select the south Korea Electric Co. as the prime contractor. In this case, too, as long as the programme coordinator supervises, it would be nothing but a “contracted being” of the US firm.

As a point at issue had been whether the “leading role” of south Korea would be recognized or not, the expression of this phrase is of great importance. It was expected that this expression would bring about a conflict. But, unexpectedly south Korea is keeping silence at present. Be it a natural result or not, the “role of south Korea” faced double or treble obstacles. The attempt of south Korea to use the

provision of LWRs as her anti-north card was totally destroyed.

First of all, the LWR style was clearly recorded in the document as the advanced version of US-origin design and technology. According to the Joint Press Statement, the style may be the same as *Uljin No. 3* and *No. 4*, but it does not mention that it refers to the *Uljin* style of south Korea. It means that a US firm may change the design of the advanced version of “Model 80” of the US firm CE (the present ABB-CE) to suit the reality of Korea. Therefore, the LWR style is nominally and virtually a US style.

First, the “south Korean style” has never been recognized internationally. Since *Uljin No. 3* and *No. 4* are the south Korean version of the US “Model 80”, the “south Korean style” has never existed.

Second, the press statement stipulates that the KEDO is under US leadership and that the United States will serve as the principal point of contact with Korea for the LWR project and US citizens will lead delegations and teams of the KEDO as required to fulfil this role.

According to the statement, south Korea cannot behave at her own discretion in the KEDO. In general, whether the programme coordinator or the KEDO supervises, the role of south Korea is not important.

The recent Korea-US talks reaffirmed that the one and only contracting party for the LWR project is the United States which should be responsible for the whole of the project, playing a leading role. If south Korea disturbs the LWR project even a little, Korea can lodge a protest with the United States at once. If the United States does not execute the contract Korea can press her for carrying it out. On the condition that such rights are vested in Korea, both sides came to the recent agreement. It would be right to say that both sides reached accord because the United States accepted all the demands of Korea, rather than to say, as in the editorial of *Tokyo Shimbun*, June 15, 1995, reads, “The recent agreement was made as a result of clearly defining the dignity and profits of the north and south of Korea.”

The Meaning of Two Personal Letters

Concerning the LWR question, US President Clinton sent two

personal letters; one is the letter of assurance to General Secretary Kim Jong Il, sent when the Agreed Framework was adopted between Korea and the United States in October 1994, and the other is the letter to Kim Young Sam, sent when the recent Joint Press Statement was published between these two countries. But the contents of the two letters are totally different and their roles and significance, too, are different.

The letter to General Secretary Kim Jong Il promised to deliver alternative energy (heavy fuel oil) by exercising the authority of the President. In other words, it reaffirmed that the United States is responsible for providing oil.

Why did Korea demand the letter of assurance?

According to the letter, in case the LWRs are not completed not because of Korea, but some other reasons, the United States herself bears the responsibility of offering and completing them. In this way the letter prevents the third party (south Korea) from interfering with the implementation of the contract. It means that the north checked beforehand the rash attempt of the south to realize the “south Korean style” and her “leading role”.

In the first item of the statement, the United States reaffirmed that the letter of assurance continues in effect. The letter of assurance and the press statement which clarified the US style and the leading role of the United States accord with each other and have no contradiction.

The letter of assurance is a victory of the diplomatic policy of Korea and at the same time, a defeat of south Korea. An editorial of *Yomiuri Shimbun*, dated June 15, wrote in wonder, “President Clinton praised General Secretary Kim Jong Il before the statement was published and sent a personal letter to him as a subject does to the King.” The editorial is certainly reasonable.

The other letter of Clinton is different from the former. In this regard there are two questions.

First, the letter reads, “The reactor to be referred to as pointed out in the commercial contract adopted between KEDO and the prime contractor is *Uljin No. 3 and No. 4*.” This is quite different from the expression “the advanced version of US-origin design and technology”. The press statement did not mention “the reactor to be

referred to". The letter goes against this fact.

Second, the letter reads, "A US firm takes part in the LWR project as a contracting party of the south Korean company, the prime contractor." This is also different from the content of the press statement which clarifies that the United States should be responsible for the whole of the project, whoever supervises the project.

After all, this letter is a desperate measure of the United States to appease south Korea's anger at the fact that the "south Korean style" and her "leading role" were not mentioned in the press statement, while aiming to reach accord with Korea at any cost. So it can be said that the United States, which had been in a dilemma between the north and the south of Korea, made another error of exposing herself to complaints of both sides for "double-dealing".

However, it is obvious that in the settlement of the nuclear and LWR questions, the document that the two parties concerned signed is more significant than the letter one party sent to the third party. Plainly speaking, the letter means that south Korea was forsaken by the United States.

Some people consider that the recent talks were not those between Korea and the United States, but those between the north and south of Korea. Precisely speaking, one party was Korea and the United States and the other party was south Korea. When the day of the conclusion of the LWR agreement was near at hand, the popular opinions in America were that "The name of the LWR is not important," "The stubborn attitude of south Korea is the direct reason for the United States to fall into a pit," "The United States must make a fresh start, disregarding south Korea," and "Allowing south Korea to supervise the provision of the LWR is a shame on the United States." The US administration, too, exerted pressure of different forms on south Korea to give up the "south Korean style".

The US attitude is that if nuclear freezing in Korea could be maintained, any compromise matters little. What is most important for both Korea and the United States is to observe and put into effect the Agreed Framework. In fact, between Korea and the United States, there was no fundamental difference in their opinions. The obstacle was south Korea. The problem was how to persuade south Korea. In this sense, the three weeks of marathon talks were indeed the time

needed to persuade south Korea.

As expected, south Korea aired her dissatisfaction. Her distrust ran very deep. She struggled desperately to the last. But the talks ended up “excluding south Korea”. The ambiguous letter of Clinton could not help anything. It was a choice placed on the edge of precipice. Sure enough, a sharp criticism that it was “betrayal of the United States” burst out from the south Korean authorities. Through the recent agreement on the LWR, south Korea became more isolated and her distrust in America increased. The “international cooperation system” between the United States and south Korea began to break, its root shaking.

Korea and the United States Moving towards the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

Linton, research associate at the Centre for Korean Research, Columbia University, who visited Korea tens of times, said that the improvement of the Korea-US relations is a prerequisite for the improvement of relations between the north and south of Korea and that there is nothing to lose for south Korea, continuing that in order to create a dialogue between the north and south of Korea, the relations between Korea and the United States must be improved first.

This remark is contrary to the allegation of the United States, south Korea and Japan that the negotiation between the north and south of Korea is a prerequisite for the improvement of Korea-US relations. Which is right?

Since October 1994, when the Agreed Framework was published between Korea and the United States, the relations between the two countries have newly developed from hostile relations to those of trust. This may bring a conclusion, “The essence of the Agreed Framework is to allow north Korea to maintain her system for a while.” (*Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 16, 1995.)

South Korea which did not want it resisted, using every possible means. Her last resort was the “south Korean style” and her “leading role”. We can consider it as “the scramble for leadership for establishing order in the Korean peninsula.” (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 14, 1995.) Therefore, the negotiation went through a hot controversy,

but it ended in south Korea's defeat.

“The true motive of north Korea is to improve her relations with the United States and Japan and make up for the shortage of food and heavy oil, the energy it can duely obtain afterwards, rather than to build the LWR which would take over ten years from the start of the project to completion. North Korea will leave a vague question for the LWR project and use it to maintain her system.” This analysis of Ri Song U, a professor of Sogang University, south Korea, reflects the present distrust and hostile relations between the north and south of Korea. However, what is most important for the north is to better the north-south relations finally, by improving her relations with the United States and Japan, so as to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone and reunify the country.

On the part of the north, improving her relations with the United States and Japan is the foundation for reunifying the country on an equal footing with the south. At present, the south seems to be “neglected”, but to reunify the country peacefully, not by a war, improving the relations with the United States and Japan even by making a detour is a prerequisite for the north for developing the relations between the north and south of Korea.

Kim Young Sam is afraid that he would fail to take initiative in achieving reunification, “unification through absorption”. The recent agreement on the LWR project clearly showed that it would be impossible.

The United States established at last diplomatic relations with Vietnam. Twenty years have passed since the Vietnam War ended, but the period is not so long as that of division of the Korean peninsula. Since Korea is divided into the north and the south, it would not be easy for the United States to establish diplomatic relations with the north. But nobody can check the historical trend in which the Cold War ended. In the United States, a demand for developing the US-Korea relations is daily increasing, disregarding the opinion of south Korea. The successful settlement of the LWR question is stirring up this trend.

The provision of the LWR will take as long as 10 years. In this period Korea and the United States would develop their relations in different fields based on the bridge of the LWR. The agreement on the

LWR became a springboard for establishing a new order in the Korean peninsula. The Korean peninsula is moving vigorously towards a new era.

III. MATURING POSSIBILITY OF THE REUNIFICATION OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH THROUGH FEDERATION

5. A MAGIC—THE NORTHERN IRELAND STYLE

The 20th century, a century of violent events and wars, is ending. It was an unprecedented century which witnessed so many regional disputes and great worldwide wars for territory, nation, religion, ideology, resources, national interest and so on, producing a lot of war victims. The high growth of civilization and technology brought about “affluent life” to the people; at the same time, the rapid increase of the power of weapons killed incomparably greater number of people than the wars in previous centuries. It caused mass destruction, claiming even civilians. The emergence of unimaginably powerful weapons which destroy a city in a moment, the appearance of atom, hydrogen and neutron bombs and biochemical weapons threaten even the existence of mankind. This is why the 20th century is called a “century stained with blood” and a “century without a victor”.

However, amid the ceaseless wars and arms race, mankind drew a lesson and displayed their resourcefulness, albeit to a little degree, to survive. Furthermore, approaching the end of the present century, the world began to move from confrontation and hatred to reconciliation, cooperation, coexistence and coprosperity. The typical examples are the conclusion of the Cold War, the restoration and independence of nation-states, the dialogues and efforts for nuclear disarmament and the reduction of mass-destruction weapons, and the realization of the historical reconciliation between Palestine and Israel. The questions which had been considered impossible to be settled, are being unentangled one after another. Indeed, man plays a role of importance. Making the 21st century a peaceful century of coexistence and

coprosperity depends largely on creating as many paradigms of reconciliation as possible.

The reconciliation negotiation for the settlement of the Northern Ireland question which came to a historical agreement on April 10, 1998, was one of such great movements. Whoever had imagined the agreement would be achieved? It was a miracle, indeed. A miracle does not mean an impossibility. It is achieved by the maturity of general situation, the arrival of an opportunity and the sincere efforts. The settlement of the Northern Ireland question proved this truth again.

The dispute in British Northern Ireland started from the 12th century. England tried to conquer Ireland, but failed. Amid such attempts, in the period of the absolute monarchy, the first plantagenet King Henry II launched a war to conquer Ireland and established domination by the Anglo-Saxon race. As a result, England forced Irish people to follow the Church of England, made Ulster province the royal fief and emigrated English people to this region.

It caused the repeated resistance mainly of the Celtic race that emigrated to this island before Christ. After many riots were put down, Ireland was converted into a colony of England and suffered oppression and poverty. In the 17th century, England emigrated her people on a large scale to Ireland and strengthened her rule. The people who came there by the forced settlement are the ancestors of the present Protestant inhabitants. Entering the 20th century, riots continued in Dublin and other parts of the island, so England divided Ireland into the north and the south. The south gained independence in 1937 and became the Republic of Ireland of today.

However, the northern part, where the Anglo-Saxons (English Protestants), the ruling circle, comprised 60 per cent of the population, remained as an English territory without gaining independence in antagonistic relationship between Roman Catholics and Protestants.

As the structure of inequality and discrimination between rich Protestants and poor Roman Catholics became solid in 1960, the civic movement was activated among Roman Catholic inhabitants and their conflict with the ruling circle or Protestant population was aggravated. With the occupation by the British army in 1969, the Irish Republican Army launched an armed struggle. This caused the Northern Ireland

dispute and brought about a bloody sectarian conflict of three decades claiming 3,200 lives.

The conflict, aggravated by Protestants insisting on remaining as a part of the United Kingdom with Roman Catholics demanding union with the Republic of Ireland, was not a religious conflict, but a 900-year-long national conflict, a conflict between the conqueror and the conquered. The United States where 38 million Irish-Americans are living sides with the Roman Catholics and the confrontation between the East and the West in the Cold-War era kept up the armed conflict between the two sides. The continued bloody dispute entangled and deepened the hatred and interests between the two parties, so people considered that their reconciliation would be absolutely impossible.

But, the two parties and the countries concerned reached an agreement on peaceful settlement and made a start towards historical reconciliation. Their agreement is as follows: first, a new Northern Ireland Assembly will be founded, which will establish autonomy and exercise administration and legislation of the area; second, the new assembly will organize the “South-North Council” with the Irish government in the form of transcending the frontier to deliberate on matters concerning the whole of Ireland; third, a “conference” of the representatives of the governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland and the assemblies of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales will be functioned; and fourth, the Republic of Ireland will amend the item of her Constitution which claims her possession of Northern Ireland.

Indeed, it is like a magic. It can be called an intelligent attempt to weaken the significance of “territory” or “frontier” so as to remove the confrontation caused by “reunion spirit”. There is a criticism that it is nothing but a delay of the “reunion” question which is the root of grudge and conflict, but it is significant in that both sides recognized that this is the only way to overcome the pent-up hatred and conflict and reached an agreement.

The peace proposals based on the agreement were approved by the referendum held in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland on May 22, 1998. 71.12 per cent voted for the proposal and 28.88 per cent against. According to the opinion poll conducted by *Guardian*, 73 per cent of the residents of Northern Ireland said they would vote

“Yes”, 61 per cent of the inhabitants of the Republic of Ireland favoured the amendment of the Constitution and 80 per cent of Britain supported the agreement. This survey was almost correct.

In the following months, incendiaryism and retaliations were frequently perpetrated by the die-hards of the two sides. The confrontation was aggravated after a demonstration of Protestants, with the result that on August 1 a bomb exploded in a bus in Banbridge, Northern Ireland, injuring 35 people and on August 15 a terroristic bomb attack took place in the centre of Armagh causing 250 casualties. But, with the growing enrageament among residents, the radical terrorist group could not but declare a “complete cease-fire”, being afraid of their isolation from the people.

Anyhow, a great trial started for peace challenging the “reunion spirit” by weakening the meaning of “territory” which had been absolutely recognized as the range of the rule of a state and the meaning of “state”. The Northern Ireland style was an epoch-making event in that it showed the way to settle different disputes caused by history and national conflict. It will be highly appreciated that it has brought about a bright future and hope for the world in the end of the 20th century.

6. THE FIRST TRIAL TO OVERCOME THE DIFFERENCE OF THE SYSTEMS BY MEANS OF “NATION”

The realization of peace by dialogue, the Northern Ireland style, suggests many things and encourages the efforts to end the territorial division of the Korean peninsula.

Needless to say, the division of Korea into the north and the south and the confrontation between them are different in essence and structure from the Irish question. The conflict between the north and south of Korea originated from the colonial rule by Japan and after liberation she was divided by the US occupation of south Korea. This division became solid by the Korean War, a proxy war of the Cold War between the East and the West. Outside forces are the fundamental factor of the national division. This is a national problem,

but, in fact, it is a national conflict caused by the differences of ideas and social systems. The “reunion” question in this case where both sides are the same race lies not in the nation, but in ideology and faith.

All big countries surrounding Korea—Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union—have been concerned with the division. Herein lies the complication of the question and difficulties for its solution.

However, everybody knows that while the division has been continuing for over half a century, the Korean nation has not remained idle, being controlled by big countries. Whenever the reunification trend was rising, various “incidents” were caused, big powers interfered with them and distrust increased between the north and the south, making the situation go against reunification. Nevertheless, if both sides are pessimistic about reunification considering it impossible and have a feeling of frustration and futility, it may help the perpetuation of the division. It may take a long time, but north-south reunification will be achieved without fail. Reunification is by no means a pipe dream. There are two explanations about this question. Those are internal and external factors in and outside the Korean peninsula.

With regard to the internal factor, the north and the south of Korea already reached the level of the Northern Ireland style. There is a tendency to underestimate this fact in that the Korean question has not been tried, but it must be correctly appreciated. We should not forget that it has been discussed at the same level as the Northern Ireland style.

This is explained by the historical agreements achieved by the north and the south, that is, the North-South Joint Statement published on July 4, 1972, and the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange between the North and the South adopted in 1991.

The July 4 joint statement proclaimed the agreement on the three principles of reunification—*independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity*. These principles are the fundamental principles even today, when one-fourth of a century has passed since its publication and will be the same in the future.

First, because it is the national conflict resulted from the division by outside forces, the reunification must be achieved by the

Korean nation itself rejecting them; second, because the division was perpetuated and the hatred and conflict were aggravated by the Korean War, a fratricidal war, the reunification must be realized not by another war but by a peaceful dialogue; and third, a fundamental solution must be found by the united efforts of the nation. Such mutual understanding resulted in the three principles of national reunification.

Based on these principles the north-south agreement explained in detail the stand and view for reunification. What is important in this document is that both sides promised “to remove the political and military confrontation for the achievement of national reconciliation, for the prevention of invasion and conflicts by the armed forces, for the realization of détente and for the guarantee of peace, to realize many-sided cooperation and exchange for the promotion of the common interests and prosperity of the nation, and to make concerted efforts to achieve peaceful reunification, admitting that the relationship between the sides is not the one between the countries but a special one formed temporarily in the process of advancing towards reunification.”

It is of epochal significance that both sides recognized the “special relationship formed temporarily, not the one between the countries”. It is because both sides had competed for a long time to be approved by the international community and if they resort to such competition, there would be nothing but one way by which one party brings the other to its knees and absorbs it. We can consider that these two documents elucidated a way to overcome hatred and conflict, a way as intelligent as that indicated in the Palestine-Israel peace agreement or the Northern Ireland agreement. This is the product of the resourcefulness of the nation and the power of national will for national reunification. The point at issue is how both sides will put the items of the agreement into practice. In particular, what must be mentioned here is the proposal to establish the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo (DFRK) made by the north in 1980 and the 10-Point Programme of the Great National Unity of the Whole Nation for the Reunification of the Country presented by President Kim Il Sung in 1993.

The former was advanced as the reunification programme based

on “One nation, one state, two systems and two governments”. The main content of this proposal is that the north and south should have their governments for the regional autonomy and the unified government formed with the representatives of both sides and representatives of overseas nationals should work as the supreme decision-making body, and that the DFRK should be a neutral country. It clarified for the first time the way for both sides to coexist tolerating the ideas and systems of both sides, on the condition of recognizing the existence of south Korea. This proposal is more epochal than the Northern Ireland style in that it explains the image of the state in a more detailed and clear way. In the present circumstances the reunification by federation is the only way to achieve north-south reunification peacefully.

Some people may say that it deters the “reunion spirit” like the Northern Ireland style, but the special character of this proposal is that it aims at achieving great unity on the common denominator of the nation recognizing different kinds of “reunion spirit” and considers it reunification.

Going one more step forward, the latter emphasizes “Patriotism and the spirit of national independence, coexistence, coprosperity and common interests”.

President Kim Il Sung appealed that the fear of invasion from both south and north, the ideas of prevailing over communism and communization should be dispelled, and the north and south should believe in each other and unite. It is an effort to make different political systems and ideas, that is, socialism and capitalism, coexist using patriotism and national unity as a binder, remove the division and conflict in the same race and build up mutual trust.

7. THE CHANGES AND FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Structure of Peace and Security

For studying the outside factor, we must consider the fact that

the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula has fundamentally changed. It is connected with the fundamental change of the world situation. It means the end of the Cold War. Until the 1980s, there was little possibility for the realization of the aforementioned north-south agreement and the proposal of federation, but entering the 1990s, the possibility is daily increasing with the collapse of the Cold-War system. So it is progressing as an inevitability of history.

We can say that the adoption of the Northern Ireland peace agreement, too, was an inevitable product brought about by the world situation on which the end of the Cold War exerted positive influence. With the cessation of the Cold War, the East and the West stopped their support to and intervention in the Protestant group and the Roman Catholic group. The world started a continuous advance towards reconciliation and peace. International criticism on armed conflict and bloody terrorism has become severe and the people's doubt and weariness about insoluble conflicts exerted influence.

The fact that Irish-American Bill Clinton became the President in the United States where many descendants of Irish immigrants are living and the fact that the Democratic government which had been closely connected with the Irish immigrants considered the solution to the conflict to be a primary diplomatic task, worked greatly in this question. President Clinton invited the leader of the Sinn Fein Party, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, to Washington to pressure him into a peaceful solution, personally visited Northern Ireland and dispatched Mitchel, chairman of the Roundtable Conference and former Democratic senator, as peace coordinator.

What is more important is that Blair's Labour Party, directly concerned in this question, took power. It exerted great influence on the adoption of peace agreement. The successive conservative governments never tried to face the Sinn Fein Party. Former Prime Minister Thatcher stuck fast to the stand that "we will not talk with the terrorists." Former Prime Minister Major relied on Protestants to obtain majority in his support because he was weak in the parliament. He was too vacillating in carrying out his policy to find a correct solution. But, Prime Minister Blair from the Labour Party which is on friendly terms with the Democrats of the United States expressed his opinion on confidence-building by both sides of the conflict

immediately after his inauguration using the majority backing. He asserted that the negotiation excluding the Irish Republican Army is meaningless and at last realized the Sinn Fein's participation in the Roundtable Conference.

Other factors that influenced the Irish question in combination were the increasing international prestige of Ireland as a result of her economic boom, an attempt by European countries to find a new way for existence, that is, the move towards the merger of countries and the development of local autonomy, and the increasing consciousness that the remains of colonialism which run counter to history must be eliminated.

However, it cannot be explained that only the situation surrounding Northern Ireland was favourable. In addition, the question was not settled by mere chance of history. It must be considered that it was an inevitable event resulted from the trend of a great change of history, the end of the Cold War. The pulling down of the Berlin Wall broadcast worldwide on TV screens might have given a great impact and courage to the Irish and British people.

But, what is the state of affairs in the Korean peninsula? The United States which had stubbornly ignored Korea's appeal for dialogue accepted her proposal for negotiation and improvement of relations after the end of the Cold War. The United States had threatened Korea by fabricating the "nuclear suspicion", but at last signed the historical Agreed Framework. The United States recognized in principle the existence of Korea to which she had been hostile and the existence of her socialist system and provided formal assurance against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. She also promised to normalize diplomatic relations. In the process of negotiation, she expressed her support for the peaceful reunification of Korea. Such a reconciliation policy means the fundamental change of the US policy towards Korea and it is attributable to the change of the meaning and significance of the Korean peninsula in view of the world strategy of the United States following the end of the Cold War.

Korea-US relationship has not been improved up to date as the United States has not relaxed economic sanctions against Korea, but confidence-building between them has advanced considerably. The Agreed Framework is significant in that it dissolved the only Cold-

War structure and helped both sides start forming a new structure for peace.

The provision of the LWRs to Korea may be a guarantee for the maintaining of peace structure in the Korean peninsula, because the international consortium, the KEDO, will exist in the construction period and the two countries would not return to the hostile relations.

In case of the four-party talks, too, the fact that the continuation of the talks itself would assure the structure for peace is more important than what would be discussed and decided in the talks. Apparently, there is no need to get optimistic or disappointed temporarily regarding the result of the talks, because the existence of the talks itself would contribute to the security of the Korean peninsula. The United States, too, said that the discussion of peace by the representatives of four countries immediately means the best measure for confidence-building.

In other words, the security and peace in the Korean peninsula are guaranteed by double or treble system in addition to the Agreed Framework, so the condition for the north-south dialogue and reunification is maturing from outside, we can say.

However, the four-party talks are not a ground for north-south dialogue. South Korea hopes that the north-south dialogue would be held in a form that the United States and China complement and guarantee it, but as far as the question of Korea-US relations are not settled, the north-south relationship cannot advance any further. Therefore, the north-south dialogue has only to go on independently based on the already reached accord. The principal parties of the four-party talks are not the north and south, but the north and the United States. The question of the change of the position and character of the American troops stationed in south Korea, the question of replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty and establishing a new peace mechanism and the like are primary issues.

Needless to say, if a progress is made in the settlement of these issues, it would complement and guarantee the north-south dialogue, but if the primary question is confused with the secondary question, it will destroy even what is possible. Korea's stand in the four-party talks is not that "the north and south shall not hold negotiation," but that "the north-south dialogue should be convened in other place."

Kenneth Quinones, a researcher of the US Institute of Peace, said; the four-party talks must suggest positive conditions to north Korea on which the withdrawal of the US troops from south Korea is possible and help its realization; on the condition that north Korea takes actions to reduce military threat, the United States should respond to the call for dissolving the nominal UN Command or the Military Armistice Commission, the remnants of the Korean War; if the policy of blockade and oppression continues as in the past, a durable peace cannot be achieved.

The Existence of Korea as the Keyman

The change of the allied relations between the Western countries brought about by the end of the Cold War made them all change their policy orientation or re-examine their policies. *Drifting Allies* (Hunabashi, *Iwanami Shoten*) narrates this dramatic real-time change. It seems that one who had long enjoyed peace, sitting cross-legged in the Cold-War days, lost his position with the change of the situation, and with his “enemy” disappearing, one goes far so as to cast a doubt on his ally.

In particular, a fierce power game is going on surrounding the Korean peninsula and one is probing another’s intention. Interestingly and unexpectedly, however, Korea is the keyman in it. For example, Korea and the United States are in honeymoon, south Korea, jealous of it, is putting a spoke in the US wheel, the US-south Korean relationship becomes worse particularly in the days of the Kim Young Sam “regime”, and Japan is only reading others’ faces. It is a comedy, indeed. How to approach Korea and what kind of relations one should have with her define the diplomatic attitude of the countries surrounding Korea and it is shaking the allied relations between the United States, Japan and south Korea.

America’s acknowledgement of Korea follows the way of recognizing her and this inevitably weakened her alliance with south Korea in inverse proportion.

This is proved by the fact that there is an opinion that the hard line of south Korea against the north is an obstacle to the settlement of the Korean question. (Larry Niksch, specialist in Asian affairs at the

Congressional Research Service.)

The US acknowledgement of Korea experienced retrogression and vacillation, but the structure of the Korea-US relations will advance in a spiral way instead of retreating.

What is most important is that the United States, China, Japan and Russia do not want the sudden change of Korea and unanimously want peace and security of the Korean peninsula. Even if it aims at soft-landing Korea, the fact that the neighbouring countries are moving to create peace on the basis of the recognition of the system of Korea and her existence had been inconceivable in the Cold-War era. Furthermore, the neighbouring countries except Japan are establishing their diplomatic strategy in anticipation of the future when Korea is reunified.

A high-ranking official of the US government said that the day will surely come when the Korean peninsula is reunified and the important mission of the Marine Corps will be finished. (*Drifting Allies.*)

An official in the US Department of Defence said that the reunification of the Korean peninsula may be achieved considerably earlier than expected. He quoted Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, former head of the planning department of the US Pacific Command, who predicted that if the Korean question is settled peacefully or the country is reunified, the existence of the US troops in East Asia would be changed from the magic number of 100,000. (*Ibid.*)

A US specialist on south Korea said that after reunification, the purpose of the US-south Korea alliance for deterring Korea will be cancelled and this situation would make it imperative to put a definition again of the Japan-US alliance whose purpose is to ensure regional security, adding that such a process has already started. (*Asahi Shimbun*, February 13, 1998.)

As mentioned above, the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula after the Cold War has changed dramatically and the condition to put the north-south agreement into effect is created. It is no exaggeration to say that the peaceful reunification of the north and south has been scheduled. This is an indication that all are moving towards reunification. It ceaselessly moves, spreads and increases. The maturing internal and external conditions for the peninsula

provide an ample possibility for the reunification as an inevitable event after the Cold War, and earlier than expected. In order to prove that it is not an unreasonable illusion, it is necessary to study the present political and economic circumstances of the north and the south of Korea.

8. THE WAY CUT BY THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH

The Present Situation of the North's Economy

Everybody knows that both the north and south of Korea are in the worst economic situation. The north is suffering a severe shortage of food as the result of successive natural disasters. Owing to the shortage of fuel and foreign currency, she is not in a position to maintain the previous economic level. According to the statistical data she presented to the UN, the gross national output decreased to 50 per cent for three years after 1993.

But, it is almost impossible to calculate and assess her socialist economy by the Western yardsticks. Of course, Korea's economy is in the stage of that of a developing country. In particular, following the disappearance of the socialist market, the economy grew worse. The situation is serious owing to the shortage of foreign currency and energy like oil and electricity, the reduction of the rate of operation of factories, and the decline in the overall economy but Korea's economy is unexpectedly unshakable as her basic policy has been self-reliance of the economy and self-sufficiency of food. The rate of food self-sufficiency in 1986 was 22 per cent in Japan and 55 per cent in south Korea, but 99 per cent in Korea. The rate in Korea might have been reduced afterwards owing to the natural disasters. In addition to this, she was not in a position to import grain. If Japan and south Korea had experienced such a situation, they might have been in a more miserable state.

In his treatise, Han Ho Sok, head of the Unification Research Institute, living in New York, emphasized the need to appreciate the socialist economy of Korea in a fundamentally different way on three

conditions; first, the economic activity of Korea is not accessible from outside, second, the economy of Korea must be assessed not by the gross national product, but by the gross social product which means only material production excluding the value coming from the service and commercial sectors, the value that occupies a great proportion in capitalist society, and third, it is necessary to take into account the various social benefit, ie, the secondary distribution of the national income, like the provision of food, dwelling houses and fuel, free education and medical care and the supply of daily necessities.

The *Report on the Korean Peninsula Policy* published in May 1998 by the Council on Foreign Relations, which exercises influence on the establishment of the foreign policy of the US government, pointed out that there is virtually no precedent in history of a state which existed after suffering deficit for eight years, but Pyongyang stays alive. The *Report on the Reality of North Korea* published by the foreign-aid section of the US Department of State explains the answer as follows:

The north Korean people has a history of boosting advance based on the spirit of self-reliance. It would be wrong to underestimate their will and ability with which to overcome continuing crisis. We must take into account that in the protracted worsening hardships and isolation, the north Korean people and government have developed complex countermeasures, assimilating themselves to any circumstances.

A correct analysis of the socialist economy of Korea is impossible by capitalist statistics and calculating methods.

Needless to say, the economic problem of Korea is serious. But, in view of the fact that the political system, the greatest factor that moves Korea's economy, is strong and functioning, we can hold that Korea has an ability and possibility of being rehabilitated once the Western countries eliminate their political, economic and military pressure on her.

The Present Situation of the South's Economy

In south Korea, too, the economic cycle reached the lowest level entering the latter half of 1997, owing to the successive bankruptcies and worsening management of the conglomerates and large

enterprises. Foreign debts of south Korea amount to 150,000 million dollars. As a result of the unprecedeted financial crisis, at the end of the same year the south Korean economy reached just before payment suspension which means the “nationwide dishonour”. She could escape this crisis temporarily by obtaining loans of 57,000 million dollars from the IMF and other international financial organizations and Japan, but the economic stagnancy has continued afterwards and the unemployment has been increasing rapidly.

It is a fact that the financial crisis, the economic crisis of Southeast Asia, exerted influence on it, but the unanimous opinion points out that the economic crisis of south Korea resulted directly from the defective economic structure, the failure of the Kim Young Sam “regime” to find a solution and its wrong policy. The strain was caused by the economic system centring on conglomerates, which, on a poor basis, aimed at growing bigger enjoying special monopolistic benefit from the development banks and rushed towards diversification thoughtlessly.

Amidst the union of politics and the economy, the egoistic management on the part of conglomerates was overlooked and the banks under the control of the government financed them recklessly without examining their solvency or standing guarantee for the transparency of the financing. They made up for deficiency by relying on foreign banks. As a result, financial bodies went so far as to bear large amounts of bad bonds and foreign liabilities which exceeded their solvency. The day has come when the south Korean economy should repay the cost of the rule-of-thumb estimation and aleatory management, by which financial groups were settling accounts, misappropriating funds. In a nutshell, it means the collapse of the bubble economy of south Korea.

But, recently it is looking up, though slowly. As its basic conditions are comparably steady, a solution can be found if the structural reform is carried out by taking bold and detailed measures including the reorganization of conglomerates.

Inevitability of the Economic Cooperation between the North and the South

Paradoxically speaking, the above-mentioned economic crisis and hardship which the north and the south are suffering simultaneously make both sides inevitably follow the one and only road to hasten the improvement of the relationship between them.

The reason is that first, the theory of reunifying the country by “absorbing” the north is practically impossible at present. Frequently talking about the “collapse” of the north, Kim Young Sam “regime” repeated provocative words and actions which meant the “unification through absorption” based on economic power. When President Kim Il Sung passed away, he did not offer condolence and, worse still, repressed those who wanted to express condolence, making the north-south relations worst. The “reunification cost” increased at every calculation and reached 1,000,000 million dollars, far exceeding the reunification cost of Germany. South Korea which is on the verge of bankruptcy cannot appropriate such a colossal sum of money. The theory which had been loudly propagated disappeared of itself so simply.

Second, after the demise of President Kim Il Sung, Western countries and south Korea were unanimous in considering that the “collapse” of the north was a matter of time, but Korea is still maintaining political stability, far from “collapsing”. They thought that the frustration of socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would be extended to Asia, but the situation has not developed as they expected. The differences in the process of establishment between the Soviet-style socialism and the Asian-style socialism and in their social systems produced the result. In particular, the Korean-style socialism is more solid than expected. The south, too, could not but recognize that the easygoing hope for the “breakdown” of the north is not realistic. Considering her present condition, the south may try, by all means, to escape an incident of the system of the north collapsing suddenly. Apparently she wants to direct all her efforts to rehabilitating her economy. To this end, they will naturally try to relax confrontation at the least and move towards reconciliation and coexistence at the most.

Third, the south came to understand that mutual economic cooperation and assistance is the best way for both sides to survive in the international community. The necessity of north-south economic

cooperation has long been recognized and brought some tangible results. For the north, the south is a big trade partner. Nevertheless, economic cooperation has not developed smoothly because it became a victim of the political situation of the north and south and the control of exchanges and investment has been intensified. However, the economic crisis of the north and south does not tolerate the theory of principle. As symbolized by the financial Big Bang, the international economy entered the era of a great competition of jungle, called liberalization and market economy. In order for both the north and south to overcome economic crisis and survive in this great competition, economic cooperation is essential. In this sense, the north and south have to share their lot in economic affairs, too. To say in addition, the south Korean people resisted the financial support from the IMF, which actually means putting south Korea under its control, saying that it is the “second national humiliation”, the “economic trusteeship” and “deprivation of economic sovereignty”. The emergence of “chauvinism” under the pressure of large-scale unemployment, heavy taxation and a sudden rise in price attracts attention as being coincident with the aspirations for attaching importance to the nation. The south Koreans’ feeling about the United States is a mixture of “thanks to her” which has extended a helping hand, though not satisfactory, to south Korea for fulfilling the role of the “anti-communist wall”, and “antipathy against her”, concerning her reconciliatory attitude towards the north “in disregard of the alliance between the United States and south Korea” and the extremely strict demand of the IMF for opening the south Korean market. Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State of the United States, criticized that the policy of the IMF strangles the countries with a high unemployment rate, encouraging nationalism in Asian countries.

Favourable Political Conditions for the Resumption of North-South Dialogue

Favourable conditions for reopening the north-south dialogue are maturing even in the complex situation surrounding the Korean peninsula and the different political circumstances of the north and the

south.

First, the three-year mourning period ended in Korea by 1997 and leader Kim Jong Il was acclaimed as the General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea. In 1998, he was re-elected Chairman of the National Defence Commission. General Secretary Kim Jong Il clarified that he would follow the lines set forth by President Kim Il Sung and it is the same in case of the reunification policy. The north defined as the three charters of national reunification the July 4 Joint Statement, the proposal to establish the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo and the 10-Point Programme of the Great Unity of the Whole Nation for the Reunification of the Country and is trying to settle the reunification question on the principle of national independence.

Second, a new "regime" was established in south Korea. In his inaugural address, the south Korean authority advanced three principles concerning the north; first, he would not tolerate armed provocation; second, he does not want "unification through absorption"; and third, he would start reconciliation and cooperation from the possible spheres. And he declared that he was ready to exchange special envoys for the execution of the north-south agreement and simultaneously to respond to a summit if the north demands it. Giving up "unification through absorption" means that he recognized for the first time the possibility of living together with the north, by reversing the "unification policy" of the successive military "regimes" and Kim Young Sam's "civilian government". Considering the fact that he attaches importance to the north-south agreement and his attitude to its implementation, he is different from the Kim Young Sam "regime".

Among the "one hundred tasks" set by the "government" transferring committee before assumption of office, seven tasks are "the preparation for the foundation of the improvement of relationship by the implementation of the north-south agreement, the promotion of economic cooperation on the principle of separation of the economy from politics, the reunion of separated families, the promotion of unification policy which enjoys the support of the people" and so on. In the item of "separation of the economy from politics", he advanced the policy for realizing exchange and cooperation in the economic and

humanitarian fields even before the reopening of the political dialogue. For tourism, he proposed to develop jointly Mt. Kumgang and other places as “free tourist resorts”. For the humanitarian aid, he expressed his intention not only to offer food aid as had been done by the Red Cross, but also to support the north with improved seeds, farming materials and agricultural technology. This is the expression of his unusually soft, detailed and colourful will for the improvement of the north-south relationship and thus it deserves attention.

Third, the north shows a positive attitude towards the resumption of north-south dialogue.

Kim Yong Sun, Secretary of Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, said on April 6, 1998, “The north-south dialogue must be held as soon as possible to hasten the implementation of the north-south agreement.” On December 12, Kim Yong Nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, told the European Parliament delegation on a visit to Korea; “We want to open a new political dialogue with the south. The withdrawal of the US troops from south Korea is an important matter, but it is not a prerequisite for dialogue.” This is very suggestive. In addition, when the north criticizes the south, she does not name the south Korean authority. It is noticeable. As if responding to this, the south Korean “government” began to show its intention to approve the improvement of the Korea-US relationship before the settlement of the north-south relations. It is important in that it changed the policy of “simultaneous parallelism”, so this created a possibility for hastening the north-south dialogue.

Fourth, the neighbouring countries welcome and support the move to improve north-south relations and reached accord in their interests for the first time. The US Department of Defence said that the interests of the United States and China were the same in that they did not want conflict and confusion in the Korean peninsula. It seems that Japan has not yet established the basic strategy in her policy towards the Korean peninsula, but anyhow she is trying to follow the trend of peace. However, the liquidation of the past and normalization of diplomatic relations with Korea are pressing the Japanese government as a thorn in the side. Russia, too, is trying to find an opportunity to have a part in the establishment of the peace system in the Korean peninsula. In this way, in spite of differences in their views, they are

unanimous in that they want the implementation of the north-south agreement and they approach the reunification issue leniently.

The plan of “the declaration of six countries for peace and stability of Northeast Asia” presented by the south Korean authority is not possible to be realized in the near future, but Northeast Asia will usher in the era that necessitates security between countries. For the settlement of this issue, too, reconciliation and coexistence of the north and south of Korea has become a prerequisite.

The Detailed Moves for Exchanges between the North and the South

Such changes of the north and south approach gradually to the same frequency and both sides are responding to each other. This has already been expressed in different speeches and moves. The year 1998 alone shows many instances of such moves.

On February 15, the north announced that she would accept from March 1 the requests to help find the addresses of separated families living at home and abroad.

On February 20, Pak Yong Su, Vice-Chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland of the north, who participated in the reunification conference of scientists from the north, south and abroad held in Beijing, expressed an expectation for the present south Korean “government”, saying, “The change of the ‘government’ is a good event and would present an opportunity for our nation to part with the past and advance towards independence, reconciliation and détente. Such an opportunity does not always present itself for our nation.” This is clearly a signal of the desire for the resumption of dialogue. Paek Yong Chol, Chairman of Unification Forum of south Korea, responded to this, saying “The south and north should use the economic crisis faced by both sides as a chance for national coexistence and cooperation.”

On February 18, one week before the change of the south Korean “regime”, the joint conference of the political parties and organizations of the north held in Pyongyang declared that they were ready to hold negotiations with their counterparts in the south to open the way to reunification and adopted letters to the President of the

National Congress for New Politics and other persons.

On March 27, the fifth red-cross talks held in Beijing reached accord that the south would offer 50,000 tons of wheat, cooking oil and salt calculated in maize equivalent by the end of May, on condition that the north allow the International Red Cross to supervise their distribution.

On the same day, the south Korean authorities made a decision to alleviate control positively when enterprises invest capital in the north and respect the independent judgement of businessmen on the principle of separating the economy from politics and to drastically simplify the procedures.

Entering April the “Unification Board” of south Korea approved the plan to establish a joint management farm of 1,500 hectares in a cooperative farm in Rajin-Sonbong economic and trade zone to cultivate crops and raise pigs. This is the first north-south cooperation in the agricultural sector. In this joint farm 8 million dollars will be invested in 20 years. The “Unification Board” also approved the request of the Korean Nation Welfare Funds to build a pharmaceutical factory and run a hospital in Rajin.

On April 6, Secretary Kim Yong Sun said, “It is said that south Korea will promote cooperation and exchanges on the principle of separating the economy from politics. If it started truly from the purpose for national reunification, we will deal with it broad-mindedly without regard to their forms.”

The vice-ministerial north-south talks reopened in Beijing on April 11 after the suspension of three years and nine months came to a “rupture” without overcoming a discord of opinions concerning the problem of fertilizer aid and separated families, but it does not mean the rupture of north-south relations as happened in the Kim Young Sam’s era. The south Korean chief delegate said, “The south and the north have the same opinion in that they should continue the talks, and the result of the current talks does not mean a rupture. It is equivalent to the time out in a sports game.” Instead of laughing or crying at the result of an event, it would be necessary to have a long-term view of the north-south dialogue gradually developing as if ascending the spiral stairs. The report that the representatives of the north and south who had a severe argument in the day drank wine together at night

and sang Korean folk songs side by side shows that such a supposition is not the result of a simple, optimistic observation. In particular, entering 1999, the “Unification Board” of south Korea pointed out that the south was changing her policy toward the north on the principle of “non-simultaneity” and “non-equivalency”, instead of “reciprocity” that demand guarantee for immediate repayment, and trying to include fertilizers in the list of humanitarian aid presupposing no concession.

On April 13 according to the south Korean Yonhap News Agency, in the policy coordination meeting, the “government” and the ruling party of south Korea adopted such measures as the expansion of visits to the north by businessmen including the leaders of big enterprises and economic bodies, the allowance of the lease and deposition of the idle facilities of the south in the north, the abolition of the limit of every investment to 1 million dollars, and the change from the present way of allowing a few categories of business to the system of forbidding a few types of industry.

On April 25, an international air route which passes through the territorial sky of the north and south of Korea was opened and an airliner of the south Korean Air Lines passed the sky of the north for the first time.

On May 2, the art troupe *Little Angels* of the south visited the north for art performance.

On June 8, different social organizations of the north formed the National Reconciliation Council.

On the same day, Jang Yong Sik, president of the Electric Co. of south Korea, said, “Preparations are being made to connect the power lines between the north and the south which have been cut since May 1948,” and expressed an intention to supply surplus electricity to the north.

On June 13, the south announced such measures of relaxing restrictions as abolishing the permission system for exporting production facilities and approving the import of books from the north on condition.

On June 16, Jong Ju Yong, honorary president of the Hyundai Group, visited the north with 500 head of cattle, and an agreement was made on the tourist development of Mt. Kumgang and the

building of a factory by the Hyundai Motors.

On June 18, the south approved as part of north-south cooperation the development project of the International Maize Foundation which planned to cultivate maize of superior strain on an experimental basis in the north.

On July 8, the north started broadcasting letters which the separated families in the north sent to their family members in the south.

On August 15, the south Korean authority proposed to run the north-south joint committee and organize the north-south permanent negotiation on the minister or vice-minister level.

On August 18, the “Unification Board” of south Korea announced to simplify from September 1 the procedures from the approval system to the application system, when members of separated families of 60 years and over want to visit the north.

On October 30, General Secretary Kim Jong Il had talks with Jong Ju Yong, honorary president of the Hyundai Group, on a visit to the north.

On November 3, the Hangyore Unification Culture Foundation, a non-governmental organization of the south, visited the north to hold a joint concert.

On November 10, the Samsung Group of the south adopted a policy on expanding south-north economic cooperation and announced a decision to create a big electronics complex in the north.

On November 18, Mt. Kumgang was opened for the tourists from the south.

On December 15, Jong Ju Yong paid a visit to the north and agreed to build a large industrial area on the west coast.

On December 30, the Hyundai Group published that over 10,000 people made a tour of Mt. Kumgang.

Some of these facts show that the figures of personnel and material exchanges between the north and the south are very high. According to a report by the Institute for Unification Education under the “Unification Board”, the south Koreans who visited the northern half of Korea in 1998 amounted to 3, 231 (except the tourists of Mt. Kumgang), whereas those who visited the north in 9 years from 1989 to 1997 numbered 2,408. Such a tendency may rise in future.

9. REUNIFICATION THROUGH FEDERATION FOR COEXISTENCE AND COPROSPERITY

As is expected, this radical development of north-south contacts and dialogue is substantially melting the frozen wall between the two sides. However, this is not believed to proceed smoothly. The mutual mistrust rooted in the confrontation and hatred that has lasted for over half a century would not be removed overnight. This is because the basic attitudes of the two sides towards dialogue and reunification are different from each other to a considerable extent.

First, even if they want to promote economic cooperation, the differences in their economic systems and methods would arouse troubles, dampening the enthusiasm of the south Korean businesses for investment. Their venture into the north may arouse anxiety that a great number of workers in the south, where unemployment is a serious problem, would be laid off and the south's economy would become empty, retaining only its name. There may be temporary retrogression. But in the long run, the south Korean economy will be revitalized and the north and the south will follow the road to coprosperity. Highly possible is that the development of north-south economic cooperation will play the role of vitamin and bring about a turn in revitalizing the south Korean economy in crisis. As for the north, she can introduce technology and capital of the south, the same nation, free from apprehension, for it will give a booster shot to her stagnant economy. If the rich natural resources of the north are supplied to the south at a low price and on a steady footing, the south will earn enormous profits. And if the south Korean goods are transported to China, Russia and Southeast Asia via the north including the Rajin-Sonbong area, their prices will be reduced. Both sides can also develop new projects in cooperation. All in all, if both sides coexist and further achieve reunification, they will become a country with a population of 70 million and its economic power will surely take an important place in Northeast Asia.

Next problem is that the two sides have different concepts of

reunification. In 1993 Kim Young Sam proposed the “doctrine of unification through three stages”—the “stages of reconciliation and cooperation, north-south commonwealth and reunification into one nation and one state”. The present chief executive of south Korea has insisted from the 1970s on his own “doctrine of unification through three stages”, the stages of coexistence and exchange, confederation and reunification. Although both doctrines sound similar, they are fundamentally different in their contents. The former advocates north-south commonwealth and the latter confederation. But in 1999 he said he would “not deny confederation”, taking a step backward. Some people interpret that his stand was influenced by the widespread understanding among the Opposition that the north is not a “partner to cooperate with on an equal footing”, but an “object to be saved”. They say the opposition figures were disappointed in socialist system after the fall of the Soviet Union and East European countries. The opinion is, in other words, that a commonwealth, recognizing two Koreas, can be tolerated, but a confederation, aspiring to one Korea, will be impossible. Furthermore, whereas the north considers the formation of a federal state as reunification, the south advocates that as commonwealth or confederation is, to all intents and purposes, a transitional stage, complete reunification is the ultimate objective. Herein lies the greatest difference. If the establishment of a federal state is not recognized as reunification, it follows that reunification will never be accomplished. To aspire after complete reunification that aims at integration of not only the territory and nation but also systems is to put reunification aside as something infeasible at the moment and avoid its implementation. How the reunified federal state would become integrated over a long period of time is a matter to be handed over to the coming generations. This is because the problems like the position of the autonomous governments of the north and the south and treatment of the diplomatic right and command of the military, the important problems that define the character of the reunified country, are decided by the ideals and concepts of reunification.

Some people would worry about the “reunification cost” the south would have to bear when reunification through federation is achieved. Unlike the case of complete reunification of east and west of

Germany, in the case of federation, the original way of Korea, the “reunification cost” will hardly arise if the integration of currencies is not enforced impetuously. A matter calling for prior settlement is to revitalize and strengthen the economic constitution of the north and the south through economic cooperation. It is possible that north’s economy will be activated through the maintenance and further promotion of such cooperation even after the realization of reunification through federation. In other words, economic integration can be promoted in the course of studying it according to the circumstances after the territory, state and nation are reunified. The south Korean authority frequently says that he does not wish for early reunification and will gradually promote reunification after realizing exchanges and cooperation. If this is aimed at overcoming the economic crisis in south Korea, he must move in the opposite direction. His aide once said; “When the north falls, the south will follow suit. So we must coexist with her.” If this is true, they should scrupulously examine the north’s proposal for reunification through federation and hold substantial discussion with the north to direct their efforts as soon as possible to reunifying the country through federation of a form agreeable to both sides, a form that does not incur any loss to either of them.

Ri Tong Bok, member of the power transferring committee in south Korea, said, “Reunification is difficult to achieve unless communism recedes and market economy appears in the north and she tolerates liberal democratic system of the south. Reunification is a waiting game. What is more important at the moment is the administration of division than reunification.” If south Korea maintains this stand, the north-south relations will never be furthered. Now is the time to move, not to “wait”, to make efforts for overcoming division for peace, not to “administer division.” Needless to say, the efforts should be orientated to reunification through federation that ensures coexistence and coprosperity.

The south Korean authority’s nomination of Kang In Dok, a notorious conservative hardliner, as minister of the National Unification Board was soon revealed to be a barrier in the vice-ministerial talks between the north and south, in which the north expressed a feeling of rejection and distrust. This was an expression of

the north's rejection and distrust of Kang In Dok who took charge of south-north talks. The north's demand for dismantlement of the "Agency for National Security Planning" (the present National Intelligence Service—Tr.) and abolition of the "National Security Law", which defines the north as enemy, is none other than sharp questioning of the present south Korean authority's real attitude towards the dialogue. It is too clear that one cannot coexist nor attain prosperity together with one's enemy. The nature of the coalition government, treatment of Kim Jong Pil and replacement of the presidential system with the cabinet system will also exert a great influence on the resumption of the north-south talks.

The south Korean authority often says, "but for the US troops in south Korea and Japan, the present stability and balance of power will be destroyed at once. The American military presence in south Korea is an absolute prerequisite for the stability and peace in Northeast Asia."

If the Korea-US relations are improved and a peace treaty is concluded between them, the meaning of the US military presence in south Korea will surely be changed. The United States basically admits that if her troops are to remain in the Korean peninsula temporarily after Korea's reunification, their nature and position have to change to those of a "peacekeeping force". Conversely speaking, this means that the insistence on the present position of the US troops in south Korea will prove an obstacle to the north-south talks and to the effort for reunification. The south Korean authority should sincerely discuss with the north the problem of the country's reunification from a standpoint of revolutionizing the status quo, a standpoint of national independence, not of maintaining the status quo.

As mentioned above, it can be said that though there are some obstacles, knotty problems and negative elements, the internal and external situation and conditions for Korea's reunification have matured. If the north and the south miss this chance, their reunification will be almost impossible. The world is focussing its attention on how the north and the south of Korea would make use of these conditions, the last chance for them, to achieve national reunification in the early 21st century.

The continuing division of the country is a shame for the entire Korean people. They will surely accomplish their national reunification; the force and boundless possibility for it are in the nation. If they advance for reunification with a great ardor, determination not to miss the capital chance, presumably the last of its kind, and faith and resourcefulness of the nation, the door to reunification will be opened without fail at long last.

Let me assert once again: the reunification of Korea is neither a dream nor a miracle but the inevitability of history.

In the wake of the “Pachinko scandal” of 1989, threats and outrages were committed against the students of the Korean schools in Japan throughout Japan. Korean girl students there go to school in the national costume of *chima* and *jogori*. As they could be recognized as Koreans at the first glance, the girl students were the main target of outrageous acts, their national costume being torn by knives. For this reason, it was called a “*chima-jogori* incident”. Severe criticisms were raised within the Japanese society as well as the Korean residents in Japan, and these outrageous acts stopped as if suppressed by the condemnation.

Ten years have passed since then. But such acts, large and small, have been committed against Koreans on several occasions. Large ones are those of “nuclear suspicion” in 1994 and the “ballistic missile” racket in 1998, which were characterized by brutality and extremity. Apparently as poisoning was “in fashion” in Japan, pernicious threatening phone calls and letters were sent to the Korean schools; “The water tower of the school is poisoned by potassium cyanide” and the like. Girl students had the backs of their hands cut by knives; and bottle grenades were thrown at the headquarters and Kanagawa Prefectural office building of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (an organization of Korean residents in Japan supporting the north). In the midst of outrages, the hall of the Chiba Prefectural headquarters of the organization was burnt and in the building a 42-year-old man named Ra Hun, who was on night duty, was found burned to death. He was hit by a blunt weapon on the back of the head, cut by a knife across the face and abdomen on a dozen spots and strangled. In view of this brutal way and the fact that he had not been hated by others, the case does not look to be a mere

robbery or arson. Because the criminal is still at large, there is no knowing whether the case is related with the “ballistic missile clamour”, but the tragic incident gave a shock to Koreans in Japan.

However, the press circle remained silent to the incident and the Japanese society did not stir up public opinion about it as it did before. Even if Korea test-fired a ballistic missile over the airspace of Japan, there is no reason why Koreans in Japan should be bullied. After Korea made public that she had launched a man-made satellite, outrages against Koreans in Japan became more violent, far from stopping. It cannot but be concluded that underlying the outrages is the feeling against Korea and her nationals sweeping the Japanese people. On December 17, 1998, a rightist stabbed Hirayama, governor of Niigata Prefecture, on the cheek. It is reported that he shouted at that time, “Why do you allow *Mangyongbong* (Korea’s cargo-passenger ship sailing between Korea and Japan—Tr.) in?” This reminds one of the proverb, “He who hates Peter harms his dog.” Prevailing among the Japanese people is an abnormal attitude not to understand Korea.

The feeling against Korea that had made inroads into the psychology of the Japanese people and been accumulated persistently by the help of various “suspicions” about the country exploded instantly with the clamour about the “suspected kidnapping of Japanese” and “ballistic missile launch”. Even if most of those, who committed violences, are related with rightist groups or have certain ideological backgrounds, it seems that hatred against Korea is widely spread and ingrained in Japan.

But dispute or war produces only hatred and tragedy. Almost all disputes have started from misunderstanding. Have the relations between Japan and Korea and between the Japanese and the Koreans residing in Japan not advanced even a single step, in half a century since the Second World War, from those between the injurer and the injured or those between the side that despised and discriminated and the side that suffered? Yes, they have. The relations have made a great advance thanks to the continuous efforts of both sides. Symbolic of this is the time when the great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake happened; things like massacre of Koreans that had been committed nearly 70 years ago at the time of the great Kanto earthquake did not take place

this time and instead, touching scenes of Koreans and the Japanese helping each other were witnessed.

For all this, an unidentifiable, giant strength is apparently aggravating and distorting the relations between Korea and Japan. I wrote this book to identify this strength. It will be no exaggeration to say that underlying my intention is indignation against those (either authorities or state) that attempt to alienate Japanese from Koreans.

When I was writing this book, the United States and Britain made an air raid on Iraq. It is said that the greatest “threat” and unforgivable “enemy states” of the West are Korea and Iraq. Is this true?

Dennis Halliday, one of the last two UN humanitarian coordinators in Iraq, resigned in October 1998 in protest against the tenacious sanctions by the UN. He said: the international community is killing the Iraqi people ceaselessly; before the Gulf War, Mr. Hussein had a lot of money invested in social infrastructure; Iraq had a best public health system in the Middle East; its communications and transportation means were in good order; he even made it a system to send excellent students abroad to educate them.

It is not my intention to speak in favour of President Hussein, who invaded Kuwait. But it is necessary to judge the Iraqi problem on the premise that the United States made remarks that resulted in exciting Iraq to invade Kuwait and that the photos of oil-soaked seabirds were shams.

The Japanese mass media did not remain silent on the air raids of the United States and Britain. They made cool analyses and criticized the sudden raids in many cases. However, it is felt as if the Japanese government, mass media and people have now lost even the last, small portion of objectivity towards Korea, their neighbouring country. They are so sensitive to the word “Korea” that they frown and do not hide the feeling of displeasure at the mention of it. A large number of them deride and despise the Korean people who are living through a serious shortage of food in economic difficulties under the socialist system, instead of giving any thought to how they are braving out the difficulties. From when did they begin to do so? Isn’t it from the time when they watched on TV the falling of the Berlin Wall, or when they witnessed the collapsing of socialism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe?

The post-Cold-War world is not dominated by capitalism alone but space time in which socialism and various concepts of value and ideologies exist and prosper together. For this, we should not be tempted by the emotions produced by the image implanted by others, but make efforts to understand, recognize and reconcile with each other.

It is apparent that the Japanese people feel it difficult to get an understanding of Korea for lack of information as she does not provide the West with information about her. Nevertheless, they should not be easily amenable to suspicions and manipulated information which lack evidence and foundation, nay, which can be analyzed to be full of contradictions if we give some thought to them. It seems many Japanese people are easily taken in by barbarous tricks and manipulated information.

We, men, act, collecting information and judging everything. False information may lead one to commit murder. If a piece of information is too well-wrought, or suspicious somewhere or unilateral, one must find time to ascertain whether it is true or not. This should be all the more so in the extremely information-oriented society of today, in which all things, be they human relations, goods, politics or diplomatic relations, are easily decided by propaganda, ie, manipulated information based on image-making strategy.

The Korean peninsula is in a vortex of fabricated information, indeed. We must not forget that the Korean peninsula is still in a state of war. In this situation, “suspicions” of various kinds pop up, most of which are linked with Korea. We must first throw doubt on this fact, I think.

At the end of 1998 it was reported by the mass media that it seemed the south Korean authority would make public that the ANSP (Agency for National Security Planning and the present National Intelligence Service) had been responsible for the crash of the plane of KAL (the south Korean Air Lines). The November 1998 issue of *Mal*, south Korean monthly, raised many questions and contradictions under the title *Mysterious Crash of KAL Flight 858* and asked for reinvestigation of the accident. Then, why has the accident, whose investigation was concluded 10 years ago, become a point under discussion now? This is because the “theory of Korea’s performance”

the West put unilaterally is full of inconsistencies and, first of all, no wreck of the plane or human corpse has been discovered.

It is uncertain whether the south Korean authority will announce the truth or not. If it is revealed that the ANSP (the former Korean Central Intelligence Agency) was responsible for it, the possibility will get greater that most of the suspicions against Korea are fabrications.

The Japanese press that has relayed much of the releases by the ANSP and the Japanese government that has boycotted the negotiations for the normalization of Korea-Japan relations mainly on the plea of the “kidnapping of Japanese” must be called to account. How will the matter develop?

Diplomacy is not decided by emotion alone. The basic objective of modern diplomacy is to accomplish cooperation, coexistence and coprosperity between countries, and its success is to reach a negotiated compromise. Sometimes it becomes a serious diplomatic game requiring political cards, but the side that grows emotional loses the game. If a country goes to dispute or war with another country, the worst confrontation, the country is a failure in diplomacy.

A joint meeting of the authorities on foreign relations and national defence of the Japan Liberal Democratic Party was held on September 1, 1998, during the period of “missile clamour”. It is reported that at the meeting measures were discussed to freeze the assets of Koreans in Japan and prohibit their remittance of money to Korea, and some participants even claimed that Chongryon was a hostage. Subject to the existing laws, these measures were not carried out. It looks Japan did not know that the measures she applied against Korea could have invited a war. Apparently the Japanese people do not still reconsider their government’s rash applying of sanctions like suspending the raising of money for the KEDO which cannot be called sanctions.

Professor Maeda Yasuhiro of Kitakyushu University said, “Even if the Japanese people regret ‘the summer of 1998 when they strayed from the normal state of mind’, it will be like coming a day after the fair. Stupid people produce a stupid government. The foundation for reconciliation and coexistence with the Korean peninsula cannot be laid until the Japanese people realize that they cannot have a government higher than their level.”

The Japanese government and mass media, as well as people should restore reason and make once again a correct observation, analysis and judgement of the situation on the Korean peninsula so as to build up favourable relations with Korea and the Korean peninsula before it is too late. This is my heartfelt wish, as a Korean residing in Japan and a man who loves both Korea and Japan and is desirous of their reconciliation and good-neighbourliness. I will be happy if this book can help readers improve their analysis and understanding of the situation on the Korean peninsula.

I am much obliged to Shinko Hajime of Shakai Hyoronsha for his advice on compiling this book.

IV. KOREA'S ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC AND REUNIFICATION STRATEGY

4. A “REVOLUTION IN POTATO FARMING” AND KOREA-US REUNIFICATIONS

Significance Tantamount to the LWR Project

The US State Department made public on June 25, 1999, the final report on the field inspection of the underground facility in Kumchang-ri, Korea.

The report concluded that there was no evidence that Korea was violating the 1994 US-Korea agreement. The report clarified that the facility was an empty tunnel whose excavation had nearly been finished, its scope was too small for a nuclear reactor or a fuel-reprocessing facility to be installed and there was no trace of any machine or equipment being installed there. It judged that the possibility that Korea had intended to build it as a nuclear facility could not be ruled out but at the moment it cannot be used for the purpose.

James Rubin, US State Department spokesman, said that the inspection team inspected every corner of the area and could not gather evidence that Korea had attempted to cover part of it.

This means the “suspicious underground nuclear facility” turned

out to be “false”. This is what had been envisaged before. Then there may arise a question as to what was the suspicion kicked up from August 1998 supported by “detailed evidence”. But I will mention here the adroitness of Korea’s US policy and its profundity.

The racket was a fuss the United States made in order to “reexamine” the Korea-US Agreed Framework including its abrogation. The United States had signed the agreement, presuming that Korea would “crumble” sooner or later, and resorted to delaying tactics, procrastinating about the performance of her obligations. Nevertheless, Korea did not crumble. Faced with this new situation, the United States came up with the “Kumchang-ri suspicion” so as to save herself from the dilemma of her own making and exert a new pressure to bear upon Korea. The “Taephodong fuss” seemed to have been helpful to the US pressure on Korea.

However, the joint statement issued on March 16, 1999, reads that the two sides reaffirm the Korea-US framework agreement, that Korea allows the United States to make an inspection of the underground facility in Kumchang-ri several times and that the United States will take measures for improving her political and economic relations with Korea. In this way Korea won an overall victory in diplomacy.

It can be explained first by the fact that the United States could not drive Korea into a corner and instead reaffirmed her positive stand towards the implementation of the agreement, though she had expressed her intention to annul the agreement, and second by the fact that she could realize her inspection of the facility not by means of the diplomatic and military pressure but through the invitation by Korea, ie, through conciliation and friendship, not through pressure and confrontation, to remove the suspicion upon the other party. The result is quite contrary to the original intention of the United States.

This is identical with the course and result of the first “nuclear suspicion” during which Korea, by using the suspicion to her advantage, made the United States recognize her system and make promise that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against her and offer LWRs to her. Korea prevailed herself of the second “nuclear suspicion” and achieved certain successes in improving her relations with the United States.

Noteworthy among the large-scale food aid the United States

agreed to offer Korea is her cooperation with the “revolution in potato farming” which Korea is pursuing.

This is entirely a success of Korea’s US strategy. Korea takes as her first and foremost diplomatic objective the improvement of her relations and reconciliation with the United States, a party responsible for the division of Korea and her greatest political and military adversary. This is because the economic development of Korea, security on the Korean peninsula and, furthermore, reunification of the nation cannot be realized unless reconciliation has been achieved between Korea and the United States.

Before and after the collapse of the Cold-War structure, Korea has made an effort to improve her relations with the United States. As mentioned before, she made use of cruel political and military pressure like the “nuclear suspicion” to her own advantage and resorted to every means to involve the United States, which is delaying the implementation of the Agreed Framework, in the Korean question. To be exact, it is not that the United States has been involved in the Korean question on her own initiative, but Korea has induced her to be involved in the question.

The LWR project is a typical example. When negotiating for the settlement of the “Kumchang-ri issue”, Korea even suggested turning the facility under “suspicion” into a civilian facility like a Korea-US joint-venture plant or office.

What is her real intention? It seems the view that Korea’s tactics aimed at not only avoiding inspection but also making the United States lift her sanctions by instituting a joint venture is formidable, and that if the first joint venture is inaugurated, she would propose normalizing relations with the United States, her highest diplomatic objective (*Tokyo Shimbun*, February 5, 1999.) is correct. This proposal has not yet been realized, but as an issue beyond the expectation of the United States, it can be fully guessed that Korea indicated the United States a course she should follow for improving relations with her.

The US agreement on helping Korea’s “revolution in potato farming” will possibly have a significance tantamount to the LWR project.

Simultaneous Solution of Energy and Food

The United States announced on March 22, 1999, that she would supply 200,000 tons of food to Korea, which is suffering a continuous shortage of food, clarifying that 100,000 tons of it is for the cooperation of potato cultivation conducted jointly by the two countries and it is the first direct aid she offers Korea.

One month later, ie, on April 22, the US Agency for International Development announced that it reached a final conclusion in Pyongyang with Korea on the detailed pilot programme for supplying potatoes for relieving the food crisis in Korea. The agreement reads that the aid would be realized between the two countries, not going through the channel of the World Food Programme, and the United States will supply Korea 1,000 tons of potato seeds and, until the programme gets under way, 100,000 tons of potato as food.

This is identical with the way of supplying LWRs by 2003 and, as a substitute fuel until then, 500,000 tons of heavy oil every year. The supply of potato is of greater significance and advantage for Korea in the sense that she can obtain food supply than the LWRs, a project that is not sure when it would get commissioned.

The south Korean newspaper *Hangyore Sinmun*, dated April 22, 1999, said that along with the US government, a joint team involving eight US civilian organizations will participate in the aid project and “two agricultural specialists and nine food-distribution monitors, 11 in all, will visit Korea and set about increasing potato production in ten farms in Kangwon Province. The civilian organizations will appropriate one million dollars for the potato seeds of 1,000 tons.” It continued; “This is the first time for the US civilian organizations to take part in the agricultural development of the north full steam. So far, the civilian relief organizations have confined themselves to supplying food and medicines. With the participation in this project by the north’s government officials and farmers, including the Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Institute and management authorities of farms, it will be promoted on a wide scale as a joint project.” The newspaper quoted a specialist participating in this project as saying, “If a comprehensive plan is formulated with the assistance from the Asian Development Bank and other international organizations, this model project will develop as a ‘small-scale Marshall Plan’, marking

an important turning-point for the agricultural and economic development of the north.

It would be advantageous for the United States to help Korea become self-sufficient in food rather than to continue with the limitless food aid. As for Korea, the political advantage will be greater than the economic advantage that is directly related with the increase of food production.

Undeniable is the fact that the difficulties now facing Korea's agriculture and economy are largely attributable to the US economic sanctions against the country. With the collapse of the socialist market, Korea began to feel strongly the economic blockade of the United States and the West. To make the matter worse, natural calamities befell the country for several successive years. For the problem of the present shortage of energy and food facing Korea to be solved, the West's economic sanctions (including the hindrance and blockade of the flow of high technology and advanced equipment) must be lifted. The great obstacle is the US economic sanctions.

Korea is trying to meet the shortage of energy by obtaining LWRs and substitute fuel. It is General Secretary Kim Jong Il's strategy to make the United States, the greatest and strongest adversary, deliver them as her due responsibility.

In *Over the Line* published by the US Enterprise Institute, Jack Downs analyzed Korea's method of diplomatic negotiation in this way; when describing north Korea's method of negotiation, "unreasonable", "random", "unpredictable" and other such words are often used, but in actual fact, seldom to be seen are countries that set "negotiation" as a main weapon of diplomacy and resort to conventional methods, winning admirable successes, as north Korea does.

The word "cunning" is improper in this regard. Diplomacy is a ruthless war of brains, and if a small country is to face a superpower on an equal footing, she cannot but resort to tactful methods of negotiation. Why does the United States, a superpower, sometimes give Korea "candy" in dealing with her? This is because Korea drives her into a situation in which she has to be engaged in it and implement her obligations. Further, it is because justness is on Korea's side.

Why does the United States still fail to publish the "report of re-

examination” of her Korea policy even after her Korea policy coordinator Perry’s visit to Pyongyang? Isn’t it because Perry confirmed in Pyongyang that the “comprehensive approach” combining “candy” and “stick” would not make any sense with Korea? And isn’t it that the United States, for this reason, has to re-examine the re-examination? At the moment, the obligations to be fulfilled by the two countries are expressly clarified by the framework agreement. Demanding a new obligation of Korea goes against the basic principle of the agreement. The “candy” Perry has offered is an obligation the United States promised to fulfil, and so Korea will not take it. In this sense, Perry Report will not prove effective unless it is conducive to implementing the agreement.

The United States is obliged by the agreement to lift her economic sanctions against Korea and improve her relations with the country at an earlier date. Her direct assistance to Korea’s potato farming is of great significance in promoting her fulfilling of the obligation.

Famine Relief and Food Security

What is the “revolution in potato farming” advocated by General Secretary Kim Jong Il, its significance and its future?

When giving a field guidance to Taehongan County in the northern Ryanggang Province in October 1998, he instructed that efforts should be directed to potato farming. True to his instruction, the joint editorial published by Korea’s leading newspapers on the New Year’s Day of 1999 called on “making a revolution in potato farming”. Now the country is trying to solve the food problem by her own efforts by cultivating potato on a wide scale and taking it as a staple food along with rice.

In order to increase potato production, she is taking measures to select fields suitable for potato farming and rezone them on the principle of the right crop on the right soil, cultivate high-yielding varieties, produce organic fertilizer in larger quantities, raise two crops a year and prevent virus generation in potato seeds.

Potato grows well even on dry and sterile land. It requires less fertilizer than maize does and the period of its growth is shorter than rice and wheat, so it is possible to cultivate it before or after another

crop in a year. Its per-unit area yield is 3.04 times, 2.68 times and 1.12 times greater than wheat, barley and maize respectively. It grows fast and the rate of fixing solar energy is quite high.

Called an “apple growing under the soil” in France for its rich nutritional elements like vitamin, calcium and minerals, it is used as a staple food. And many countries and nations in Europe and Africa eat mainly potato.

Potato yield is stable even in the changeable climate. Not particular about the soil conditions, it yields a certain amount even in dry lands. Its rate of fixing solar energy is high. So during the period of famine or when food import is stopped, it plays the role of famine-relief crop, food-security crop. It is well known that during the Second World War Switzerland, with the channels of food import cut by the encirclement of Nazi Germany, tided over the food crisis by ensuring every household to plant potato in its kitchen yard. There are many examples of countries that escaped famine by increasing potato production.

Viewed from this light, it can be called a wise measure for Korea to have set about increasing potato production, for it has been experiencing successive natural calamities, adverse climatic conditions, decrease of soil conditions, and a shortage of fertilizers.

General Secretary Kim Jong Il said that had Korea directed efforts to potato farming ten years ago, the people would not have suffered the shortage of food and potato is as good as rice.

If the increasing of potato production goes on smoothly, Korea will possibly relieve the food shortage.

Then hasn't Korea cultivated potato in the past?

So far, Korea has cultivated potato in its northern plateau regions like Ryanggang Province. In the plain areas, maize has been cultivated. If maize is cultivated on the same soil for years, the soil fertility and the crop yield decrease. The adverse weather that has lasted for several years seems to have been another reason of the fall of crop output.

Worse still, potato production has not increased.

On this matter, Dr. Jong Jong Gil of the south Korean rural economy institute, a specialist in the north's rural issue, says:

“Potato yields 20 tons per hectare. But if the same variety is sown,

the yield decreases to 10 tons in the second year and to 3 tons in the third year because of virus contamination. The per-hectare yield in the United States is 39 tons, whereas it is 11 tons in the north. This can be ascribed to the failure to improve the seed."

His opinion seems to be right.

Over the recent years Korea has emphasized improvement of potato seed and directed efforts to the research and experiment of seed production and storage and to the building of related institutions. The test cultivation in Taehongdan, Ryanggang Province, of the seed imported from Switzerland and said to be yielding 80 tons per hectare recorded 71 tons per hectare. She is importing the seeds from the Netherlands and Germany, too. When the seeds and technology of the United States are introduced, it will prove effective in further increasing potato production.

The Conception of Turning and the Strategy of Self-Reliance

General Secretary Kim Jong Il is adhering to the Juche farming method, initiated by President Kim Il Sung as the basis of the agricultural policy of Korea.

The West ascribes the decreased crop production in Korea and her shortage of food to the structural defect of the Juche farming method and its failure. The Japanese newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun*, dated March 18, 1999, explains that Korea has "set about 'restructuring' her agricultural structure in the name of 'converting the Juche farming method into a farming method of the peasant masses themselves'." But they are misguided.

As a scientific farming method, the Juche farming method requires the principle of growing the right crop on the right soil in the opportune time taking into consideration the characteristics of the crop. General Secretary Kim Jong Il emphasizes that the opinions and choice of the peasants must be respected, calling adherence to the Juche farming method and its faithful application. He never has in mind repealing or diversion from the method.

He stresses improvement of seeds, land rezoning and two-crop farming a year so as to make maximum use of the limited crop land,

cultivation of the right crop on the right soil and in the right time, promotion of diversified farming, and increased production of organic fertilizer. Particularly noteworthy is the promotion of diversified farming and increased production of organic fertilizer.

Cooperative farms breed pigs and other domestic animals mainly on potato, and increase the soil fertility by means of the organic fertilizer made of the animals' excretions so as to increase potato production. The state encourages this method, saying, "If we raise 16 pigs for one hectare of potato field, we can produce about 70 tons of liquid manure every year, as well as meat." (*Rodong Sinmun*, October 31, 1998.)

The country is also using compound microbial fertilizer, which proved to be effective in rice farming. The fertilizer is a liquid organic fertilizer, a mixture of 80 soil microbes including yeast, lactobacilli and the bacteria helpful to photosynthesis. It has been produced for some years with the assistance of the Koreans living in Japan. The organic farming method that excludes the usage of chemical fertilizers and agricultural chemicals has been introduced in many countries of the world. In addition, microbial chemicals are being experimented. The chemicals are said to be effective in preventing virus contamination without destroying the ecological environment. This is the way Korea's agriculture is developing on the principle of establishing an organic agricultural system, which is stable and makes soil fertile at a low cost. Over the past years Korea has used less chemical fertilizers than other countries, and now she is applying them as less as possible, saying that relying on chemical fertilizers and agricultural chemicals is tantamount to strangling herself.

While realigning crop lands for a wide-scale potato farming, the state allows each farm to cultivate various crops as suited to its situation, consolidating the foundation of her self-reliant agriculture.

When the land becomes fertile and crop output increases through the organic farming method and diversified farming, President Kim Il Sung's objective of making people "eat rice and meat soup" will be attained.

Following is a dialogue excerpted from *Compound Pollution*, a bestseller written by Ariyoshi Sawako, Japanese writer, and published by Shinchosha:

“If some pigs are distributed to each peasant family, who cultivate one crop, for its switchover to organic farming, it can produce organic fertilizer with the excretions of pigs and rice straw, so its living with regard to expenditure will get stabilized. If the households that raise pigs only decrease their number and obtain crop land, they can manage without buying fodder. Furthermore, they can leave the pigs on the harvested paddy fields in autumn, enabling them to take exercise and gnaw at the rice stubble digging soil and eating the good earth instead of internal-organ regulators.”

“To hear your words, it's quite simple and clear.”

“The objective of organic agriculture is to make every farm household self-sufficient by producing on its own rice, barley, beans and vegetables by using a small number of domestic animals. It is diversified farming through stockbreeding, so to speak.”

“It smells old-day agriculture.”

Agriculture Korea is pursuing at present seems to be this self-sufficient organic agriculture, old and yet fresh. When we consider the state as a unit, it means self-reliant agriculture.

As is known, Japan's agriculture is not self-reliant. Through the US food (wheat) aid after the Second World War and the subsequent propagation of meal service at schools under demand from the United States and the “diet-improvement drive”, her staple food was converted from cooked rice to bread. Falling captive to the world strategy of the US cereal dealers, the amount of meat consumption has radically increased.

What has become the result?

The book, *Japan's Six Conditions—The Age of Competing for Food*, compiled by a coverage team of the NHK and issued by the Japan Broadcasting and Publishing Association, reads in part:

“According to the statistics of 1980, the self-sufficiency rate of milk and dairy products was 87.8 per cent, that of chicken 93.7 per cent and that of pork 87.4 per cent. Japan produced 71.6 per cent of the beef consumed, which was the focus of economic conflict and trade liberalization. At a glance, the self-sufficiency rates are high. But in actual fact, the figures are all sham, because nearly 100 per cent of the fodder of cattle, pigs and chickens has been imported. Japan imports 96 per cent of the defatted bean-cake. Bean paste, soy sauce,

bean curd, fermented beans and vegetable oil are all produced in Japan, but their raw material, defatted bean-cake, is from abroad. All in all, the rich table of the contemporary Japanese people, who are living in unprecedentedly gluttonous times, is laid with the foods imported from the world. The rate of her food self-sufficiency being 33 per cent, Japan ranks last in this sphere among the developed countries. If rice is excluded, the rate decreases to 4 per cent. Now Japan is the No. 1 food importer in the world. Japan depends most on the United States, the food power.”

The food export of the United States accounts for 60 per cent of the total amount of food export in the world. Being fully under the cover of the US “food umbrella”, the rate of Japan’s food self-sufficiency is on the decline, reaching 22 per cent in 1986. In the same year the rate in the south and north of Korea was 55 per cent and 99 per cent respectively. Of course, a country should import what is lacking, but if the self-sufficiency rate of staple food and other basic cereals is low, the danger that it would be threatened by the food exporter becomes greater. This is the very reason why cereal is called a strategic material. In other words, the greater the proportion of imported cereals, the greater the political and diplomatic dependence on the exporter.

Korea’s present rate of food self-sufficiency would be low as she is receiving assistance from other countries and international organizations. However, she will never depend on other countries for food as Japan does. She is adhering to the principle of food self-sufficiency. She values sovereignty and national dignity before anything else. In case she depends on others for food, Korea, under the West’s constant pressure to yield (to “restructure” and “open door”), would have to give up her socialist system.

The clear-cut agricultural policy of self-reliance finds expression in the “revolution in potato farming”. General Secretary Kim Jong Il’s extraordinary quality can be found in this conception of turning misfortune into a blessing and his dauntless will.

Rodong Sinmun, dated January 3, 1999, said, “If we emerge victorious in the revolution of potato farming, we will solve the problem of food and lay the economic basis of a powerful nation. This is not a thing of distant future.” This is never a pipe dream.

Bright is the future of the “revolution in potato farming” aimed at achieving both the solution of food problem and the improvement of the Korea-US relations and General Secretary Kim Jong Il’s prudent and daring agricultural and diplomatic strategy.

5. WAVERING DOLLAR REGIME AND KOREA’S ECONOMIC STRATEGY

Korea’s Approach to the EU

The highlight of the session of the UN General Assembly held in September 1999 was Korea’s active diplomatic campaign with the member states of the EU (European Union).

Korea’s Foreign Minister, Paek Nam Sun, made a speech at the assembly seven years after his predecessor and now President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK, Kim Yong Nam, had made a speech there in 1992. In 1993 Vice Foreign Minister Song Won Ho made a speech at the assembly and from 1994 to 1998 Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su Hon made speeches.

The attendants from the West listened with keen interest to the speech of Paek Nam Sun from a country, the focus of world attention for her “nuclear issue” and serious famine.

Paek said in his general speech that Korea would “suspend missile launch during the period of the Korea-US high-level talks.”

In a statement released at a press interview, he said, “The economy that had been suffering difficulties for five years has passed through the most serious phase and entered a period of recovering. Some people guessed we would fall soon, but we did not fall. Rather we have become stronger in the course of overcoming difficulties.”

What surprised foreign delegations more greatly was his “quite unprecedented”, active diplomacy behind the scenes. The Foreign Minister had talks with the Foreign Ministers of 18 countries, including Italy, Switzerland, Denmark, Austria, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, the Philippines, Cuba, China and Australia. He also met his counterparts from Middle East and Africa.

What was especially noteworthy was his active approach towards

the EU countries. Korea had vice-ministerial talks with Finland, the country that held presidency of the EU that year, and Norway. Finland reached a basic agreement with her to make efforts to continue dialogue. In the name of 15 member states of the EU, Finland published on September 29 of the same year a Statement on the Issue of the Korean Peninsula, calling the north and south of Korea to resume dialogue without any preconditions attached. This can be viewed to be based on the agreement.

Before the opening of the session of the UN General Assembly, Korea also suggested to the United Kingdom, France and Germany to hold bilateral foreign-ministerial talks. The talks did not take place, but all the EU countries were the target of Korea's approach diplomacy.

Surprised as they were, Japan's mass media made analyses like "Aimed at creating an environment conducive to promoting the Korea-US dialogue, it is a sign of Korea's commencement of multifarious diplomacy," (*Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, August 26, 1999.) and "It is an effort to free herself from the post-Cold War isolation." (*Asahi Shimbun*, September 27, 1999.)

These analyses can be said to be right to a large measure, but the purpose of Korea's diplomacy is not confined there, I think.

Korea's approach to the EU started several years ago.

According to the south Korean newspaper *Hankuk Ilbo*, dated October 11, 1999, Korea and Britain had secret contacts on six occasions (on the level of section chiefs and department chiefs) from October 1996 up until recently and discussed on opening liaison offices in each other's capital cities. The first political, working-level talks between Korea and the EU were held in Brussels in December 1998 on the level of department chiefs. The EU is rendering food aid and other humanitarian aids to Korea and has joined the KEDO.

This groundwork did make possible the minister-level talks during the session of the UN General Assembly. All in all, it would be reasonable to view Korea's approach to the EU as being based on a far-reaching strategy, not on an improvisational strategy so as to escape from an "international isolation" and economic difficulties.

Following is the analysis of this intention on the point of Korea's economic strategy (of consolidating her independent economy and

establishing a new international economic order).

Common Illusion about the Dollar

No one will deny the fact that the dollar, as a key currency, holds sway over today's world economy. Key currency is a currency that is used widely in international settlements and financial dealings. The dollar occupies 62 per cent of the foreign currency in reserve in the world, and 50 per cent of the world trade is settled by means of the dollar.

After the end of the Cold War the United States has become the only superpower. At the moment she has greeted an unprecedented boom. In spite of the worldwide financial crisis and economic depression, only the US economy is showing a sign of spiralling up. In addition, the dollar, supported by the US economic and military strength, is becoming a more powerful key currency, and it looks to be enjoying an unshakable trust.

Then will the dollar's dominance continue as ever? As the European economy was devastated by two world wars, the pound sterling had to yield its position of a key currency to the dollar. Likewise, if the US strength becomes weak, the dollar's power (trustworthiness) will become weak automatically and this will end up jeopardizing the status of the United States as the centre of the world economy. In other words, the status of the United States as the superpower is directly linked to the strength of the dollar.

Over the past ten years after the end of the Cold War the US hegemony and the dollar's pre-eminence has looked to be unshakable. But in actual fact, it has been managed to be maintained by the impalpable common illusion as Japan's "bubble" economy has.

The United States maintained the "conversion system", the gold parity of the dollar. Holding the dollar was as good as holding gold. But the unbridled arms race between the East and the West during the Cold War affected the US economy greatly. With the increasing international payments deficit, the United States could not continue to maintain the "convertibility" of the dollar, and President Nixon declared the annulment of the system in 1971. Nevertheless, the dollar continued to operate as a key currency, because no currency strong

enough to take the place of the dollar was available and the dollar was supported by the military strength of the United States. The expectation and trust that “whatever happens, the dollar will be stable” is merely a common illusion that relieved to a certain extent the fear that the dollar will become only a piece of paper when the strength of the United States becomes weak.

The total amount of the US foreign debt exceeds 3,000,000 million dollars. Her national debt recorded 5,400,000 million dollars in 1997. She has to pay 240,000 million dollars every year as interest, which is as large as her defence budget. The United States is the largest debtor country in the world.

Then how could this country continue to exist as a country of key currency?

The tricky device is simple and yet shrewd. Thanks to an excessive issue of the notes of the dollar and the government bonds, the American people, at the expense of getting into debt, have led a luxurious consumer life and the country has showered a colossal amount of money on military budget.

Yamada Atsushi, member of the editorial board of the Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, said, “At the expense of being called a ‘worker bee’ and a ‘rabbit hutch’, Japan did not stop buying the US bonds. The unsung service to America’s victory in the arms race was rendered by the Japanese people’s savings. The sweat of their brow supported the American people’s excessive consumption. The United States sold the dollar abroad, getting into debt, so as to remain as the ‘rich superpower’. The dollar flown into Eastern Europe and the erstwhile Soviet Union circulated in the black market. The market economy run by the dollar expanded into black dealings and excited consumerism, destroying the controlled economy. It was the deficit economy of the United States that crumbled the Communist camp.”

To say conversely, this is the very weak point of the dollar. One day in 1997 the then Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto muttered, “I once felt like selling the US bonds.” Soon the New York Stock Market responded to it too sensitively and in consequence the share prices nosedived. In view of this example alone, the outflow of a huge amount of dollar (an excessive issue, circulation and saving sustained by an excessive common illusion, to be exact) can be called the

weakest link in the US economy. “Self-satisfaction of the strong over successive victories in spite of the worldwide crises” (*Asahi Shimbun*) will be shattered sooner or later and the time will come when the strong will have to taste the bitter.

Symptoms of the Crumbling of the Dollar’s Pre-eminence

In recent years the decades-old pre-eminence of the dollar began to wave.

The first attack was the Asian financial crisis. Most of the Southeast Asian countries linked their currencies to the dollar, building an economic sphere by relying on the dollar. In the early years they benefited from the low risk of the exchange rate of the dollar, achieving a high rate of growth. But excessive dependence on the dollar deteriorated their economic foundations and China’s devaluation of her *Renminbi* and the weakening of their competitive positions entailed by wage increase brought about the financial crisis. In 1997 Thailand cut the link, followed by other Asian nations. Consequently, the price of the dollar slumped and the financial crisis swept over the whole world.

The countries experiencing the financial turmoil has to receive assistance from the IMF. But claiming that the assistance from the organization representing the US-style economic system was inducing fresh strengthening of the dollar’s supremacy and their dependence on it, they showed a strong negative response to it.

Typical of the opposition to the dollar’s dominance and the IMF system is the following remarks by Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia; freed from colonial domination, we learned about capitalism and introduced foreign capital, achieving prosperity; but there is a time when the wealth of the developing countries goes to nothing overnight by the capital that moves freely at a fast speed; it is preferable to become a dissident than to become a colony of those who worship only money.

This is not a case only related with the Thai baht. It is cynical that George Soros, an international speculator, who is said to have set Malaysia as one of his targets, has the same opinion with Prime Minister Mahathir. He says that the financial market, originally

unstable, was maintained by the misguided view that the equilibrium was ensured by free competition. He is quite pessimistic about the market economy going beyond its limit. He admits that the financial market is destroying the economy of a country without mercy like an iron ball that is used in demolishing a building. He points out that the capitalist system has begun to disintegrate.

The volume of foreign exchange circulated across the world in 1995 was about 430,000,000 million dollars, the volume of trade transactions reaching only 5,000,000 million dollars. After all, impalpable speculative funds, 80 times as large as the trade volume, are making a fool of the world economy through the bubble game. Peter Drucker, No. 1 man in the management theory, calling it "virtual money", said that nation-states and market economy have begun to discontinue their functions.

As the fear and reactions show, the apprehension about the American-style capitalist system, ie, market economy, is looming large, and it is being negated around the world. A warning against, and negation of, the excessive dependence on the dollar has become an irresistible trend.

The second attack against the dollar was the appearance of the euro on January 1, 1999, the common currency of the 11 of the 15 EU member states.

The population of the European region that would form a single-currency economic sphere as large as the dollar sphere is 290 million, and its GDP in 1997 was 6,900,000 million dollars, 1.5 times as great as that of Japan and nearly the same as that of America. In 1998 the United States had a deficit of 235,000 million dollars, while the euro area registered a black figure of 110,000 million dollars. The euro is fully capable of becoming a powerful currency, a key currency.

The notes and coins of the euro will be circulated from 2002, but the credit cards and bank checks have already begun to be settled in the euro. Stable in its exchange rate, the euro is expected to become an international currency. It is almost definite that the new currency will threaten the dollar in the future. It was presumed that a tripolar monetary system involving the dollar, euro and yen would be established. But the Japanese government, fearing the response of the United States and the Asian countries, is reluctant to "internationalize

the yen" and the currency fails to become strong because of the long-drawn-out recession of the Japanese economy. In this situation, the possibility of the system has become small. As a result, growing worldwide is the expectation for the newly-emerged euro, a challenger to the dollar, the international monetary champion.

Either out of her forecast or as her measure to contain America's hegemonism, China, a country that boasts of being second in holding foreign currency in reserve (about 151,500 million dollars as of September 1999) made a statement that she will "hold a large amount of the foreign currency in reserve in the euro," shocking the United States. Some say that China is going to hold 40 per cent of her foreign currency in reserve in the euro. Taiwan and Cuba are sympathetic with it.

Chairing with the EU a conference of the banks of the central and south American countries held in November 1998, the President of the Cuban Central Bank said, "The cause of the worldwide financial crisis is in the monetary system centred on the United States, the dominance of the US dollar. In the future we must hold the currency in reserve in the euro, instead of the dollar."

It is an urgent task for Cuba, whose socialist principle of "equality" is being seriously threatened by the double economy of the dollar and peso, and for central and south American countries, a citadel of the dollar, to free themselves from the domination of the dollar. The euro's appearance would probably have been a godsend to them.

The dollar occupies 62 per cent and the European currencies 20 per cent of the fund in reserve in the world. When the euro starts to be circulated, the figures will change greatly and a hot competition is expected to take place. A serious money war will erupt in the early 21st century.

The third attack was the symptom of disintegration of the US economy itself.

Of the "twin deficits" of the United States, the financial deficit shows a sign of improvement, but the trade deficit registered a record high of 168,500 million dollars in 1998. President Clinton expressed a deep apprehension that the trade deficit would reach 300,000 million dollars in the end of 1999. As mentioned above, the United States is the largest debtor country in the world and the power of the dollar is a

fiction. So the US economy is destined to go downhill. As the market economy advocates free competition, it is inconceivable that the economy of only one country would continue to win one victory after another.

In October 1999 the stock prices in New York slumped for a time. Afterwards, they began to go up; but there was no ecstasy on the day when the stock prices hit the highest and an unidentifiable feeling of uneasiness is prevailing over the stock markets in the United States. In spite of the US government's message that "the US economy is healthy," the fear about inflation is deep-rooted inside the country. This is quite natural, because it is a common sense that the market economy always courts the danger of being crumbled even in the days of boom. It will be redundant to quote Paul Krugman, Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who said that the US stock prices had clearly become a bubble and were going astray from the normal track.

The plummeting of the share price of the Coca-Cola Inc. by the continual failure of its world strategy including the incident of its product containing impurities in Belgium and France signifies the beginning of the shattering of the myth of the US growth.

Needless to say, the United States will not remain a mere onlooker. She will make desperate efforts to maintain the dollar's pre-eminence. But when many countries that feel disgusted with the dollar's dominance and the high-handed hegemonism of the United States confront it in alliance and the US economy continues to go downhill, the disintegration of the dollar's pre-eminence and the US domination of the unipolar world will be inevitable.

Disengagement from Dollar's Dominance and the Independent Economy

The dollar exerts a great influence on Korea, too. How come Korea, a socialist country that had advocated a self-reliant economy, faced this situation?

This is the result of the end of the Cold War. In the past, she maintained an independent economy supported by the socialist economic system. She mainly conducted barter trade with other

socialist countries. This made it possible for her to dispense with the dollar in conducting trade. After the end of the Cold War the socialist market became extinct of its own accord, and Russia and China demanded that Korea settle account in hard currency. Being self-reliant and engaged in barter trade in the past, Korea had not saved the dollar or the yen in large quantities, so she soon began to feel a dearth of foreign currency and could not conduct foreign trade on a regular footing. Consequently, her economy experienced a vicious cycle and the rate of operation of factories decreased sharply owing to an acute shortage of energy and raw materials. Earning foreign currency became an urgent task for her to boost her economy.

Availing themselves of this situation, the United States, Japan and south Korea began to enforce the “soft-landing” policy on Korea, claiming that she could not revitalize her economy unless she introduced “restructuring” and “openness”, in order to force her to abandon the socialist system. However, Korea asserted that she would maintain the socialist economy and would not introduce the market economy. She is making use in part of the elements of the market economy, like setting up the Rajin-Sonbong economic and trade zone and developing an industrial zone of the type of a special economic zone in the west coast area with south Korea’s Hyundai Group. There is no doubt that she will make use of such elements tentatively in the future. But it seems she would not introduce the market economy in full measure.

Then what will be the way for Korea to escape from the situation?

Korea is trying to find the way by consolidating the self-reliant character of her economy, contrary to the “international common sense”. This can never be called a choice inconsistent with the common sense in view of the aforementioned remarks of the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad and the US speculator George Soros. It is because the market economy is not an immutable economic system and its future is bleak as it is exposed to constant danger of crumbling.

Korea has possibly defined a new economic strategy with the focus on freeing herself from the fetters of the dollar.

To give a further explanation for the sake of the readers’ understanding, an independent economy is an economy that supports

itself as far as possible, an economy that does not sway in any economy fluctuations of the world. It is never a closed economy; it does not deny trade and exchanges with other countries. A healthy, independent economy preconditions mutually beneficial economic exchanges on an equal footing with other countries.

Korea feels more keenly than others the dire situation in which the socialist market crumbled and she was thrown into the maelstrom of the market economy inevitably accompanied by unbridled competition. The choice of continued advance towards consolidating the independent economy is based on General Secretary Kim Jong Il's judgement that it is the best way.

Korea thinks that some countries may choose the socialist economy and others the market economy. In other words, she is searching for a way of coexistence of the two types of economy. Whatever one chooses, one must build an independent economy and consolidate it—this is the basic stand of Korea.

The Ideal for Establishing a New International Economic Order

Korea's consistent contention for rebuilding the world economy is that a new international economic order must be established.

A new international order aims at eliminating the economic difference between the developed countries centring on the imperialist powers and the backward, developing countries, former colonies, and eliminating the backwardness, poverty and hunger in the latter countries.

It can be said that most of the economic problems, territorial disputes and national conflicts are the aftermath of the colonial rule of the imperialist powers and war. Korea, Palestine, Kosovo and East Timor—there are innumerable examples. It is the same case with the problem between the rich North and the poor South. The North has enjoyed prosperity by exploiting the resources of the South and selling finished products to it. The principle of market economy, the principle of the law of jungle, further widens the economic gap between the North and the South.

According to the Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, dated

September 6, 1999, “The ratio of income difference between the most developed country and the least developed country in the early this century was about 10:1. In 1960 it was 30:1, in 1990 60:1 and in 1997 74:1, increasing at an accelerated tempo.”

This is an undeniable, stark reality of the problem between the North and the South. Worse still, its seriousness and complicatedness is growing every year, with the addition of the global inequality like the devastation of nature and environmental pollution. In order to solve the problem the non-aligned countries proposed on their own initiative the establishment of a new international economic order.

A method for this is the building of an independent national economy and the South-South cooperation of the relatively rich non-aligned countries helping poor ones.

President Kim Il Sung said:

“South-South cooperation is a noble work of the developing countries to achieve economic independence through economic and technical cooperation and an important link in their struggle to establish a new international economic order. Achieving economic independence by building an independent national economy is a primary task facing the developing countries today.”

Nevertheless, this noble ideal has not yet been realized owing to the obstacles placed by developed countries, the differences in purposes and situations of individual countries and in particular to the excessive dependence on the old order that can hardly free itself from the dollar’s domination. Another reason is the situation in which the non-aligned countries had to place themselves under the domination of the dollar with the further strengthening of the market economy and the dollar’s dominance in the post-Cold War days. It is never easy to root out the cause of the cumulative debt of the developing countries, totalling 1,300,000 million dollars.

After the end of the Cold War, some non-aligned countries have expressed their doubt over the significance of the existence of the non-aligned movement itself. In other words, the establishment of a new international economic order is becoming more and more difficult.

Even in this world situation, Korea has not abandoned her hope and ideal. She is striving to build an independent economy and realize the noble ideal. For this, she has to break the shackles of the dollar. Isn’t

it for this purpose that she has first paid attention to the euro that can confront the dollar? Underlying Korea's attention for the EU and her policy of active approach towards it is that purpose, I think.

Kim Jong Il's government is very realistic and profit-orientated. But General Secretary Kim Jong Il does not confine himself to realism. I think he has a strategy of first shaking the dollar-dominated old unipolar economic order by pitting the euro against the dollar and in future producing a unified currency of the non-aligned countries to make it a key currency on a par with the dollar and euro. Needless to say, this will be regarded as a daydream at the present stage. But this will not be a quite impossible happening as the domination by the dollar will one day collapse and the system of market economy, whose future cannot be foreseen, is not immutable.

Korea has long ago intensified approach to the ASEAN (the Association of South-East Asian Nations), apparently to participate in the East Asian Economic Sphere advocated by the ASEAN.

Searching for "a framework that would develop into a common currency of the future free trade sphere" (the Philippin Foreign Minister Domingo Siaazon) is another challenge to the dollar's dominance and a sign of the incipient independent economies being established. If a powerful common currency appears in Asia that has a large proportion of the world population, the world economy will change radically.

In the 21st century the concept and existence of key currency might become dim. When the system of key currency is rearranged in the world and a new system is established, the establishment of a new international economic order will naturally be promoted.

Korea regards the improvement of her relations with the United States as her supreme task. The two countries will establish diplomatic relations in the near future. Some guess that "Korea will become a pro-American country in the future," but she approaches the United States with good will when the latter approaches her with good will; she will never be a pro-American state. Korea values political independence, so it is natural that she maintains economic independence that guarantees political independence. This means that she does not build an economy that depends on the dollar.

Viewed on this basis, Korea's economic strategy and diplomacy is

thought to be conducted in the direction of accelerating the collapse of the dollar-based unipolar domination and establishing a new international economic order through the strengthening of the independent economies of her own and other countries.

6. KOREA ELIMINATES THE MAIN FACTORS OF THE CONTINUING NATIONAL DIVISION

Elimination of the US Hostile Policy and Her Control

The main factor of the 50-year-long division of Korea into north and south is not the difference and contradiction of their political and economic systems and ideological beliefs. This is only a secondary factor. An agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, and cooperation and exchange was adopted between the north and the south of Korea, but today it remains as a sheet paper; and the promotion of non-governmental economic exchanges between the two parts of Korea has not been a decisive factor in realizing the reunification. This means that they are secondary conditions in the final analysis.

Needless to say, the efforts made by the people of the north and south of Korea and the overseas Koreans to put an end to national division have radically inspired the spirit of reunification and decisively prevented permanent national division. However, there seems to have been not a few misunderstandings and pits in that some people regarded that the lack of reunification force is the main factor of the continuing division. It goes without saying that the main factor and the right of decision for the reunification is in the Korean nation, the core of which is the expansion and maturing of the independent reunification force of the nation. But the main factor has existed in another way.

As is well-known, the division of Korea has been finalized after the Korean War. The United States, a party to the war, has neglected to comply with the Armistice Agreement she had signed. Ignoring the existence and system of Korea, she has been hostile towards her; she has continued to threaten her, maintained a blockade against her and continually committed war provocation. In the meantime, she has

pursued a neo-colonial policy in south Korea to subordinate her politically, economically and militarily. It is the United States that has been the basic factor of national confrontation and aggravated it. In other words, the continuation of the US hostile policy towards Korea and maintenance of her control over south Korea is the main factor that has aggravated the confrontational structure of the Korean peninsula and the danger of re-eruption of a war and blocked the country's reunification.

In order to check the US interference and intervention, the main factor that blocks Korea's reunification, Korea, through various means, called the United States to observe the Armistice Agreement; in other words, she attempted to achieve the withdrawal of foreign troops and peaceful settlement of the Korean question by means of dialogue. As this was given a wide berth, Korea could no longer allow the continued division of the country. Though it was a secondary requirement, Korea succeeded in issuing a joint statement with the south Korean authorities on July 4, 1972, making public the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity. The entire Korean nation supported the statement enthusiastically; the majority of the Korean people thought that the day of reunification was not far. But it could not be a decisive measure without the US engagement, so it gave the people a disappointment. It was the same case with the north-south agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, and cooperation and exchange.

The United States is responsible for neglecting and obstructing Korean people's desire for national self-determination and reunification. What made Korea succeed in inducing the United States to enter into dialogue were the negotiations on the nuclear problem originated by the so-called "north Korea's nuclear suspicion" and the subsequent talks between Korea and the United States.

In the course of this, Korea received from the United States assurances, first, against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons; second, for peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, respect for her sovereignty and non-interference in her internal affairs; and third, for support for the peaceful reunification of Korea. The joint statement containing these three principles was issued on June 11, 1993. With the main party responsible for the

division of Korea recognizing the system of Korea and supporting the reunification of north and south of Korea at the talks, Korea's reunification has become a feasible task of the day.

That Korea's reunification cannot be realized unless an end is put to the hostile relations between Korea and the United States, the parties to the Korean War, is eloquently proved by the history of the Korean peninsula of half a century.

Korea Emerges Victorious in Her Diplomatic War with the United States

I will not dwell on the details of the ten-year negotiations between Korea and the United States. But the diplomatic war of the brains and strategies of the two sides can be called a war without gunshot, and Korea can be said to have won the "war".

Having made claptrap concessions repeatedly on the basis of the illusion about Korea's possible "collapse", the United States neglected to comply with the framework agreement she had signed in 1994; and employing delaying tactics, she waited for the collapse of Kim Jong Il's government.

This expectation was shattered to smithereens by the successful launching of the man-made satellite *Kwangmyongsong No. 1* by Korea in 1998. The satellite, though launched for a peaceful purpose, displayed the capability of intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach the US territory. The fact that a hostile state, though small, had possessed an ability of mass destruction in retaliation was enough to make the United States shudder with fear. The seriousness of the fear is proved by the United States' tenacious pursuance, albeit repeated failures, of the missile interception tests based on the NMD initiative for the "defence from the nuclear-missile attack of Korea and others".

For this reason, when Korea hinted that she would launch the second satellite, she could not but start implementing the agreement so as to check the launch.

The first stage is Perry Report on revising her Korea policy. Its full text has not been made public, and it has been described as a comprehensive approach involving dialogue and deterrence; in short, it will be something like a "statement of defeat".

Han Ho Sok, head of the New York-based Unification Research Institute, said, “The report is a document that formulated an alternative policy of the 21st century that the United States would normalize her relations with Korea and she would neither interfere in nor obstruct Korea’s peaceful reunification in return for Korea’s promise not to threaten her nuclear non-proliferation policy and her alliance with Japan.”

The second stage is the US promise to improve her relations with Korea at the Korea-US high-level talks in Berlin in September 1999. In return for Korea’s temporary suspension of missile launch, the United States announced comprehensive relaxation of economic sanctions against her. The West expressed a feeling of surprise at it, but it is not so surprising. The outcome had already been decided by the successful launching of the satellite *Kwangmyongsong No. 1*, and the United States could not but implement the agreement, her responsibility.

Fifty years have passed since the outbreak of the Korean War, and the last ten years have proved that the positions of Korea and the United States have reversed completely. The United States entertained a deep-rooted fear for Korea, the adversary she could not defeat in the war, and so it continued to slight it; but as she could no longer neglect the country for the “nuclear suspicion”, this time she fought a diplomatic war, and she again suffered a defeat.

The third stage is the Korea-US negotiations held after the second round of talks in Berlin. According to the sources of the south Korean government, on the eve of the talks Charles Kartman, US special envoy for the Korean peace talks, told Kim Kye Gwan, Vice Foreign Minister of Korea, that the United States was ready to make an official statement to the effect that “the United States abandons animosity toward north Korea.” This will be a further development of her assurance of non-use of force. If the hostile policy is given up, what is left is the establishment of diplomatic relations of the two countries.

As a result, Korea and the United States shall implement the Agreed Framework of 1994 in conformity with the three principles made public in 1993 and the principle of simultaneous action and, in the course of this, a peace treaty will be reached between the two countries, and in the early 21st century they will enter into diplomatic

relations.

At this point reunification of the two parts of Korea will become a realistic task from a long-term task.

Withdrawal of the US Troops in South Korea and the Status of South Korea

The focal point of the time when Korea and the United States conclude a peace treaty and establish diplomatic relations will be the treatment and status of the US troops stationed in south Korea.

On condition that the US troops remain in south Korea, neither peace treaty nor diplomatic relations would be conceivable. It is because putting an end to the Cold-War structure on the Korean peninsula and realizing peaceful coexistence is immediately détente between Korea and the United States and a precondition for the reunification of north and south of Korea.

The south Korean government and people, who have the wrong idea that they have so far been protected by the GIs, will fall into a panic if they withdraw all at once. South Korea might drastically increase armaments (including developing nuclear weapons and ICBMs) allegedly for the capability to confront the north. This would never be conducive to reunification, and it might jeopardize the result of the improvement of the Korea-US relations. The United States does not want this, either.

The authorities of Korea and the United States are presumed first to make the US troops in south Korea not hostile towards Korea, second to make them keep security in the Korean peninsula along with the Korean People's Army like a peace-keeping force, and third to withdraw them by stages.

Probably the US troops, changing their nature and tasks in this direction, will have to remain in south Korea until north and south of Korea move towards reunification in concrete terms. It is apparent that Korea recognizes it, though passively.

Some people might doubt whether the United States would withdraw her troops from south Korea and waive her control of south Korea. This is natural in view of the division of Korea that has lasted for half a century. However, the answer is, "It is inevitable." A good

example took place 30 years ago.

The United States realized a dramatic reconciliation in 1972 with China, one of her big adversaries in the Cold War. The two countries agreed on five principles of peace in the Shanghai Joint Communiqué, building a framework for new Sino-American relations.

The GIs in Taiwan withdrew and the US military bases there were closed. In this way, the Cold War between China and the United States came to an end.

President Kim Il Sung described Nixon's visit to China as "white-flag diplomacy". The US abandoning of her military control of Taiwan, her ally, can be called a defeat of her previous diplomacy. As a result, however, she gained more than she had lost, gathering a fruit at the cost of honour. In January 1979, seven years later, the two countries established diplomatic relations and, at the same time, the United States severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

The procedure and content of the improvement of the Sino-American relations are very similar to those of the improvement of the relations between Korea and the United States. What corresponds to the five principles of peace is the three principles clarified in the joint statement of 1993 and the principles took a concrete shape in the Agreed Framework of 1994. The content is more complicated than that of the relations between China and the United States, because China was a big power possessed with nuclear weapons and ICBMs, whereas Korea is a small country who has not yet made clear whether she has possessed them. In other words, what China had to do was to wait for the United States to call her, waving a white flag, as Tokugawa Ieyasu said, "Wait until you are called." Nevertheless, Korea had to force an unwilling United States to open her mouth and cry by resorting to every wisdom and means.

It is obvious that Korea and the United States will conclude a peace treaty and establish diplomatic relations and the US troops in south Korea will withdraw; at this stage the two countries will reconcile with each other. Then, will south Korea sever diplomatic relations with the United States as Taiwan did? No, she will not.

The difference in national power (like territory, population, military strength and total economic strength) between China and Taiwan was beyond compare. And China insisted on reunification

through “one country and two systems”, whereas Taiwan advocated reunification through “one country and two governments”. Taiwan that had been trying to fix the division and take a path different from China’s could not tolerate the US support and recognition of China’s reunification policy. She had no choice but to break off her relations with the United States.

However, the difference in strength between the north and south of Korea is not as great as that between China and Taiwan. Though superficially, the south wishes for coexistence with the north. Kim Dae Jung is not opposed to the normalization of relations between the north and the United States. He even proclaimed that he would “put an end to the Cold-War structure in the Korean peninsula” during his tenure of office. When Korea and the United States establish diplomatic relations and the US troops get out of south Korea, it will entail a certain degree of shock and confusion in south Korea, but the inevitable current of history cannot be checked now.

The theory of cross recognition of north and south of Korea insisted by the United States, south Korea and Japan was realized only for one side, with south Korea establishing diplomatic relations with Russia and China after the Cold War. This destroyed political and military balance in the Korean peninsula and aggravated military tension. It follows that redressing this imbalance poses itself as the first and foremost task in settling the Korean issue.

And unlike the case of China and Taiwan, the question of reunification becomes a primary task in the Korean peninsula almost simultaneously with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the north and the United States; so, the south needs not sever her diplomatic relations with the United States thereupon. But it is doubtful whether the south Korean government, which has been ingrained with subordination to the United States and dependence on foreign forces, could preserve the political strength with which to realize reunification coping appropriately with the new era of reunification in which the spirit of national independence is the main thing.

The Realistic Mode of “One Country and Two Systems”

As preconditions for Korea's reunification have been provided, a question arises as to which mode would be most feasible. The modes under discussion at the moment are federation (one country and two systems) and union (one union and two independent governments).

At present different ideologies and systems exist in the north and south of Korea. Both of them are not willing to give them up unilaterally nor can they force them upon each other. At one point the theories of the "collapse of the north" and "unification through absorption" were in vogue, but they disappeared on their own accord as Kim Jong Il's government remained firm. It is unrealistic to wait for one side to collapse. To achieve complete reunification through "one country, one system and one government", the two sides must fight a war to decide who will conquer whom. In other words, peaceful reunification by this theory is not feasible.

There is no other way than to view the recognition of each other's ideology and system and their peaceful coexistence as reunification. How a reunified national state will be created afterwards cannot but be left with the coming generation.

According to the Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, dated January 1, 2000, Kim Dae Jung said, "What I have to do during my tenure of office is to put an end to the Cold War in the Korean peninsula and achieve peaceful coexistence and exchange between the south and the north. I leave reunification with the future successors."

At the first glance this looks similar to the theory of reunification advocated by the north. But it is fundamentally different from it as to which stage should be viewed as reunification. Kim Dae Jung, who has so far insisted on reunification through a moderate union of the south and the north, once advanced "three stages" initiative: the first stage is peaceful coexistence, with the present governments exercising the right of diplomacy and defence separately; the second stage is the establishment of a federal government that exercises the right of diplomacy and defence uniformly, while leaving the regional governments in the south and the north to deal with their respective internal affairs; and the third stage is achieving the complete reunification on the principle of "one nation, one state and one government".

The first stage is identical in nature with Taiwan's "theory of two

states”; and the third stage could be viewed as reunification. But viewed from this theory, it is not clear when reunification can be achieved. To conclude, it cannot be recognized that this theory aims at reunification.

Contrary to this, the mode of reunification through federation advanced by the north views the establishment of a federal state based on “one nation, one state, two systems and two governments” as reunification, the state being a neutral one. In other words, the realization of “one state, two systems and two governments” means reunification. This can be accomplished right now provided that the main factors of division have been cleared. This is the very reason why reunification through federation is reasonable and rational. This mode provides a concrete plan and hope for reunification to the Korean nation that have experienced sufferings and tragedy of division for more than half a century. Reunification is not an issue of the future, an issue to be left “with the future successors”; it is an issue that must be settled right now so that a reunified state could be handed over to the coming generations.

Here let us refer again to the example of China.

In December 1999 China restored Macao after the lapse of 442 years. With China’s restoration of Hong Kong and then Macao, the West’s colonial rule of Asia came to an end.

Like Hong Kong, Macao, on the principle of “one country and two systems”, will exercise a high degree of autonomy for 50 years except diplomacy and defence. The restoration of Hong Kong and Macao, ensurance of a high degree of autonomy and their sustained economic prosperity prove the validity of the Chinese style of “one country and two systems”. President Jiang Zemin of China said at the ceremony celebrating the restoration of Macao, “This proves a model for the final solution of the Taiwan problem.”

What is important here is the fact that the United States supports “one China”, the Chinese government’s policy of reunification through “one country and two systems”. Korea, too, welcomed the event, saying in her newspaper *Rodong Sinmun*, dated December 20, 1999, “The fact that Macao, following Hong Kong, has returned to China through the mode of ‘one country and two systems’ convincingly proves the validity and reasonableness of the proposal

for reunification through federation.” This is a sort of signal to the United States, demanding her support also for “one country and two systems” in the settlement of the Korean issue.

When the relations between the United States, the main factor of the continuing division, and Korea, the hard core of the reunification force, improve drastically, the feasibility of reunification through federation will become decisive. Having supported fully China’s principle of “one country and two systems”, the United States will have no reason to object the same principle of Korea, a country it has established diplomatic relations. If the United States refuses to do so, the relations between the two will go back to the starting point. In other words, the United States will have nothing to do other than supporting Korea’s reunification through federation.

“One country and two independent governments” advocated by the present south Korean authority cannot achieve the peaceful coexistence of the north and the south of Korea, only maintaining the present tension. Only “one country and two regional autonomous governments” that tolerate each other’s system can achieve peace and security on the Korean peninsula, as well as coexistence and coprosperity between the north and the south.

What needs attention here is that establishing national sovereignty in the south is a prerequisite for achieving reunification through federation. Unless the deeply-ingrained habit of depending on foreign forces is rooted out, federation cannot be achieved. If the favourable relations with the reunified Korea do not violate her national interests, the United States will not oppose a government of national independence being established in the south.

The possibility that the present regime would become such a government is not so high, but it depends on which attitude it takes. For example, a touchstone is whether it will take at an earlier date a political decision of repealing the “National Security Law”, which has been condemned at home and abroad, an obstacle to reunification.

Korea Clears Away One after Another the Obstacles Surrounding Reunification

Having set a milestone in her relations with the United States, the

main factor of national division, Korea set about clearing away the surrounding obstacles to reunification.

First, to make her victory in the diplomacy towards the United States as a decisive one, Korea continuously wages a fierce diplomatic war to bring it to completion.

When will Korea and the United States establish diplomatic relations? The important figure for foretelling it is 2003. On the assumption that "Korea will collapse," the United States signed the framework agreement, agreeing easily to supply LWRs to Korea until then. She apparently treated it lightly, thinking that it would not present a big trouble to promise for a thing of ten years later with a country that would "collapse" soon.

The LWR project of the KEDO has been delayed up until now, and it is totally impossible to hand over finished LWRs to Korea three years later, ie, in 2003. This is why the United States drew up the Perry Report in a hurry to revise her Korea policy, but it was too late. If she fails to keep promise by the year 2003, she must make compensation for it. If the Clinton Administration fails to do so, its successor must do it. Whether it is Republican or Democratic, it has a weak point from its first day of being obliged to pay the debt incurred by the failure to fulfil the agreement.

The compensation is nothing but the establishment of diplomatic relations with Korea and support for Korea's reunification through north-south federation. Economic aid is only a secondary issue. If the year 2003, the absolute condition, is assumed to be a prerequisite, diplomatic relations between the United States and Korea will be established before the year. In other words, the US delaying tactics have only three years to go.

Until then, Korea will gain what she aims at by conducting the negotiations with the United States in her favour and coordinate and perfect to the maximum the conditions for achieving reunification through federation.

Second, Korea promotes improvement of her relations with the West.

In the end of 1999 Korea reached an agreement with Japan to resume the talks for normalizing relations between the two countries. The improvement of her relations with Japan is presumed to be most

difficult and take time since it contains the issue of making reparation for the past.

The continuation of dialogue between Japan and Korea will be favourable for ensuring security in Northeast Asia and it will also be advantageous to Korea in clearing away the surrounding obstacles on the way for reunification. If Japan wishes for dialogue and friendship, Korea will not reject it, but welcome it.

On the other hand, Korea has intensified contact with the West, mainly with the EU member states, over the recent years. In the early 2000 she made public establishment of diplomatic relations with Italy. Italy is the first country among the G7 countries to establish diplomatic relations with Korea. The political influence this event exerts on the United States, south Korea and Japan is great. It shattered their propaganda that they “pursue security in Northeast Asia by drawing into the international community Korea that has been isolated internationally.”

Isn’t Korea trying to make loose their encirclement and further replace it with her own encirclement by improving her relations with the G7 countries? It is beyond doubt that her establishment of diplomatic relations with Italy will at least become a factor that accelerates the improvement of Korea-US relations.

In this way, Korea has established diplomatic relations with 135 countries, reducing the difference in number with south Korea that has diplomatic relations with 183 countries. She will possibly establish diplomatic relations with Australia and the Philippines in the near future. It is also said a delegation of the Foreign Ministry of France will be visiting Korea in February 2000.

There is a considerable degree of economic merits. Recently, Fiat made public that it will build in Korea a plant for assembling 10,000 cars a year and conduct production under license of low-priced station wagons. A joint project of an auto company of the south and a joint-venture company of the north with the total investment of 300 million dollars will start production in June 2001 and export the assembled cars to Russia and Southeast Asia. This shows that economic exchange starts smoothly soon after the establishment of diplomatic relations. The political and economic relations between Korea and the United States will follow the precedent.

Establishment of diplomatic relations with Italy that broke down a corner of the Group of 7 can be called an event, which shows a full picture of profit-orientated Kim Jong Il's diplomacy that tries to win economic and political gains and create conditions favourable for the country's reunification by breaking a new ground for cultivating relations with the West while maintaining friendly relations with the non-aligned countries.

Third, Korea revitalizes her economy.

Owing to various reasons, the socialist economy of Korea began to slacken from the mid-1990s. To make the matter worse, she has suffered a serious shortage of food. It is largely attributable to this situation that the United States, south Korea and Japan made a fuss about the "theory of north Korea's fall". However, braving through difficulties with a strong political cohesion and a persistent spiritual power, Korea began to rehabilitate her economy from around 1998.

Having advanced a plan for building a "powerful nation", General Secretary Kim Jong Il is channelling a greatest effort into the economy as well as to the military affairs. This is a strategy, a prerequisite for national reunification. The "reunification cost" once discussed in south Korea is nonsense in reunifying the country through federation. Still, Korea must consolidate her independent economy based on socialist system and restore its power in order to realize the principle of "one country and two systems". If the advantages of socialist economy are not demonstrated, it will be impossible to reunify the country through federation based on an equal footing with the south.

As seen above, Korea is trying to attain the main objective of national reunification at an earlier date by clearing away the surrounding obstacles one by one. Concrete successes are being achieved now and reunification has become quite feasible. Reunification of the country will soon be an order of the day. The Korean nation will put an end to national division without fail and live in the 21st century as a reunified nation.

APPENDIX

AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION,

NONAGGRESSION, AND COOPERATION AND EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH

(Agreed and signed in Seoul on December 13, 1991, by Premier Yon Hyong Muk, head of the north's delegation, and Prime Minister Jong Won Sik, head of the south's delegation)

Pursuant to the will of all the fellow countrymen desirous of the peaceful reunification of the divided country,

Reaffirming the three principles (independence, peace and great national unity) of national reunification laid down in the July 4 North-South Joint Statement,

Pledging themselves to remove the political and military confrontation for the achievement of national reconciliation, for the prevention of invasion and conflicts by the armed forces, for the realization of détente and for the guarantee of peace, to realize many-sided cooperation and exchange for the promotion of the common interests and prosperity of the nation, and to make concerted efforts to achieve peaceful reunification, admitting that the relationship between the sides is not the one between the countries but a special one formed temporarily in the process of advancing towards reunification, the north and the south have agreed as follows:

1. North-South Reconciliation

Article 1. The north and the south shall recognize and respect the system that exists on the other side.

Article 2. The north and the south shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the other side.

Article 3. The north and the south shall cease to abuse and slander the other side.

Article 4. The north and the south shall refrain from all acts aimed at destroying and overthrowing the other side.

Article 5. The north and the south shall make concerted efforts to convert the present armistice into a lasting peace between the north and the south and to observe the present Military Armistice Agreement until such peace has been achieved.

Article 6. The north and the south shall discontinue confrontation and competition, cooperate with each other and make concerted efforts for national dignity and interests in the international arena.

Article 7. The north and the south shall set up and operate a north-south liaison office at Panmunjom within 3 months after the effectuation of this agreement in order to ensure close contacts and promote consultation with each other.

Article 8. The north and the south shall form a north-south political subcommittee within the framework of the full-dress talks in one month after the effectuation of this agreement in order to discuss concrete measures for implementing and observing the agreement on north-south reconciliation.

2. North-South Nonaggression

Article 9. The north and the south shall not use arms against the other side, nor shall they invade the other by force of arms.

Article 10. The north and the south shall settle differences and disputes between them peacefully through dialogue and negotiation.

Article 11. The north and the south shall designate as the demarcation line and zone of nonaggression the Military Demarcation Line which was laid down in the Agreement on the Military Armistice dated July 27, 1953 and the area which has so far been within the jurisdiction of the sides.

Article 12. In order to implement and guarantee nonaggression the north and the south shall set up and operate a north-south joint military committee within three months after the effectuation of this agreement.

The north-south joint military committee shall discuss and promote the realization of military confidence-building and disarmament, such as notification of and control over the transfer of large units and military exercises, use of the Demilitarized Zone for peaceful purposes, exchange of military personnel and information, the realization of phased arms cutdown including the removal of mass destruction weapons and offensive capability and their verification.

Article 13. The north and the south shall install and operate direct telephone links between the military authorities of the sides in order to

prevent the outbreak and escalation of accidental armed conflicts.

Article 14. The north and the south shall form a north-south military subcommittee within the framework of the full-dress talks in one month after the effectuation of this agreement and discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement on nonaggression and the removal of military confrontation.

3.North-South Cooperation and Exchange

Article 15. The north and the south shall effect economic cooperation and exchange, such as joint development of resources and the exchange of goods in the form of exchange within the nation and joint investment for the coordinated and balanced development of the national economy and for the promotion of the well-being of the whole nation.

Article 16. The north and the south shall effect cooperation and exchange in various fields, such as science, technology, education, literature and art, public health, sports, environment and mass media including newspapers, radio, TV and publications.

Article 17. The north and the south shall effect free travels and contacts between the members of the nation.

Article 18. The north and the south shall effect free correspondence, travels, meetings and visits between the separated families and relatives and their reunion based on their free will and take measures regarding other problems awaiting humanitarian solution.

Article 19. The north and the south shall connect severed railways and roads and open sea and air routes.

Article 20. The north and the south shall install and connect the facilities necessary for the exchange of post and telecommunication and ensure secrecy in this sphere of exchange.

Article 21. The north and the south shall cooperate with each other in economic, cultural and many other fields in the international arena and jointly conduct external activities.

Article 22. For the implementation of the agreement on effecting cooperation and exchange in various fields, such as the economy and

culture, the north and the south shall form a north-south joint economic cooperation and exchange committee and other departmental joint committees within three months after the effectuation of this agreement.

Article 23. In order to discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement on cooperation and exchange between the north and the south, the two parts shall establish a north-south cooperation and exchange subcommittee within the framework of the full-dress talks in one month after the effectuation of the agreement.

4. Amendments and Effectuation

Article 24. This agreement can be amended and supplemented by mutual consent.

Article 25. This agreement shall become effective as from the date when the north and the south exchange its text after they go through necessary formalities.

December 13, 1991

JOINT DECLARATION ON DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA

(Adopted and signed in Panmunjom on January 20, 1992, by the signers of the above agreement)

With a view to denuclearizing the Korean peninsula and thus removing the danger of nuclear war, creating conditions and environment favourable for peace and peaceful reunification of our country and contributing to peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world, the north and the south declare as follows:

1. The north and the south shall refrain from the testing, manufacture, production, acceptance, possession, stockpiling,

deployment and use of nuclear weapons.

2. The north and the south shall use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes.

3. The north and the south shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.

4. The north and the south shall make an inspection of facilities chosen by the other side and agreed upon between the sides through procedures and methods defined by the north-south joint committee of nuclear control in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

5. The north and the south shall form and operate the north-south joint committee of nuclear control within one month after the publication of this joint declaration in order to implement it.

6. This joint declaration shall take effect from the day of exchange of its texts between the north and the south through procedures necessary for their effectuation.

January 20, 1992

JOINT STATEMENT OF THE DPRK AND THE UNITED STATES

(Adopted at the first round of talks held in New York on June 11, 1993)

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America held government-level talks in New York from the 2nd through the 11th of June, 1993. Present at the talks were a delegation of the DPRK headed by First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju and a delegation of the United States led by Assistant Secretary of State Robert L. Gallucci, both representing their respective governments.

At the talks, the two sides discussed policy matters with a view to a fundamental solution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. Both sides expressed support for the North-South Joint Declaration on

the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the interest of nuclear non-proliferation goals.

The DPRK and the United States have agreed to principles of:

-Assurances against the threat and the use of force, including nuclear weapons;

-Peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, including impartial application of full scope safeguards, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs; and

-Support for the peaceful reunification of Korea.

In this context, the two governments have agreed to continue dialogue on an equal and unprejudiced basis. In this respect, the government of the DPRK has decided unilaterally to suspend as long as it considers necessary the effectuation of its withdrawal from the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

June 11, 1993, New York

PRESS STATEMENT ON THE DPRK-US TALKS

(Agreed at the second round of talks in Geneva and agreed to publish respectively on July 19, 1993)

The delegation of the DPRK and the United States met from July 14 to 19, 1993 in Geneva for the second round of talks on resolving the nuclear issue.

Both sides reaffirmed the principles of the June 11, 1993 joint DPRK-US statement.

For its part, the United States specifically reaffirmed its commitment to the principles on assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons.

Both sides recognize the desirability of the DPRK's intention to replace the current graphite moderated reactors and associated nuclear facilities with light-water moderated nuclear reactors. As part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue and on the premise that a solution

related to the provision of light-water moderated reactors (LWRs) is achievable, the United States is prepared to support the introduction of LWRs and explore with the DPRK ways in which LWRs could be obtained.

Both sides agreed that a full and impartial application of IAEA safeguards is essential to accomplish a strong international nuclear non-proliferation regime. On this basis, the DPRK is prepared to begin consultations with the IAEA on outstanding safeguards and other issues as soon as possible.

The DPRK and the United States also reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK reaffirmed that it remains prepared to begin the north-south talks as soon as possible on bilateral issues including the nuclear issue.

The DPRK and the United States have agreed to meet again in the next two months to discuss outstanding matters related to resolving the nuclear issue, including technical questions related to the introduction of LWRs, and to lay the basis for improving overall relations between the DPRK and the United States.

July 19, 1993, Geneva

AGREED STATEMENT BETWEEN THE DPRK AND THE UNITED STATES

(Published after the first-day session of the third round of talks in Geneva on August 12, 1994)

The delegations of the DPRK and the United States met in Geneva from August 5 to 12, 1994, to resume the third round of talks.

Both sides reaffirmed the principles of the June 11, 1993, DPRK-US joint statement and reached agreement that the following elements should be part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue:

1. The DPRK is prepared to replace its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants, and the United States is prepared to make arrangements for the

provision of LWRs of approximately 2,000 MW(e) to the DPRK as early as possible and to make arrangements for interim energy alternatives to the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors. Upon receipt of US assurances for the provision of LWRs and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze construction of the 50 MW (e) and 200 MW (e) reactors, forgo reprocessing, and seal the Radiochemical Laboratory, to be monitored by the IAEA.

2. The DPRK and the United States are prepared to establish diplomatic representation in each other's capitals and to reduce barriers to trade and investment, as a move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

3. To help achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, the United States is prepared to provide the DPRK with assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States, and the DPRK remains prepared to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

4. The DPRK is prepared to remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.

Important issues raised during the talks remain to be resolved. Both sides agree that expert-level discussions are necessary to advance the replacement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated program with LWR technology, the safe storage and disposition of the spent fuel, provision of alternative energy, and the establishment of liaison offices. Accordingly, expert-level talks will be held in the DPRK and the United States or elsewhere as agreed. The DPRK and the United States agreed to recess their talks and resume in Geneva on September 23, 1994.

In the meantime, the United States will pursue arrangements necessary to provide assurances for the LWR project to the DPRK as part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue, and the DPRK will observe the freeze on nuclear activities and maintain the continuity of safeguards, as agreed in the June 20-22, 1994, exchange of messages between First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju and Assistant Secretary of State Robert L. Gallucci.

August 12, 1994, Geneva

AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(Published as the final agreement of the third round of talks in Geneva on October 21, 1994)

Delegations of the governments of the DPRK and the United States of America held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement between the DPRK and the United States and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the DPRK and the United States to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The DPRK and the United States decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:

V. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the US President, the United States will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW (e) by a target date of 2003.

-The United States will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The United States, representing the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.

-The United States, representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this document.

-As necessary, the DPRK and the United States will conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the US President, the United States, representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy forgone due to the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.

-Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.

-Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries.

3) Upon receipt of US assurances for the provision of LWRs and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities.

-The freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this document. During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.

-Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.

-The DPRK and the United States will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW (e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.

4) As soon as possible after the date of this document, DPRK and US experts will hold two sets of experts talks.

-At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project.

-At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements

for the spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.

VI. The two sides will move towards full normalization of political and economic relations.

1) Within three months of the date of this document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.

2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert-level discussions.

3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the DPRK and the United States will upgrade bilateral relations to the ambassadorial level.

VII. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

1) The United States will provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States.

2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

3) The DPRK will engage in north-south dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.

VIII. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.

2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze.

3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed

necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.

Kang Sok Ju,
Head of the DPRK delegation,
First Vice-Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the DPRK

Robert L. Gallucci,
Head of the US delegation,
Ambassador-at-Large of the
USA

October 21, 1994, Geneva

DPRK-US JOINT PRESS STATEMENT

(Issued in Kuala Lumpur on June 13, 1995, and served as the basis of the LWR supply agreement reached between the DPRK and the KEDO on December 15 of the same year)

The delegations of the DPRK and the United States held talks in Kuala Lumpur from May 19 to June 12, 1995, with respect to implementation of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994.

Both sides reaffirmed their political commitments to implement the DPRK-US Agreed Framework, and with particular regard to facilitating the light-water reactor (LWR) project as called for in the Agreed Framework, decided as follows:

I

The United States reaffirms that the letter of assurance from the US President dated October 20, 1994 concerning the provision of the LWR project and interim energy alternatives continues in effect.

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), under US leadership, will finance and supply the LWR project in the DPRK as called for in the Agreed Framework. As specified in the Agreed Framework, the United States will serve as the principal point

of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project. In this regard, US citizens will lead delegations and teams of KEDO as required to fulfill this role.

II

The LWR project will consist of two pressurized light-water reactors with two coolant loops and a generating capacity of approximately 1,000 MW (e) each. The reactor model, selected by KEDO, will be the advanced version of US origin design and technology currently under production.

III

The Commission for External Economic Relations representing the DPRK Government and KEDO will conclude a supply agreement at the earliest possible date for the provision of the LWR project on a turnkey basis. On the basis of this statement the DPRK will meet with KEDO as soon as possible to negotiate the outstanding issues of the LWR supply agreement.

KEDO will conduct a site survey to identify the requirements for construction and operation of the LWR project. The costs of this site survey and site preparation will be included in the scope of supply for the project.

KEDO will select a prime contractor to carry out the project. A US firm will serve as program coordinator to assist KEDO in supervising overall implementation of the LWR project; KEDO will select the program coordinator. A DPRK firm will enter into implementing arrangements as necessary to facilitate the LWR project.

IV

In addition to the LWR project, the two sides decided to take the following steps towards implementation of the Agreed Framework.

Experts from the two sides will meet in the DPRK as soon as possible in June to agree on a schedule and cooperative measures for phased delivery of heavy fuel oil in accordance with the Agreed

Framework. KEDO will begin immediately to make arrangements for an initial delivery of heavy fuel oil, subject to conclusion of the above agreement.

The DPRK-US Record of Meeting of January 20, 1995, on safe storage of spent fuel will be expeditiously implemented. In this regard, a US team of experts will visit the DPRK as soon as possible in June to begin implementation.

June 13, 1995, Kuala Lumpur

EDITOR'S COMMENT

The writer supplemented the preface for the translated version of the book and Part IV in February 2000, and it took several months to translate it in several languages.

The months was a witness to the fact that the development course of the situation he had drawn in the book was correct. Typical examples are the meeting and talks the heads of the north and the south held in Pyongyang, the first of its kind in over-half-a-century-long national division, and the signing of the North-South Joint Declaration by them.

Leaving the readers to analyze and judge these developments, the editorial board reproduces the full text of the North-South Joint Declaration for the readers' reference.

NORTH-SOUTH JOINT DECLARATION

True to the noble will of all the fellow countrymen for the peaceful reunification of the country, Chairman Kim Jong Il of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea had a historic meeting and summit talks in Pyongyang from June 13 to 15, 2000.

The heads of the north and the south, considering that the current meeting and summit talks, the first of its kind since the division of the country, are events of great importance in promoting mutual understanding, developing inter-Korean relations and achieving

peaceful reunification, declare as follows:

1. The north and the south agreed to solve the question of the country's reunification independently by the concerted efforts of the Korean nation responsible for it.
2. The north and the south, recognizing that the low-level federation proposed by the north and the commonwealth system proposed by the south for the reunification of the country have similarity, agreed to work together for the reunification in this direction in the future.
3. The north and the south agreed to settle humanitarian issues as early as possible, including the exchange of visiting groups of separated families and relatives and the issue of unconverted long-term prisoners, to mark August 15 this year.
4. The north and the south agreed to promote the balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and build mutual confidence by activating cooperation and exchange in all fields—social, cultural, sports, public health, environmental and so on.
5. The north and the south agreed to hold an authority-to-authority negotiation as soon as possible to put the above-mentioned agreed points into speedy operation.

President Kim Dae Jung invited Chairman Kim Jong Il of the DPRK National Defence Commission to visit Seoul and Chairman Kim Jong Il agreed to do so at an appropriate time.

June 15, 2000

Kim Jong Il,
Chairman of the DPRK
National Defence Commission

Kim Dae Jung
President of the Republic of
Korea